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edge for future research.
This report summarises the state 
of relevant science from a Europe-
an perspective. We consider it as 
the start of a continuing process, 
the beginning of a wider, worldwide 
partnership to summarise knowl-
edge globally, and make it available 
to the disaster risk management 
community.
The report is timely for the discus-
sions at the Global Platform for 
Disaster Risk Reduction in Mexico 
in May 2017. It caters for the need 
to translate the wealth of available 
science into language understanda-
ble by stakeholders such as policy 
makers, practitioners and scientists 
from other disciplines. 
We invite you to engage with us, 
now and in the future, to enhance 
the science-policy interface so that 
strategies for disaster risk reduction 
at national and local level, which 
will be put in place by the Sendai 
Framework deadline of 2020, are 
based on sound evidence and ro-
bust science.
FOREWORD
Dear 
policymakers, 
practitioners 
or scientists,
It is deeply encouraging to see how 
quickly the scientific community has 
mobilized to play its full part in im-
plementation of the Sendai Frame-
work for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030 with the overall aim 
of reducing disaster risks and loss-
es, and shifting the emphasis from 
managing disasters to managing 
the underlying risks. 
The Sendai Framework clearly rec-
ognises the strong role that the 
scientific community can play in 
improved understanding of risk and 
communicating on new knowledge 
and innovation. The European Com-
mission took the initiative early by 
launching the Disaster Risk Manage-
ment Knowledge Centre in Septem-
ber 2015, just six months after the 
adoption of the Sendai Framework 
as a contribution to the Science and 
Technology Roadmap. Now we have 
this insightful publication as the 
first fruit of its labours.
The UN Office for Disaster Risk Re-
duction (UNISDR) and European 
Commission, Joint Research Centre 
(JRC) have been partners to stimu-
late new research and to encourage 
the use of available science by all 
stakeholders. 
JRC was one of the co-organisers of 
the UNISDR Science and Technology 
Conference in January 2016, which 
produced an ambitious Science and 
Technology Roadmap and launched 
the Science and Technology Part-
nership. 
The JRC has worked with over 200 
top scientists, practitioners and poli-
cy makers from many fields to sum-
marise the state of the science rel-
evant to disaster risk management, 
and to make it accessible in this 
current report. The aim is to break 
out of the silos, demystify work from 
other disciplines, encourage poten-
tial synergies across disciplines, and 
to identify gaps in scientific knowl-
Robert Glasser, 
United Nations Special Representative 
of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction
Vladimir Šucha, 
Director General,
European Commission, Joint Research Centre
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EXPECTATIONS
This report aims to provide reviews 
of scientific solutions and their prac-
tical use in various areas of DRM in 
Europe. It is comprehensive in scope 
but selective in topic and is written 
in a format that is intended to be 
accessible to all DRM actors. The 
reviews of the scientific evidence 
base are summaries of (1) recent 
advances/outcomes of EU research 
projects, (2) relevant national work 
and (3) relevant international work.
The report aims to bridge science 
and policy as well as operation 
communities. The intended audi-
ence consists of practitioners and 
policy makers in addition to experts 
from different scientific disciplines. 
It seeks to understand the scientific 
issues of relevance to their work; 
specifically civil protection opera-
tions and disaster risk policy, but 
equally climate adaptation policy. 
The audience includes government 
officials at EU, national, regional 
and local levels interested in finding 
better ways to use science, and also 
scientists to help them understand 
work in other disciplines that would 
allow the identification of possible 
cross-sectoral synergies and needs 
from practitioners.
THE PROCESS
The Disaster Risk Management 
Knowledge Centre has committed 
to producing a series of reports to 
analyse, update the state of the art 
and identify research and innova-
tion gaps in the field of DRM. Each 
report will be multi-hazard, multi-
disciplinary, and will address the 
full disaster risk cycle; it will have 
scientific-oriented contributions 
presenting the state of science, and 
practitioner-oriented contributions 
presenting the use of science. 
The process started in January 
2016, when the DRMKC working 
group defined expectations and de-
veloped the outline of this report, 
the first in the series. The process 
was run by the JRC Editorial Board 
of 4 members with strong support 
from the European Commission Ad-
visory group of 79 experts in spe-
cific topics. The writing phase was 
carried out by Author teams consist-
ing in total of 8 Coordinating Lead 
Authors, 3 Facilitators, 34 Lead Au-
thors and 140 Contributing Authors. 
The drafts were circulated for for-
mal review to 123 scientific experts, 
policymakers and practitioners. The 
preparation of the report succeed-
ed in pulling together a network of 
273 contributors from 26 mostly 
European countries and 172 organ-
izations. It has been endorsed by 
11 European Commission Services 
and will be officially released at the 
Global Platform for Disaster Risk 
Reduction in May 2017.
STRUCTURE
Understanding disaster risk to man-
age it is one of the main focus of 
Sendai Framework. This perspec-
tive already opens two big issues: 
understanding disaster risk with 
the focus on scientific evidence, and 
managing disaster risk with the fo-
cus on knowledge applied by differ-
ent actors. In order to convey the 
DRMKC’s mission of bridging science 
and the policy/operation community, 
the issue of communicating disas-
ter risk has been introduced with a 
The Disaster Risk 
Management Knowledge 
Centre has produced this 
flagship science report as a 
contribution to the Science 
and Technology Roadmap 
of the Sendai Framework for 
Disaster Risk Reduction.
This report is the result 
of the multi-sectorial and 
multi-disciplinary networking 
process and represents the 
combined effort of more 
than two hundred experts. 
It will support the integration 
of science into informed 
decision making through 
synthesizing and translating 
evidence for disaster 
risk management and 
strengthening the science-
policy and science-operation 
interface.
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strong focus on how to successfully 
overcome barriers to implementing 
knowledge in the field of DRM.
The scope of the report is divided 
conceptually into three distinct 
parts: understanding disaster risk, 
communicating disaster risk and 
managing disaster risk, forming the 
“bridge concept” of the report. 
The “Understanding disaster risk” 
part has been split into two chapters: 
Chapter 2, covering risk assessment 
methodology and examples in gen-
eral, and Chapter 3 that provides a 
comprehensive overview of hazard 
related risk issues, the structure of 
which follows the Sendai taxonomy 
of hazard classification. Chapter 4 
on “Communicating disaster risk” 
tackles many issues on communi-
cation in different phases of DRM 
among different actors. Chapter 5 
“Managing disaster risk” addresses 
the governance issues of the full 
disaster risk cycle.
The first and last chapter wrap the 
scope of the report into a whole. 
Chapter 1 “Current status of disaster 
risk management and policy frame-
work” aims to explain why recent 
global and European initiatives are 
beginning to seek help to strengthen 
society’s resilience by using science 
and technology. The final Chapter 6 
“Future challenges of disaster risk 
management” aims to inform de-
cision makers and practitioners of 
existing science that should find its 
way into legislative form and prac-
tice as well as tackling a much more 
challenging purpose: to recognise 
knowledge gaps that could serve as 
valuable reference based input for a 
Horizon2020 call.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We wish to express special thanks 
to all the Coordinating Lead Authors, 
Lead Authors, Contributing Authors, 
Reviewers and EC Advisors. Without 
their expertise, experiences and a 
huge commitment to a cause, this 
report with such a holistic under-
standing of both disaster risk and 
disaster risk management could 
never have been completed.
It is our pleasure to invite you to ex-
plore the content of this report and 
we wish you pleasant and informa-
tive reading.
JRC EDITORIAL BOARD
Karmen Poljanšek
Montserrat Marín Ferrer
Tom De Groeve
Ian Clark
The "Bridge concept"
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Un
de
rst
an
din
g d
isas
ter r
isk    Com
municating disaster risk     Managing disaster risk  
10
Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre
DRM policies, as well as timely and reli-
able scientific-based analyses for emer-
gency preparedness and coordinated 
response activities. It brings together 
existing initiatives in which science and 
innovative practices contribute to the 
management of disaster risks.
At a global level, the EU supports the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Re-
duction to promote a more systematic 
and reinforced science-policy interface 
to strengthen the contribution of DRM 
to smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth globally. 
Enhancing the 
Knowledge base to 
support Disaster 
Risk Management 
Faced with the risk of increasingly se-
vere and frequent natural and man-
made disasters, policy-makers and risk 
managers in Disaster Risk Management 
(DRM) and across EU policies increas-
ingly rely on the wealth of existing 
knowledge and evidence at all levels 
– local, national, European and global 
– and at all stages of the DRM cycle – 
prevention; reduction; preparedness; re-
sponse and recovery. 
Better knowledge, stronger evidence 
and a greater focus on transformative 
processes and innovation are essential 
to improve our understanding of disas-
ter risk, to build resilience and risk-in-
formed approaches to policy-making, 
and contribute to smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth. 
The Disaster Risk Management Knowl-
edge Centre (DRMKC) provides a net-
worked approach to the science-policy 
interface in DRM, across the Commis-
sion, EU Member States and the DRM 
community within and beyond the EU. 
This Commission initiative builds on 
three main pillars:
Partnerships and networks to improve 
science-based services;
Better use and uptake of research and 
operational knowledge;
Innovative tools and practices for risk 
and crisis management;
Activities of the DRMKC support the 
translation of complex scientific data 
and analyses into usable information 
and provides science-based advice for 
3
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In practice:
Partnership
To achieve the ambitious goal of fully 
exploiting and translating complex sci-
ence into useful policy and applications 
in DRM, the DRMKC reinforces the devel-
opment of disaster science partnerships 
and networks. 
•	 Where	 knowledge	 begins: Net-
works and activities are activated 
and promoted to improve the sci-
ence-policy interface in prevention 
activities and to facilitate the trans-
lation of complex science into useful 
policy advice.  
•	 Where	 knowledge	 applies: Part-
nerships for operational prepared-
ness and response to major natural 
disaster types in the EU are promoted 
to facilitate the information flow be-
tween the different partnerships, the 
Emergency Response Coordination 
Centre (ERCC) and Member States. 
Knowledge
Scientific research results and opera-
tional knowledge gained from lessons 
learnt, exercises, training, peer reviews 
and other assessment tools need to 
be better exploited in the DRM cycle to 
mitigate risks and vulnerabilities and to 
improve response when disaster strikes.
•	 Where	 knowledge	meets: A com-
mon repository of relevant research 
and operational projects and results 
will be accessible through the DRMKC 
and its Web-platform. 
•	 Where	needs	are	identified: A sci-
ence advisory panel of experts and 
scientists at local, national and Eu-
ropean levels provides analyses, up-
dates and advice into research and 
innovation needs in DRM. 
Innovation
Industry and the scientific community 
play an essential role in developing in-
novative methods, tools and technolog-
ical solutions for the mitigation of dis-
asters and their impacts. They facilitate 
the work of first responders and other 
operational actors in crisis management 
through innovative technologies and in-
struments.
•	 Where	 gaps	 are	 filled: A Support 
System facilitates the use of exist-
ing expertise to help Member States 
meet risk management related obli-
gations – DRM Capabilities Assess-
ment, Disaster Loss Databases, Sci-
ence-policy interfaces, National Risk 
Assessment.
•	 Where	 innovation	 is	 tested: The 
DMKC assesses the current state of 
DRM science and technology in Eu-
rope and addresses technological 
and operational challenges to cov-
er the existing gaps, and assists in 
building globally common standards, 
through the European Network for 
Innovation Test Beds (ENITB) and the 
European Crisis Management Labo-
ratory (ECML). 
The DRMKC is supported and coordinat-
ed by a number of Commission Servic-
es in partnership with a key network of 
Member States. A Steering Committee 
meets regularly to propose, discuss and 
establish the activities and priorities of 
the knowledge centre. 
The DRMKC web-platform facilitates in-
formation and knowledge sharing, while 
enhancing the connection between sci-
ence, operational activities and policy: 
http://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/
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SHORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
risk assessment respectively from a 
multi-hazard and hazard specific per-
spective. Chapter 5 discusses science 
for managing disaster risk, and Chap-
ter 4 bridges science and practice by 
focusing on communication of risk. Fi-
nally, Chapter 6 summarises challenges 
brought forward by all authors.
Current status of disaster risk 
management and policy 
frameworks
A main challenge for policymakers ad-
dressing natural and human-induced 
disaster risk management, across all EU 
policies, is to capitalise on the wealth of 
existing knowledge at all levels — local, 
national, European and global. In order 
to improve all stages of the disaster 
risk management cycle — prevention 
and mitigation, preparedness, response 
and recovery —, the knowledge and 
evidence base needs to be further im-
proved, advances in relevant technology 
exploited, research results applied and 
the interaction between researchers 
and end users enhanced. Understanding 
the state of play of policy frameworks 
relevant to disaster risk management 
will help strengthen the interface be-
tween science and policy required to re-
duce the risk of disasters and enhance 
our prevention and mitigation, prepar-
edness, response and recovery.
Understanding disaster risk: risk 
assessment methodologies and 
examples
Risk is complex. There have been huge 
advances in recent years in all of the 
key areas of risk: hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability. The science base in Europe 
is a rich source of information and data. 
Initially there was often a culture clash 
between the needs of industry for prac-
tical useable information within tight 
timetables, perhaps just representing 
what is known, compared to academia’s 
focus on research and discovery with 
necessarily longer time horizons. With 
greater exposure and encouragement, 
including EU research grants promoting 
partnerships between the public and 
private sectors and academia, scientists 
and practitioners are now more attuned 
to working closely with each other. Sim-
ilarly, methodologies have now been 
developed to categorise risk, model risk 
and present the results of risk assess-
ments and analysis in forms that ena-
ble decision makers not only to decide 
the right course of action but also to 
provide transparency around the deci-
sion-making process.
The process of risk understanding is 
not simple and data are always partial 
and flawed. Initial models and analysis 
may be viewed as simplistic, particu-
larly in retrospect. The discrepancies in 
data quality are sometimes asserted an 
excuse to delay risk analysis and mod-
elling, but it is infinitely better to em-
bark on a risk assessment and analysis 
process from the outset than wait un-
til better data become available. A “1 
in 100 event” could happen tomorrow, 
it is better to have tried, and commit 
resources to develop a greater under-
standing of the risks as far as possible 
now (and so identify key weaknesses 
and data gaps) than postpone action 
until better data are collected. 
Risk assessments and risk models can-
not make decisions but they can inform 
policy. Policymakers may reject the ad-
vice of a risk model but if they do so, 
they should be able to articulate why. In 
practice no model includes all factors; 
decisions based upon broader consider-
ations are often valid. But there is no 
Knowing better and losing less
Natural and human-induced disasters 
present major risks to the economy, the 
security and well-being of citizens and 
society. Addressing these risks relies on 
robust evidence-based decision-mak-
ing. A main challenge for policy-makers 
and practitioners addressing natural 
and human-induced disaster risk man-
agement, across all policies and sectors, 
is to capitalise on the wealth of existing 
knowledge at all levels – local, national, 
European and global.
Science and technology play a central 
role in many EU policies and interna-
tional agreements addressing disaster 
risk management. Ensuring efficient 
disaster risk reduction and prevention 
measures relies on a robust under-
standing and assessment of risks. 
The UN Sendai Framework for Disas-
ter Risk Reduction calls for a strong in-
terface between science and policy to 
build a strong knowledge of disaster 
risk; make efficient use of data to bet-
ter understand the economic impacts 
of disasters; and develop adequate 
preventive policies to reduce the risks 
of disasters. Science and innovation 
equally contribute to several Sustain-
able Development Goals and their as-
sociated targets. In the context of the 
Paris Agreement on climate change, 
the importance of data collection, evi-
dence-based approaches and the con-
tribution of science was recognised.
This report presents a synthesis of sci-
entific knowledge in the field of disas-
ter risk reduction. It draws from many 
scientific disciplines, practitioner com-
munities and policy experts. It is organ-
ised in 6 parts. Chapter 1 summarises 
the policy landscape. Chapters 2 and 
3 present the available knowledge on 
13
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doubt that encouraging and developing 
a culture of risk identification, risk un-
derstanding, risk assessment and risk 
modelling ultimately benefits society, 
making it more resilient and saving 
lives, livelihoods and property.
Understanding disaster risk: 
hazard related risk issues
Today monitoring of geophysical phe-
nomena is performed with well-devel-
oped instrumental recording networks 
extended at global, regional, national 
and local levels. However, since large 
geophysical events tend to occur in-
frequently and may appear benign for 
generations, the risks may be underes-
timated. The assessment of risks posed 
by earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and 
tsunamis first requires a good knowl-
edge of the type, magnitude and fre-
quency of past events. The preparation 
of hazard maps is a good practice not 
only for decision makers but also for 
citizens who would like to know where 
the hazardous areas are situated and 
what types of hazards threaten their 
community.
There is important room for further im-
provement of monitoring systems and 
their geographic expansion in less well 
covered areas. If appropriate monitor-
ing is in place, it may be possible to is-
sue early warnings for different hazards 
and to provide short term forecasts of 
likely future activity. The assessment of 
event scenarios can play a critical role 
in the development of risk manage-
ment and risk reduction measures, such 
as elaboration of emergency plans, de-
velopment of infrastructure to support 
the affected regions, or risk awareness 
campaigns. 
Developing adequate hydrological risk 
maps is key for the short term (emer-
gency response) as well as the long 
term planning (urban and rural devel-
opment) to increase society’s resilience 
to those risks. Fully comprehensive 
hydrological risk maps require a great 
deal of data including long time series 
of events, and/or a chain of models and 
assessments that reflect our level of 
understanding of the complex physi-
cal processes controlling hydrological 
events.
Different types of floods are predictable 
with different time ranges. Flash floods 
driven by convective rainfall are noto-
riously challenging to predict ahead in 
time to produce effective early warn-
ings, whereas slower developing floods 
in large catchments can be predicted 
several days ahead with the use of 
probabilistic flood forecasting systems. 
Landslides mapping is a challenge due 
to the extraordinary breadth of the 
spectrum of landslide phenomena. No 
single method exists to identify and 
map landslides and to ascertain land-
slide susceptibility and hazard. 
The majority of recent scientific studies 
indicate that hydrological risks will in-
crease overall even for warming levels 
of 1.5°C. It is estimated that about 70% 
of the global coastlines are projected 
to experience a sea-level change with-
in 20% of the global mean sea-level 
change.
Meteorological risks include hazards 
from different types of storm systems 
as well as extremes of temperature, cli-
matological risks include droughts and 
wildfires and biological risks include 
epidemics and pandemics. In order to 
mitigate the effects of these hazards, 
an understanding of their origin, behav-
iour and evolution is critical. Building 
knowledge about human vulnerability 
to the various hazards is required, and 
region-specific hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability need to be analysed for 
different sectors.
Forecasting the onset or likely evolution 
of hazards is becoming more accurate 
through the use of new technologies; 
however there remains a degree of un-
certainty which can be problematic for 
decision-makers as it can be difficult 
to strike the right balance between the 
risk of missing the opportunity for ear-
ly warning and the risk of raising too 
many false alarms. Improvements in 
forecasting will be driven by the inter-
action and partnerships forged between 
different fields.
Disaster risk reduction frameworks 
have not commonly addressed tech-
nological risks. The Sendai Framework 
for Action recognises the importance of 
technological hazards and promotes an 
all-hazards approach to disaster risk re-
duction. This includes hazardous situa-
tions arising from man-made activities 
due to human error, mechanical failure, 
and natural hazards. 
Chemical accidents continue to occur 
relatively frequently in industrialized 
and developing countries alike, which 
raises questions as to the adequacy 
of current risk-reduction efforts. The 
causes underlying chemical accidents 
in current times are largely assumed 
to be systemic. Most chemical acci-
dents today are caused by violations 
of well-known principles for chemicals 
risk management which has led to in-
sufficient control measures. Natech ac-
cidents are a technological “secondary 
effect” of natural hazards and have 
caused many major and long-term 
social, environmental and economic 
impacts. Studies on the status of Na-
tech risk management in the EU and 
14
cluding policy makers, practitioners and 
citizens.
Managing disaster risk
The disaster management cycle com-
monly includes four types of meas-
ures needed to manage disasters: pre-
vention/mitigation and preparedness 
(before a disaster), and response and 
recovery (after disaster). Holistic under-
standing of disaster risk management 
focuses on all four phases of the dis-
aster cycle.
Based on an analysis of the benefits 
arising from avoided losses, mitigation 
and prevention measures are widely 
considered more cost-effective than ex-
post disaster interventions. An increase 
in mitigation investment has occurred 
in some European countries, but the 
lack of public and therefore political in-
terest in prevention and mitigation re-
mains a problem.
In disaster preparedness and response 
planning there is a trend towards great-
er professionalization of emergency 
management across all Europe sup-
ported by evolution of legislative and 
regulatory frameworks. A comprehen-
sive strategy for disaster financing can 
moderate the impacts of natural haz-
ard risks, speed up recovery and recon-
struction, and harness knowledge and 
incentives for risk reduction. The private 
financial sector plays an important role, 
along with governments and civil socie-
ty organizations, in designing innovative 
financial protection goals and sharing 
knowledge and capacity. 
Public-private partnerships are a mod-
el for a joint bearing of responsibili-
ties and efficient risk-sharing, capable 
of increasing insurance coverage and 
penetration, and guaranteeing a strong 
financial backing in view of uncertain 
probabilities of risk.
Future challenges of disaster risk 
management
Drawing from the analysis in each 
chapter, the report concludes with a 
summary of challenges for knowledge, 
partnerships and innovation addressed 
to the three reader communities: scien-
tists, policymakers and practitioners.
the OECD have highlighted deficiencies 
in existing safety legislation and the 
need to consider this risk more explic-
itly. Conventional technological risk-as-
sessment methodologies need to be 
expanded to be applicable to Natech 
risk assessment and only a very few 
methodologies and tools are available 
for this purpose. 
Communicating disaster risk
Disaster risk communication is a grow-
ing field in disaster science, and highly 
relevant for policy makers, practitioners 
and citizens. It aims to prevent and mit-
igate harm, prepare populations of vul-
nerable areas before a disaster strikes; 
and to validate, share, disseminate 
and combine information from various 
sources both at times of disasters and 
in the recovery phase. 
There is not a one size fits all in risk 
communication, as the local context 
(e.g. local cultures) and histories (e.g. 
previous experiences with disasters) 
matter. Risk communication based on a 
one-way approach that tells people how 
to prepare and to respond to a disaster 
is rarely effective. Instead, a two-way 
mode of communication will lead to a 
situation in which people become more 
engaged in risk communication. This en-
gagement increases the likelihood that 
someone can successfully cope with a 
situation of uncertainty.
 
The key challenges in risk communica-
tion lie not so much in developing new 
tools and innovations but in the im-
plementation of social mechanisms by 
which such innovations become embed-
ded in actual communication practices. 
Adequate disaster risk communication 
and management requires the collabo-
ration of a variety of stakeholders in-
15
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1.1
Introduction
Since 1990, over 1.6 million peo-
ple have died in reported disasters 
around the world. Despite important 
improvements in the management of 
disasters, economic losses remain at 
an annual average of  EUR 235 billion 
(USD 250 billion) to EUR 280 bil-
lion (USD 300 billion) (UNISDR, 
2015). The European Union is not 
spared, as disasters have caused over 
90 000 deaths and EUR 100 billion 
in economic loss since 2000 (CRED, 
2017).
The impacts of  disasters have signifi-
cantly increased in recent years, partly 
as a result of  climate change, rapid 
and unplanned urbanisation, popula-
tion growth and environmental deg-
radation (European Commission 
2014). No country alone can be fully 
prepared for all kinds of  disasters. We 
need to act together and benefit from 
a coordinated common response and 
to be stronger and more efficient.
Policymakers and risk managers in 
disaster risk management (DRM) and 
across EU policies increasingly rely on 
the wealth of  existing knowledge and 
evidence at all levels — local, nation-
al, European and global — and at all 
stages of  the DRM cycle — preven-
tion and mitigation, preparedness, re-
sponse and recovery. Innovative ways 
to carry out DRM policies and oper-
ations are necessary. In this respect, 
the European Commission itself  rec-
ognises that ‘the challenges faced by 
the EU today require fast and effec-
tive solutions from the Commission, 
which often involve multiple policy ar-
eas’ (European Commission, 2016a).
The 2015 United Nations World Con-
ference on Disaster Risk Reduction 
and its associated Sendai framework 
2015-2030 (UNGA, 2015a) is an am-
bitious appeal for cooperation and ac-
tions to achieve substantial results at 
the global level. The European Com-
mission has been instrumental in con-
tributing to a better understanding of 
disaster risk in all its dimensions and 
defines its priorities for actions under 
a comprehensive Sendai action plan 
(European Commission, 2016b).
Natural and man-made 
disasters present major 
risks to the economy, 
security and well-being 
of citizens and society. 
Addressing these risks 
relies on robust evidence-
based decision-making.
Over the years, the EU and its Mem-
ber States have developed substantial 
experience in enhancing and main-
streaming DRM across a range of 
policies at national, European and 
global levels.
This chapter sets the policy scene for 
this report by highlighting some of 
the main policy processes and instru-
ments at European and global levels, 
which contribute to the management 
and the reduction of  disaster risks. 
It provides examples of  how science 
and knowledge contribute to DRM in 
policy areas such as civil protection, 
humanitarian aid, climate change ad-
aptation, flood risk management, 
earth observation, critical infrastruc-
ture protection, regional policy, health 
and research and innovation policies. 
In doing so, this chapter underlines 
the extent to which strengthening 
the contribution of  science through-
out these policy areas is an important 
step towards reducing disaster risks 
through robust evidence-based deci-
sion-making.
1.2
Disaster prevention 
and risk reduction 
through risk-informed 
policies
In the area of  disaster management, 
the recent Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism (UCPM) addresses disas-
ter risks both in the EU and in third 
countries by strengthening cooper-
ation and facilitating coordination 
within Europe in the areas of  dis-
aster prevention, preparedness and 
response (European Union, 2013a). 
The European Commission and its 
Member States work to strengthen the 
EU’s resilience to crises and disasters 
through the development and use of 
scientific tools in crisis management, 
satellite image processing and anal-
ysis, DRM surveillance systems and 
other forms of  integrated systems for 
risk management, situational aware-
ness, early warning and collaborative 
decision-making.
The area of  disaster prevention is rec-
ognised under the UCPM to be a key 
component to protect and build resil-
ience to disasters, as a first and vital 
stage in the full DRM cycle. Ensuring 
the prevention and reduction of  disas-
ter risks relies on a robust knowledge 
base on disaster risks and efficient 
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sharing of  knowledge, best practices 
and information. Strong knowledge 
on disaster risks and the contribution 
of  science are important for Member 
States to undertake risk assessments, 
assess risk management capabilities 
and record loss and damage data on 
disasters. The European Commission 
also relies on robust knowledge and 
evidence to support Member States in 
reinforcing their prevention capacities 
and actions, as illustrated in Box 1.1 
(European Union, 2013a).
In humanitarian policy, the EU is 
one of  the major donors in terms of 
meeting response needs and reducing 
the risks of  disasters worldwide (Eu-
ropean Community, 1996). It relies 
on a strong knowledge and evidence 
base as well as on a growing culture of 
innovation. In this context, the Euro-
pean Commission is playing a cen-
tral role to develop and promote the 
INFORM index for risk management, 
which is a global, open-source risk 
assessment for humanitarian crises 
and disasters, contributing to global 
efforts to reinforce risk assessments 
and risk reduction strategies — see 
Box 1.2.
Disaster prevention and 
risk reduction are cross-
cutting to a number of 
key EU policies. Ensuring 
efficient disaster risk 
reduction and prevention 
measures relies on a 
robust understanding and 
assessment of risks.
Science also plays an important role 
in enhancing the resilience and per-
formance of  vital and critical infra-
structures and services. In the case of 
the European programme for critical 
infrastructure protection (European 
Commission, 2006), several research 
projects have been financed to devel-
op fresh knowledge and innovative 
concepts in this area. This has led to 
progress in the development of  risk 
assessment methodologies and other 
tools for critical infrastructure protec-
tion, in the analysis of  interdepend-
encies and cascading effects and in 
responses to man-made threats and 
natural hazards. The programme has 
led to a better understanding of  the 
issues related to critical infrastructure 
protection and has helped Member 
States develop their own national 
strategies and research projects.
Disaster risk reduction (DRR) and 
climate change adaptation are in-
trinsically linked in reducing risks 
and vulnerabilities to climate-related 
hazards. Both rely on the availability 
of  robust knowledge and data at all 
levels. Knowledge and data are key in 
defining scenarios and projections ac-
cording to which adaptation measures 
are developed, in monitoring progress 
of  implementation and in developing 
innovative instruments/tools to in-
crease resilience. The development of 
appropriate methodologies and the 
sharing of  good practices are key in 
carrying out national risk assessments 
and the assessment of  risk manage-
ment capabilities. Improving the re-
cording of  loss and damage data relies 
on robust systems, models and meth-
odologies. Science will help improve 
the understanding of  risks and the 
undertaking of  the vital first steps to-
EU Overview of natural and man-made disaster risks
The European Commission is mandated under the UCPM to develop a comprehensive overview and mapping of 
natural and human-induced disaster risks in the EU as one of its key disaster prevention actions (Article 5.1(a), 
ibid.). The overview, published in 2017 and to be updated on a regular basis, builds on national assessments of 
disaster risks and extensive scientific input (European Commission, 2017). 
Science plays a central role in developing a comprehensive understanding of disaster risks across Europe, with 
a particular emphasis on cross-border, emerging and new risks and taking into consideration climate change.
BOX 1.1
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wards DRM and adaptation planning.
The global threat of  new and 
re-emerging infectious diseases and 
man-made and natural disasters re-
quires reinforcing the infrastructure 
of  public health response through 
strengthening health systems and the 
global health security framework. The 
EU decision on serious cross-border 
threats to health (European Union, 
2013b) provides the framework to 
improve prevention and prepared-
ness and to strengthen the capacity to 
coordinate response to health emer-
gencies across the EU; emergencies 
caused by biological, chemical and 
environmental agents and threats of 
unknown origin aiming to contribute 
to a high level of  public health pro-
tection The EU health programme 
provides scientific support and capac-
ity building in Member States through 
training and exercises, sharing experi-
ences, guidelines and procedures, and 
technical support and expertise with 
preparedness planning or for imple-
mentation of  improvements in cer-
tain areas such as maritime traffic or 
specialised laboratories. In the field of 
emerging and re-emerging infectious 
diseases, science and innovation play 
a key role in vaccine, diagnostics and 
drug development and in risk model-
ling and assessment, as well as in iden-
tifying effective prevention and con-
trol strategies at the population level. 
The EU Early Warning and Response 
System is instrumental in notifying 
alerts as well as measures undertaken 
by the Member States.
Major industrial accidents can have 
consequences beyond the limits of 
industrial establishments and the hu-
man, ecological and economic costs 
of  an accident are borne not only 
by the establishment affected, but 
also by the society concerned. It is 
therefore necessary to establish and 
apply safety and risk reduction meas-
ures to prevent possible accidents, 
to reduce the risks of  accidents oc-
curring and to minimise the effects 
if  they do occur, thereby making it 
possible to ensure a high level of  pro-
tection throughout the Union. The 
Directive 2012/18/EU on major-ac-
cidents hazards involving dangerous 
substances (European Union, 2012), 
also known as ‘Seveso III’, sets risk 
management goal-oriented objectives 
based on the fact that operators are 
obliged to take all necessary meas-
ures to prevent major accidents and 
to limit their consequences for human 
health or the environment. The direc-
tive is focused on the unintentional 
(accidental, including natural hazards) 
potential events in the establishments, 
thus usually not related to the inten-
tional acts (attacks), and excludes the 
military establishments and pipelines, 
as well as the transportation outside 
establishments.
In recent years, and in particular fol-
lowing the Fukushima accident in 
Japan, the EU significantly strength-
ened its legislative framework on nu-
clear safety by adopting the amended 
directive on nuclear safety in 2014 
(European Union, 2014), the revised 
directives on basic safety standards in 
2013 (European Union, 2013c) and 
the directive on radioactive waste and 
spent fuel management in 2011 (Eu-
ropean Union, 2011). Altogether, this 
INFORM – Index for Risk Management
INFORM is a global, open-source risk assessment for humanitarian crises and disasters. It can support decisions 
about prevention, preparedness and response. It is the first global, objective and transparent tool for under-
standing the risk of humanitarian crises. When all those involved in crisis prevention, preparedness and response 
use a shared risk assessment, they can work more effectively together. It has been developed in response to 
recommendations by numerous organisations to improve the common evidence basis for risk analysis as well 
as the real demands of Inform partner organisations. It is a way to simplify a lot of information about crisis risk 
so it can be easily used for decision-making. The Inform model is based on risk concepts published in scientific 
literature and envisages three dimensions of risk: hazards & exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity 
dimensions (INFORM, n.d.).
BOX 1.2
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represents the most advanced legally 
binding and enforceable regional legal 
framework in the world.
By the summer of  2017, EU Mem-
ber States have agreed to implement 
the provisions of  the amended nu-
clear safety directive in their national 
laws. An ambitious EU-wide safety 
objective for all types of  nuclear in-
stallations has been introduced in 
this revised directive, with the aim 
of  reducing the risk of  accidents and 
avoiding large radioactive releases. 
This EU-wide safety objective will 
have a global impact via the 2015 Vi-
enna Declaration on the International 
Atomic Energy Agency’s Convention 
of  Nuclear Safety.
In addition and in the post-Fukushi-
ma environment, the new Basic Safety 
Standards Directive modernises and 
consolidates the European radiation 
protection legislation and takes into 
account recent international recom-
mendations and standards. Once fully 
implemented, the revised standards 
will bring the highest level of  pro-
tection of  workers, patients and the 
general public across Europe. It will 
also foster improvement in emergen-
cy preparedness and response regimes 
across Europe and will lead to better 
coordination and cooperation be-
tween Member States.
Specific policy instruments are also 
in place in the water sector related to 
extreme hydrometeorological events 
such as floods and droughts. Comple-
menting the Water Framework Direc-
tive (WFD) (European Community, 
2000), flood prevention and manage-
ment are tackled by the European Un-
ion Flood Directive (European Com-
munity, 2007). In this framework, 
Member States should carry out a 
preliminary flood risk assessment on 
the basis of  a methodology and ac-
counting for historic floods, establish 
mechanisms to assess the flood haz-
ard (e.g. extent and depth of  water) 
and flood risk (i.e. the impact of  sig-
nificant flooding on health, the econ-
omy, the environment and cultural 
heritage) in Europe. This requires, for 
instance, knowledge of  the location 
of  floodplains and receptors with-
in them, the use of  advanced digital 
elevation models and the ability for 
elaborate modelling of  the propaga-
tion of  water during a flood — and 
the know-how to calculate damages 
arising from flooding. Based on the 
mapping, the design and implemen-
tation of  a flood risk management 
plan with objectives and measures 
leading to the reduction of  flood risk 
is carried out, which requires the use 
of  prioritisation methods (e.g. based 
on cost/benefit) and an estimation of 
the likely impact of  climate change in 
the longer term.
Water scarcity and droughts are also 
considered in the policy context. A 
European assessment of  water scar-
city and droughts has been conduct-
ed by the European Commission in 
this framework to monitor changes 
across Europe and to identify where 
further action is needed in response 
to climate change (European Com-
mission, 2007). The successive steps 
of  the WFD river basin management 
planning and the related flood and 
drought policy frameworks may con-
veniently incorporate adaptation to 
climate-related water risks through 
risk assessment, monitoring, environ-
mental objective setting, economic 
analysis and action programmes to 
achieve well-defined environmen-
tal objectives. In addition, while the 
protection of  the (coastal) marine 
environment is covered by the WFD, 
EU environmental policymakers con-
sidered there was a lack of  strategy 
underpinning the policies to protect 
the marine environment. A strategy 
was thus developed in the sixth envi-
ronmental action programme (2002-
2012), which resulted in setting up en-
vironmental objectives for the marine 
environment. The related protection 
regime is regulated under the EU Ma-
rine Strategy Framework Directive, 
which was adopted in 2008 (Europe-
an Community, 2008).
Finally, through its European Struc-
tural and Investment Funds, the EU 
provides important contribution to 
disaster prevention and management 
(European Union, 2013d); see Box 
1.3. The regional dimension is central 
to disaster prevention, as local and 
regional authorities are the first to be 
confronted with the impacts of  dis-
asters. Disaster prevention is also im-
portant for regional development and 
cross-border action. Prior investment 
is safeguarded, as it is important in 
maintaining local growth and jobs. In-
vestment in risk prevention itself  can 
also develop new professional fields, 
foster innovation, support small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
boost the transition to a low-carbon 
and climate-resilient economy.
CHAPTER 1 CURRENT STATUS OF DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
25
1.3
Enhanced 
preparedness and 
response through 
timely, relevant and 
reliable information
The European disaster response co-
ordination is ensured by the Emer-
gency Response Coordination Centre 
(ERCC) to bring together scientific 
and operational communities in Eu-
rope in order to improve the planning 
of  disaster response operations, in-
cluding scenario building for disaster 
response, asset mapping and the de-
velopment of  plans for the deploy-
ment of  response capacities. Timely, 
relevant and reliable information is 
vital for detection and alert systems 
at the core of  disaster response ac-
tivities. Forecasting and early warning 
tools supporting ERCC activities in-
clude the European Forest Fire Infor-
mation System (EFFIS), the Europe-
an Flood Awareness System(EFAS), 
the Medical Information System 
(MedISys), the Tsunami Assessment 
Modelling System and the European 
Drought Observatory (EDO).
The development and better integra-
tion of  transnational and multi-haz-
ard early warning systems by bringing 
together scientific centres around ear-
ly warning systems is being strength-
ened through the EU project ‘all risk 
integrated system towards’ (Aristotle). 
The holistic early warning (INGV, 
2016) is a unique project that has 
created a European scientific natural 
hazard partnership following a mul-
ti-hazard approach — consisting of 
15 institutions, the majority of  which 
are legally mandated to provide scien-
tific advice in their national civil pro-
tection authorities as well — to sup-
port the ERCC. Aristotle is designed 
to be scalable in order to expand in 
the future to include other hazards 
and institutions, under the condition 
that the partnership and its structure 
prove to be solid and well function-
ing during this pilot phase. Aristotle 
was launched on 1 February 2016 and 
will last until 31 January 2018. Since 
1 February 2017, it has become ful-
ly operational, providing the ERCC 
with 24/7 multi-hazard scientific 
analysis and advice for selected haz-
ards (earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic 
gases/ashes, floods and severe weath-
er including tropical cyclones). This 
aims at increasing both preparedness 
and response levels of  the ERCC and 
the UCPM participating states, all the 
while respecting the national respon-
sibilities of  the latter.
Disaster preparedness 
and response measures 
depend on the support of 
tools and instruments to 
provide timely, relevant 
and reliable data for 
operational decision-
making.
EU Cohesion policy contributions to disaster risk prevention, 
2014-2020
With EUR 8 billion for climate change adaptation and risk prevention and management, the cohesion policy is one 
of the most important sources for funding in this area. Twenty Member States have selected risk prevention as 
a priority for the 2014-2020 funding period, depending on their specific needs. Furthermore, risk prevention, dis-
aster resilience and climate change adaptation are integrated into other cohesion policy-funding priorities, such 
as innovation, energy efficiency and water management. The planned investments increase Europe’s resilience to 
disasters and climate change and aim at protecting 13.3 million people from floods and 11.8 million from forest 
fires (European Commission, 2016c).
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Other tools are central to the oper-
ational activities of  the European 
Commission, via the ERCC, such as 
the Copernicus programme (see sec-
tion on Earth observation), and the 
Global Disaster Alert and Coordina-
tion System (GDACS), which pro-
vides key information on disasters 
worldwide and a platform for struc-
tured information exchange to facil-
itate decision-making in emergency 
responses (GDACS, n.d.).
Reinforcing access and use of  sound 
data, evidence and DRM knowledge is 
also contributing to the development 
of  an EU voluntary pool of  pre-com-
mitted response assets to provide a 
basis for the identification of  poten-
tial response capacity gaps and buff-
er capacities for use in extraordinary 
situations. Indeed, to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of  the 
UCPM, the European Commission 
endeavours to foster technological 
innovation in response operations by 
encouraging the registration of  inno-
vative capacities in the ERCC.
The Copernicus programme provides 
accessible and global Earth obser-
vation through high-quality satellite 
mapping and services (European 
Union, 2014). Environmental infor-
mation is of  crucial importance to 
its activities and helps to understand 
how our planet and its climate are 
changing, the role played by human 
activities in these changes and how 
they will influence our daily lives. 
The Copernicus services address six 
thematic areas: land, marine, atmos-
phere, climate change, emergency 
management and security. The main 
users of  the Copernicus services are 
policymakers and public authorities 
that need the information to develop 
environmental legislation and pol-
icies or to take critical decisions in 
the event of  an emergency, such as a 
natural or human-induced disaster or 
a humanitarian crisis. In the area of 
DRM, Copernicus provides products 
such as maps identifying the extent 
of  the disaster (e.g. delineation of  the 
flooded area) and the level of  damage 
(e.g. destroyed buildings in case of  an 
earthquake).
Last but not least, better access to 
knowledge also benefits training net-
works, including the EU Trainet set 
up under the UCPM, which seek to 
create synergies through the exchange 
of  experience, best practices, relevant 
research and other activities. 
The EU Trainet is Lessons learnt ac-
tivities also aim at providing a broad-
er basis for knowledge development, 
also contributes to enhance the 
knowledge base in DRM (European 
Union, 2013a).
1.4
A robust knowledge 
base for disaster risk 
management 
The Union’s multiannual research and 
innovation framework programmes 
support a range of  research and in-
novation projects relevant to disas-
ter management (European Union, 
2013e); see Box 1.4. Multinational and 
interdisciplinary research in the field 
of  natural and technological disasters 
has led to the development of  inno-
vative tools and methodologies to 
forecast and monitor man-made and 
physical hazards. 
On the other hand, research efforts in 
support of  risk management and crisis 
management have largely contributed 
in the preparedness and response to 
major crises and have therefore helped 
reduce the toll on human lives and 
economic assets. 
A risk-informed approach 
to DRM is built upon a 
robust and extensive 
knowledge base: research, 
innovation and scientific 
projects are central 
components
The European Commission’s Com-
munity of  Users on Secure, Safe and 
Resilient Societies aims to make better 
sense of  available research and identify 
research needs through stronger net-
works and exchange of  information. 
The Community of  Users built around 
EU research and the Disaster Risk 
Management Knowledge Centre will 
be mutually reinforcing the EU’s ef-
forts to strengthen the interface be-
tween policy and science and pave the 
way for a risk-informed approach to 
EU policies.
The importance of  knowledge for 
climate change adaptation planning 
is recognised in the EU Adaptation 
Strategy: one of  the pillars of  the 
Strategy rests on refining the knowl-
edge gap for adaptation to promote 
better-informed decision-making 
(European Commission, 2013b). The 
development of  the one-stop-shop 
for adaptation, Climate-ADAPT, 
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contributes to improving accessibil-
ity and usability of  information on 
and relevant to climate change adap-
tation. This public platform contrib-
utes to strengthening the knowledge 
base and providing valuable data and 
sources to inform policymakers and 
other stakeholders (Climate-ADAPT, 
n.d.).
European efforts towards enhanced 
urban resilience to disasters also 
risks requires strengthening the con-
tribution of  science and innovation 
to enhance the resilience of  urban 
settings as well as integrating urban 
risk management into national DRR 
strategies and sustainable develop-
ment planning. The Global Human 
Settlement Layer (GHSL) framework, 
developed by the European Commis-
sion will produce new global spatial 
information, evidence-based analyt-
ics and knowledge describing urban 
settlements on the planet. This infor-
mation will be instrumental in assess-
ing the impacts of  DRM policies on 
development trends and patterns in a 
consistent and detailed manner.
In the field of  humanitarian relief, the 
European Commission contributes to 
building the capacity and to shaping 
the governance of  the internation-
al humanitarian system through the 
Enhanced Response Capacity funds, 
which aim to support coordination 
structures for the delivery of  hu-
manitarian assistance like the global 
humanitarian clusters and stand-by 
expertise for emergencies, as well as 
studies and guidelines on specific as-
pects of  humanitarian assistance and 
platforms and networks for learning 
and knowledge sharing (European 
Commission, 2015). The European 
Commission also ensures, through 
scientific tools such as the EU Aid 
Explorer, to make aid data easily ac-
cessible to ensure aid effectiveness 
and accountability and to reinforce 
the evidence base for policymak-
ing. Maps and graphs are developed 
to support operations as well as to 
Examples of relevant Horizon 2020 research priorities
Under the current EU framework 
programme for research and inno-
vation Horizon 2020, the societal 
challenge chapters on ‘Secure soci-
eties’ and ‘Climate action, environ-
ment, resource efficiency and raw 
materials’ address the research 
needs across prevention, prepar-
edness and response actions in the 
areas of crisis management, disas-
ter resilience, climate change, crit-
ical infrastructure protection and 
sustainability. In light of this new 
direction, vulnerability studies, in-
tegrated risk assessments and DRM 
strategies are increasingly consid-
ering the social, economic, environ-
mental and health dimension of the 
risk. 
Developing the awareness and 
demonstration of the added value 
of risk mitigation and adaptation 
approaches in terms of co-benefits 
for local economies, social cohesion 
and the broader environment will 
be further supported by demonstra-
tion projects and other EU funds 
programmes.
Research needs for humanitarian 
aid are also addressed by Horizon 
2020, such as with calls focused on 
advancing theoretical and practical 
knowledge on EU response mecha-
nisms and their effectiveness (INT-
5-2015) or the development of 
civilian humanitarian mission per-
sonnel tracking (BES-10-2015).
Climate services, nature-based 
solutions for building more resilient 
cities or territories, and dynamic 
earth observations are examples of 
promising sectors. Heightened em-
phasis in DRR and resilience build-
ing in urban areas is also becoming 
increasingly central to sustainable 
urban development (European Un-
ion, 2016). The Horizon 2020 re-
search programme has a strong 
focus on social, technological, dig-
ital and nature-based innovation in 
urban planning and policy formula-
tion.
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visualise the distribution of  aid across 
countries and sectors worldwide (EU 
Aid Explorer, n.d.).
The EU was one of  the first develop-
ment donors to develop a dedicated 
resilience policy aiming to strength-
en the resilience of  communities and 
their livelihoods and ecosystems as a 
core objective for humanitarian and 
development aid (European Commis-
sion, 2012, 2013a). A new European 
consensus on development has been 
made to guide all of  the EU and its 
Member States’ development poli-
cy activities (European Commission, 
2016d) and under which they should 
increase efforts to build resilience and 
adaptability to change.
In this context, the EU is committed 
to reinforcing the science and policy 
dimension of  DRR both within the 
EU and in support to crisis-prone 
developing countries in line with pri-
ority areas of  the Action Plan for Re-
silience in Crisis Prone countries. The 
EU supports developing countries, in 
particular Least Developed Countries 
(LDC) and Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS), to develop DRR poli-
cies capacities and mainstream DRR, 
climate change adaptation and the 
protection of  ecosystems or protect-
ed zones (see Box 1.5).
1.5
Coherent 
international 
processes and the 
role of science
The European Commission is ful-
ly committed to being a frontrunner 
in the implementation of  the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs). Science and innova-
tion contribute to several SDGs and 
their associated targets; for instance, 
they feature prominently within SDG 
17 on means of  implementation and 
Examples of programmes and projects to support implemen-
tation of DRR and climate change policies in EU development 
cooperation
The global thematic project, ‘Build-
ing capacities for increased public 
investment in integrated climate 
change adaptation and disaster 
risk reduction: 2012-2015’, covers 
40 vulnerable developing coun-
tries that were supported between 
2013 and 2016 in a partnership 
with the United Nations Office for 
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) to 
build and improve national disas-
ter loss databases for disaster loss 
accounting. Among these 40 coun-
tries, 30 have progressed further 
in capacity building to develop and 
use probabilistic risk assessments 
and 20 have been supported in in-
tegrating risk-informed planning in 
different sectors of development, 
with a focus on public investments. 
This partnership project further 
supported the preparation of the 
Global Assessment Reports (UNIS-
DR, 2015) by providing the means 
to conduct modelling and investi-
gate disaster risk from the national 
to the global level. 
In addition, the EU supported the 
elaboration and publication of the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
Compendium of Risk Knowledge 
(Morinière and Zimmerman, 2015) 
through the 10th European Devel-
opment Fund intra-ACP programme 
as part of its support for DRR in 
partnership, among others, with the 
ACP group of countries and regional 
organisations.
Since 2007, with the launch of the 
Global Climate Change Alliance 
(GCCA), more than 50 projects in 
35 countries have been implement-
ed under its flagship programme 
contributing to the resilience of the 
communities and their livelihoods 
and vulnerable ecosystems.
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the global partnership, SDG 9 on re-
silient infrastructure and inclusive, 
sustainable industrialisation and SDG 
11 on making cities inclusive, safe, re-
silient and sustainable. The European 
Commission will support the imple-
mentation of  the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, firstly by 
mainstreaming the SDGs in the Eu-
ropean policy framework and current 
European Commission priorities and 
secondly by launching a reflection on 
further developing our longer-term 
vision and the focus of  sectoral pol-
icies after 2020 (European Commis-
sion, 2016d, 2016e).
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (an 
integral part of  the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development) sets out a 
comprehensive range of  policies and 
actions, including science, technology 
and innovation, which are needed to 
achieve the ambitious vision set out in 
the SDGs (UNGA, 2015a).
The World Humanitarian Summit, 
organised in 2016 as a response to 
an unprecedented increase of  peo-
ple affected by conflict and natural 
disasters, put forward a number of 
key commitments to place the safety 
of  people, dignity and the safeguard 
of  human rights at the heart of  deci-
sion-making (WHS, 2016). In its sup-
port to the commitments made, the 
EU will rely on the support of  a num-
ber of  scientific tools and platforms, 
some of  which were developed by the 
European Commission and its key 
partners; see Box 1. 6.
The United Nations Sendai Frame-
work for DRR shifts the emphasis 
from response-oriented disaster man-
agement to comprehensive DRM, 
in which a more systematic and re-
inforced science-policy interface 
strengthens the contribution of  DRM 
to smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth globally (European Commis-
sion, 2016a). The framework calls for 
a strong interface between science 
and policy to build a strong knowl-
edge of  disaster risk; make efficient 
use of  data to better understand the 
economic impacts of  disasters; and 
develop adequate preventive poli-
cies to reduce the risks of  disasters 
(UNGA, 2015b); see Box 1.6.
At a global level, science 
and technology play a 
central role in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and other 
international agreements 
addressing DRM
In the context of  the Paris Agree-
ment on climate change (UNFCCC, 
2015), the importance of  data collec-
UNISDR Science and Technology Conference on the Implemen-
tation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
2015-2030 (UNISDR, 2016)
The outcomes of the 2016 UNISDR Science and Technology Conference underline that the science and technolo-
gy community should support the implementation of the Sendai framework through:
• original research and investigation;
• the assessment and analysis of hazards and the consequences of cascade effects;
• the development and validation of applied tools and standards;
• the design and use of new technologies;
• a range of education and communication roles.
More generally, ensuring the integration and promotion of a holistic approach to the science of hazards will be 
an important contribution to reinforcing the science-policy interface around DRM.
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tion, evidence-based approaches and 
the contribution of  science was rec-
ognised. Science is needed to inform 
and provide tools to achieve the tar-
get specified in the climate deal, both 
for adaptation and mitigation, and 
to contribute to taking stock of  pro-
gress. The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) was invit-
ed to produce a special report by 2018 
on the impacts of  global warming of 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and 
related global greenhouse gas emis-
sion pathways.
As illustrated by the New Urban 
Agenda agreed at the Habitat III Con-
ference on Housing and Sustainable 
Urban Development, the internation-
al community has come to acknowl-
edge how essential greater attention 
to urban needs is when addressing 
DRM, climate adaptation and urban 
resilience. Unique and emerging de-
velopment challenges facing all coun-
tries are given particular attention for 
the implementation of  the New Ur-
ban Agenda. Commitments such as 
the support for disaster risk assess-
ments; the development of  stand-
ards for levels of  risks and of  quality 
infrastructure and spatial planning; 
and most of  all the mainstreaming 
of  data-informed DRR and DRM at 
all levels reinforce the relevance of 
an integrated science-policy interface 
to ensure environmentally sustaina-
ble and resilient urban development 
(UNGA, 2016).
1.6
Towards a stronger 
science-policy 
interface
Faced with the risk of  increasingly 
severe and frequent natural and hu-
man-induced disasters, policymak-
ers and risk managers in DRM and 
across EU policies increasingly rely 
on the wealth of  existing knowledge 
and evidence at all levels — local, na-
tional, European and global — and at 
all stages of  the DRM cycle — pre-
vention and mitigation, preparedness, 
response and recovery.
Many policies at EU level as well as 
political initiatives on a global scale 
include a disaster risk dimension. En-
suring a robust DRM knowledge base 
is essential to informing these differ-
ent policy processes and to working 
towards effective evidence-based deci-
sion-making.
Reinforcing the science-policy inter-
face should allow for better exploiting 
and translating the complexities of 
scientific results into useful and usa-
ble policy outputs through efficient 
access and uptake of  knowledge and 
research, a networked approach across 
relevant stakeholder communities and 
continuous efforts towards innovation 
and new technologies and tools.
The Disaster Risk Management 
Knowledge Centre (DRMKC, 2017) 
launched by the Commission on 30th 
September 2015 offers a valuable plat-
form to meet these aims and further 
enhance the contribution of  science 
to DRM policymaking. The Knowl-
edge Centre implements a networked 
approach to translate complex scien-
tific data and analyses into usable in-
formation at all stages of  the disaster 
risk management (DRM) – from pre-
vention to recovery – and at all levels 
– local, national, European and glob-
al -  to provide science-based advice 
for DRM policies, as well as timely 
and reliable scientific-based analyses 
for emergency preparedness and re-
sponse coordinated activities.
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Definition of risk
There is no commonly accepted definition of  risk. According to the United Kingdom’s Royal Society (1992), risk is ‘the probability that a particular adverse event occurs during a stated period of  time, or results from a particular challenge’. By contrast, the latest UNISDR’s 
definition (2017) of  disaster risk is ‘the potential loss of  life, injury, destroyed 
or damaged assets which could occur to a system, society or a community in a 
specific period of  time, determined probabilistically as a function of  hazard, 
exposure, vulnerability and capacity’.
Disaster risk is not just about the likelihood and severity of  the hazard event 
but also about what is exposed to that hazard and how vulnerable that expo-
sure is. A severe earthquake in a relatively uninhabited region can be of  far less 
consequence than a relatively minor one near a large conurbation. Similarly, a 
severe earthquake in an area known to be prone to earthquakes and so with 
strict design and construction standards can cause fewer fatalities and less dam-
age than an unexpected, much smaller one in an unprepared area with poor 
building standards.
Following the Sendai disaster risk definition, we may consider risk to comprise 
of  three elements.
1. Hazard: the adverse event causing the loss.
2. Exposure: the property, people, plant or environment that are threatened 
by the event.
3. Vulnerability: how the exposure at risk is vulnerable to an adverse event 
of  that kind.
Note that the forth Sendai element; capacity, the ability of  the system to re-
spond after the event to mitigate the loss, is generally considered to be a com-
ponent of  vulnerability. Loss suffered, that is the damage caused to the expo-
sure at risk to a defined hazardous event, will depend upon these elements.
Risk complexity and dependency
Single events may have no one single cause. For example a major flood could 
be caused by a combination of  one or more of  heavy rain, unseasonably high 
temperatures causing snow to melt fast, baked land from a prior dry spell or 
conversely saturated soil from earlier continuous rains, which both increase 
run-off, high tides and storm surge.
Whilst it is sometimes difficult to consider risks from a single hazard, what 
of  their combinations? The major cause of  death and damage following the 
Great Kantō earthquake affecting Tokyo in 1923, an event that left more than 
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140 000 people dead or missing, was not from building collapse due to ground 
shaking but from fire storms provoked by cooking equipment knocked over in 
the event. Similarly, earthquakes may cause tsunamis, landslides, dam failures or 
avalanches and windstorms may cause landslides, storm surge, floods or flash 
floods. Vetere Arellano et al. (2004) includes a fascinating example of  cascad-
ing risk following an earthquake in Turkey in 1999.
Human action can also affect the loss. For example, canalising rivers or build-
ing on historical floodplains can give excess flood water nowhere to go; wide-
scale concreting over gardens to provide hard standing for motor cars prevents 
water absorption, perhaps exacerbated by inadequate or poorly maintained 
drains. What historically would have been a benign event can now become a 
calamitous one.
Uncertainty and subjectivity
Risk includes elements of  the scientific and the subjective. In some hazards 
or sectors, risk can be clearly defined. For example in the insurance industry, 
the ‘risk business’ defines property or people who are normally insured against 
defined hazards with payment made upon financial loss suffered. As we will 
discuss later, this has led to an explosion in risk analytics over the last 30 years, 
leading to a far more technically sophisticated but also financially secure insur-
ance industry.
However, even here there are limits in what we know. We may feel we know 
how well a particular building will react to an earthquake of  a certain intensity, 
but do we know it was built to the right standard or correctly maintained? We 
may feel we can reasonably estimate the damage that a flood with a depth of 
1 metre can do to an industrial plant, but how well can we estimate the firm’s 
economic loss related to this damage, which will depend on how quickly the 
plant may be repaired or replaced, on whether it has any other factories avail-
able to take some of  the strain and on whether business temporarily lost can 
ever be fully regained.
There is an inherent uncertainty, as by definition catastrophes are rare events; 
data to describe their effects may be partial, at best. However, as we will discuss 
later on, the process to understand and model risk sheds light on areas where 
data are lacking and therefore where additional focus is required. Subjective 
assumptions, perhaps currently unstated, must be made explicit and so held up 
for discussion.
Risk is not static but rather dynamic and dependent upon changes to hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability. Anthropogenic climate change is accepted as scien-
tific fact, but its consequences on a local level and for a particular hazard may 
not be clear. Historical observations are often limited, partial and contaminated 
with natural variation and underlying factors that may not be fully understood. 
But clearly there is a public and therefore political pressure for governments 
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to protect their populations against the impacts of  climate change. In practice, 
though, the risk as it is now is very often not properly understood, and still 
less how it may worsen (or conversely improve) under different climate change 
assumptions in 30 years’ time; understanding current risk is fundamental to 
understanding how that risk may change in the future.
Risk perception
When we begin to move into exposure, such as the preservation of  habitat 
and/or animal population, it may be harder to place an agreed value on pres-
ervation or qualification of  damage if  either is impaired, even where there is 
common acceptance of  the importance of  the risk to society. A common risk 
metric must be agreed in order to allow, for example, the relative social and 
environmental cost of  sacrificing an important ecological habitat to protect the 
human population of  a city.
Humans have short memories; current risk concerns may be driven by recent 
experience rather than underlying loss potential. Few were concerned with tsu-
nami risk until the tragic events of  2004 and 2011 — the risks were theoretical-
ly known but were rare, and crucially as no significant tsunami had been filmed 
until 2004, the risk was difficult to relate to and was often overlooked.
Indeed, perception of  risk drives policy (Klinke and Renn 2002). For example, 
many more die on the road than in train crashes, but these deaths tend to come 
in ones and twos at any time, rather than several casualties, as in rail crashes. 
Post-loss this may lead to calls to improve the already relatively safe rail system 
when a similar amount spent on the road network may save more lives.
The public purse is not unlimited. Should the politician react to the public 
perception of  risk by spending on risk prevention in areas of  known public 
concern or try to assess the range of  risks the population face and prioritise 
spending on a more rational cost/benefit approach? In the short term, pre-
event, the former will be more electorally advantageous but the post-event 
failure to react to an unrecognised hazardous eventcould have enormous po-
litical as well as human consequences. It is vital to consider not just what has 
happened but what could happen; taking action to minimise loss in advance 
and not just reacting to events as they occur.
Recognising risk may also have its consequences. Many societies have a pres-
sure on housing. Flood plains offer an easy solution, the land drained, defences 
constructed and houses built, which is popular as people like living near water. 
But how robust are the new properties in a changing climate? Can risk be 
overlooked if  there is a social need? Certainly before the event, but what about 
after? What if  the properties become uninsurable and so unsaleable?
The importance of understanding disaster risk
Risk is complicated, but understanding risk is vital to the proper protection 
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of  society and the environment. Without proper risk analysis, can appropriate 
policy decisions be made?
In an increasingly litigious society, could governments and officials not have a 
proper risk assessment methodology? It is vital to understand and use the best 
science, but ultimately policymakers will also necessarily react to stakeholder 
perception. It is hoped that scientific fact, properly presented, will drive per-
ception, but ultimately risk management decisions are necessarily political.
Those decisions need to be made in a transparent manner; open to scrutiny, 
challenge and debate. It is impossible to completely eliminate risk, even with an 
unlimited public purse. In reality, budgets are under pressure, with many calls 
upon limited funds: spending money on preparing for an event that will prob-
ably not even occur within a politician’s period of  office may not be as high a 
priority as trying to address an immediate social need.
However, there is a duty of  care to protect the citizens and the natural envi-
ronment of  Europe. Modern risk assessment, coupled with risk and financial 
modelling, provides the framework to make the right decisions for both now 
and the future.
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2.1 Qualitative and 
quantitative approaches 
to risk assessment
David	C.	Simmons, Rudi Dauwe, Richard Gowland, Zsuzsanna 
Gyenes, Alan G. King, Durk Riedstra, Stefan Schneiderbauer
2.1.1
Risk assessment
2.1.1.1 
The importance of risk 
assessment
Risk assessment is a means not only to 
understand the risks that society (or a 
family or business) faces, with their 
potential probabilities and impacts, 
but also to provide a framework to 
determine the effectiveness of  disas-
ter risk management, risk prevention 
and/or risk mitigation.
It would be spurious to pretend that 
we fully understand all the hazards 
that society faces and their poten-
tial consequences. The process of 
risk assessment requires a structured 
approach. Without such a process, 
risks may be overlooked or implic-
it assumptions may be made. A risk 
assessment process requires transpar-
ency, opening up assumptions and 
options to challenge, discussion and 
review.
A structured approach is 
required to understand all 
the hazards that society 
faces and their potential 
consequences. This 
requires transparency, 
opening up assumptions 
to challenge, discussion 
and review.
Risk assessment and mapping guide-
lines for disaster management (Euro-
pean Commission, 2010) and Over-
view of  natural and man-made disaster 
risks in the EU (European Commis-
sion, 2014), provide a solid outline of 
the issues in a European context. The 
first outlines ‘the processes and meth-
ods of  national risk assessments and 
mapping in the prevention, prepared-
ness and planning stages, as carried 
out within the broader framework of 
disaster risk management’, whereas 
the second paper analyses 18 national 
contributions, identifying 25 hazards, 
both natural and man-made (mali-
cious and non-malicious).
However, as an example of  the im-
portance of  risk assessment, the ex-
perience of  the insurance industry is 
presented, an industry that has been 
transformed by the adoption of  an 
increasingly rigorous risk assessment 
and modelling process over the last 30 
years. The lessons learnt are relevant 
to policymakers and practitioners in 
government.
2.1.1.2 
Example: catastrophe 
risk and the insurance 
industry
As recently as the 1980s, the insurance 
industry’s catastrophe risk assessment 
was almost entirely based on histori-
cal experience or ‘rule of  thumb’ as-
sumptions. Catastrophes are, by defi-
nition, rare events. It is very unlikely 
that a mega event will have occurred 
in recent years and, even if  that were 
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the case, it may have had unique fea-
tures that may not reoccur. If  we had 
a historical event, would it cause simi-
lar damage if  it reoccurred? The glob-
al population is growing and getting 
wealthier, with the majority now con-
centrated in cities. Pressure of  popu-
lation growth has created the need to 
build on land that was wisely avoided 
by our forefathers. Growth may be 
unplanned with infrastructure, such 
as drainage not keeping up with the 
rate of  development. People like liv-
ing close to water, potential loss may 
be more than just scaling the historical 
loss by population change and wealth.
The need for a better approach was 
clear. In 1984 Don Friedman pub-
lished a paper that would form the 
template for modelling insurance 
catastrophe risk over the following 
30 years, breaking the process into 
hazard, exposure, vulnerability and 
financial loss. The first United States 
hurricane model to this template was 
produced by the reinsurance bro-
ker E.W. Blanch in 1987 (White and 
Budde, 2001), followed by the United 
States earthquake in 1988. Reinsur-
ance brokers and reinsurers also lead 
the field in Europe; however, the early 
1990s saw the rise of  three major ca-
tastrophe modelling firms, which still 
dominated the industry in 2016.
These models were stochastic models 
— based not on a few historic haz-
ard events but rather on a synthetic 
event made of  many thousands of 
events that attempt to represent the 
range of  possible events with their 
associated probabilities. The mod-
els required knowledge not only of 
what properties were insured and 
their value but also of  their location, 
construction type and occupation. 
Engineering principles augmented by 
historical loss analysis attempted to 
understand the relationship between 
the event’s manifestation at a particu-
lar location (e.g., peak ground acceler-
ation, peak gust speed and maximum 
flood depth) and its likely damage. 
From this an overall damage estimate 
for any given property portfolio for 
each of  the synthetic events could 
be calculated. If  the probability of 
each synthetic event is then applied, 
we could understand the distribution 
off  loss to the overall portfolio, for 
example what the annual average loss 
is and how big a loss from that hazard 
type can be expected every 5, 10, 20, 
50 and 100 years.
The process of modelling 
catastrophe risk has 
transformed the 
reinsurance industry by 
increasing knowledge, 
scientific engagement, 
technical competence 
and, most importantly, the 
resilience of the 
industry — its ability 
to pay claims.
Decisions could be made based on 
‘objective fact’, not subjective opin-
ion. Underwriters now had much 
more information to appropriately 
rate individual policies and to decide 
how much total risk they could accept 
across their portfolio and how much 
to off  lay. The concept of  risk/re-
turn entered the market. Firms began 
to clearly define their risk appetite to 
ensure appropriate levels of  financial 
security and then seek to maximise re-
turn within that appetite.
It has not been a painless process. In-
itially, many saw the models as a pan-
acea to the market’s problems. There 
was a tendency by those unaware of 
the complexity of  the models to be-
lieve the results. Arguably, the mod-
els were oversold and overbought: 
the vendors sold the models on their 
technical capabilities and the buyers 
bought them seeking certainty, but 
neither publically faced up to the in-
herent uncertainty within the models, 
despite growing pains in the process. 
However, this information has trans-
formed the industry. Twenty years ago 
the most technical reinsurance broker 
had perhaps 3 % of  staff  engaged in 
risk analytics, whereas now this has 
become 25 % to 30 %. Chief  risk of-
ficers were virtually unknown in the 
insurance industry 20 years ago; now 
they are embedded.
The models became a mechanism to 
raise debate above vague opinion to a 
discussion of  the veracity of  assump-
tions within the model. The models’ 
data requirements led to a massive 
increase in the quality and quantity 
of  data captured, leading in turn to 
improved models. Knowledge of  ca-
tastrophe risk has grown immeasura-
bly; firms have become smarter, more 
financially robust and therefore more 
likely to meet their claim obligations.
Whilst such modelling originally ap-
plied to catastrophe risk only, it has 
been extended to cover man-made 
hazards such as terrorism and more 
esoteric risk such as pandemic. In-
deed, the EU’s solvency II (Directive 
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2009/138/EC) an insurance regula-
tory regime, requires firms to under-
stand all the risk they face, insurance 
and non-insurance (e.g., market risk, 
counterparty risk and operational 
risk), with the carrot that if  they can 
demonstrate that they can adequately 
model their risks, then they may be al-
lowed to use the capital requirement 
implied by their model rather than the 
standard formula. Regulators rather 
smartly realise that any firm willing 
and able to demonstrate such capacity 
and understanding is less likely to fail.
2.1.1.3 
The key elements of risk 
assessment
Whilst the insurance industry is a spe-
cial case, others are noticing that the 
same methods can be used to manage 
risks to governments, cities and com-
munities. They can drive not only a 
better understanding of  the risks that 
society faces but also a means to de-
termine and justify appropriate risk 
planning, risk management strategies 
as well as  public and investment de-
cisions.
Risk assessment requires 
the identification of 
potential hazards as 
well as a knowledge of 
those hazard including 
their probability, what is 
exposed to that hazard 
and the vulnerability 
of that exposure to the 
hazard.
Indeed, it can be argued that the pro-
cess of  risk assessment and modelling 
is more important than the results ob-
tained. Risk assessment does not need 
to be as complex as a full stochastic 
model to add real value. Similarly, it 
is a common misunderstanding that 
a lack of  good-quality, homogeneous 
data invalidates risk assessment. Any 
risk assessment methodology requires 
assumptions to be brought to light 
and so opened to challenge. Assump-
tions can then be reviewed, compared 
and stressed, identifying areas of  in-
consistency, illogicality, sensitivity and 
where further research should be con-
centrated.
The key steps in risk assessment are 
the following.
• Identify the hazards which might 
affect the system or environment 
being studied A brain-storming 
session to identify all potential 
hazards should be done at an ini-
tial stage. It is important to think 
beyond events or combinations of 
events that have occurred in order 
to consider those that may occur.
• Assess the likelihood or probability 
that hazards might occur: inputs to 
this process include history, mod-
elling, experience, corporate mem-
ory, science, experimentation and 
testing. In practice, events with a 
very, very low probability (e.g. me-
teor strike) are ignored, focussing 
on ones more likely to occur and 
can be either prevented, managed 
or mitigated.
• Determine the exposure to the 
hazard, i.e. who or what is at risk.
• Estimate the vulnerability of  that 
hazard to the entity exposed in 
order to calculate the physical or 
financial impact upon that entity 
should the event occur. This may 
be obtained by a review of  histor-
ical events, engineering approaches 
and/or expert opinion and may 
include the ability of  the system 
to respond after the event so as to 
mitigate the loss.
• Estimate the potential financial 
and/or social consequences of 
events of  different magnitudes.
2.1.1.4
Risk tolerance
The likelihood of  the hazard and its 
consequences needs to be compared 
with the norms of  tolerability/ac-
ceptability criteria that society or an 
organisation has formulated. If  these 
criteria are met, the next step would 
be to manage the risk so that it is at 
least kept within these criteria and 
ideally lowered with continuous im-
provement.
If  the risk criteria are not met, the 
next step would be risk reduction by 
either reducing exposure to the haz-
ard or by reducing vulnerability by 
preventative measures or financial 
hedging, typically through traditional 
indemnity insurance that pays upon 
proof  of  loss, but also increasing-
ly through parametric insurance that 
pays upon proof  of  a defined event 
occurring. Insurance-like products 
can also be obtained from the finan-
cial markets by means of  catastrophe 
or resilience bonds.
In industry, reducing event likelihood 
is normally the preferred method, 
since this dimension is amenable to 
improving reliability and enhancing 
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the protective measures available. In 
many cases, these can be tested, so are 
therefore often a dominant feature of 
risk reduction. Estimating the poten-
tial severity of  the hazard is harder and 
often leaves much to expert opinion. 
If  risk cannot be credibly reduced in 
industry, it may lead to the cessation 
of  an activity. Ideally, a hazard would 
be completely avoided: a fundamental 
step in the design of  inherently safer 
processes.
However, for natural hazards and 
climate risk, where hazard likelihood 
reduction is often impossible, it is re-
quired to work on exposure and vul-
nerability. Building codes, for example 
the EU standard Eurocodes, encour-
age appropriate resilience in design 
and construction and can include 
‘build back better’ after an event. 
Spatial planning and the delineation 
of  hazard zones of  various levels can 
promote development in areas less 
exposed to risk. 
Risks can never be 
eliminated but they can 
be managed and their 
consequences reduced, 
at a cost. Defining risk 
tolerance allows informed, 
cost-effective risk 
management decisions.
The insurance mechanism can be 
used to encourage appropriate risk 
behaviours, penalising poor construc-
tion, maintenance or location by re-
duced cover or higher premiums and 
rewarding mitigation measures, e.g. 
retro-fitting roof  ties in tropical cy-
clone-exposed areas or installing irri-
gation systems for crops by premium 
reductions.
2.1.2
Risk identification 
process
2.1.2.1
The importance of 
risk identification
It is necessary to identify unwanted 
hazardous events (i.e., atypical sce-
narios) and their consequences. It is 
very important to include all these in 
a study. If  a possible hazard is over-
looked, it will never be assessed. Un-
fortunately, there are many examples 
of  this failure (Gowland, 2012). 
In all risk assessment methods, the 
failure to include these ‘atypical’ sce-
narios will present problems. Exam-
ples include the major fire and explo-
sion at Buncefield (December 2005) 
and the tsunami that inundated the 
Fukushima nuclear power station 
(March 2011). Identification of  all 
potential hazards is absolutely funda-
mental in ensuring success.
The United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive has identified and 
reviewed almost 40 hazard identifica-
tion methods.
The scope and depth of  study is im-
portant and relevant to purpose and 
the needs of  users of  the assessment. 
It is necessary to identify all hazards 
so that a proper risk assessment may 
be made. When we are open to con-
sidering potential deviations we need 
to make sure that we are open-mind-
ed enough to consider all possibilities 
even when they may seem to be re-
mote.
It is important to consider all poten-
tial hazards, natural and man-made, 
and their possible interactions and 
consequences. The process should 
not be limited to events known to 
have happened in the past, but also to 
consider what could happen.
Methods in use greatly depend on 
the experience of  the persons carry-
ing out the study. This is normally a 
team activity, and how it is made up is 
important and should be drawn from 
persons familiar with the technology 
or natural phenomena and the loca-
tion being considered. Techniques 
adopted range from relatively un-
structured ‘brainstorming’ through to 
the more structured ‘what if ’ analysis. 
Potential risks may not be 
obvious and may not have 
occurred in the past. It is 
vital to seek to identify 
what could occur as well 
as the consequences.
Other more formalised processes ex-
ist in industry, though, including fail-
ure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) 
and the highly structured hazard and 
operability (HAZOP) study, both 
of  which look to identify hazardous 
events and to locate causes, conse-
quences and the existing preventive 
measures. FMEA was developed for 
the automobile industry and HAZOP 
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was developed for the chemical and 
process industry. However, similar 
studies can be applied to any field of 
risk. For example, the HAZOP (Tyler 
et al., 2015) use of  guide words and 
deviations, which might seem to be 
limited to the industry where first ap-
plied, can be adjusted or replaced with 
those relevant to the field being stud-
ied; this has been demonstrated in the 
mining industry in Australia, where 
modified chemical industry methods 
have proved useful.
2.1.2.2
What if
This is a form of  structured team 
brainstorming. Once the team under-
stands the process or system being 
assessed and the kind of  risks (po-
tential exposures and vulnerabilities), 
each discreet part or step is examined 
to identify things that can go wrong 
and to estimate their possible conse-
quences.
A team of experts 
brainstorming is one way 
to flush out potential 
risks, but it is important 
to use a panel of experts 
whose experience covers 
all aspects of risk.
In order to carry this out successful-
ly, we must stress the need for the 
team to be properly qualified and to 
have a full set of  data relating to the 
system being studied. This would in-
clude operating instructions, process 
flow sheets, physical and hazardous 
properties of  the materials involved, 
potentially exposed persons, environ-
ment or assets, protective systems. 
Most users will simply estimate the 
likelihood and severity of  conse-
quences in a similar way to that used 
in risk matrix applications.
A brainstorming exercise has the side 
benefit of  encouraging a wide partic-
ipation in the risk identification and 
assessment process, increasing own-
ership of  the ultimate conclusions.
2.1.2.3
Failure mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA) 
FMEA is a rigorous, step-by-step 
process to discover everything that 
could go wrong in a task or process, 
the potential consequences of  those 
failures and what can be done to pre-
vent them from happening. In this 
way, it can be used in risk assessment 
in industry. As shown in Figure 2.1, it 
comprises a systemised group of  ac-
tivities designed to:
• recognise and evaluate the poten-
tial failure of  a process or equip-
ment and their effects;
• identify actions which could elim-
inate or reduce the chance of  po-
tential failure;
• document the process.
It captures:
• the failure mode, i.e., what could go 
wrong;
• the effect analysis, i.e., how it would 
happen, how likely it is to go wrong 
and how bad it would be.
A graphic illustration of the FMEA process.
Source: courtesy of authors
FIGURE 2.1
Define requirements 
and expected outcomes
How can we detect the 
onset of failure? Identify failure modes
What are the potential 
effects of failure mode?
Control Plan Identify possible causes How serious are these effects?
DETECTION 
AVAILABILITY (D) X
OCCURANCE 
PROBABILITY (P) X SEVERITY (S)
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A very good example of  a high-risk 
and high-priority project is the space 
shuttle where we put fragile human 
lives in a tin can and send them to 
space, hoping to get them home safe-
ly. Considering the complexity of  the 
shuttle, there are many possible items 
which can fail, and they all have in-
dividual failure modes and effects. 
Lives are at risk and space shuttles 
are expensive. FMEA is a tool used 
to provide a structured process to un-
derstand and thereby minimise risk.
FMEA is a structured 
what-if process widely 
used in the process 
industries and provides 
a template for other 
potential applications.
The three distinct assessments for 
each of  the three strands of  this 
methodology, detection availability, 
occurrence probability and severity, 
are each given a rating: D, P and D, 
respectively. Risk ranking is calculated 
by multiplying these factors to give a 
single rating D x P x S. A risk matrix 
may be used to illustrate this process 
(see Chapter 2.1.4.3.).
2.1.2.4
Hazard and operability 
study (HAZOP)
The technique of  HAZOP has been 
used and developed since the 1970s 
for identifying potential hazards and 
operability problems caused by ‘devia-
tions’ from the design intent of  a part 
of  a production process or a proce-
dure for new and existing operations. 
The technique is most associated with 
identifying hazardous deviations from 
the desired state, but it also greatly 
assists the operability of  a process. 
In this mode it is very helpful when 
writing operating procedures and job 
safety analysis (Tyler et al., 2015).
Processes and procedures all have a 
design intent which is the desired nor-
mal state where operations proceed in 
a good way to make products in a safe 
way.
With this in mind, equipment is de-
signed and constructed, which, when 
it is all assembled and working to-
gether, will achieve the desired state. 
In order to achieve this, each item of 
equipment will need to consistently 
function as designed. This is known 
as the ‘design intent’ for that particu-
lar item or section of  the process.
HAZOP is a what-if 
process identifying 
potential hazards caused 
by ‘deviations’ from the 
design intent of a part of 
a production process or 
procedures.
Each part of  this design intent speci-
fies a ‘parameter’ of  interest. For ex-
ample, for a pump this could be   flow, 
temperature  or pressure. With a list 
of  ‘parameters’ of  interest, we can 
then apply ‘guide words’ to show de-
viations from the design intent. Inter-
esting deviations from the design in-
tent in the case of  our cooling facility 
could include less or no flow of  wa-
ter, high temperature or low (or high) 
pressure. When these deviations are 
agreed, all the causes associated with 
them are listed. For example, for no 
or less flow, causes will include pump 
failure, power failure, line blockage, 
etc. 
The possible hazardous consequenc-
es can now be addressed, usually in a 
qualitative manner without significant 
calculation or modelling. In the exam-
ple, these might be, for example, for 
line blockage pump overheats or loss 
of  cooling to process, leading to high 
temperature problems with product.
These simple principles of  the meth-
od are part of  the study   normally 
carried out by a team  that includes 
designers, production engineers, tech-
nology specialists and, very impor-
tantly, operators. The study is record-
ed in a chart as in the study record. 
A decision can  then be made about 
any available safeguards  or extra ones 
that might be needed — based on the 
severity or importance of  the conse-
quence.
It is believed that the HAZOP meth-
odology is perhaps the most widely 
used aid to loss prevention in indus-
try. The reason for this can   be sum-
marised as follows:
• it is easy to learn;
• it can be easily adapted to almost all 
the operations that are carried out 
within process industries;
• no special level of  academic quali-
fication is required.
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2.1.3
Risk analysis  
methodologies
2.1.3.1
Types of risk analysis
Risk analysis is a complex field requir-
ing specialist knowledge and expertise 
but also common sense. It is not just 
a pure scientific field but will neces-
sarily  include judgements over issues 
such as risk appetite and risk manage-
ment strategy. It is vital that the pro-
cess be as comprehensive, consistent, 
transparent and accessible as possible. 
If  a risk cannot be properly under-
stood or   explained, then it is difficult 
if  not impossible for policymakers, 
companies and individuals to make 
rational choices.
The appropriate form of 
risk analysis will depend 
on the purpose and the 
data available from 
simple scenarios to full 
probabilistic analysis, 
but all can lead to 
better decision-making.
Currently, there is no universally 
agreed risk analysis method applied 
to all phenomena and uses, but  the 
methods used rather are determined 
by a variety of  users, such as indus-
trial and transport companies, regula-
tors and insurers. They are selected on 
the basis of  their perceived relevance, 
utility and  available resources. For 
example, a method adopted in indus-
try may not be suitable in the field of 
natural hazards. Legal requirements 
may also dictate the degree of  study 
as well as such factors as the ‘allowa-
ble’ threat to the community. This last 
matter is common in ‘deterministic’ 
risk analysis where the requirement 
may be that there is no credible risk 
for a community in the location of  an 
industrial operation.
Deterministic methods consider the 
consequences of  defined events or 
combinations of  events but do not 
necessarily consider the probability of 
these events or guarantee that all pos-
sible events are captured within the 
deterministic event set. Often this is 
the starting point for risk analysis. At 
the other extreme, stochastic or prob-
abilistic analysis attempts to capture 
all possible outcomes with their prob-
abilities; clearly coming with a much 
higher data and analytical requirement 
and, if  correct, forming the basis for a 
sophisticated risk assessment process.
2.1.3.2
Deterministic methods
Deterministic methods seek to con-
sider the impact of  defined risk events 
and thereby prove   that  consequenc-
es are either manageable or capable of 
being managed. They may be appro-
priate where a full stochastic model is 
impossible due to a lack of  data; pro-
viding real value whilst a more robust 
framework is constructed.
Risk standards may be set at  nation-
al and international level and, if  fully 
complied with, are believed to prevent 
a hazard that could impact the com-
munity. This is akin to the managing 
of  risk in the aviation industry, where 
adherence to strict rules on the design 
and operation of  aircraft and flights 
has produced a very safe industry. 
The same approach to rule- based op-
erations exists in some countries and 
companies.
How are deterministic events framed? 
For example, to check the safety of 
an installation against a severe flood, 
severity is assessed according to the 
worst recently seen, the worst seen in 
the last 20 years or the worst that may 
be expected every 100 years based on 
current climatic conditions and cur-
rent upstream land use. A different 
choice of  event will have a different 
outcome and potentially a very differ-
ent conclusion about manageability. 
Can we ensure that all deterministic 
events used in risk assessment across 
hazards are broadly equivalent in 
probability? If  not, assessments and 
conclusions may be skewed.
Deterministic methods 
seek to consider the 
impact of defined risk 
events and thereby prove 
that  consequences 
are either manageable 
or capable of being 
managed.
In recent times there has been a shift 
from a totally rule- based system to 
one where an element of  qualitative, 
semi- quantitative and quantitative 
risk assessment (QRA) may influence 
decisions. But deterministic risk as-
sessment is also carried out as a reali-
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ty check for more complex stochastic 
models and to test factors that may 
not be adequately modelled within 
these models.
For example, over the past 20 years 
the insurance industry has enthusias-
tically embraced advances risk assess-
ment techniques, but deterministic 
assessment of  the form ‘if  this hap-
pens, this is the consequence’ is still 
required by regulators. They may be 
referred to as:
• a scenario test, where a defined 
event or series of  events is pos-
tulated and the consequences as-
sessed;
• a stress test, where pre-agreed as-
sumptions of  risk, for example 
implied within a business plan 
(e.g. interest rate assumptions), are 
stressed and challenged to deter-
mine their impact on results and 
company sustainability;
• a reverse stress test, where events 
or combinations of  events are pos-
tulated that could cause insolvency 
of  the firm if  unhedged.
Scenario, stress and reverse stress 
tests may be informed by science and 
modelling or expert opinion, or both, 
and often an assessment of  probabili-
ty will be estimated. Insurance regula-
tors often focus on a 0.5 % probabili-
ty level as a benchmark, i.e. the worse 
that may be expected every 200  years. 
If  stress and scenario tests give num-
bers for an estimated 1 in 200 events 
that the stochastic model says could 
happen, say, every 10  years, then it 
casts doubt on the assumptions with-
in the model or the test itself  — they 
could be assessed and challenged. 
Similarly, the framing of  multievent 
reverse stress tests may challenge as-
sumptions about dependency and 
correlation within the model.
Realistically, deterministic methods 
are not 100 % reliable, taking as they 
do only a subset of  potential events, 
but their practical performance in 
preventing hazard -impacting com-
munities is as good and in some cas-
es even better than other methods. If 
properly presented they can be clear, 
transparent and understandable. The 
process of  developing deterministic 
stress and scenario sets can also be a 
means to engage a range of  experts 
and stakeholders in the risk analysis 
process, gaining buy-in to the process.
Whether rules and standards derived 
from such tests work may depend 
on the risk culture of  the region or 
firm where the risk is managed. Some 
risk cultures have a highly disciplined 
approach to rules, whereas others al-
low or apparently tolerate a degree 
of  flexibility. Furthermore, the ef-
fort required to create, maintain and 
check for compliance where technical 
standards are concerned is consider-
able and may be beyond the capacity 
of  those entrusted with enforcement.
2.1.3.3
Semi-quantitative 
risk analysis
Semi-quantitative risk analysis seeks 
to categorise risks by comparative 
scores rather than by explicit proba-
bility and financial or other measur-
able consequences. It is thus more 
rigorous than a purely qualitative ap-
proach but falls short of  a full com-
prehensive quantitative risk analysis. 
But rather like deterministic methods, 
it can complement a full stochas-
tic risk analysis by inserting a reality 
check. Semi-quantitative methods can 
be used to illustrate comparative risk 
and consequences in an accessible way 
to users of  the information. Indeed, 
some output from complex stochas-
tic models may be presented in forms 
similar to that used in semi-quanti-
tative risk analysis, e.g., risk matrices 
and traffic light rating systems (for ex-
ample where red is severe risk, orange 
is medium risk, yellow is low risk and 
green is very low risk).
Semi-quantitative 
risk analysis seeks 
to categorise risks by 
comparative scores 
rather than by explicit 
probability and financial 
or other measurable 
consequences.
A risk matrix is a means to commu-
nicate a semi-quantitative risk assess-
ment: a combination of  two dimen-
sions of  risk, severity and likelihood, 
which allows a simple visual compari-
son of  different risks.
Severity can be considered for any 
unwanted consequence such as fire, 
explosion, toxic release, impact of 
natural hazards (e.g. floods and tsu-
namis) with their effects on workers 
and the community, environmental 
damage, property damage or asset 
loss. A severity scale from minor to 
catastrophic can be estimated or cal-
culated, perhaps informed by some 
form of  model. Normal risk matri-
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ces usually have between four and six 
levels of  severity covering this range 
with a similar number of  probability 
scales. There is no universally adopted 
set of  descriptions for these levels, so 
stakeholders can make a logical selec-
tion based on the purpose of  the risk 
assessment being carried out. The ex-
ample depicted in Figure 2.2, below, 
is designed for risk assessment by a 
chemical production company and is 
based on effects on people. Similar 
matrices can be produced for envi-
ronmental damage, property or capi-
tal loss.  See also Chapter 2.5, Figure 
2.21 for the risk matrix suggested by 
European Commission (2010).
 
In this illustrative example the severi-
ty scale is defined as: 
• insignificant: minor injury quick re-
covery;
• minor: disabling injury;
• moderate: single fatality;
• major: 2 -10 fatalities;
• severe: more than 11 fatalities.
Similarly, the likelihood scale is de-
fined as:
• rare: no globally reported event of 
this scale — all industries and tech-
nologies;
• unlikely: has occurred but not relat-
ed to this industry sector;
• possible: has occurred in this com-
pany but not in this technology;
• likely: has occurred in this location 
— specific protection identified 
and applied;
• almost certain: has occurred in this 
location — no specific protection 
identified and applied.
When plotted in the matrix (Figure 
2.2), a link may be provided to rank 
particular risks or to categorise them 
into tolerable (in green), intermediate 
(in yellow and orange) or intolerable 
(in red) bands. A risk which has severe 
consequences and is estimated to be 
‘likely’ would clearly fall into the intol-
erable band. A risk which has minor 
consequences would be intermediate 
and ‘very rare’ in likelihood would be 
in the tolerable band. For risks which 
appear in the intolerable band, the 
user will need to decide what is done 
with the result. 
There are choices to be made, either 
to reduce the severity of  the conse-
quence or the receptor vulnerability 
and/or to reduce the event’s likeli-
hood. All may require changes to the 
hazardous process. Many users would 
also require intermediate risks to be 
investigated and reduced if  practica-
ble.
Some users apply numerical values to 
the likelihood and/or severity axes of 
the matrix. This produces a ‘calibrat-
ed’ matrix.
The following matrix, in Figure 2.3 
is derived from the Health and Safe-
ty Executive’s publication Reducing 
risks, protecting people (2001) as 
well as from  its final report on the 
A risk matrix
Source: courtesy of authors
FIGURE 2.2
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCES
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Severe
Almost Certain M H H E E
Likely M M H H E
Possible L M M H E
Unlikely L M M M H
Rare L L M M H
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Buncefield fire and explosion, Safety 
and environmental standards for fuel 
storage sites (2009).
Sometimes matrices are used to com-
pare different risk types as per this 
example from the United Kingdom’s 
National risk register of  civil emer-
gencies report (2015). Such matrices 
are intuitively attractive, but in prac-
tice they can be misleading (Cox, 
2008).
Very often an assessment of  both 
frequency and severity is highly sub-
jective and so can greatly differ , even 
when produced by two people with 
similar experiences; the impact of 
expert judgement can be profound 
(Skjong and Wentworth, 2001). It is 
vital  for reasoning to be given for any 
A comparative risk matrix
Source: United Kingdom Cabinet Office (2015)
A calibrated risk matrix
Source: Health and Safety Executive (2001, 2009) 
FIGURE 2.4
FIGURE 2.3
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LIKELIHOOD
SINGLE 
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2 - 10 
FATALITIES
11 - 50 
FATALITIES
51 - 100 
FATALITIES
101+ 
FATALITIES
Likely >10-2/yr Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
Unlikely
>10-4/yr 
but <10-
2/yr
Tolerable 
(but 
intolerable 
if individual 
risk of 
fatality
>10-3/yr)
Tolerable 
(but 
intolerable 
if individual 
risk of 
fatality
>10-3/yr)
Intolerable Intolerable Intolerable
Very 
unlikely
>10-6/yr 
but <10-
4/yr
Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable Intolerable
Remote
>10-8/yr 
but <10-
6/yr
Broadly 
Acceptible
Broadly 
Acceptible Tolerable Tolerable Tolerable
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2
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1 Disruptive industrial action
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and 1 in 2,000
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1 in 200
Between 1 in 200 and 
1 in 20
Between 1 in 20 and 
1 in 2 Greater than 1 in 2
RELATIVE LIKELIHOOD OF OCCURING IN NEXT 5 yEARS
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assessment, therefore allowing debate 
and challenge.
If  subject to a full probabilistic mod-
elling exercise, we would  not just 
have one value for coastal flooding 
but rather a complete distribution of 
coastal floods from frequent but very 
low severity to rare  but very high se-
verity. 
Which point of  the curve should be 
picked for each peril? Different selec-
tions will give very different impres-
sions of  comparative risk.
Semi-quantitative methods can be 
a useful stepping stone towards a 
full quantitative system, particularly 
where detailed data are lacking, and 
can be used as a means to capture 
subjective opinion and hold it up to 
challenge, opening debate and be-
coming a framework to identify where 
additional analytical effort is required.
2.1.3.4
Probabilistic risk  
analysis
This method originated in the Cold 
War nuclear arms race, later adopted 
by the civil nuclear industry. It typi-
cally attempts to associate probability 
distributions to frequency and severi-
ty elements of  hazards and then run 
many thousands of  simulated events 
or years in order to assess the likeli-
hood of  loss at different levels. The 
method is often called Monte Carlo 
modelling after the gaming tables of 
the principality’s casinos. These meth-
ods have been widely adopted by the 
insurance industry, particularly where 
problems are too complicated to be 
represented by simple formulae, in-
cluding catastrophic natural hazard 
risks.
Anonymised insurer comparative event exceedence curve 
Source: Willis Towers Watson
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A commonly used generic term for 
these methods is QRA or probabil-
istic or stochastic risk modelling. To-
day it is frequently used by industry 
and regulators to determine individ-
ual and societal risks from industries 
which present a severe hazard con-
sequence to workers, the community 
and the environment. EU legislation 
such as the Seveso III directive (Di-
rective 2012/18/EU) requires risks 
to be mapped and managed to a tol-
erable level. These industrial require-
ments have resulted in the emergence 
of  organisations, specialists and con-
sultants who typically use specially 
designed software models. The use 
of  probabilistic methods is spreading 
from the industrial field to others, for 
example the Netherlands flood de-
fence planning.
Probabilistic or stochastic 
risk analysis seeks to 
understand and model all 
potential events with their 
associated probabilities 
and outcomes, allowing a 
sophisticated cost/benefit 
analysis of different risk 
management strategies.
Stochastic risk modelling has been 
wholeheartedly embraced by the 
re/insurance industry over the past 
30 years, particularly for natural ca-
tastrophes, though increasingly for all 
types of  risks. EU solvency II regu-
lation (Directive 2009/138/EC), a 
manifestation of  the advisory insur-
ance core principles  for regulators set 
by the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors in Basel (IAIS, 
2015), allows companies to substitute 
some or all of  their regulatory capital 
calculation with their own risk models 
if  approved by their regulatory and 
subject to common European rules.
The main advantage of  a quantitative 
method is that it considers frequency 
and severity together in a more com-
prehensive and complex way than 
other methods. The main problem 
is that it can be very difficult to ob-
tain data on risks: hazard, exposure, 
vulnerability and consequential se-
verity. If  it is difficult to understand 
and represent the characteristics of 
a single risk then it is even harder to 
understand their interdependencies. 
There is inevitably a high level of  sub-
jectivity in the assumptions driving 
an ‘objective’ quantitative analysis. A 
paper by Apostolakis (2004) on QRA 
gives a coherent argument for appro-
priate review and critique of  model 
assumptions. The level of  uncertainty 
inherent in the model may not always 
be apparent or appreciated by the ul-
timate user, but   the results of  a fully 
quantitative analysis, if  properly pre-
sented, enhance risk understanding 
for all stakeholders.
Often the process of  building a 
probabilistic model is as valuable as 
the results of  the model, forcing a 
structured view of  what is known, 
unknown and uncertain and bringing 
assumptions that may otherwise be 
unspoken into the open and thereby 
challenging them.
Typically for a full stochastic mod-
el, severities for each peril would be 
compared for different probability 
levels, often expressed as a return pe-
riod; the inverse of  annual probability, 
i.e. how many years would be expect-
ed to pass before a loss of  a given size 
occurred.
Figure 5 gives an example of  output 
of  such a model, here showing the 
size of  individual loss for two differ-
ent perils  with return periods of  up to 
the worst that may be expected every 
500 years. Note that a return period is 
a commonly used form of  probability 
notation. A 1-in-200 year loss is the 
worst loss that can be expected every 
200 years, i.e. a loss with a return pe-
riod of  200 years. A return period is 
the inverse of  probability; a 1- in -200 
year event has a 0.5 % probability 
(1/200).
We can see that, for example, every 
100 years the worst tropical cy-
clone loss we can expect is over 
EUR 28 million compared to the 
worst earthquake loss we can expect 
every 100 years of  EUR 10 million.
In fact, a tropical cyclone gives rise 
to significantly higher economic loss 
than an earthquake, up until the 1 -in- 
450-year probability level. But which 
is the most dangerous? A more likely 
event probabilities tropical cyclone 
is much more damaging, but at very 
remote probabilities it is earthquake. 
Notice too the very  significant dif-
ferences in loss estimate for the prob-
ability buckets used in the  National 
risk register for civil emergencies re-
port (United Kingdom Cabinet Office 
2015) risk matrix example in Figure 
2.4. The national risk register looks at 
the probability of  an event occurring 
in a 5-year period, but compares the 
1-in-40-year loss to the 1-in-400-year 
loss, broadly equivalent to the 1-in-
200 to 1-in-2 000 5-year bucket: the 
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loss for both perils at these probabili-
ty levels is very different.
Terms like ‘1-in-100 storm’ or ‘1-in 
-100 flood’ are often used in the pop-
ular press, but it is important to define 
what is meant by these terms. Is this 
the worst flood that can be expected 
every 100 years in that town, valley, 
region or country? It is also impor-
tant not just to look at the probabili-
ty of  single events as per Figure 2.5, 
an occurrence exceedance probability 
curve, but also annual aggregate loss 
from hazards of  that type, i.e. an an-
nual aggregate exceedance probabil-
ity curve. For a given return period 
the aggregate exceedance probability 
value will clearly be greater or at least 
equal to the occurrence exceedance 
probability — the 1 in 200 worst ag-
gregate exceedance probability could 
be a year of  one mega event or a year 
of  five smaller ones that are individ-
ually unexceptional but cumulatively 
significant.
The models can be used to compare 
the outcome of  different strategies 
to manage and mitigate risk. The cost 
and benefit of  different solutions 
can be compared, and so an optimal 
strategy rationalised. An anonymised 
insurance example is shown in Figure 
2.6.
Figure 2.6 compares  10 reinsurance 
hedging options to manage insurance 
risk against two measures, one of  risk 
and one of  return. On the horizon-
tal axis we have the risk measure: the 
worse result that we may expect every 
100 years, while on the vertical axis 
we have the return measure, or rath-
er its inverse here, the cost of  each 
hedging option.
Ideally we would be to the top left 
An anonymised example of a risk return analysis
Source: Willis Towers Watson
FIGURE 2.6
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of  the chart: low risk but low cost. 
The ‘do nothing’ option is the black 
triangle at the top right: high risk (a 
EUR 70 million 1-in-100 year loss) 
but zero additional cost. The nine re-
insurance hedging options  fall into 
two clusters on the chart.
The purple diamond option to the ex-
treme left has the least risk, reducing 
the 1-in-100 loss to EUR 30 million, 
but at an annual cost of  EUR 2.25 mil-
lion. The other two options in that 
cluster cost more and offer less ben-
efit so can be ignored. The best opin-
ion of  the middle group is the purple 
square, reducing the 1-in-100 loss to 
EUR 55 million but at an annual aver-
age cost of  EUR 1.75 million. Again, 
this option clearly offers the best risk 
return characteristics of  all  the others 
in the middle group, so the others in 
that group may be discounted.
Therefore, from 10 options including 
the ‘do nothing’, option we have a 
shortlist of  three: 
• black triangle: high risk 
(EUR 70 million 1-in-100 loss), 
zero cost;
• purple square: medium risk 
(EUR 55 million 1-in-100 loss), 
medium cost (EUR 1.75 million);
• purple diamond: lowest risk 
(EUR 30 million 1-in-100 loss), 
highest cost (EUR 2.25 million).
Which  to pick depends on the risk ap-
petite of  the firm. If  they are uncom-
fortable with the unhedged risk then 
the purple diamond seems to offer 
much better protection than the pur-
ple square option for comparatively 
little additional cost.
Similar methods can be used to com-
pare options for, say, managing flood 
risk in a particular location and/or 
process risk for a particular plant. 
The same metrics can be used to look 
at and compare different perils and 
combinations of  perils. The methods 
make no moral judgements but  allow-
ing the cost of  a particular strategy to 
be compared against the reduction is a 
risk as defined by a specific risk meas-
ure. It is at this point that more sub-
jective, political decisions can be made 
on an informed, objective basis.
An example of  a comparative peril 
analysis for a European city is out-
lined in a paper by Grünthal et al. 
(2006) on the city of  Cologne.
It must always be remembered that 
models advise, not decide. Such charts 
and analyses should not be considered 
definitive assessments; like any model 
they are based upon a set of  defined 
assumptions.
2.1.4
Conclusions and key 
messages
Partnership
The process of  risk assessment acts as 
a catalyst to improve risk understand-
ing and so to encourage a process of 
proactive risk management. An early 
adapter of  these methods, the glob-
al catastrophe insurance and reinsur-
ance industry has been transformed 
by the process and has become more 
technically adept, more engaged with 
science and more financially secure, 
providing more resilience for society. 
Similarly, the manufacturing and pro-
cess industries have embraced struc-
tured risk identification and assess-
ment techniques to improve the safety 
of  the manufacturing process and the 
safety of  the consumer.
Disaster risk assessment requires a 
combination of  skills, knowledge and 
data that will not be held within one 
firm, one industry, one institution, 
one discipline, one country, or neces-
sarily one region. Risk assessment re-
quires input from a variety of  experts 
in order to identify potential hazards, 
those that could occur as well as those 
in the historical record. 
Rigorous approaches to risk assess-
ment require scientific modelling and 
a precise understanding of  risk and 
probability. Scientific models can be 
compared in order to challenge the 
underlying assumptions of  each and 
lead to better, more transparent deci-
sions. 
As risk assessments get more quan-
titative, scientific, and technical, it is 
important that policymakers are able 
to interpret them. The assumptions 
within models must be transparent, 
and qualitative risk assessment (such 
as deterministic scenario impacts 
or risk matrixes) can be useful and 
complementary to stochastic model-
ling. It is important that policymak-
ers can demonstrate that appropriate 
expertise and rigor has been engaged 
to found risk management decisions 
firmly.
The practitioner lies in the centre of 
the many opportunities for partner-
ships in disaster risk assessment. In 
order to think beyond accepted ways 
of  working and challenge ingrained 
assumptions, links between other 
practitioners in familiar fields as well 
as other sectors and industries and ac-
ademia are extremely valuable.
58
Knowledge
The risk assessment process is struc-
tured and covers risk identification, 
hazard assessment, determining expo-
sure and understanding vulnerability.
 
Depending on the objective of  risk 
assessment and data availability, risk 
assessment methods can range in for-
malization and rigor. There are more 
subjective scenario based determinis-
tic models, semi quantitative risk anal-
yses such as risk matrixes, and fully 
quantitative risk assessment; probabil-
istic or stochastic risk modelling. The 
more qualitative approaches to risk 
add value through the process of  de-
veloping a framework to capture sub-
jective risk perception and serve as a 
starting point for a discussion about 
assumptions and risk recognition en-
gaging a wide variety of  experts and 
stakeholders in the process. They also 
provide a means to reality check more 
theoretical models. Probabilistic and 
stochastic analyses provide the poten-
tial to perform cost/benefit or risk/
return analysis, creating an objective 
basis for decision making.
Rigorous quantitative approaches 
to risk assessment and probabilistic 
analysis raise awareness of  the need 
for further scientific input and the re-
quirement to transfer of  knowledge 
and engagement between science and 
practitioners.
Risk assessment and analysis provides 
a framework to weigh decisions, and 
risk models provide an objective ba-
sis against which policy decisions 
can be made and justified. However, 
it is important that the limitations of 
modelling are recognized and inher-
ent uncertainty is understood. Having 
the ability to compare and challenge 
assumptions, as well as requiring evi-
dence based analysis, is required.
Risk perception is subjective, but 
practitioners have valuable informa-
tion in the fields of  data, methodol-
ogies and models that further solidify 
frameworks through which hazards 
can be understood and compared in 
an objective fashion. 
Innovation
Innovation is required to meet the 
challenges of  lack of  data and partial 
information in risk identification and 
modelling. Creative approaches can 
be made to capture and challenges 
assumptions implicitly or explicitly 
made and so test them against availa-
ble data and defined stresses.
.
Risk analysis creates a 
framework; a starting 
point for debate about 
policy, risk and what we 
know and cannot know. 
This leads to greater 
understanding and 
better, more transparent 
decision-making.
No model is perfect. New scientif-
ic input can improve and challenge 
models – testing sensitivity to prior 
assumption, so leading to a great-
er understanding of  disaster events 
which in turn leads to safer compa-
nies, communities and countries A 
deeper understanding of  the quantita-
tive and qualitative approaches to risk 
management can help innovate ways 
of  thinking about subjective public 
risk perception, and risk assessment 
frameworks can develop a more ob-
jective understanding of  risk and 
risk-informed decision making.
Risk assessment and associated mod-
elling contain inherent uncertainty and 
are not fully complete. It is important 
to innovate in areas where hazards are 
less known and capable of  anticipa-
tion; truly “unknown unknowns” and 
“known unknowns” must be consid-
ered.  Similarly assumptions held for 
“known knowns” should be contin-
uously challenged and tested as new 
information arises.
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2.2 Current and innovative 
methods to define expo-
sure
Christina	Corbane, Paolo Gamba, Martino Pesaresi, Massi-
miliano Pittore, Marc Wieland
2.2.1
What is exposure?
Exposure with vulnerability (see 
Chapter 2.3) and hazard (see Chapter 
3)  is used to measure disaster risk (see 
Chapter  2.3). It is reported that expo-
sure has been trending upwards over 
the past several decades, resulting in 
an overall increase in risk observed 
worldwide, and that trends need to be 
better quantified to be able to address 
risk reduction measures. Particular at-
tention to understanding exposure is 
required for the formulation of  poli-
cies and actions to reduce disaster risk 
(UNISDR, 2015a), as highlighted by 
the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction (UNISDR, 2015b): 
‘Policies and practices for disaster risk 
management should be based on an 
understanding of  disaster risk in all its 
dimensions of  vulnerability, capacity, 
exposure of  persons and assets, haz-
ard characteristics and the environ-
ment. Such knowledge can be lever-
aged for the purpose of  pre -disaster 
risk assessment, for prevention and 
mitigation and for the development 
and implementation of  appropriate 
preparedness and effective response 
to disasters.
Exposure is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, determinant of  risk (Cardona et 
al., 2012) (see Chapter  2.1). Accord-
ing to available global statistics, least 
developed countries represent 11 % 
of  the population exposed to hazards 
but account for 53 % of  casualties, 
while the most developed countries 
account for 1.8 % of  all victims (Pe-
duzzi et al., 2009) with a population 
exposure of  15 %. These figures 
show that similar exposures with con-
trasting levels of  development, of 
land- use planning and of  mitigation 
measures lead to drastically different 
tolls of  casualties. Hence it is possi-
ble to be exposed, but not vulnerable; 
however, it is necessary to also be ex-
posed to be vulnerable to an extreme 
event (Cardona et al., 2012).
Due to its multidimensional nature, 
exposure is highly dynamic, varying 
across spatial and temporal scales: 
depending on the spatial basic units 
at which the risk assessment is per-
formed, exposure can be character-
ised at different spatial scales (e.g. at 
the level of  individual buildings or 
administrative units).
Exposure represents the 
people and assets at risk 
of potential loss or that 
may suffer damage to 
hazard impact. It covers 
several dimensions like 
the physical (e.g. building 
stock and infrastructure), 
the social (e.g. humans 
and communities) and the 
economic dimensions.
Population demographic and mobility, 
economic development and structural 
changes in the society transform expo-
sure over time. The quantification of 
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exposure is challenging because of  its 
interdependent and dynamic dimen-
sions. The tools and methods for de-
fining exposure need to consider the 
dynamic nature of  exposure, which 
evolves over time as a result of  often 
unplanned urbanisation, demograph-
ic changes, modifications in building 
practice and other socioeconomic, in-
stitutional and environmental factors 
(World Bank, GFDRR, 2014). Various 
alternative or complementary tools 
and methods are followed to collect 
exposure-related data; they include 
rolling census and digital in situ field 
surveys. When the amount, spatial 
coverage and/or quality of  the infor-
mation collected in the ground is in-
sufficient for populating exposure da-
tabases, the common practice is then 
to infer characteristics on exposed 
assets from several indicators, called 
proxies. Exposure modelling  also has 
a key role to play in risk assessment, 
especially for large- scale disaster risk 
models (regional to global risk model-
ling (De Bono and Chatenoux, 2015; 
De Bono and Mora ,2014)). Among 
the different tools for collecting in-
formation on exposure, Earth obser-
vation represents an invaluable source 
of  up-to-date information on the ex-
tent and nature of  the built-up envi-
ronments, ranging from the city lev-
el (using very high spatial resolution 
data) to the global level (using global 
coverage of  satellite data) (Deich-
mann et al., 2011; Dell’Acqua et al. 
,2013; Ehrlich and Tenerelli, 2013). 
Besides, change -detection techniques 
based on satellite images can provide 
timely information about changes to 
the built-up environment (Bouziani et 
al., 2010).The choice of  the approach 
determines the resolution (spatial de-
tail) and the extent (spatial coverage) 
of  the collected exposure data. It also 
influences the quality of  the collected 
information.
Despite the general conceptual and 
theoretical understanding of  disaster 
exposure and the drivers for its dy-
namic variability, few countries have 
developed multihazard exposure da-
tabases to support policy formulation 
and disaster risk- reduction research. 
Existing exposure databases are often 
hazard specific (earthquakes, floods 
and cyclones), sector specific (infra-
structure and economic) or target 
specific (social, ecosystems and cul-
tural) (Basher et al., 2015). They are 
often static, offering one-time views 
of  the baseline situation, and cannot 
be easily integrated with vulnerability 
analysis.
This chapter reviews the current in-
itiatives for defining and mapping 
exposure at the EU and global levels. 
It places emphasis on remote sensing- 
based products developed for phys-
ical and population exposure map-
ping. Innovative approaches based on 
probabilistic models for generating 
dynamic exposure databases are also 
presented together with a number 
of  concrete recommendations for 
priority areas in exposure research. 
The broader aspects of  exposure, in-
cluding environment (e.g. ecosystem 
services) and agriculture (e.g. crops, 
supply chains and infrastructures), de-
serve to be addressed in a dedicated 
future chapter and will not be covered 
by the current review.
2.2.2
Why do we need 
exposure?
There is a high demand for exposure 
data by the communities that address 
disaster risk reduction (DRR). Na-
tional governments and local author-
ities need to implement DRR pro-
grammes; the insurance community 
needs to set premiums and manage 
their aggregate exposures; civil society 
and the aid community need to identi-
fy the regions of  the world that most 
urgently require DRR measures (Ehr-
lich and Tenerelli, 2013). Effective 
adaptation and disaster risk manage-
ment (DRM) strategies and practices 
depend on a rigorous understanding 
of  the dimensions of  exposure (i.e. 
physical and economic) as well as a 
proper assessment of  changes and 
uncertainties in those dimensions 
(Cardona et al., 2012).
Both the scope and 
the scale of the 
natural hazard impact 
assessment determine 
the type of exposure data 
to be collected.
Risk models require detailed exposure 
data (e.g. with information on build-
ings, roads and other public assets) to 
produce as outputs risk metrics such 
as the annual expected loss  and the 
probable maximum loss  (see Chapter 
2.4). For instance, catastrophe mod-
els commonly used by the insurance 
industry include an exposure module, 
which represents either a building of 
specific interest, a dwelling represent-
ative of  the average construction type 
in a given area or an entire portfolio of 
buildings with different characteristics 
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(e.g. an entire city). The characteristics 
may include physical characteristics 
like building height, occupancy rate, 
usage (private, public like commer-
cial, industrial, etc.), construction type 
(e.g. wood or concrete) and age, and 
also non-physical characteristics like 
the replacement cost which is need-
ed for calculating the loss at a certain 
location (Michel-Kerjan et al., 2013). 
Besides, insurance companies need to 
assess and  model the business inter-
ruption  that represents a major part 
of  the total economic loss. To quan-
tify loss due to business interruption, 
exposure databases need to include 
information on building contents and 
business information for different 
types of  properties (Rose and Huyck 
2016). These industry exposure data-
bases are often proprietary and use 
heterogeneous taxonomies and classi-
fication systems which hinder efforts 
of  merging independently developed 
datasets (GFDRR, 2014). However, 
the Oasis (OASIS, 2016) community 
and the recently established Insur-
ance Development Forum are dedi-
cating special efforts to exposure data 
harmonisation, sourcing, structuring 
and maintenance at the global levels. 
Moreover, an initiative lead by Perils 
is offering de facto standard indus-
try exposure databases for property 
across Europe at an aggregated spa-
tial level (PERILS, 2016).
If  the aim is to know whether a par-
ticular feature is likely to be affected 
or not by a certain level of  hazard, 
then it is enough to simply identify 
the location of  that feature (e.g. build-
ing location and building footprint) or 
group of  features (e.g. building stock). 
Whereas if  the purpose is to under-
stand the potential economic impacts 
or human loss, then other attributes 
of  the feature or  group of  features 
need to described (e.g. the type of 
construction materials, population 
density and the replacement value). 
Exposure databases detailed to single 
building units are seldom available for 
disaster modellers. Instead, the expo-
sure data are more often available in 
an aggregated level for larger spatial 
units related to arbitrary areal subdivi-
sion of  the settlements, census block, 
postal codes, city blocks or more reg-
ular gridded subdivision. A spatial 
unit may contain a statistic summary 
of  building information such as aver-
age size and average height, density or 
even relative distribution of  building 
types (Ehrlich and Tenerelli, 2013). 
For optimal results the choice of  the 
attribute and its granularity should be 
aligned with the scale and the purpose 
of  the risk assessment. To a certain 
extent, the requirements in terms of 
granularity also depend  on the peril 
being modelled: e.g. flood models re-
quire detailed information on the lo-
cation and building type. By contrast, 
windstorm models arguably need to 
be less precise. Detailed gust speeds 
will not be known at a precise loca-
tion level but rather estimated on a 
broader spatial scale. There are clearly 
many attributes that can be attached 
to exposure data. Developing such 
databases requires a multidiscipli-
nary team of  construction engineers, 
economists, demographers and statis-
ticians.
In recent years, several exposure data-
sets with regional or global coverage 
have attempted to generate detailed 
building inventories and compile ex-
posure data despite the challenges re-
lated to the heterogeneous mapping 
schemas, the different typologies and 
the varying resolutions. In the follow-
ing sections, we review the existing 
initiatives at  EU and global levels that 
have made a first step in overcoming 
these obstacles either i)  by using ex-
posure proxies such as land -use and 
land- cover products, ii)   by using 
Earth observation technologies for 
mapping human settlements and pop-
ulation or iii)  by integrating existing 
information from different acquisi-
tion techniques, scales and accuracies 
for characterising the assets at risk 
and for describing the building stock. 
We purposely limit the review here 
to large -scale exposure datasets  that 
have a spatial component (i.e. associ-
ated with a geographic location) and 
that are open, hence ensuring repli-
cability and a better understanding of 
risk (World Bank, 2014).
2.2.3
Land-cover and 
land-use products
as proxies to  
exposure 
These products outline areas with 
different uses, including ‘industrial’, 
‘commercial’ and ‘residential’ classes, 
as well as non-impervious areas (e.g. 
green spaces). 
Land- use and land- 
cover (LU/LC) information 
products that are usually 
derived from remote 
sensing data may provide 
information on buildings 
and thus on exposure. 
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Some products may also describe the 
building density. LU/LC maps pro-
vide valuable information on infra-
structure  such as roads. The spatial 
characteristics of  LU/LC maps are 
influenced by the minimum mapping 
units , which refer to the smallest size 
area entity to be mapped.
2.2.3.1
European land-use 
and land-cover (LU/LC) 
products
The currently available EU-wide and 
global LU/LC products have mini-
mum mapping units  ranging between 
0.01  ha (e.g. the European Settlement 
Map (ESM)) to 100  ha (e.g. MODIS 
land cover). At the EU level, the Corine 
Land Cover is the only harmonised 
European land cover data available 
since 1990. It comprises 44 thematic 
classes with  units of  25 ha and 5 ha 
for changes, respectively. From 1990 
until 2012, four  of  such inventories 
were produced and completed by 
change layers, and it  has been used 
for several applications like indicator 
development, LU/LC change analysis 
(Manakos and Braun, 2014) and flood 
risk assessment within the EU con-
text (Lugeri et al., 2010). However, 
its limitations in terms of  spatial res-
olution do not allow the conversion 
of  land- cover classes into accurate, 
physical exposure maps. To comple-
ment LU/LC maps, detailed inven-
tories of  infrastructures are  essential 
for assessing risks to infrastructures 
as well as for managing emergency 
situations. In 2015, a geographical 
European Settlement Map– 10 m resolution – Genova
Source: European Commission (JRC)
FIGURE 2.7
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database of  infrastructure in Europe 
was developed including transport 
networks, power plants and industry 
locations. (Marin Herrera et al., 2015). 
The database was successfully used 
in a comprehensive multihazard and 
multisector risk assessment for Eu-
rope under climate change (Forzieri 
et al., 2015).
The Urban Atlas is another pan-Eu-
ropean LU/LC product describing, 
in a consistent way, all major Eu-
ropean cities’ agglomerations with 
more than 100 000 inhabitants. The 
current specifications of  the Urban 
Atlas fulfil the condition of  a mini-
mum mapping unit  of  0.25  ha, al-
lowing the capture of  urban, built-up 
areas in sufficient thematic and geo-
graphic detail (Montero et al., 2014). 
The Urban Atlas cities are mapped 
in 20 classes, of  which 17 are urban 
classes. It is  a major initiative dealing 
with the monitoring of  urban sprawl 
in Europe,   designed to capture ur-
ban land use, including low- density 
urban fabric, and in this way it offers a 
far more accurate picture of  exposure 
in urban landscapes than the Corine 
Land Cover does. Despite its accuracy 
and relevance for risk modelling, the 
main limitation of  this product is its 
spatial coverage, as it is restricted to 
large urban zones and their surround-
ings (more than 100 000 inhabitants).
Currently, the continental map of 
built-up areas with the highest reso-
lution  so far produced is the ESM 
(Florczyk et al., 2016). The ESM (Fig-
ure 2.7) is a 10 metre  x  10 metre ras-
ter map expressing the proportion of 
the remote sensing image pixel area 
covered by buildings;  it was  pro-
duced in 2013-2014. It was developed 
jointly by two services of  Europe-
an Commission (JRC and REGIO). 
The ESM is distributed as a building 
density product at both 10 metre  x 
10 metre and 100 metre x 100 metre 
resolutions, each supporting specific 
types of  applications. For a pan-Eu-
ropean risk assessment (Haque et al. 
2016), the coarser (100 metre) resolu-
tion is sufficient, whereas the 10 me-
tre product would be necessary for 
local to regional risk assessment.
2.2.3.2
Global land-use and 
land-cover  products
A number of  global land- cover 
products covering different time pe-
riods and different spatial resolutions 
have been created from remote sens-
ing, e.g. MODIS (Friedl et al., 2010), 
Africover,  GLC-SHARE of  2014 
(Latham et al., 2014), GLC2000 (Fritz 
et al., 2010), IGBP (Loveland et al., 
2000) and GlobCover (Arino et al., 
2012). Many of  these products are 
based on coarse resolution sensors, 
e.g. GLC2000 is at 1 km, MODIS 
is at 500 metre and GlobCover is at 
300 metre resolution, which hampers 
the potential to provide accurate ex-
posure data that can directly feed into 
risk assessment models.
The first high- resolution (30 me-
tres) global land -cover product is the 
GlobeLand30, which comprises  10 
types of  land cover including artifi-
cial surfaces for years 2000 and 2010 
(Chen et al., 2015). However, the  ‘ar-
tificial surfaces’ class consists of  ur-
ban areas, roads, rural cottages and 
mines impeding the straightforward 
conversion of  the data into physical 
exposure maps.
The Global Urban Footprint  de-
scribing built-up areas is being de-
veloped by the German Aerospace 
Centre  and is based on the analysis 
of  radar and optical satellite data. The 
project intends to cover the extent of 
the large urbanised areas of  megaci-
ties for four -time slices: 1975, 1990, 
2000 and 2010 at a spatial resolution 
of  12 metre  x  12 metre (Esch et al., 
2012). Once available, this dataset will 
allow effective comparative analyses 
of  urban risks and their dynamics 
among different regions of  the world.
The global human settlement layer 
(GHSL) is the first global, fine- scale, 
multitemporal, open data on the phys-
ical characteristics of  human settle-
ments. It was  produced in the frame-
work of  the GHSL project, which is 
supported by the European Commis-
sion. The data have been released on 
the JRC open data catalogue (Glob-
al Human Settlement Layer, 2016). 
The main product, GHS Built-up, is 
a multitemporal built-up grid (built-
up classes: 1975, 1990, 2000 and 2014 
), which has been produced at high 
resolution (approximately 38 metre 
x  38 metre). The GHS Built-up grid 
was obtained from the processing of 
the global Landsat archived data in 
the last 40  years in order to under-
stand global human settlement evolu-
tion. The target information collected 
by the GHSL project is the built-up 
structure or building aggregated in 
built-up areas and then settlements 
according to explicit spatial composi-
tion laws. They are the primary sign 
and empirical evidences of  human 
presence on the global surface that are 
observable by current remote sens-
ing platforms. As opposed to stand-
ard remote sensing practices based 
on urban land cover or impervious 
surface notions, the GHSL semantic 
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approach is continuously quantitative 
and centred around the presence of 
buildings and their spatial patterns 
(Pesaresi et al., 2015; Pesaresi et al., 
2013). This makes the GHSL perfect-
ly suitable for describing the physical 
exposure and its changes over time at 
a fine spatial resolution (Pesaresi et al., 
2016).
2.2.4
Status of population  
exposure at the EU 
and global levels
The static component relates to the 
number of  inhabitants per mapping 
unit and their characteristics, where-
as the dynamic component refers to 
their demography and their activity 
patterns that highlight the move-
ment of  population through space 
and time. Population distribution can 
be expressed as either the absolute 
number of  people per mapping unit 
or as population density. Census data 
are commonly used for enumerating 
population and for making projec-
tions concerning population growth. 
Census data may also contain other 
relevant characteristics that are used 
in risk assessment, such as informa-
tion on age, gender, income, educa-
tion and migration. 
For large- scale analysis, census data 
are costly and seldom available in large 
parts of  the world or are even out-
dated or unreliable. Remote sensing, 
combined with dasymetric  mapping, 
represents an interesting alternative for 
large- scale mapping of  human expo-
sure. Dasymetric mapping consists in 
disaggregating population figures re-
ported at coarse source zones into a 
finer set of  zones using ancillary geo-
graphical data like LU/LC.
2.2.4.1
European-wide 
population grids
At the EU level, a European popu-
lation grid with a spatial resolution 
of  100 metres x 100 metres was pro-
duced (Batista e Silva et al., 2013). The 
method involved dasymetric mapping 
techniques with a resident population 
reported at the commune level for the 
year 2011 and a refined version of  the 
Corine Land Cover as the main input 
sources. The data are publically dis-
tributed on the geographic informa-
tion system of  the Commission fol-
lowing the standardised 1 km x  1 km 
grid net and the Inspire specifications.
A new population grid at 10 me-
Modeled nighttime and daytime population densities (at 50 m) and  volcanic hazard zones in Campi Flegrei – 
Naples.
Source: Sergio Freire et al. (2015)
FIGURE 2.8
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tres has recently been produced for 
the whole European territory, which 
builds on the ESM at 10 metres as a 
proxy of  the distribution of  residen-
tial population and 2011 census data 
(Freire et al., 2015a). The layer has 
been produced upon request of  the 
European Commission and will soon 
be made freely available and down-
loadable online. Figure 2.8. shows an 
example of  potential uses of  the 10 
-metre- resolution, EU- wide ESM 
map for modelling day and night pop-
ulation distribution in volcanic risk 
assessment.
2.2.4.2
Global human exposure
Global distribution of  population 
in terms of  counts or density per 
unit area is considered as the prima-
ry source of  information for expo-
sure assessment (Pittore et al., 2016). 
Global population data are available 
from the LandScan Global Popula-
tion Database (Dobson et al., 2000), 
which provides information on the 
average population over 24  hours and 
in a 1 km resolution grid. 
The LandScan data have annual up-
dates and  are widely used despite be-
ing a commercial product. Although 
LandScan is reproduced annually and 
the methods are constantly revised, 
the annual improvements made to the 
model and the underlying spatial var-
iables advise against any comparison 
of  versions.
Other global human exposure da-
tasets include the Gridded Popula-
tion of  the World  (GPWv4) availa-
ble at a resolution of  approximately 
5 km at the equator. It is developed 
by SEDAC and  provides population 
data estimates at a spatial resolution 
of  approximately 1 km at the equa-
tor. For GPWv4 , population input 
data are collected at the most detailed 
spatial resolution available from the 
results of  the 2010 round of  census-
es, which occurred between 2005 and 
2014. The input data are extrapolated 
Global human exposure represented by the GHSL population data in 3D. The box represents an example of ap-
plication for analysing the evolution of exposure to coastal hazards over the last 40  years. 
Source: Pesaresi et al. (2016)
FIGURE 2.9
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to produce population estimates for 
the years 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 
2020 (Neumann et al., 2015).
The open WorldPop is another in-
itiative providing estimated  popu-
lation counts at a spatial resolution 
of  100 metres x 100 metres through 
the integration of  census surveys, 
high- resolution maps and satellite 
data (Lloyd et al., 2017) . Within the 
WorldPop project, population counts 
and densities are being produced for 
2000-2020;  the available data current-
ly essentially cover America, Asia and 
Africa.
People present the most 
important elements-at-
risk with a static and 
dynamic component.
Recently, within the framework of 
the GHSL, an improved global lay-
er called GHS-POP, which maps the 
distribution of  the population with 
unprecedented spatio-temporal cov-
erage and detail, has been released. 
The data have been produced from 
the best available global built-up layer 
(GHS-BU) and from census geospa-
tial data derived from GPWv4. The 
population grids correspond to res-
idential-based population estimates 
in built-up areas and not ‘residential 
population’ or ‘population in their 
place of  residence’, for which consid-
eration of  land use would be required 
(Freire et al., 2015b). 
The multitemporal data are available 
free of  charge at a spatial resolution 
of  250 metres x 250 metres for 1975, 
1990, 2000 and 2015. It has already 
successfully been used in the context 
of  global risk assessment for the anal-
ysis of  the increase in population ex-
posure to coastal hazards over the last 
40 years (Pesaresi et al., 2016).
2.2.5
Exposure data  
describing the 
building stock
Several exposure databases attempt 
to characterise the assets at risk by 
including physical exposure infor-
mation. The latter is often derived 
from the integration of  a large vari-
ety of  possible exposure information 
sources using different modelling ap-
proaches. We review here the existing 
initiatives that describe the building 
stock through a variety of  attributes 
(e.g. height, construction material and 
replacement value).
2.2.5.1
EU-wide building 
inventory databases
The European Union’s seventh 
framework programme for research 
and technological development (FP7) 
project, the NERA (Network of  Eu-
ropean Research Infrastructure for 
Earthquake Risk Assessment and 
Mitigation) initiated the development 
of  a European building inventory da-
tabase to feed into the Global Expo-
sure Database (GED) (see Chapter 
2.2.5.2). The database builds upon the 
outcomes of  NERIES project (Net-
work of  Research Infrastructures for 
European Seismology) to compile 
building inventory data for many Eu-
ropean countries and Turkey (Erdik 
et al., 2010). The European building 
inventory is a database that describes 
the number and area of  different 
European building typologies within 
each cell of  a grid, with a resolution of 
at least 30  arc seconds (approximately 
1 km2 at the equator) for use in the 
seismic risk assessment of  European 
buildings (Crowley et al., 2012). The 
database includes building/dwelling 
counts and a number of  attributes 
that are compatible with the Glob-
al earthquake model’s basic building 
taxonomy (i.e. material, lateral load, 
number of  storeys, date of  construc-
tion, structural irregularity, occupancy 
class, etc.). This inventory contains 
useful information for the assessment 
of  risk assessment and for the estima-
tion of  economic loss at the EU level.
2.2.5.2
Global building 
inventory databases
The prompt assessment of  glob-
al earthquakes for response (PAG-
ER) (Jaiswal et al., 2010), the GED 
for GAR 2013 (GEG-2013) and 
the GED for the Global earthquake 
model (GED4GEM) are examples of 
global exposure databases that specif-
ically include physical exposure in-
formation.
On a country-by-country level, the 
PAGER (Jaiswal et al., 2010) con-
tains estimates of  the distribution of 
building types categorised by material, 
lateral force resisting system and oc-
cupancy type (residential or non-resi-
dential, urban or rural). The database 
draws on and harmonises numerous 
sources: (1)  United Nations statistics, 
(2)  the United Nations habitat’s de-
mographic and health survey  data-
base, (3)  national housing censuses, 
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(4)  the world housing encyclopae-
dia project and (5)  other literature. 
PAGER provides a powerful basis for 
inferring structural types globally. The 
database is freely available for public 
use, subject to peer review, scrutiny 
and open enhancement.
The GEC-2013 (De Bono and Chate-
noux, 2015) is a global exposure da-
taset at 5 km spatial resolution which 
integrates population and coun-
try-specific building typology, use and 
value. It has been developed for the 
global risk assessment 2013 with the 
primary aim of  assessing the risk of 
economic loss as a consequence of 
natural hazards at a global scale. The 
development of  GEG-2013 is based 
on a top-down or ‘downscaling’ ap-
proach, where information including 
socioeconomic, building type and 
capital stock at a national scale are 
transposed onto a regular grid, using 
geographic population and gross do-
mestic product  distribution models 
as proxies. GEG-2013 is limited in 
some important ways: i)  it was fun-
damentally constructed using national 
indicators that were successively dis-
aggregated onto a 5 × 5 km grid; and 
ii)  the capital stock in each cell is dis-
tributed on the basis of  the number 
of  persons living in that cell and does 
not take into account the real value of 
the assets of  the cell. The data can be 
downloaded from the GAR risk data 
platform.
The GED4GEM is a spatial invento-
ry of  exposed assets for the purpos-
es of  catastrophe modelling and loss 
estimation (Dell’Acqua et al., 2013, 
Gamba et al., 2012). It provides infor-
mation about two main assets at risk: 
residential population and residential 
buildings. Potentially, it can also in-
clude information about non-residen-
tial population and buildings, although 
the amount of  information for these 
two additional assets is currently quite 
limited. In general, the GED is divid-
ed into four different levels, which are 
populated from different data sourc-
es and use different techniques. Each 
level has a different geographical scale 
as for the statistical consistency of  the 
data it contains as well as a different 
level of  completeness. Each level is 
thus appropriate for a different use: 
• Level 0 — A representation of  the 
population and buildings on a 30- 
arc seconds grid with information 
about the buildings coming from 
statistics available at the country 
level. The building distribution is 
thus the same for each element of 
the grid belonging to a given coun-
try, with a binary difference be-
tween ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ areas.
• Level 1 — A representation of 
population and buildings on a 30 
-arc seconds grid with information 
about the buildings that is availa-
ble using the subnational statistics 
(e.g. for regions, states, provinces 
or municipalities according to the 
different countries).
• Level 2 — A representation where 
each element of  the same 30 -arc 
seconds grid includes enough in-
formation to be consistent by itself, 
and no distribution on a bigger ge-
ographical scale is used. This case 
corresponds to the situation when 
all building counts are actually ob-
tained, not by means of  a disaggre-
gation of  a distribution available 
on a wider area on the elements of 
the grid but by aggregating build-
ing -level data, possibly available 
for the area of  interest.
• Level 3 — A representation at the 
single building level, including all 
the possible information about 
each building, such as structural, 
occupancy and economic variables.
The first version of  the GED con-
tains aggregate information on pop-
ulation and the number/built area/
reconstruction cost of  residential and 
non-residential buildings at a 1 km 
resolution. Detailed datasets on single 
buildings are available for a selected 
number of  areas and will increase 
over time.
2.2.6
Future trends in 
exposure mapping: 
towards a dynamic 
exposure modelling
The review of  existing initiatives 
for defining and mapping exposure 
shows that there is a clear trend to-
wards the use of  satellite data in 
combination with statistical model-
ling (top-down and bottom-up ap-
proaches) for building exposure data: 
remotely sensed data sourcing for ex-
posure is particularly useful in low-in-
come and emerging economies which 
lack well-established data collection 
resources, frameworks and agencies. 
These economies are often also un-
dergoing rapid urbanisation with dra-
matically changing exposure concen-
trations over short periods of  time.
In parallel, over the last  5 years, the 
field of  risk assessment has been in-
creasingly driven by open data and 
open -source modelling, as highlight-
ed in the report Understanding risk in 
an evolving world (GFDRR, 2014). 
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Open data initiatives such as the Hu-
manitarian OpenStreetMap Team  has 
contributed significantly to the collec-
tion of  exposure data in vulnerable 
countries: in a little over a year, more 
than 160 000 individual buildings 
were mapped through crowdsourcing 
and in situ surveys.
At present, one of  the most challeng-
ing aspects of  exposure modelling is 
to implement multihazard exposure 
models through dynamic, scalable 
frameworks. The dynamic nature of 
such frameworks in this context re-
flects the need to explicitly account 
for both the time variability of  the 
exposed assets and the constant evo-
lution of  their representation in the 
model, which is seldom complete and 
exhaustive.
Remote sensing, 
combined with dynamic 
exposure modelling and 
bottom-up approaches 
such as citizen mapping 
initiatives, can be an 
effective way to build 
large exposure databases 
.
In a dynamic, multiresolution expo-
sure model, two basic types of  entities 
should therefore coexist: atomic data 
and statistical (aggregated) models. 
Atomic data refer to physical struc-
tures such as buildings or bridges that 
have been analysed individually and 
possibly not fully enumerated. Statis-
tical models are aggregated descrip-
tions defined over specific geographic 
boundaries and possibly influenced 
by atomic data. Atomic data and sta-
tistical models are closely related and 
mutually interactive, with both having 
geometric properties and attributes. 
Compound models accommodat-
ing both atomic data and statistical 
models would be able to optimally 
exploit direct, in situ information ob-
tained from specialised surveys, even 
if  not complete and exhaustive, by 
constraining a set of  statistical distri-
butions describing the assets’ attrib-
utes at the atomic level (e.g. material 
properties for a single building) or at 
the aggregation boundary level (for 
instance the expected number of  sto-
reys of  different building types based 
on empirical observations in a city dis-
trict). At atomic level, this can be ob-
tained for instance by modelling the 
(in)dependence relationships among 
different assets’ attributes and with 
external covariates (e.g. geographical 
location, altitude, terrain slope, etc.). 
An example for a probabilistic infor-
mation integration approach is given 
in Pittore and Wieland (2013), where 
Bayesian networks are proposed for 
their sound treatment of  uncertain-
ties and for the possibility of  seamless 
merging of  different data sources, in-
cluding legacy data, expert judgement 
and data mining- based inferences. 
Due to the increasingly large varie-
ty of  possible exposure information 
sources including sparse and incom-
plete data available at small- scale res-
olution, the issue of  the need for the 
flexible integration of  existing infor-
mation at different scales and accura-
cies in order not to  discard available 
information needs to be confronted.
To exploit the full capabilities of  the 
available information in combined 
spatio-temporal approaches, a da-
tabase is needed that allows one to 
model and query complex data types 
composed of  multiple spatial and 
temporal dimensions. Information ex-
tracted from a satellite image or man-
ually sampled in situ show different 
degrees of  quality in terms of  relia-
bility and accuracy. Therefore, a prob-
abilistic framework for information 
integration, updating and refinement 
is required, as exemplified in Pittore 
and Wieland (2013). During monitor-
ing activities, the resulting informa-
tion model continuously evolves and 
a dynamic exposure database should 
be able to track an object’s evolution 
over space and time while accounting 
for its identity which  is the lifespan 
of  an object. To this regard, Pittore et 
al. (2015) propose a novel approach 
to prioritise exposure data collection 
based on available information and 
additional constraints. They utilise 
the concept of  focus maps (Pittore, 
2015), which combine different infor-
mation layers into a single raster rep-
resenting the probability of  the point 
being selected for surveying, condi-
tional on the sampling probability of 
each of  the other layers. Based on a 
focus map, a set of  sampling points 
is generated and suitably routed on 
the existing road network. This al-
lows one to realise a further optimi-
sation of  the overall data collection 
by including additional survey con-
straints in the routing algorithm and 
which drives the in situ data collec-
tion phase. Iteratively repeating this 
process allows for an efficient model 
updating which can be optimised to 
fit the available time and resources.
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2.2.7
Conclusions and key 
messages 
The increasing availability of  detailed 
and harmonised hazard datasets is 
calling for parallel efforts in the pro-
duction of  standardised multihazard 
exposure information for disaster risk 
models. GEDs can be a possible solu-
tion for harmonisation and for mov-
ing beyond single-hazard databases. 
Several recommendations can be 
distilled from this overview and  are 
provided here to develop a roadmap 
towards the effective implementation 
of  global, dynamic exposure data-
bases. Finally, exposure data collec-
tion should be regarded as a contin-
uous process sustaining a continuous 
re-evaluation of  risks to enable an ef-
fective DRR.
Partnership
Authoritative and non-authoritative 
sources should be integrated in order 
to ensure quality standards and com-
pliance with the disaster risk- reduc-
tion purposes. Within this context, it 
becomes important to harvest data 
from crowd-sourced information and 
exploit volunteered geographic in-
formation to augment authoritative 
sources and involve communities and 
experts, especially in data-poor coun-
tries.
Knowledge
The need for quality assessment and 
an analysis of  the uncertainty in the 
exposure data to avoid error propaga-
tion. Quantification of  exposure data 
uncertainty is useful for anatomising 
the structure of  the total uncertainty 
in the risk assessment into individual 
uncertainties associated with the risk 
components (exposure uncertainty 
compared to that of  hazard and vul-
nerability). In addition, the communi-
cation of  uncertainty to the users of 
the exposure databases is also essen-
tial to ensure local understanding and 
trust in the data.
Innovation
Data and (statistical) models have to 
coexist in a statistically sound frame-
work in order to overcome the im-
practicality of  having a complete and 
fully enumerated global dynamic ex-
posure database. Flexible integration 
of  existing information at different 
scales and accuracies in order  not to 
discard available information needs to 
be confronted. To this regard, rapid, 
large-scale data collection based on 
remote sensing should be fully ex-
ploited and   be complemented when-
ever possible by information collected 
in situ using suitable sampling meth-
odologies.
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2.3.1
The importance of 
vulnerability for 
disaster risk  
assessment
2.3.1.1 
Vulnerability: a key 
component to  
determine risks
Disaster risk is determined by the 
combination of  physical hazards and 
the vulnerabilities of  exposed ele-
ments. Vulnerability relates to the sus-
ceptibility of  assets such as objects, 
systems (or part thereof) and popula-
tions exposed to disturbances, stress-
ors or shocks as well as to the lack of 
capacity to cope with and to adapt to 
these adverse conditions. Vulnerabili-
ty is dynamic, multifaceted and  com-
posed  of  various dimensions,  all of 
which have to be considered within a 
holistic vulnerability assessment.
Vulnerability plays a fundamental role 
for understanding, assessing and re-
ducing risks. When a hazardous event 
occurs — be it of  natural, technolog-
ical or man-made origin — the vul-
nerability of  exposed people, objects 
(e.g. critical infrastructure, etc.) and 
systems (e.g. socioecological systems) 
at different scales is key to determine 
the severity of  the impact. Though 
this fact has been widely accepted, 
the definition of  vulnerability and 
the components it comprises varies 
between different authors and disci-
plines. 
The United Nations Office for Disas-
ter Risk Reduction (UNISDR Termi-
nology, 2017) defines vulnerability as 
‘the characteristics and circumstances 
of  a community, system or asset that 
make it susceptible to the damaging 
effects of  a hazard. This definition 
reflects the last decades’ shift in the 
understanding of  vulnerability from 
a focused concept (for example limit-
ed to physical resistance of  engineer-
ing structures) to a more holistic and 
systemic approach. At the same time, 
it does not provide reference to the 
political/institutional situation and 
does not account for power relations 
or the heterogeneity within commu-
nities, which are aspects considered as 
important and included in the defini-
tions proposed by other authors (Car-
dona et al., 2012; Alexander, 2013; 
Birkmann et al., 2013; Wisner, 2016)
Vulnerability represents 
a fundamental 
component of risk. A 
proper understanding of 
vulnerability comprising 
its dimensions as well 
as its root causes is 
important for effective 
risk assessment and risk 
reduction.
The significance of  vulnerability for 
assessing risk is emphasised by the 
fact that the consequences of  a haz-
2.3 The most recent view 
of vulnerability
Stefan	Schneiderbauer, Elisa Calliari, Unni Eidsvig
Michael Hagenlocher
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ardous event largely depend on hu-
man factors. That is, the hazardous 
event itself  may be predominantly an 
external phenomena out of  the con-
trol of  those affected; any devastating 
impact caused by this event, however, 
is mainly influenced by inherent soci-
etal conditions and processes.
The L’Aquila earthquake in April 
2009 in Italy is an example of  a me-
dium-power seismic event that had a 
disproportionately large human im-
pact. It caused 308 fatalities, most of 
which were the young and elderly, as 
well as  women. The death toll is par-
tially linked to the high vulnerability 
of  building stock in the mountains of 
Abruzzo.  It is in part explained by the 
risk perception among female victims, 
who tend to be more fatalistic than 
men and who perceived their homes 
as a refuge, instead of  leaving it (Al-
exander, 2010; Alexander and Magni, 
2013).
The degree of  vulnerability within a 
society or a population group is usu-
ally not homogenously distributed; 
social class, ethnic origin, age and 
gender may determine a lower or 
higher probability of  being affected. 
Evidence of  this fact has been shown 
by the impact of   Hurricane Katrina, 
which caused a disproportionately 
high number of  victims amongst the 
poor black and elderly population in 
New Orleans in 2005 (Cutter et al., 
2006).
Addressing vulnerability — together 
with exposure — represents the gate-
way for risk reduction measures. Con-
sequently, the importance of  vulner-
ability for DRM is underlined by the 
Sendai framework for disaster risk re-
duction, claiming that understanding 
disaster risk (Priority 1) and develop-
ing related policies and practices need 
to consider the various dimensions of 
vulnerability (UNISDR, 2015a).
Resilience and capacities
Besides the notion of ‘vulnerability’ 
there are other terms and concepts 
addressing the possibility of harm 
to a system, people or specific ob-
jects by certain events and process-
es. Vulnerability – understood as a 
holistic and systemic concept – is 
closely related to and partly over-
laps, for example, with the concepts 
of resilience and of coping and 
adaptive capacity. 
‘Resilience’ is a term that has been 
widely used over the last years to 
describe characteristics related to 
the ability to absorb stresses, to 
respond to changes and to recov-
er from shocks. Some authors see 
resilience as the positive flipside 
of vulnerability. A broader under-
standing of resilience incorporates 
the ability and willingness to learn, 
to reorganise and to undertake crit-
ical self-reflection (Alexander 2013; 
Kelman et al., 2016). Climate resil-
ience has emerged into a new doc-
trine under the umbrella of which 
communities define the activities to 
combat the impending implications 
of climate change. 
There are numerous related ac-
tivities within Europe, for example 
the RESIN project is investigating 
climate resilience in European cit-
ies, the European Commission’s 
FP7 project emBRACE has focused 
on community resilience and de-
veloped a set of key indicators for 
assessing it, and the Commission’s 
Horizon 2020 project ‘resilens’ is 
scrutinising the resilience of Euro-
pean critical infrastructure.
Just as the term ‘resilience’, the 
concept of capacities relates to the 
possibilities and abilities to reduce 
harm under hazardous conditions. 
Hereby, ‘coping capacity’ rather 
deals with the short-term conser-
vation and protection of the current 
system and institutional settings, 
whilst ‘adapting capacity’ denotes a 
longer-term and constantly unfold-
ing process of learning (Birkmann 
et al., 2013).
BOX 2.1
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2.3.1.2 
Conceptual issues and 
dimensions of  
vulnerability
Just as there are numerous definitions 
of  the term ‘vulnerability’, there ex-
ist many models and concepts that 
describe vulnerability in its relation 
to other terms, such as resilience, ex-
posure or capacities, and that elabo-
rate on vulnerability’s key dimensions. 
The European project  ‘Methods for 
the improvement of  vulnerability as-
sessment in Europe’ (MOVE) devel-
oped such a concept, which attempts 
to represent the multifaceted nature 
of  vulnerability (Figure 2.10). In its 
central part, it identifies six themat-
ic dimensions of  vulnerability: the 
physical, the ecological, the social, 
the economic, the cultural and the 
institutional dimension. All of  these 
dimensions have to be considered 
within a holistic vulnerability study. 
The majority of  assets and systems 
exposed to hazard will exhibit more 
than one dimension of  vulnerability 
and hence these dimensions need to 
be addressed more in detail for any 
The MOVE framework to conceptualise vulnerability
Source: Birkmann et al. (2013)
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assessment (Birkmann et al., 2013). 
This framework is particularly useful 
within the context of  disaster risk 
since it embeds vulnerability in the 
wider framework of  risk governance/
management and emphasises the var-
ious intervention opportunities that 
may be taken to reduce risk.
A key initial question when scruti-
nising vulnerability is who or what is 
vulnerable to what type of  threat or 
hazard. This leads to the question of 
how the interactions between hazards 
and vulnerabilities look like. In fact, 
there are significant differences in  the 
way the various factors that determine 
vulnerability are linked or connected 
to different types of  hazards. Typi-
cally, physical characteristics of  ele-
ments at risk are directly linked to a 
particular hazard. For example, the 
degree to which a building withstands 
an earthquake is directly linked to the 
type of  building material used. How-
ever, a great level of  resistance related 
to earthquakes as a result of  building 
material does not automatically imply 
that the ability to resist a flood event is 
similarly high. On the other hand, the 
predisposition to be adversely affected 
due to the economic, sociocultural or 
political-institutional susceptibilities 
is to a large degree hazard independ-
ent. A community, for instance, with 
a well-working emergency response 
system and a strong social network 
is better forearmed against any type 
of  hazardous event than a communi-
ty with corrupt public authorities and 
disrupted internal linkages (Brooks, 
2003; Schneiderbauer and Ehrlich, 
2006; Cardona et al., 2012).
Transferring these rather theoretical 
concepts into operational vulnerabil-
ity assessments in practice results in 
a number of  challenges. Most impor-
tantly, the majority of  non-physical 
aspects of  vulnerability are not meas-
urable in the way in that we are able 
to determine temperature or people’s 
income. Consequently, alternative 
methods for assessing vulnerability 
are applied. They can be  quantitative 
or qualitative  or  a mix of  both (see 
Chapter 2.3.4). Widely applied and 
accepted tools comprise vulnerability 
curves predominantly used for assess-
ing physical vulnerabilities and the 
use of  (proxy-) indicators, particu-
larly to estimate the vulnerability of 
non-physical dimensions (for example 
social, economic or institutional vul-
nerabilities). Here, indicators are used 
to communicate simplified informa-
tion about specific circumstances that 
are not directly measurable or can 
only be measured with great difficul-
ty (Meyer, 2011). At local level, where 
spatial data and statistics often do not 
exist in sufficient resolution, expert 
opinions as well as participatory, com-
munity- based approaches play a ma-
jor role in vulnerability assessments.
Power relations, cultural beliefs, the 
attitude towards risk- reduction ef-
forts or the willingness and capacity 
to learn from previous events are es-
sential for the degree of  preparedness 
of  a population. Related information 
can be found in story lines rather than 
in statistics. Another challenge lies in 
providing evidence about the degree 
of  vulnerability and its causes. Vul-
nerability bears witness only in the 
aftermath of  an event when damage 
and loss are realised. Loss and damage 
data, though strongly depending on 
the magnitude of  the hazard itself, are 
therefore important data sources for 
vulnerability assessments and/or for 
the validation of  assessment attempts 
(see Chapter 2.4).
Due to the conceptual complexity and 
methodological challenges connected 
with vulnerability, the uncertainties of 
vulnerability assessments and their re-
sults is a topic of  ongoing discussion. 
The uncertainties are an aggregation 
of  uncertainties from several sources. 
They include limitations in knowledge 
about the socioecological systems that 
the vulnerable elements are part of  as 
well as inaccuracies of  empirical data 
and limitations of  models applied for 
vulnerability assessments.
Uncertainty can be classified in many 
different ways. One possibility is to 
subdivide  it into ‘aleatory uncertain-
ty’, which represents the variability of 
the properties of  concern, and ‘epis-
temic uncertainty’, which stems from 
limited knowledge. A sophisticated 
estimation of  uncertainties is usually 
a difficult and costly exercise. Hence, 
the level of  complexity and sophisti-
cation and the effort and resources to 
be spent should be in line with the risk 
management issue and correspond to 
the level of  detail needed.
2.3.1.3 
State of the art and 
research gaps
The number of  existing theoretical 
frameworks and concepts related to 
various aspects of  vulnerability is 
striking. Future work should focus on 
the translation of  these concepts into 
action, namely by developing easy-to-
use tools to implement vulnerability 
studies that yield useful results for the 
stakeholder and user. At least within 
Europe, a set of  standardised meth-
ods for defined purposes at certain 
scales would help to monitor changes 
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over time and to compare vulnerabil-
ity patterns spatially. The respective 
activities need to consider the devel-
opments of  other relevant fields of 
action such as climate change adapta-
tion or sustainable development.
The awareness of  the significance of 
vulnerability for DRM has significant-
ly increased  over the last decades. 
Nevertheless, the importance of  un-
derlying triggering factors of  vulnera-
bility and not directly tangible aspects 
such as the cultural and institutional 
dimension requires further attention.
2.3.2
System and  
systemic  
vulnerability
In order to advance the understand-
ing of  vulnerability and its dynamics 
as well as to set appropriate policy 
agendas, it is crucial to look at how 
the vulnerability dimensions interact 
at different spatial, temporal and func-
tional scales (Cardona et al., 2012). 
The fact that our modern 
world is increasingly 
interconnected calls for 
systemic approaches 
when assessing 
vulnerabilities and risks, 
which take into account 
feedback loops and 
cascading chains of 
impacts
In particular, analysing vulnerability in 
the framework of  sustainable devel-
opment or climate change adaptation 
requires considering the interactions 
between human and natural systems.
2.3.2.1 
System dynamics  
affecting vulnerability
Vulnerability is a dynamic concept 
(Cardona et al., 2012) and thus varies 
in space and time. Trends in exposure 
and vulnerability are influenced by 
changes in the demographic, econom-
ic, social, institutional, governance, 
cultural and environmental patterns of 
a system (Oppenheimer et al., 2014). 
Taking demography as an example, 
the current trend of  an ageing pop-
ulation  that characterises developed 
countries has considerably influenced 
people’s vulnerability to heat stress, as 
shown by the high death toll paid by 
the elderly during the 2003 heatwave 
event in Europe (Robine et al., 2008).
Another example is the concentra-
tion of  assets and settlements (and 
economic activities) in hazard-prone 
areas due to population growth and 
the lack of  related spatial planning. 
At a first view this phenomena simply 
represents increased exposure values. 
At a closer look, it is strongly linked 
to vulnerability. Hazard-prone areas 
are in general characterised by lower 
land values and are thus occupied by 
low-income households. The scarcity 
or non-existence of  infrastructure, 
services, social protection and securi-
ty in these sites eventually leads to ‘so-
cially segregated’ urban development, 
which in turn generates new patterns 
of  vulnerability and risk (UNISDR, 
2015b). 
For instance, the most damaged ar-
eas during the 2010 floods in Bursa 
(Turkey) were those neighbourhoods 
characterised by the presence of  in-
formal settlements and occupied by 
low-income families (Tas et al., 2013).
Another aspect of  systemic vulnera-
bility is the dependence of  human so-
cieties on ecosystem services, particu-
larly those regulating climate, diseases 
and providing buffer zones (Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). 
For example, coastal wetlands increase 
energy dissipation of  storm surges, 
dampen wind-driven surface waves, 
modify wind fields and reduce the ex-
posure of  (and thus protect) people 
and physical assets in the hinterland. 
Moreover, provisioning services in-
clude food, raw materials, fresh water 
and medicinal resources, the availa-
bility of  which determines well-being 
and thus can strongly influence the 
socioeconomic vulnerability profile 
of  a community. Consequently, eco-
system-based adaptation approaches 
have been applied in DRM to address 
potentially hazardous processes such 
as flash floods, heat waves, sea level 
rise, increasing water scarcity, etc.
2.3.2.2 
System criticality
Globalisation has made communi-
ties and nations interdependent in a 
number of  realms, including politics, 
economy, culture and technology. 
A systemic view postulates to consid-
er those linkages within and without a 
socioecological system that may affect 
its vulnerability, thus drawing atten-
tion to wider human and environmen-
tal processes and phenomena (Turner 
et al., 2003). In concrete terms, this 
means that systems and their popula-
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tions are not only affected by hazards 
to which they are physically exposed 
but also — by means of  cascading 
effects — to those experienced else-
where. Recent disasters such as the 
eruption of  Eyjafjallajökull  in Iceland 
(2010), the floods in Thailand (2011), 
the Great East Japan Earthquake 
(2011) and Hurricane Sandy in the 
United States (2013) called attention 
to the severe effects of  such cascades 
of  disasters.
Cascading disasters can be exempli-
fied by the vulnerability of  critical 
infrastructure (Pescaroli & Alexander, 
2016). When in 2003 a tree fell on a 
Swiss power line, causing a fault in 
the transmission system, 56  million 
people in Italy suffered the effects of 
the worse blackout in the country’s 
history. 30 000 people were trapped 
on trains and many commercial and 
residential users suffered disruption 
in their power supplies for up to 48 
hours (Johnson, 2007). At a larg-
er scale, failures in the global supply 
chain highlight how the vulnerability 
of  one system may depend on the re-
silience of  another system working in 
far spatial distance. 
The Swedish company Ericsson ex-
perienced substantial loss due to 
the vulnerability of  a subsupplier. A 
10-minute fire at Philips’ plant in New 
Mexico, caused by a lighting hitting 
the electric line, translated into a loss 
in phone sales of  about EUR 375 mil-
lion (Jansson, 2004). 
This was mainly because Ericsson 
took no action after Philips’ reas-
surance about production returning 
on track in a week — which was not 
the case. On the contrary, Nokia, an-
other big Philips customer, promptly 
switched supplier and it even re-engi-
neered some of  its phones to accept 
both American and Japanese chips. 
By doing so, it raised its profits by 
42 % that year and managed to ac-
quire new market shares (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2009). The Erics-
son–Nokia example underscores the 
fundamental role played by coping ca-
pacity in reducing the adverse effects 
of  experienced hazards. Moreover, it 
calls for drawing attention not only to 
the triggering event when considering 
cascading disasters, but more impor-
tantly to how vulnerabilities of  differ-
ent system’s components  may align 
and thus amplify impacts (Pescaroli & 
Alexander, 2016).
2.3.2.3 
State of the art and  
research gaps 
Disaster risk research often remains 
fragmented in a number of  disciplines 
and focused on single hazards (Cutter 
et al., 2015), with limited interaction 
with other relevant communities. Re-
search adopting a coupled human-en-
vironmental system approach in fram-
ing vulnerability has contributed to 
the integration of  separate domains 
(Cardona et al., 2012). 
Namely, the approach of  ecosys-
tem-based adaptation has transferred 
this holistic view into practice. Yet, the 
level of    trans- and interdisciplinarity 
that would be required to implement 
truly systemic approaches in vulner-
ability assessment is rarely achieved. 
Hence, future applied research should 
follow an approach of  coproduction 
of  knowledge and need to integrate 
relevant disciplines. Relevant universi-
ty education and training programmes 
should prepare young scientists and 
practitioners accordingly.
2.3.3
Vulnerability  
within the context of 
changing climate 
conditions
Climate change is one of  the most 
prominent examples of  an external 
biophysical stressor putting coupled 
human-natural systems at risk and 
the vulnerabilities to changing cli-
mate conditions has been the focus of 
many assessment studies. Originally, 
the understanding of  ‘vulnerability’ in 
the community of  climate scientists 
differed from that of  the disaster risk 
research by encompassing the hazard 
component itself. That is, the project-
ed change of  relevant climate param-
eters was seen as part of  the system’s 
vulnerability to climate change (IPCC, 
2007). 
Knowledge on climate 
change is growing 
fast, but standardised 
vulnerability assessment 
approaches are lacking. 
Vulnerability assessment 
must consider changing 
socioeconomic, political 
and organisational 
conditions that determine 
possible vulnerability 
pathways.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) special report, 
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Managing the risks of  extreme events 
and disasters to advance climate 
change adaptation (IPCC, 2012a), and 
later on  its fifth assessment report 
(IPCC, 2013) have introduced the 
concept of  ‘climate risks’ and have 
hence worked towards converging the 
concepts of  both communities. The 
currently ongoing integration of  cli-
mate change adaptation and disaster 
risk- reduction approaches leads to 
an increase of  knowledge and has the 
potential to foster network building 
and to develop more efficient policies. 
A respective report is under prepara-
tion under the lead of  the European 
Environment Agency (EEA).
The IPCC’s fifth assessment report 
identifies several ways in which in-
creasing warming and climate-relat-
ed extremes can have an impact on a 
socioecological system and focuses in 
particular on those complex interac-
tions between climate and such sys-
tems that increase vulnerability and 
risk synergistically (Oppenheimer et 
al., 2014). One of  them is the negative 
effect of  climate change on human 
health, which results from a number 
of  direct and indirect pathways. 
Direct biological consequences to 
human health can derive from heat-
waves, extreme weather events and 
temperature-related concentrations 
of  pollutants; yet most of  the impacts 
will be indirectly triggered by warm-
ing-induced changes in environmen-
tal and social conditions (Mc Michael, 
2013) and are hence in their extent de-
termined by respective vulnerabilities. 
Moreover, climate change induced ad-
verse impacts on crop yields’ quantity 
and quality can exacerbate malnutri-
tion (Met Office & WFP, 2014) and 
thus contribute to new or stronger 
vulnerabilities to a range of  diseases. 
The assessment of  climate-related 
risks and the identification of  respec-
tive key vulnerabilities needs to con-
sider the variety of  these possible di-
rect and indirect impacts. Useful tools 
to tackle this challenge are so-called 
impact chains, which represent cas-
cading cause-effect relationships and 
allow for structuring assessment pro-
cesses and the prioritisation of  fields 
of  action (Schneiderbauer et al., 2013; 
Fritzsche et al., 2014). Impact chains 
have, for example, been developed 
and applied by the ci:grasp adaptation 
support platform (n.d.) and the latest 
German climate change vulnerability 
study (Buth et al., 2015).
2.3.3.1 
Vulnerability and climate 
change in Europe
At European level, climate change is 
recognised as an important driver of 
risk due to both climate extremes (for 
example heavy precipitation events 
or storms) and slow onset events of 
long-term duration (for example sea 
Global maps of vulnerability index calculated by INFORM (upper left) and WorldRiskIndex (upper right). The respective underlying conceptual 
approaches and the identified sub-components of risk and vulnerability are shown in the lower part representing the INFORM index on the bottom 
left and the WorldRiskIndex on the bottom right. 
Source:  BEH and UNU-EHS (2016), INFORM (n.d.)
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level rise or glacier retreat) Climate 
change will also have positive im-
pacts in Europe in specific sectors 
and in certain regions (for example 
agriculture and tourism in northern 
Europe). In this chapter we concen-
trate on potential adverse impacts 
that require actions to reduce related 
risks.. Though all the countries in the 
EU are exposed to climate change, 
the related impacts vary depending 
on differences in climate conditions 
but also in vulnerabilities and degree 
of  exposure (EC, 2013). Many EU 
Member States have based their na-
tional adaptation strategies on studies 
about risks and vulnerabilities to cli-
mate change, for example the United 
Kingdom in 2016 (UK, 2016), Ger-
many in 2015 (Buth et al., 2015) and 
the Netherlands (PBL, 2012). At Eu-
ropean level, respective studies have 
been implemented by the European 
Observation Network, Territorial De-
velopment and Cohesion (ESPON) 
in 2011 (EPSON, 2011) and the EEA 
in 2012 (EEA, 2012) and 2016 (EEA, 
2017), as well as the European Com-
mission in 2014 (Ciscar et al., 2014). 
The EEA hosts the European climate 
adaptation platform website that rep-
resents the knowledge hub for climate 
change risks and adaptation in Europe 
(Climate-ADAPT, n.d.). 
Some key vulnerabilities related to 
climate change identified by these re-
ports are:
• demographic change / aging pop-
ulation;
• population growth in low- lying ur-
ban agglomerations;
• vulnerability of  (critical) infrastruc-
ture to warming and floods;
• increasing dependency on elec-
tricity, particularly linked with the 
increasing internationalisation of 
power grids.
2.3.3.2 
State of the art and  
research gap 
The knowledge about future climate 
conditions is vast and continues to 
increase. There are numerous studies 
scrutinising climate change impacts 
and vulnerabilities. However, most of 
them have been carried out in a static 
context and they have not considered 
future socioeconomic developments 
resulting in changes of  land use, ur-
banisation or demography. Besides 
climate scenarios, climate risk studies 
should aim to integrate vulnerability 
pathways.
Europe-wide climate risk assessment 
should further be supported and   co-
ordinated with the results from na-
tional and subnational studies, where 
appropriate. A certain level of  stand-
ardisation is desirable in order to al-
low for comparison in space and time.
Global maps of vulnerability index calculated by INFORM (upper left) and WorldRiskIndex (upper right). The respective underlying conceptual 
approaches and the identified sub-components of risk and vulnerability are shown in the lower part representing the INFORM index on the bottom 
left and the WorldRiskIndex on the bottom right. 
Source:  BEH and UNU-EHS (2016), INFORM (n.d.)
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2.3.4
Approaches to  
assess vulnerability
Researchers and practitioners apply 
quantitative, semi-quantitative, qual-
itative and increasingly mixed-meth-
ods approaches in order to assess 
vulnerability. Whether an approach is 
best suitable strongly depends  on the 
objective and the scope of  the assess-
ment (e.g. understanding root causes, 
identification of  hotspots, trend anal-
ysis or the selection of  risk- reduction 
measures), as well as on the temporal 
and spatial scale; there is no ‘one size 
fits all’ approach.
Qualitative vulnerability analyses are 
based on experts’ estimates. They 
are particularly useful if  time and re-
sources for the study are limited and 
if  accessible data/information is not 
sufficient for quantitative analysis of 
complex phenomena. Qualitative as-
sessment carried out with participa-
tory techniques, such as interviews 
or focus group discussions,  is par-
ticularly important for work at local/
community level and can reveal con-
text-specific root causes for vulnera-
bilities. Quantitative assessments are 
often based on statistical analysis ex-
ploiting data about loss and damage 
related to certain hazards (see Chapter 
2.3.4.1). The most widely employed 
alternative to this is the application 
of  indicator-based approaches, which 
ideally allows assessing patterns and 
trends of  vulnerability across space 
and time. The multifaceted nature 
of  vulnerability cannot be adequately 
represented by a single variable (e.g. 
income per capita). Consequently, the 
generation of  composite indicators 
has gained importance for grasping 
such complexities. It allows for com-
bining various indicators into a vul-
nerability index and helps to translate 
complex issues into policy-relevant 
information.
At global level, there are a number of 
composite indicators to assess disas-
ter risk, which represent vulnerability 
as one of  the risk’s dimensions next 
to hazard and exposure, for exam-
ple the WorldRiskIndex (Welle and 
Birkmann, 2015; BEH and UNU-
EHS, 2016) and the INFORM Index 
(De Groeve at al., 2014; INFORM, 
n.d.). Both are continuously updat-
ed multi-hazard risk indices aiming 
to support disaster risk reduction. 
The WorldRiskIndex is a means for 
understanding natural hazard related 
Social vulnerability to floods in the Salzach river catchment, Austria. 
Source: Kienberger et al. (2014)
FIGURE 2.12
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risks including the adverse effects of 
climate changes whilst INFORM is 
a tool for understanding risks to hu-
manitarian crises and disasters. Con-
ceptually, both indices are very similar. 
Their methodologies are presented in 
Figure 2.11. In the WorldRiskIndex, 
the vulnerability part comprises the 
components of  susceptibility, cop-
ing capacity and adaptive capacity, 
which are represented by 23 indica-
tors. In INFORM, vulnerability and 
lack of  coping capacity are divided 
into two separate dimensions, which 
are described by 31 indicators. Fig-
ure 2.11 shows the countries' vul-
nerability scores based on data from 
2016 calculated using the INFORM 
approach (left) and the WorldRisk-
Index approach (right). Below these 
maps, the respective approaches and 
sub-components are visualised. Both 
indices started with an approach at 
nation-state resolution and global 
scale but strive for more sub-nation-
al applications of  their methodology 
(Wannewitz et al., 2016).
In Europe, a range of  assessments 
have used spatial approaches, such 
as spatial multicriteria analysis  or 
composite indicators to create maps 
at subnational level that facilitate the 
identification of  hotspots and offer 
information for place-based interven-
tion planning. For instance, a number 
of  studies have investigated vulnera-
bility in the context of  river floods at 
different spatial scales. Examples in-
clude assessments: (1)  in Vila Nova 
de Gaia, a flood-prone municipality 
in northern Portugal (Fernandez et 
al., 2016); (2)  along the rivers Rhine, 
Danube and Elbe in Germany (Fekete, 
2009); or (3)  in the Salzach catchment 
in Austria (Kienberger et al., 2014) 
(Figure 2.12). Using indicator-based 
approaches, the three case studies 
identify a set of  social (e.g. age, edu-
cation and gender), economic (e.g. in-
come, employment and dependency), 
organisational and institutional (e.g. 
early warning systems (EWS), access 
to health services, proximity to first 
responders, etc.) indicators and aggre-
gate them into a composite index of 
vulnerability.
Composite indicators have the advan-
tage to represent complex phenome-
na in a single value. If  necessary, the 
underlying indicators or subcompo-
nents of  the index can be visualised 
separately to support the understand-
ing of  which factors contribute most 
to a positive or negative situation in 
the aggregated result (Hagenlocher et 
al., 2013). On the other hand, com-
posite indicators are always data driv-
en and might conceal crucial aspects 
that are not or cannot be expressed in 
numbers and statistics.
In recent years, there is an increasing 
number of  studies aiming to under-
stand and analyse vulnerability in mul-
tihazard settings. For example, Welle 
et al. (2014) present an approach for 
the assessment of  social vulnerability 
to heat waves and floods as well as in-
stitutional vulnerability to earthquakes 
in the city of  Cologne, Germany. 
While different sets of  vulnerability 
indicators are used and aggregated to 
assess vulnerability to heat waves (e.g. 
age, unemployment, place of  origin, 
etc.) and floods (age and occupan-
Generic quantitative vulnerability functions showing vulnerability (i.e. de-
gree of loss) as a function of hazard intensity. The red curve represents a 
more vulnerable element and the blue curve a less vulnerable element.
Source: courtesy of authors
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cy rates per household), institution-
al vulnerability was evaluated using 
qualitative information obtained from 
a series of  stakeholder consultations. 
Acknowledging the fact that commu-
nities are often affected by multiple 
hazards — combined, sequentially or 
as a cascading effect —, these stud-
ies present an important step towards 
providing solutions for real-world 
challenges.
2.3.4.1 
Quantitative  
vulnerability functions
Potential damage to physical assets 
and loss of  human lives are often as-
sessed using quantitative vulnerability 
functions. These functions take into 
account the intensity of  the hazard 
and the properties of  the exposed 
elements. The intensity expresses the 
damaging potential of  the hazard. 
Properties represent the resistance of 
the exposed elements such as  build-
ing material and maintenance level. 
Vulnerability functions are widely 
applied to illustrate the relationship 
between hazard characteristics and 
fatalities and damage. Generic vulner-
ability functions are shown in Figure 
2.13 and refer to physical vulnerabili-
ty, described as  ‘the degree of  loss to 
a given element, or set of  elements, 
within the area affected by a hazard. It 
is expressed on a scale of  0 (no loss) 
to 1 (total loss)’ (UNDRO, 1984).
Vulnerability functions may be sub-
divided into fatality/mortality func-
tions and damage functions (the latter 
denoted and formulated in different 
ways, e.g. loss functions, susceptibil-
ity functions and fragility functions). 
Damage functions are mainly based 
on empirical data collected in the af-
termath of  an event. Damage func-
tions, in particular functions relat-
ing building damage to water depth, 
have a long tradition in the context 
of  flood damage evaluation (Mey-
er et al., 2013). Physical vulnerability 
of  buildings can also be assessed by 
physical models or by use of  expert 
judgement. For some hazard types, fa-
tality or mortality functions are devel-
oped to determine the death ratio for 
a single hazard parameter, e.g. water 
depth or earthquake magnitude. This 
allows the estimation of  numbers of 
fatalities occurring at, for example,  a 
certain water level. However, the de-
velopment of  fatality functions goes 
along with a high degree of  uncer-
tainty, which stems from the variety 
of  physical and human parameters 
influencing the loss of  life. For exam-
ple, water depth may not be the only 
and most relevant intensity measure. 
Aspects such as flow rate, flood du-
ration or sediment transport might be 
equally as important.
The most appropriate 
methodology to assess 
vulnerability strongly 
depends on the purpose 
and the context, as well 
as the temporal and 
spatial scales; there is no 
‘one size fits all’ approach.
For quantitative physical vulnerabili-
ty assessment, one can apply existing 
vulnerability curves, which are appro-
priate for the specific hazard and the 
exposed elements (e.g. building types) 
in study. Vulnerability curves have 
been developed for several types of 
natural hazards, such as wind storms, 
landslides, floods, tsunamis and earth-
quakes. There are curves expressing 
loss within the built environment as 
well as loss of  human lives. Most of 
the curves are developed from empir-
ical data and accordingly fit well with 
previous events in the area where the 
data was collected. For other loca-
tions a calibration or validation of  the 
model is necessary prior to use. Vali-
dation is also needed for physical or 
analytical vulnerability functions.
Application of  vulnerability functions 
is useful in several phases of  the risk 
management, such as risk assessment 
and risk treatment. Risk analysts, 
scientists, stakeholders and deci-
sion-makers could be users of  vulner-
ability functions with the purpose to 
provide input to:
• decisions about the question of 
whether risks need to be treated or 
about issues such as the prioritisation 
of  risk treatment options of  different 
areas and of  different hazard types;
• identification of  appropriate and 
optimal risk- reduction measures;
• financial appraisals during and im-
mediately after a disaster as well as 
budgeting and coordination of  com-
pensation (Merz et al., 2010).
Alternatives to vulnerability curves 
are fragility curves, which also express 
the uncertainty in the physical vul-
nerability. Fragility curves have been 
widely applied in probabilistic risk and 
vulnerability assessment, in particular 
for earthquake risk (Hazus n.d.), but 
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recently also for landslide risk assess-
ment. These functions describe the 
probability of  exceeding different 
damage states for various intensities. 
In a recent study on seismic risks in 
the city of  Barcelona, Spain,  a physi-
cal vulnerability assessment approach 
was first carried out based on vulner-
ability functions for different building 
types (e.g. unreinforced masonry or 
reinforced concrete, steel and wood 
buildings). In a second step this was 
combined with a probabilistic analysis 
of  the seismic hazard into a seismic 
risk assessment for buildings across 
the city (Carreño et al., 2014). The 
authors also considered conditions 
related to social fragility and lack of 
resilience that favour second order 
effects when a city is hit by an earth-
quake. Factors such as population 
density, population with poor health 
or social disparity were used as prox-
ies for social fragility. In addition, the 
operating capacity in case of  an emer-
gency, the state of  development or the 
access to health services were used as 
indicators of  lack of  resilience and 
combined in an overall urban seismic 
risk index (Carreño et al., 2007). The 
results show that the population in 
the central parts of  Barcelona lives at 
a considerably higher risk than those 
living on the outskirts of  the city.
2.3.4.2 
State of the art and 
research gaps
Indicator-based assessment methods 
have proved to support the drafting 
and prioritisation of  disaster risk- re-
duction measures and strategies as 
well as the allocation of  resources. 
Several challenges exist with respect 
to the dependency on data availability 
and quality, the validation of  the ap-
plied methodology and related uncer-
tainty analysis (Hinkel, 2011).
Vulnerability curves are widely applied 
for physical vulnerability assessment. 
Future activities should focus on the 
development of  a repository of  vul-
nerability curves with user guidelines 
for different hazard types and differ-
ent types of  assets. Research should 
work on the development and use of 
multiparameter vulnerability func-
tions that are transferable, i.e. valid 
for different building types, and appli-
cable for vulnerability changing over 
time and for multirisk scenarios.
In order to fill these gaps, more data 
are required for improving and cali-
brating existing models as well as for 
proposing new empirical vulnerability 
models (see Chapter 2.4). Data collec-
tion and analysis should be extended 
and streamlined through the use of 
remotely sensed data and geographic 
information system  technology. The 
potential of  Copernicus services and 
particularly of  Sentinel data has not 
been fully exploited by the disaster 
risk community.
An additional challenge lies in the 
forward-looking nature of  vulnerabil-
ity. That is, vulnerability assessment 
needs to take into account those fac-
tors and processes that may not yet 
have become evident in past disaster 
situations. This is particularly valid in 
highly dynamic environments where 
both socio-natural hazards and vul-
nerability patterns might undergo 
rapid changes in the near- and mid-
term future (Garschagen, 2014).
The importance to integrate uncer-
tainty in vulnerability assessment has 
often been underlined but remains an 
issue of  concern  still today.
2.3.5
How vulnerability 
information is used 
in practice
The IPCC acknowledges DRM as 
a process that goes beyond DRR 
(IPCC, 2012b). Decisions to reduce 
disaster risk must be based on a sound 
understanding of  the related vulnera-
bilities. 
A requirement that has clearly been 
articulated in the SFDRR  (UNISDR, 
2015b) as one of  four main priorities 
for action  in the years to come.
2.3.5.1 
Vulnerability in disaster 
risk management: from 
knowledge to action
Complementing hazard analysis, vul-
nerability studies generate informa-
tion of  relevance for various aspects 
of  risk reduction and adaptation strat-
egies, emergency management and 
sustainable territorial planning. They 
are of  importance for all phases of 
the   DRM cycle covering short-term 
response as well as long-term prepar-
edness or recovery. Correspondingly 
large is the field of  potential users 
of  vulnerability information, includ-
ing public administration staff  who 
are responsible for civil protection or 
spatial planning, actors in the field of 
insurance, private companies running 
critical infrastructure, the civil society 
and, finally, any individual. One way 
of  grouping the various purposes of 
vulnerability studies and their main 
users is to classify them according to 
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Overview of vulnerability assessments, their main objectives and potential users at different spatial scales.
Source: courtesy of authors
TABLE 2.1
Scale Main objective Examples Potential users 
Global Identification of 
spatial hot spots; 
allocation of 
resources; 
awareness raising 
The vulnerability components of the 
following risk indices: INFORM index (De 
Groeve et al., 2015); World Risk Index 
(BEH & UNU-EHS, 2016); Disaster Risk 
Index (Peduzzi et al., 2009); Natural 
Disaster Hotspots index (Dilley et al., 
2005) 
International 
organisations  (including 
donors); international non-
governmental 
organisations (NGO); 
regional 
intergovernmental 
organisations  
Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index 
(ND-GAIN, n.d.) 
International/ 
regional 
Identification of 
spatial hot spots; 
allocation of 
resources; 
awareness raising 
The vulnerability component of the  
INFORM Subnational risk index for the 
Sahel and the Greater Horn of Africa 
(INFORM subnational models, n.d.) 
International 
organisations  (including 
donors); international 
NGOs; ROI  
Vulnerability to climate change in 
Europe (ESPON, 2011); climate change 
vulnerability mapping for Southeast 
Asia (Yusuf & Francisco, 2009) 
National / 
subnational 
Identification of hot 
spots; development 
of risk reduction / 
adaptation 
strategies; 
allocation of 
resources; 
awareness raising; 
advocacy  
The vulnerability component of the  
INFORM Subnational risk index (INFORM 
subnational models, n.d.) for Lebanon 
and Colombia, World Risk Index 
subnational for the Philippines 
(Wannewitz et al., 2016); Social 
Vulnerability Index for the USA (Cutter 
et al., 2003) 
International 
organisations  (incl. 
donors); international 
/national / local NGOs; 
national, subnational and 
local governments and 
public administration  
Numerous studies in Europe. For an 
overview of work related to climate 
change, see Prutsch et al., 2014 
Local Identification of 
root causes; 
strengthening 
capacities of local 
actors; empowering 
communities  
For an overview of vulnerability 
assessments in Europe with respect to 
natural hazards, see Birkmann et al., 
2014;  
International 
organisations  (incl. 
donors); international / 
national/ local NGOs; 
national, subnational and 
local governments and 
public administration- 
affected communities 
A semi-quantitative assessment of 
regional climate change vulnerability by 
Kropp. et al., 2006 
 
CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISK: RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES AND EXAMPLES
83
spatial scale. Extending the examples 
presented above, Table 2.1 provides 
an illustrative overview of  selected 
vulnerability assessments, their main 
purposes and potential users at differ-
ent spatial scales. 
Vulnerability assessment 
is used to support 
stakeholders and 
policymakers in 
prioritising various risks, 
in identifying root causes 
and spatial hotspots 
and in developing risk 
reduction strategies and 
measures.
The complexity of  vulnerability and 
the wide range of  possible appli-
cations of  assessment studies re-
quire considerable effort to define 
the studies’ scope (objective, target 
groups, spatial and temporal scale, 
spatial resolution of  results, etc.). In 
practice, vulnerability studies have 
benefited from pursuing a process 
of  co-production of  knowledge. The 
integration of  scientists, practition-
ers and potential users in the process 
of  a vulnerability assessment right 
from the beginning usually results in 
a higher level of  acceptance of  their 
results. They are also more likely to be 
used in decision- and policymaking. 
An example is the latest vulnerability 
assessment for Germany within the 
scope of  which a network of  nation-
al authorities was created and which 
participated in all important decisions 
(Greiving et al., 2015).
2.3.5.2 
Conclusions and key 
messages
Over the past decades, vulnerability 
research has made considerable pro-
gress in understanding some of  the 
root causes and dynamic pressures 
that influence the progression of  vul-
nerability and raised awareness that 
disasters are not natural but predom-
inantly a product of  social, economic 
and political conditions (Wisner et al., 
2004). 
Vulnerability assessments are a re-
sponse to the call for evidence by de-
cision-makers for use in pre-disaster 
risk assessment, prevention and re-
duction, as well as the development 
and implementation of  appropriate 
preparedness and effective disaster 
response strategies by providing in-
formation on people, communities or 
regions at risk. 
The following steps are proposed to 
further improve vulnerability research 
and related applications with the final 
aim to inform policymakers to most 
appropriately:
• co-produce knowledge in a trans-
disciplinary environment;
• evaluate and present inherent un-
certainties;
• integrate intangible but crucial fac-
tors into quantitative assessments;
• develop and apply methods that al-
low for considering cascading and 
multirisks;
• combine vulnerability scenarios 
with (climate-) hazard scenarios 
when assessing future risks;
• empower communities to better 
understand and reduce their vul-
nerability in order to make them 
more resilient to identified hazards;
• design and facilitate multilevel and 
cross-sectoral feedback loops be-
tween public, practitioners and pol-
icymaking bodies (local, regional, 
national and European) and other 
stakeholders;
• standardise vulnerability assess-
ment approaches in order to allow 
for more comparison (in space and 
time);
• work on improved evidence with-
in vulnerability assessment — this 
requires continuous effort to im-
prove loss and damage data.
Partnership
The comprehensive analysis and as-
sessment of  vulnerability requires an 
interdisciplinary approach involving 
both natural and social sciences. In 
addition, in order to foster sustainable 
and efficient vulnerability reduction 
strategies and measures, an approach 
to produce knowledge co-productive-
ly is desirable. This calls for a part-
nership with affected communities, 
practitioners and decision-makers. A 
stronger link and enhanced interac-
tion with other relevant communities 
is desirable, namely climate change 
adaptation, natural resource manage-
ment, public health, spatial planning 
and development.
Knowledge 
The determination of  risk often re-
mains hazard centred and hazard 
specific and does not consider vul-
nerability appropriately. Vulnerability 
assessment has tended to be mostly 
quantitative in nature. Cultural as-
pects as well as formal (procedures, 
laws and regulations) and tacit infor-
mal (values, norms and traditions) 
institutions play a fundamental role 
as both enabling or limiting factors 
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of  resilience and have not gained 
sufficient attention. A challenge is 
the need to consider local data and 
information in order to account for 
small-scale specificities of  vulnerabil-
ity. Present databases on damage and 
loss caused by natural hazards should 
be standardised and extended to sup-
port evidence building in vulnerability 
assessment. Existing barriers in the 
co-production, exchange and use of 
knowledge have to be understood and 
minimised.
Innovation
In recent years, improved approach-
es to assess vulnerability by statistical 
analyses or indices have been estab-
lished. Fostering the integration of 
Earth observation data and technol-
ogy to detect changes would improve 
the possibility to represent some of 
the dynamic aspects of  vulnerability. 
Further improvement requires en-
hanced event and damage databases 
and more sophisticated methods for 
potential future vulnerability path-
ways and their integration into risk 
scenarios. The challenge to integrate 
qualitative information, which of-
ten contains crucial facts, needs to 
be addressed. Observation data and 
technology to detect changes would 
improve the possibility to represent 
some of  the dynamic aspects of  vul-
nerability. Further improvements  re-
quire enhanced event and damage 
databases and more sophisticated 
methods for potential future vulner-
ability pathways and their integration 
into risk scenarios. The challenge to 
integrate qualitative information, 
which often contains crucial facts, 
need to be addressed. 
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2.4 Recording disaster 
losses for improving risk 
modelling capacities
Scira	Menoni, Costanza Bonadonna, Mariano García-Fernández,
Reimund Schwarze 
2.4.1
Relationship  
between pre-event 
risk modelling and 
post-disaster 
loss data
Pre-event risk assessment and post-
event damage estimation are more 
linked than is generally thought. As 
shown in Figure 2.14, either prob-
abilistic or deterministic damage 
forecasts are appraised in pre-event 
risk assessment, whilst in the  after-
math of  the event, the scenario that 
occurred  is analysed. Both modelled 
and estimated damage can regard 
one or few exposed items or multi-
ple sectors ranging from businesses 
to lifelines (available in fewer cases). 
Damage can be expressed as physical 
damage to items and/or monetary 
costs of  repair or as loss to individual 
economic sectors or to a given econo-
my and society as a whole.
In the case of  the pre-event assess-
ment, hazard, exposure and vulnera-
bility are the components that need to 
be evaluated and combined in order to 
obtain a risk assessment. In the post-
event analysis, the estimated damage 
must be described on the basis of  the 
observed hazard features, on the con-
figuration of  exposed systems and on 
their vulnerability at the time of  the 
event.
Pre- and post-damage 
assessment have more in 
common than generally 
perceived; in both 
cases there is a need to 
understand the relative 
contribution of hazard, 
exposure and vulnerability 
factors on the overall 
damage.
There is still a debate on the mean-
ing of  damage and losses and which 
types should be considered; here, an 
interpretation based on previous EU 
projects and available literature is pro-
posed (Merz et al., 2010; Meyers et al., 
2015; Van der Veen and Logtmeijer, 
2005). As can be seen in Figure 2.15, 
damage due to natural hazards is gen-
erally divided into damage to tangible 
objects and assets, meaning those for 
which a monetary assessment is eas-
ily obtained and not controversial, 
and damage to intangibles, meaning 
values such as human life, historic 
heritage or natural assets for which 
monetisation is either extremely dif-
ficult or controversial. Damage to 
both tangibles and intangibles can be 
direct, meaning the damage provoked 
by the hazardous stressor, or indirect, 
which is consequent upon the direct 
damage (e.g. production loss due to 
damaged machinery) or upon ripple 
effects due to the interdependency 
of  economic systems, both forward 
and backward linkages. Whilst direct 
damage generally occurs locally, indi-
rect damage can develop over much 
greater time and space scales, also far 
from the event’s ‘epicentre’ and long 
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after the event has occurred. In some 
methodologies, damage and losses are 
distinct: the first term refers to affect-
ed infrastructure and buildings, whilst 
the second refers to economic losses 
(GFDRR, 2013). In the following sec-
tions, the link between pre- and post-
event damage and loss assessment is 
discussed, showing the contribution 
that enhanced post-disaster analysis 
can make in terms of  knowledge and 
information to improve the quality 
and comprehensiveness of  pre-event 
risk models. 
Examples will be taken from three dis-
tinct hazard domains, such as earth-
quakes, floods and volcanic eruptions, 
in order to provide evidence for more 
theoretical assumptions. These natu-
ral disasters were chosen because of 
their diversity, the difference in terms 
of  types and the extent of  damage 
they produce. However, their use is 
just paradigmatic. Experts in other 
fields will be able to find correspond-
ences to the hazard risk they are more 
familiar with.
2.4.2
How post-disaster 
damage has been 
used to develop risk 
models: state of the 
art in a nutshell
2.4.2.1 
State of the art of 
risk models 
Expected damage can be assessed 
using quantitative, qualitative and 
semi-quantitative risk models (Figure 
2.14, see also Chapter 2.1). Quanti-
tative risk assessments dominate in 
Pre - and post - disaster damage assessments
Source: courtesy of authors
FIGURE 2.14
Modelled 
Physical damage 
to one or few 
sectors
Modelled losses 
to multiple 
sectors
Modelled 
impact on 
economy and 
resources
Observed 
Physical damage 
to one or few 
sectors
Observed 
losses to 
multiple 
sectors
Observed/
Modelled impact 
on economy and 
resources
Hazard 
variables 
Exposed systems
description (values)  
Vulnerability assessment 
(functions) 
Hazard 
feature
Exposed systems
configuration
Vulnerability 
conditions
 
in
pu
t
Pre-event forecasted damage 
Probabilistic 
Risk Assessment
Deterministic 
Scenarios
Post-event estimated damage 
Occurred 
Scenario
Data and information for validation; knowledge regarding systemic and 
indirect damage occurring in complex systems across time and space
du
e 
to
Semi-quantitative QualitativeQuantitative Semi-quantitative QualitativeQuantitative
CHAPTER 2 UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISK: RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES AND EXAMPLES
87
scientific journals; however, they gen-
erally consider quite a limited number 
and type of  variables. More complex 
understandings of  risk, which also 
comprise the consequences on the so-
cial, economic and environmental sys-
tems as well as on complex built sys-
tems such as critical infrastructures, 
are inevitably covered by a mixture of 
quantitative and qualitative apprais-
als (OECD, 2012; Theocharidou and 
Giannopoulos, 2015; Menoni et al., 
2007). In the more widely accepted 
definition, risk is measured in terms 
of  expected damage (probability of 
expected damage or deterministic 
damage scenarios) and is obtained as 
a function of  hazard, exposure (see 
also Chapter 2.2) and vulnerability 
(see also Chapter 2.3). Whilst the first 
two aspects are provided in quanti-
tative terms, the last one is often as-
sessed through more qualitative or 
semi-qualitative approaches (Turner 
et al., 2003; Petrini, 1996). In the past, 
risk assessments were actually main-
ly hazard analyses, whereas in more 
recent times, quantitative appraisals 
of  exposure have been increasingly 
included in risk assessment. Besides 
exposed people and assets, more re-
alistic evaluations take into consid-
eration their relative vulnerability as 
well, intended as the susceptibility to 
damage, which is an intrinsic measure 
of  weakness and fragility (Mc Entire, 
2005; Scawthorn, 2008). 
Vulnerability and damage 
functions have been the 
most widely used tools, 
especially by engineers, 
to deal with pre-event 
damage assessment 
fed by post-disaster 
statistical data.
The capacity to assess the latter is 
more recent and restricted to some 
exposed elements and systems, with 
Definition of direct and indirect damage 
Source: Merz et al. (2010)
FIGURE 2.15
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the obvious difficulty of  constructing 
a comprehensive and coherent picture 
of  what   the total effect of  a disaster 
in a given area may be (Barbat et al., 
2010).
In the following section, the state 
of  the art in vulnerability or damage 
functions in the field of  seismic, vol-
canic and flood hazards are provided, 
highlighting similarities and differenc-
es. Vulnerability or damage functions 
are used to correlate hazard indicators 
(such as acceleration or water depth) 
with damage (such as damage index 
or monetary cost of  repair and recov-
ery).
2.4.2.1.1 
How vulnerability/damage 
curves have been developed 
for seismic risk
Seismic engineers have started devel-
oping vulnerability curves long before 
colleagues in other natural hazards 
fields, coherent with the fact that 
the only possible protection measure 
against earthquakes is reducing build-
ings’ vulnerability. Early seismic vul-
nerability methods were proposed in 
the seventies in Japan and the Unit-
ed States,  and were being developed 
during the eighties in Europe (Cor-
sanego, 1991; Senouci et al., 2013). 
Main European seismic vulnerability 
methods include GNDT (Benedetti 
et al. 1988), Risk-UE (Lagomarsino 
and Giovinazzi, 2006) and Vulner-
alp (Guéguen et al., 2007). Thus, the 
seismic field set the floor for a gener-
al methodology that was followed in 
other fields as well; it  can also be con-
sidered as having general relevance.
First, damage after earthquakes was 
observed in a very large number of 
cases and in structures differing in 
their layout, material, typology, age, 
resistant systems, etc. Two relevant re-
sults were achieved: on the one hand, 
a very large database with hundreds 
of  failure cases was developed, and 
on the other hand, the specific factors 
determining buildings’ response to 
earthquakes were identified. Such fac-
tors have been translated into param-
eters, as in the example provided in 
Table 2.2 (Zonno et al., 1998). In the 
practical application of  the latter, the 
vulnerability of  buildings is obtained 
from the weighed sum of  the score 
assigned to each parameter, ranging 
from A (no vulnerability) to D (very 
high vulnerability), and multiplied by 
a weight expressing the relative rele-
vance of  the parameter.
Second, vulnerability curves are com-
piled by plotting seismic severity (on 
the horizontal x axis), expressed, for 
example, as acceleration, versus the 
percentage of  damage or a damage 
index between 0 and 1 (on the vertical 
y axis). At maximal stress, any build-
ing is expected to collapse, whereas at 
no stress no building is expected to 
be damaged; anything in between, the 
intrinsic vulnerability of  buildings is 
likely to produce differential damage. 
As a third step, a comparison between 
modelled damage based on vulnera-
bility curves and post-event observed 
damage should be carried out as dis-
cussed in Chapter 2.3.
2.4.2.1.2 
How vulnerability/damage 
curves have been developed 
for volcanic risk 
Vulnerability curves in volcanology 
have been developed much more re-
cently and  are available only for some 
of  the hazards that may be triggered 
by an explosive eruption. More specif-
ically, vulnerability curves describing 
the collapse of  roofs are available for 
Indicators to assess seismic risk 
Source: Zonno et al. (1998)
TABLE 2.2
PARAMETERS VULNERABILITy CLASS WEIGHT
A B C D
1 Organization of resistant elements 0 5 20 45 1
2 Quality of resistant elements 0 5 25 45 0.25
3 Conventional Strenght 0 5 25 45 1.5
4 Building position and foundations 0 5 25 45 0.75
5 Floors 0 5 15 45 var
6 Plan Shape 0 5 20 45 0.5
7 Elevation Shape 0 5 20 45 var
8 Maximum distance between walls 0 5 20 45 0.25
9 Roof 0 15 20 45 var
10 Non structural elements 0 0 20 45 0.25
11 Maintenance conditions 0 5 20 45 1
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tephra fallout (e.g. Figure 2.16), while 
initial curves have been proposed for 
ballistic and pyroclastic flows in EU 
funded project MIAVITA (n.d.) (see 
also in Chapter 3.2 for the description 
and definition of  volcanic hazards). 
The lack of  vulnerability data for 
other hazards includes the unfeasibil-
ity of  building constructions that are 
able to stand the stress due to lava or 
pyroclastic flows. Exposure, i.e. the 
location of  constructions, becomes 
more important. In addition, given 
the relative low frequency of  large 
volcanic eruptions affecting largely 
inhabited places, damage to modern 
structures could be observed only in 
a limited number of  cases and mostly 
related to the collapse of  roofs under 
tephra load. This is why vulnerability 
curves have been developed only for 
the damage to building roofs due to 
tephra fallout (Figure 2.16). The effect 
of  tephra on other exposed elements, 
e.g. agriculture and infrastructures, 
have also recently been attempted 
(Wilson et al., 2014; Craig et al., 2016).
2.4.2.1.3 
How vulnerability/damage 
curves have been developed 
for flood risk
It should be highlighted that in the 
flood case, scholars refer to damage 
rather than vulnerability curves, even 
though the followed method is very 
similar. Curves are plotted on a plane 
with an x axis that generally reports 
water depth and a y axis where damage 
is reported as costs of  repair. Curves 
represent types of  buildings differing 
for the number of  floors, material, 
presence of  basement or not and oc-
cupation of  the first level. For a com-
prehensive overview of  such curves, 
one may refer to the work of  Jong-
man et al. (2012) and Thieken et al. 
(2008). Both recognise the limitations 
of  current methods that neglect haz-
ard severity variables such as velocity 
or sediment transport, which  may be 
more relevant than water depth as a 
damage cause, especially in the case of 
flash floods.
Damage curves for collapse of roofs associated with tephra fallout 
Source: Biass et al. (2016)
FIGURE 2.16
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2.4.2.2 
Key aspects of currently 
used vulnerability and 
damage curves
The brief  discussion of  the three 
domains permits to highlight some 
commonalities: first, the philosophy 
according to which vulnerability is 
represented by curves that depend 
on the intrinsic characteristics of  dif-
ferent types of  structures; second, 
the need of  a statistically meaning-
ful population of  observed damaged 
buildings to develop vulnerability or 
damage curves; and third, vulnerabili-
ty or damage curves are available for a 
limited set of  structures and a limited 
number of  sectors. They are largely 
available for residential buildings, far 
less for industrial facilities and even 
less for infrastructures. This restricts 
the capacity to construct comprehen-
sive quantitative risk assessment for 
all assets and sectors. Furthermore, 
whilst vulnerability curves are derived 
from the observation of  individual 
objects, risk assessment  is developed 
for an area or a region. Therefore, risk 
assessment is based on the hypothesis 
that assets in a given region can be av-
eraged in terms of  their vulnerability 
features.
Another factor limiting the possibility 
to transfer such curves from one ge-
ographic area to another derives from 
the fact that the observed damage and 
relative vulnerability factors are highly 
context dependent, as they are linked 
to the types of  buildings and struc-
tures that have been surveyed. This 
is the reason why consulting firms 
that provide insurance and reinsur-
ance companies with immediate fig-
ures of  loss  due to a recent calamity 
carry out post-disaster surveys. The 
rapid evolution of  information tech-
nology information technology has 
given an important impulse to the 
use of  risk assessment scenarios  by 
means of  very large datasets com-
prising information on land uses and 
basic built stock characteristics that 
can be digested in a rather short time. 
However, feedback from real events 
is crucial to increasing the reliability 
of  their modelling capacity (Marsh, 
2015).
2.4.2.3 
Use of post-event  
damage data for  
evaluating the reliability 
of risk models results
Even though  separate events that 
have occurred cannot provide a com-
Observed building damage in the city of Lorca in terms of mean damage 
grade  (D1: slight, D2: moderate, D3: heavy and D4: partial collapse) for 
the Mw5.2 earthquake on 11 May 2011
Source: DG Citizen Security and Emergencies of the Region of Murcia
FIGURE 2.17
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prehensive validation for risk models, 
they can be used to assess the discrep-
ancies between the model forecasts 
and observations.
Here the comparison between pre- 
and post-damage assessments con-
ducted for the city of  Lorca in Spain 
is provided. Figure  4 shows the actual 
observed damage in the most affected 
suburbs in Lorca as a consequence of 
the earthquake that occurred on 11 
May 2011. Figure 2.18 represents the 
modelled damage using Risk-EU ap-
proach (Lagomarsino and Giovinazzi, 
2006), considering the seismic load by 
the observed European macroseismic 
scale (EMS-98) intensity and the vul-
nerability index by building typology, 
age and number of  floors.
The comparison between Figure 
2.17 and Figure 2.18 shows that the 
modelled scenario underestimates the 
damage, particularly for the highest 
damage levels. This suggests the need 
to consider additional vulnerability 
factors such as the state of  preserva-
tion, orientation, discontinuities, soft 
story buildings, plan/vertical irregu-
larities, openings and quality of  con-
struction that were missing in the pre-
event vulnerability appraisals. Also, 
in this specific case, there could be 
possible previous effects from a M4.5 
foreshock.
2.4.3
Damage and losses 
to multiple sectors: 
relevance for more 
comprehensive risk 
assessments
Exercises similar to the one briefly 
shown in  Chapter 2.4.2.3 are very 
important to evaluate the consistency 
of  risk models; however, they are of-
ten limited to a restricted number of 
assets and to direct physical damage. 
In the following, the state of  the art 
in risk assessments and damage esti-
mations by sectors will be shortly dis-
cussed, distinguishing between tan-
gible and intangible exposed assets. 
Needs in terms of  future damage data 
provision are also discussed.
Simulation of physical damage to buildings in the city of Lorca using the 
direct approach.
Source: courtesy of authors
FIGURE 2.18
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2.4.3.1
Damage to tangibles
2.4.3.1.1 
Agriculture
As suggested by Brémond et al. 
(2013), damage to agriculture should 
comprise different elements: crops, 
soil, infrastructures and storage facil-
ities, which  are differently exposed 
and vulnerable to various hazards 
such as earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions and floods (FAO, 2015). 
Post-event damage 
assessment can provide 
a more comprehensive 
understanding of damage 
to multiple sectors 
including agriculture, 
infrastructure, services 
and industrial and 
commercial activities, 
overcoming the narrow 
approach taken so far.
Earthquakes have usually been associ-
ated with potential damage to storage 
facilities for animals or machinery; 
not much thought has been given to 
infrastructures used in agriculture. 
Nonetheless, the 2012 earthquake 
in Italy proved to be devastating for 
hydraulic infrastructures needed for 
irrigation that was halted for sever-
al days with heavy consequences for 
production. 
Damage due to volcanic hazard, in 
particular gas and tephra, is associat-
ed with animals, crops, irrigation wa-
ter and soil that can be devastated for 
a long time (Craig et al., 2016). 
Floods may affect all above men-
tioned components differently, but as 
mentioned by Brémond et al. (2013), 
this is not reflected in currently avail-
able damage curves.
2.4.3.1.2 
Industries and commercial  
businesses
Industries and commercial business-
es are often treated as buildings, even 
though they differ from the latter in 
many regards. A first difference is 
the large space usually necessary for 
activities that make these facilities 
more vulnerable to earthquakes. Sec-
ondly, potential damage to machinery 
and raw and finished products may 
be more relevant than damage to 
structures, particularly in the case of 
floods, where damage to structures is 
generally low. 
Thirdly, businesses present a very large 
combination of  buildings, machinery, 
activities and processes that make it 
hard to standardise vulnerability as-
sessment. Information on damage 
suffered by industries and factors that 
make them vulnerable are available 
for flood risk and  earthquakes (Su-
zuki, 2008; Krausman, 2010). Dam-
age to business can sometimes turn 
into a severe secondary hazard (risk 
cascade), when dangerous plants are 
affected by natural hazards producing 
the so called Natech hazards (Cozzani 
et al., 2010; Ministère chargé de l’en-
vironnement, 2005; see also Chapter 
3.14).
2.4.3.2
Damage to intangibles
Damage to intangibles is that which 
affects people and artefacts that are 
considered of  incommensurable val-
ue, i.e. it is very difficult or controver-
sial to monetise.  Consideration in this 
paper will be limited to three exam-
ples, one for each hazard.
2.4.3.2.1 
Loss of cultural heritage due 
to earthquakes
Earthquakes occurring in historic 
towns often affect ancient buildings 
and monuments more permanently 
and dramatically. Their vulnerability is 
due to several factors including con-
struction material, type of  resistant 
technology, lack of  maintenance and 
poor or totally lacking seismic retro-
fitting. Furthermore, historic centres 
in Mediterranean areas, e.g. Greece, 
Spain, southern France, Italy and 
Slovenia, are characterised by com-
plex urban blocks. The vulnerability 
of  these blocks is exacerbated by the 
presence of  shared structural com-
ponents between adjacent buildings, 
topographic layout and the recent in-
troduction of  infrastructures, without 
taking seismic risk into sufficient con-
sideration. From a cultural perspec-
tive, it is very difficult to assess the 
value of  lost heritage. Methods are 
available but evaluations are always 
heavily loaded with societal and emo-
tional concerns that are hard to repre-
sent in formalised quantitative terms.
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2.4.3.2.2 
Loss of natural assets 
and soil as a consequence 
of floods
Floods may damage, for example, 
parks and natural preserves in differ-
ent ways (Gautak and Van der Hoek, 
2003): light structures used for visit-
ing such areas may be destroyed and 
contamination due to toxic and dan-
gerous substances carried out by in-
undating waters may occur with dif-
ferent degrees of  severity, while fauna 
and flora may also be affected. When 
a post-flood damage assessment was 
conducted it was observed that cer-
tain species of  birds abandoned the 
area due to the loss of  nutrients in 
the soil and   water (Menoni et al., 
2017). Time is required in order to 
assess whether or not such damage is 
permanent and whether or not even-
tual substituting species are as rich in 
biodiversity as those they have sub-
stituted. Similar considerations may 
regard the soil itself  for agricultural 
purposes. Salinisation resulting from 
coastal inundations and loss of  fertile 
soil may be more or less permanent. 
Those observations should lead to 
enhanced risk models that provide an 
output to show not only the immedi-
ate damage due to the event, but also 
its evolution and dynamic over time, 
which may require years to appraise 
the real, longer-term effects.
2.4.3.3 
Historical examples of  
permanent relocation
Loss of  social capital as a result of 
temporary or long-term relocation 
is an issue that should be considered 
whenever such a measure is exam-
ined. Sometimes during volcanic cri-
ses, such a decision is inevitable to 
safeguard people’s life. Examples of 
past relocations such as those associ-
ated with the 1982 El Chichón erup-
tion in Mexico (Marrero et al., 2013), 
the 1991 Pinatubo eruption in the 
Philippines (Newhall and Punong-
bayan, 1997), the 1991 Hudson vol-
cano eruption in Chile (Wilson et al., 
2012) and the 2010 Merapi eruption 
in Indonesia (Mei et al., 2013) suggest 
that without careful planning, com-
munities can be largely disrupted. In 
all these examples, people were de-
tached from their source of  income 
and from the territory that is often a 
fundamental component of  their live-
lihood and identity.
2.4.4
The relevance of 
indirect damage and 
losses to account 
for the complexity 
of events
Literature on direct, indirect and sec-
ondary damage is rather significant 
and there is still no perfect consensus 
on what those terms mean; howev-
er, larger convergence by the scientif-
ic and practitioner communities has 
been achieved in more recent years 
thanks to efforts at the European and 
international levels.
 At the former level, one may consid-
er the results of  the Conhaz project 
(Meyer et al., 2015), the Nedies pro-
ject (Van der Veen et al., 2003) and, 
lately, the work carried out by the 
European Commission on disaster 
loss data (De Groeve et al., 2013; EU 
technical working group, 2015). At 
the international level, the work car-
ried out within  ECLAC (Cepal, 2014) 
and the post-disaster needs assess-
ment (PDNA) (GFDRR, 2013) has 
provided relevant approaches to pave 
the way for the SFDRR.
2.4.4.1 
Indirect damage due  
to ripple effects in  
complex systems
The need to consider other types of 
damage as well as damage to multi-
ple systems stems from the recogni-
tion that real events are much more 
complex than the representation of 
physical damage to few assets. Cas-
cading effects, enchained failures, 
malfunctions of  critical lifelines and 
inaccessibility to facilities and affect-
ed areas may be more severe in terms 
of  impact and victims than the phys-
ical damage itself  (Park et al., 2013). 
This can be considered as the system-
ic facet of  indirect damage due to the 
interconnection and interdependency 
of  urban and regional systems as well 
as among components of  complex 
systems (Pitilakis et al., 2014).
As for systemic aspects, there have 
so far been few and partial attempts 
to model them to make them part 
of  a more complete risk assessment 
(Bruneau et al., 2003). The MATRIX 
(2013) and the Syner-G (2014) pro-
jects can be recalled here, in particular 
with reference to the work done on 
modelling lifeline disruption due to 
natural disasters. By analysing in detail 
the models provided by both projects, 
it is evident that even though they are 
rather formalised, expert decisions 
must be provided at crucial nodes in 
order to run them. This is consistent 
with the fact that there is not enough 
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statistical evidence for each type 
of  malfunction of  complex lifeline 
systems to allow for a more general 
formalisation of  the evaluation pro-
cedure. In fact, until recently, only 
anecdotic narrative was available, ac-
companied by a few numerical figures. 
Few written reports regarding damage 
suffered by lifelines in case of  floods 
are available (Pitt, 2008; Ministère de 
l’écologie, 2005). As for earthquakes, 
only recently the EERI reports pro-
viding first reconnaissance analysis 
of  events have introduced a more in-
depth section on lifelines. For the vol-
canic risk a rather interesting work has 
been conducted upon observations 
for a few eruptions, e.g. the Puye-
hue-Cordón Caulle 2011 eruption in 
Chile (Wilson et al., 2013; Craig et al., 
2016; Elissondo et al., 2016) and the 
Shinmoedake 2011 eruption in Japan 
(Magill et al., 2013). Such efforts have 
not produced the number and exten-
sive data   available for physical dam-
age, yet they represent an important 
first step that would require more fo-
cus on future efforts of  collecting and 
analysing post- disaster damage data.
2.4.4.2 
Indirect economic  
damage
Even less evidence is available for in-
direct damage on economic systems 
induced by direct damage, lifelines 
failures, and losses due to business 
interruption. Such damage and loss-
es include induced production losses 
suffered by suppliers and custom-
ers of  affected companies, the costs 
of  traffic disruption or the costs of 
emergency services. Evidence to date 
suggests that  indirect damage  is 
more important in big disasters than 
in more trivial ones. For example, 
Hallegatte (2008) demonstrates that 
significant indirect loss for the state 
of  Louisiana only arises when direct 
losses exceed EUR 50 billion. In a 
separate study, he also demonstrates 
that indirect impacts are  greater if  a 
natural disaster affects the economy 
during the expansion phase of  its 
business cycle than if  it touches it 
during a recession phase (Hallegatte 
et al., 2007).
Systemic interconnections 
and complexity of 
modern societies require 
new approaches of 
damage analysis and 
representation with 
respect to the ones that 
have been in use so 
far. Post-event damage 
assessment can provide 
key knowledge regarding 
multiple types of failures 
and indirect damage and 
loss.
Compared to direct physical effects, 
indirect economic losses are much 
more difficult to measure. Addition-
ally, there are limited available sources 
of  data for measuring indirect loss-
es. It seems that defined and agreed- 
upon protocols for identifying and 
collecting useful data in this domain 
are still missing or are still in their ear-
ly stages. Insurance data on business 
interruption are of  limited value for 
that purpose, as most indirect effects, 
for example power outage, do not 
qualify for compensation under busi-
ness interruption insurance. Moreo-
ver, insurance data must be indexed 
by insurance market characteristics 
(e.g. market penetration and average 
deductibles) to allow correct data in-
terpretation and cross-country inves-
tigations. Also, until recently, most 
insurance companies tended to treat 
this data as private asset.
The limitation of  accessible primary 
data have led to attempts to measure 
indirect losses using economic mod-
els of  the type that have long been 
utilised for economic forecasting, 
such as: 
• simultaneous equation economet-
ric models (Ellison et al., 1984; 
Guimares et al., 1993; West and 
Lenze, 1994),
• input-output models (e.g. Rose and 
Benavides, 1997; Boisevert, 1992; 
Cochrane, 1997),
• computable general equilibrium 
models (Brookshire and McKee, 
1992; Boisevert, 1995).
Studies evaluating model-based es-
timates (Kimbell and Bolton, 1994; 
Bolton and Kimbell, 1995; West, 
1996) show that models developed 
for traditional economic forecasting 
tend to overstate the indirect effects. 
Differences to observed impacts from 
post- event economic surveys are by 
70 % to 85 % (West and Lenze, 1994). 
The reason for this overestimation of 
both indirect regional economic loss-
es from natural disasters and indirect 
regional economic gains from recon-
struction is that statistically based 
economic models have been designed 
primarily to forecast the effects of  a 
lasting impact. 
The historical interlinkages embodied 
in these models are likely to be sub-
stantially disturbed and temporarily 
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changed during a disaster. Dynamic 
adjustment features such as recovery, 
resilience, interregional substitution, 
inventory adjustments, changes in 
labour supply, number of  displaced, 
etc. are not reflected in these models. 
In short, these models must be sub-
stantially revised in order to produce 
reliable estimates of  indirect effects. 
Computational algorithms modelling 
supply shocks, post- event supply 
constraints and time- phased recon-
struction in disaggregated spatial set-
tings (as, for example, applied in van 
der Veen and Logtmeijer, 2005 and 
Yamano et al., 2007) seem promising 
to overcome this methodological gap.
2.4.4.3 
Changes needed to  
improve post-disaster 
damage and loss data 
availability and quality
In order to obtain a more compre-
hensive and satisfactory overview of 
damage to assets, systems and sectors 
following a disaster, more consistent 
and systematically gathered data to 
address the complexity of  real events 
are needed. Furthermore, as already 
suggested by the World Meteorolog-
ical Organisation  guidelines (2007), 
efforts of  data collection should be 
reiterated in the same areas in order 
to detect trends that cannot be seen a 
few hours or days after the event and 
to monitor the rehabilitation and re-
covery process.
To achieve such a goal of  obtaining 
and maintaining a more robust repos-
itory of  different types of  damage to 
multiple sectors, a standardised re-
porting system, similar to the PDNA 
or to the so- called Retour of  Experi-
ence in France (Direction territoriale 
Méditerranée du Cerema, 2014) would 
provide significant advantages. First, 
because they will permit comparison 
between cases across geographic re-
gions and time; it will then be easier to 
recognise similarities among cases and 
aspects that are specific to each case. 
Second, data collected and processed 
in the same way for key variables will 
allow us to obtain statistical evidence 
for some variables that at present are 
described only in a qualitative way. 
Third, more comprehensive and com-
parable reports will permit the build-
ing of  a body of  knowledge on differ-
ent types of  damage to several sectors 
that can support decision-making for 
a more resilient recovery and to feed 
pre-event modelling, as suggested in 
Figure 2.14.
2.4.4.3.1 
Costs versus physical  
damage
Another field that would require sub-
stantial advancement relates to the 
reconciliation between different ways 
of  representing damage and losses. 
Engineers generally provide a physi-
cal representation of  damage in terms 
of  affected buildings, bridges, lifelines 
and plants (and related components). 
Costs of  asset repair or substitution 
can then be estimated. It is less easy 
than generally  perceived  to find an 
exact   match between the estimated 
repair and substitution costs and the 
real expenses that are declared for 
the reconstruction of  the same items 
(Comerio, 1996). This can be due to 
the fact that costs of  amelioration 
are included too or that, if  not gov-
erned, the process may lead to some 
distortions where someone takes un-
due advantage of  the disaster. Extra 
costs may be due also to the exces-
sive amount of  needed repair mate-
rial or workers from other areas to be 
recruited as local capacities are over-
whelmed.
Furthermore, there are spatial and 
temporal scale issues that cannot be 
neglected; for example, the shift from 
individual items that are assessed to 
entire sector categories, like the shift 
between individual residential build-
ings to residential land uses. For an 
attempt of  alignment, one may con-
sider the recent work carried out by 
Amadio et al. (2015).
More comprehensive post-
event damage analysis 
will provide fundamental 
knowledge to a variety of 
stakeholders. Innovation 
is needed to reconcile 
the ‘engineering’ 
representation of the 
physical damage and the 
economic assessment 
of direct and indirect 
damage and loss
The economic damage, however, is 
not restricted to the translation of 
physical damage or services malfunc-
tion into monetary terms. Instead, it 
reflects the economist’s perspective, 
according to which loss goes beyond 
repair and reconstruction needs and 
comprises the total effect the damage 
will have on a given economy (either 
local or national) in terms of  lost re-
sources and assets (Pesaro, 2007). 
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Such resources can be linked to ma-
terial damage, to business and service 
interruption or to the fact that cus-
tomers will be lost as a consequence 
of  prolonged businesses’ interrup-
tion, etc. Systemic effects due to the 
failure or malfunction of  lifelines and 
services can be described in terms of 
numbers (days/hours of  interruption, 
number of  customers without ser-
vice) or in terms of  the economic loss 
that has been caused by such a failure. 
The two representations of  damage 
and losses do not fully coincide; in-
stead it would be very important  to 
find correspondences between them.
2.4.5
Conclusions and key 
messages
Partnership 
A stronger partnership among a va-
riety of  stakeholders is required to 
achieve a more comprehensive and 
realistic picture of  complex disasters’ 
impact on society. Despite claims re-
lated to the usefulness of  risk models 
for decision-making, researchers de-
voted attention to models that were 
already satisfactorily developed and to 
sectors for which it was relatively easy 
to get data (Grandjean, 2014). In fact, 
the focus of  many scientific studies 
is improving the quality and the re-
liability of  models, independently of 
completeness in terms of  covered 
sectors and types of  item. Complete-
ness is important, however, for deci-
sion-makers. Local and regional gov-
ernments are certainly interested in 
assessing not only the potential phys-
ical damage to buildings and a limited 
number of  assets, but also the larger 
systemic effects, potential disruption 
of  services and businesses and overall 
impacts on the regional economy. De-
pending on whether their role is man-
aging prevention or emergencies, they 
are keen to know which sectors de-
serve more resources to reduce future 
risk and how expected damage will be 
distributed in space and in time.
Insurers are also interested in en-
hanced damage modelling and in a 
wider view of  impacts that may shape 
the environment in which the damage 
they will have to compensate for oc-
curs. In fact,    duration of  interrup-
tion is a crucial factor, particularly for 
businesses. In recent years, insurance 
companies have become more active 
in supporting their customers after 
an event to reduce such a duration. 
Knowing in advance what ‘external 
factors’ may impact on the capacity 
to return to normal operations will al-
low us to better tailor advice for mit-
igation that is increasingly recognised 
as part of  insurers’ work to diminish 
their own financial exposure.
Ultimately, we conclude that improved 
risk models supported by larger and 
more refined evidence derived from 
the observation of  what actually hap-
pens after real events is for the benefit 
of  risk mitigation measures, be they 
structural or non -structural.
Knowledge 
The potential benefits for risk model-
ling that may be provided by enhanced 
damage data collection and analysis is 
still an open issue for both academic 
researchers and practitioners. Fol-
lowing a review of  existing methods 
of  damage modelling in Europe and 
the United States, Hubert and Ledoux 
(1999) had already suggested that post 
-event surveys may provide more ‘re-
ality’ to assessments by subtracting the 
field of  imagined and hypothesised 
damage and providing more evidence 
from observed and surveyed damage. 
They suggest this is necessary, particu-
larly for those sectors such as lifelines 
and industries, for which risk models 
are still in their infancy in terms of 
robustness and completeness. In fact, 
as shown in this chapter, knowledge is 
more advanced in the field of  direct 
physical damage to certain assets, in 
particular buildings, while less so with 
respect to other sectors and  different 
types of  damage.
Innovation 
Multiple innovations are needed to 
enhance our capacity for damage 
modelling . First, there is the need to 
substantially improve post- disaster 
event and damage data collection and 
analysis (Barredo, 2009) to account 
for the different types of  damage to 
multiple sectors that are currently 
missing. Second, there is a need to 
reconcile different interpretations of 
damage, not only in terms of  defi-
nitions, a field where significant ad-
vances have been achieved, but also 
in terms of  adopted units of  measure 
and methods to aggregate cost at dif-
ferent scales. 
Closer interaction between engineers, 
volcanologists, geophysicists, geog-
raphers and economists has to be 
sought in order to understand the im-
plications and the links between dif-
ferent ways of  accounting for and re-
porting damage and loss. This would 
permit an advancement of  risk mod-
elling by overcoming the apparent 
randomness of  current assessments, 
which for some risks and for some 
assets are provided as damage index, 
and for others as costs.
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Also, a more comprehensive frame-
work considering spatial and tempo-
ral scales should be adopted in risk as-
sessment. As for the former, it would 
be established looking at the chain 
of  potential impacts, physical and 
systemic, and the quality and quanti-
ty of  exposed elements and systems 
(including economic systems). There-
fore, damage should not be consid-
ered only in the core area, where most 
physical damage has occurred, but 
case by case in the area of  relevance, 
which can range from local to global 
in some extreme instances (Nanto et 
al., 2011). As for the temporal scale, it 
is key to reiterate the data collection 
at time intervals relevant for the type 
of  event that has occurred. This will 
help to provide risk assessments with 
a clearer timestamp. A shift from a 
static representation of  damage, de-
fined in a pre-assigned time (often 
not made explicit), to more dynamic 
representations is necessary to show 
how damage changes and what type 
of  damage becomes more prominent 
at each stage of  the disaster event 
(impact, emergency or recovery).
98
2.5 Where are we with 
multihazards, 
multirisks assessment 
capacities?
Jochen	Zschau
2.5.1
Why do we need a 
change in the way we 
assess natural risks?
2.5.1.1 
Multirisk assessment 
versus single-risk 
assessment for disaster 
risk management
A given location on Earth may be 
threatened by more than one hazard. 
One of  the challenges of  disaster 
risk  management (DRM) is to prior-
itise the risks originating from these 
different hazards to enable decisions 
on appropriate and cost-effective 
mitigation or preparedness measures. 
However, comparability between risks 
associated with different types of  nat-
ural hazards is hampered by the dif-
ferent procedures and metrics used 
for risk assessment in different hazard 
types (Marzocchi et al., 2012). A com-
mon multirisk framework is needed 
being designed around a homogene-
ous methodology for all perils. In ad-
dition, many of  the natural processes 
involve frequent and complex interac-
tions between hazards. Examples in-
clude the massive landslides triggered 
by an earthquake or floods and debris 
flows triggered by an extreme storm 
event. 
Risk globalisation and 
climate change are great 
challenges that require 
a shift in the way we 
assess natural risks from 
a single-risk to a multirisk 
perspective.
 
The chain of  events — referred to as 
cascade or domino effects — can in-
crease the total risk, and the second-
ary events may be more devastating 
than the original trigger, as shown in 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami or the 
2011 tsunami in Japan (Zschau and 
Fleming, 2012). Even independent 
events, if  they occur at the same time 
and at the same place (e.g. hurricanes 
and earthquakes), may generate great-
er loss than the sum of  totally sepa-
rated single events.
The consequences of  disastrous 
events are often propagated through 
the human-made system, causing in-
terrelated technological, economic 
and financial disruptions, which may 
also result in social and political up-
heavals on all spatial scales. Even 
worldwide economies could poten-
tially be disrupted by major disasters 
through their impact upon global 
supply chains (Zschau and Fleming, 
2012). In addition, the impact of  one 
hazard may increase the potential 
harmful effect of  another hazard. 
For example, by changing vegetation 
and soil properties, forest fires may 
increase the probability of  debris and 
flash floods (Cannon and De Graff, 
2009). Similarly, a building’s vulnera-
bility to ground shaking may increase 
due to additional structural loads 
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following volcanic ash fall or heavy 
snowfall (Lee and Rosowsky, 2006; 
Zuccaro et al., 2008; Selva, 2013). 
Vulnerability in these cases would be 
highly time variant.
Multihazard risk approaches start 
from single-hazard risk assessments. 
Figure 2.19 attempts to capture the 
transition from single-hazard to mul-
tihazard risk as well as the definitions 
used. Single-hazard risk is the most 
common method.
2.5.1.2 
Emerging challenges: 
risk globalization and 
climate change
The risks arising from natural hazards 
have become globally interdependent 
and, therefore, not yet fully under-
stood. The ongoing ‘urban explo-
sion’, particularly in the Third World, 
an increasingly complex cross-linking 
of  critical infrastructure and lifelines 
in the industrial nations as well as an 
increasing vulnerability due to climate 
change and growing globalisation of 
the world’s economy, communication 
and transport systems, may play a ma-
jor part (Zschau and Fleming, 2012, 
Gencer, 2013). These factors are re-
sponsible for high-risk dynamics and 
also constitute some of  the major 
driving forces for disaster risk glo-
balisation. Communities are affected 
by extreme events in their own coun-
tries and become more vulnerable to 
those occurring outside their national 
territories. The effects of  a destruc-
tive earthquake in Tokyo, for instance, 
may influence London through shaky 
global markets and investments; or a 
disaster in a global city such as Los 
Angeles may affect developing econ-
omies like Mexico and can put the 
already vulnerable poor into further 
poverty (Gencer, 2013). In addition, 
the increased mobility of  people can 
spatially enlarge the scale of  natural 
disasters. This was demonstrated, for 
example, by the fatal tsunami disas-
ter of  2004 along the coasts of  the 
Indian Ocean, where the victims did 
not only come from the neighbouring 
countries, but included nearly 2 000 
citizens from Europe, for instance, 
most of  whom had been visiting re-
sorts in the affected region during 
their Christmas holidays when the 
tsunami struck. Globalisation is not 
From ‘single-hazard’ to ‘multirisk’ assessment and terminology adopted here.
Source: courtesy of author
FIGURE 2.19
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the only reason for the growing inter-
dependencies and the high dynamics 
seen in the risks from natural hazards. 
Climate change may be another im-
portant factor. According to IPCC 
(2014), it is very likely that extreme 
events will occur with higher fre-
quency, longer duration and different 
spatial distribution. Climate change 
is also projected to increase the dis-
placement of  people, which will lead 
to an increase of  exposure to extreme 
events. They will be exposed to dif-
ferent climate change impacts and 
consequences such as storms, coast-
al erosion, sea level rise and saltwater 
intrusion (Nicholls and Cazenave, 
2010).
A multirisk modelling approach will 
be required in order to capture the 
dynamic nature and various inter-
actions of  the hazard and risk-relat-
ed processes driven by both climate 
change and globalisation. Moreover, 
the sought-after solutions for risk as-
sessments are no longer exclusively 
aiming at the best possible quantifica-
tion of  the present risks, but also at 
keeping an eye on their changes with 
time and allowing to project these 
into the future.
2.5.2
Towards multirisk
 assessment  
methodology: where 
do we stand?
2.5.2.1
Sources of our present 
knowledge: the role of 
EU-funded projects
The Agenda 21 for Sustainable De-
velopment (UNEP, 1992), the Jo-
hannesburg Plan for Implementation 
(UN 2002), the Hyogo Framework 
for Action (UNISDR, 2005) and the 
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction (UNISDR, 2015) promote 
multihazard risks of  natural hazards. 
Together with the International Dec-
ade for Natural Disaster Reduction 
(IDNDR) from 1990 to 1999 and 
the following permanently installed 
International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (ISDR), they constitute a 
worldwide political framework for the 
initiation of  a multitude of  scientific 
projects in the risk research commu-
nity (Zentel and Glade, 2013). These 
projects include global index-based 
multihazard risk analysis such as Nat-
ural Disaster Hotspots (Dilley et al., 
2005) or INFORM (De Groeve et 
al., 2015). They also include regional 
multihazard initiatives like the cities 
project for geohazards in Australi-
an urban communities (Middelmann 
and Granger, 2000), the Risk Scape 
project in New Zealand (Schmidt et 
al., 2011) and the platforms HAZUS 
(FEMA, 2011) and CAPRA (Maru-
landa et al., 2013) for the automated 
computation of  multihazard risks in 
the United States and Central Ameri-
ca, respectively.
The European Union funded pro-
jects on multihazard and multirisk 
assessment within its framework pro-
grammes FP4, FP5, FP6 and FP7. 
The TIGRA project (Del Monaco et 
al., 1999) and the TEMRAP project 
(European Commission, 2000) were 
among the first attempts to homog-
enise the existing risk assessment 
methodologies among individual 
perils. The European Spatial Plan-
ning Observation Network (ESPON) 
compiled aggregated hazard maps 
weighting the individual hazards by 
means of  expert opinion and tak-
ing into account various natural and 
technological hazards in Europe 
(Schmidt-Thomé, 2005).
A multirisk assessment 
framework should allow 
for the comparison of 
risks and account for 
dynamic vulnerability as 
well as complex chain 
reactions on both the 
hazard and vulnerability 
levels 
Quantitative, fully probabilistic meth-
ods for multihazard and multirisk as-
sessment were developed in a series 
of  FP6 and FP7 projects: Na.R.As. 
2004-2006 (Marzocchi et al., 2009), 
ARMONIA 2004-2007 (Del Monaco 
et al., 2007) and MATRIX 2010-2013 
(Liu et al., 2015). Their results allow 
independent extreme events (coincid-
ing or not coinciding) as well as de-
pendent ones, including cascades, to 
be treated on both the hazard and the 
vulnerability levels. Moreover, these 
projects have time-dependent vul-
nerability taken into account. Their 
methods were applied in the CLUVA 
project 2010-2013 to future projec-
tions of  the influence of  climate 
change on natural hazards and urban 
risks in Africa (Bucchignani et al., 
2014; Garcia-Aristizabal et al., 2015 
a, b, 2016) as well as in the CRISMA 
project 2012-2015 to crisis scenario 
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modelling for improved action and 
preparedness(Garcia-Aristizabal et 
al., 2014).
In addition, projects in Europe fund-
ed on a national or regional basis have 
contributed significantly to our pres-
ent knowledge on multirisk assess-
ment. The German Research Network 
for Natural Disasters (DFNK), which 
had undertaken comparative multirisk 
assessments for the city of  Cologne 
(Grünthal et al., 2006), gives an exam-
ple of  this. The Piedmont region pro-
ject in Italy, with a focus on a meth-
odological approach for the definition 
of  multirisk maps (Carpignano et al., 
2009), and the ByMuR project 2011-
2014 on the application of  the Bayes-
ian probabilistic multirisk assessment 
approach to natural risks in the city 
of  Naples (Selva, 2013) are two oth-
er examples. Furthermore, the Centre 
for Risk Studies of  the University of 
Cambridge in the United Kingdom is 
presently one of  the first to systemat-
ically address the globalisation aspect 
of  risk. The centre is currently setting 
up a global threat taxonomy and a risk 
assessment framework aiming at mac-
ro-catastrophe threats that have the 
potential to cause large-scale damage 
and disruption to social and econom-
ic networks in the modern globalised 
world (Coburn et al., 2014).
2.5.2.2 
Multilayer single-risk 
assessments: 
harmonisation for risk 
comparability
In order to assist decision-makers in 
the field of  DRM in their prioritising 
of  mitigation actions, one has to un-
derstand the relative importance of 
different hazards and risks for a given 
region. This requires the threats aris-
ing from different perils to be compa-
rable with each other. However, this 
is difficult, because different hazards 
differ in their nature, return period 
and intensity, as well as the effects 
they may have on exposed elements. 
Moreover, the reference units, such as 
ground acceleration or macroseismic 
intensity for earthquakes, discharge or 
inundation depth for floods and wind 
speed for storms, are different among 
the hazards. This does not only ham-
per the comparability between the 
threats, but it also makes it difficult to 
aggregate the single perils in a mean-
ingful way in order to assess the total 
threat coming from all the hazards in 
a region. These problems exist inde-
pendently of  whether hazard inter-
actions and/or interactions on the 
vulnerability level are important or 
not. Thus, to overcome them, and as 
a first step towards a full multirisk as-
sessment, one may treat them in the 
context of  a multilayer single-hazard/
risk assessment approach, ignoring 
the interactions but harmonising and 
standardising the assessment proce-
dures among the different perils.
Three major standardisation schemes 
can be distinguished in this context 
(Kappes et al., 2012; Papathoma-Köh-
le, 2016). They make use of:
• matrices — hazard matrix, vulnera-
bility matrix and risk matrix;
• indices — hazard index, vulnerabil-
ity index and risk index; and
• curves — hazard curves, vulnera-
bility curves and risk curves.
They are applicable on all three as-
sessment levels: hazard, vulnerability 
and risk, respectively.
Matrices
A hazard matrix applies a colour code 
to classify certain hazards by the in-
tensity and frequency (occurrence 
probabilities) determined qualitative-
ly, for instance ‘low’, ‘moderate’ and 
‘high (Figure 2.20). Based on this, one 
can compare the importance of  haz-
ards and one may derive the overall 
hazard map by overlaying the classi-
fication results of  all single hazards. 
An example of  this approach is the 
risk management of  natural hazards 
in Switzerland (Figure 2.20, redrawn 
from Kunz and Hurni, 2008; see also 
Loat, 2010). The European Commis-
sion-funded Armonia project (Ap-
plied Multi-Risk Mapping of  Natu-
ral Hazards for Impact Assessment) 
has proposed a similar classification 
scheme (Del Monaco et al., 2007). 
Likewise, the French risk prevention 
plans (Cariam, 2006) follow this kind 
of  approach.
Like in the ‘hazard case’, overarch-
ing matrix schemes also exist on the 
vulnerability level. So-called damage 
matrices, for example, are discrete ap-
proaches to vulnerability assessment 
that oppose relative damage or dam-
age grades to classified hazard intensi-
ties in a matrix. The resulting vulner-
ability (fragility) is either qualitatively 
described (few, many or most), for in-
stance as the proportion of  buildings 
that belong to each damage grade for 
various levels of  intensity (see Grün-
thal, 1998 in relation to the European 
macroseismic scale), or quantitatively 
described as the probability to reach 
a certain damage grade (Tyagunov et 
al., 2006).
For the aim of  comparing and ag-
gregating risks coming from multiple 
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hazards, assessment procedures are 
required that combine both hazard 
and vulnerability information. Var-
ious authors (e.g. Sterlacchini et al., 
2007; Sperling et al., 2007; Greiving, 
2006) have suggested matrix schemes 
that fulfil this requirement. The Euro-
pean Commission (2010) proposed a 
risk matrix that relates the two dimen-
sions, likelihood (probability) and im-
pact (loss), for a graphical representa-
tion of  multiple risks in a comparative 
way (Figure 2.21). Distinct matrices 
were suggested for human impact, 
economic and environmental impact 
and political/social impact, as these 
categories are measured with distinct 
scales and would otherwise be diffi-
cult to compare.
Indices
Apart from the matrix-based ap-
proaches described above, in-
dex-based approaches are another 
means to achieve comparability in 
the multilayer single-hazard and -risk 
context. The methodology of  com-
posite indicators allows to combine 
various indicators to obtain a mean-
ingful measure.
An example of  an index-based ap-
proach on the hazard level is global 
Natural Disaster Hotspots (see also 
Chapter 2.5.2.1), which is an aggre-
gated multihazard index calculated 
from the exposure of  a region to var-
ious hazards and is used to identify 
key ‘hotspots’, where the exposure to 
natural disasters is particularly high. A 
more recent example was put forward 
by Petitta et al. (2016) who suggest-
ed a multihazard index for extreme 
events capable of  tracking changes 
in the frequency or magnitude of  ex-
treme weather events.
Vulnerability indices (see also Chap-
ter 2.3) are already widely used in the 
socioeconomic field, including multi-
hazard settings, as for example in the 
studies of  Wisner et al. (2004), Col-
lins et al. (2009) and Lazarus (2011), 
but they are rarely hazard specific 
(Kappes et al., 2011). In contrary , 
physical vulnerability is regarded as 
hazard- specific. An increasing num-
ber of  studies is now available that 
applies hazard-specific vulnerabili-
ty indicators to, for instance, tsuna-
mis (Papathoma et al., 2003), floods 
(Barroca et al., 2006, Balica et al., 
2009; Müller et al., 2011), landslides 
(Papathoma-Köhle et al., 2007; Silva 
and Pereira, 2014) and mountain haz-
ards (Kappes et al., 2011). In various 
cases the indicators are combined 
with the PTVA (Papathoma Tsuna-
mi Vulnerability Assessment) method 
(Papathoma and Dominey-Howes, 
2008).
Going from vulnerability indices to 
risk indices is another solution to 
achieving comparability in the mul-
tilayer single-risk context. As a risk 
indicator includes hazard information 
in addition to vulnerability informa-
tion, such a step also allows the aggre-
gation of  the risks coming from dif-
ferent perils. Dilley et al. (2005), who 
computed hazard and vulnerability 
for natural hazards on a global scale 
and weighted the hazard with the vul-
nerability index to calculate risk, gave 
an example. For the derivation of  the 
multihazard risk, all single-hazard 
Swiss hazard matrix 
Source: Kunz and Hurni (2008) 
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risks were added up.
All three levels of  an index-based ap-
proach, i.e. the hazard, vulnerability 
and risk levels, are addressed in the 
ongoing European project INFORM 
(see also Chapter 2.5.2.1), where sep-
arate indices for hazard and exposure, 
vulnerability, lack of  coping capacity 
and risk are developed in order to 
identify countries where the human-
itarian crisis and disaster risk would 
overwhelm national response capac-
ity. 
Curves
More quantitative methods for as-
sessing natural threats in a multilayer 
single-hazard approach are based on 
‘curves’ (‘functions’).
Hazard curves present the exceedance 
probabilities for a certain hazard’s in-
tensities in a given period. Vulnerabil-
ity curves graphically relate the loss or 
the conditional probability of  loss ex-
ceedance to the intensity measure of 
a hazard (for instance ground motion, 
wind speed or ash load) in order to 
quantify the vulnerability of  elements 
at risk. When the probability of  ex-
ceeding certain damage levels is con-
sidered, the curves are referred to as 
‘fragility curves’.
One may easily combine vulnerability 
curves with the corresponding hazard 
curves to arrive at a measure of  risk. 
This could be the average loss per 
considered period, the so-called av-
erage annual loss or expected annual 
loss, if  the period is 1 year. It could 
also be a risk curve, which graphically 
relates the probability of  loss exceed-
ance within the period under con-
sideration to the loss coming from 
all possible hazard intensities. As ex-
ceedance probabilities and loss are 
not expressed in hazard-specific units, 
they are directly comparable among 
different hazards and can easily be 
aggregated to an overall multilayer 
single risk.
Figure 2.22 shows the annual exceed-
ance probability of  direct econom-
ic loss from earthquakes, floods and 
storms in the city of  Cologne (Grün-
thal et al., 2006). Storms turn out to 
be the dominant risk at return peri-
ods lower than 8years (largest loss!). 
Floods take over for higher return pe-
riods up to 200 years and earthquakes 
become the dominant risk for return 
periods higher than 200 years.
A comparison between the risks from 
the different perils can be accom-
plished based on the expected aver-
age loss within the considered period 
represented by the area under the risk 
curve (Van Westen et al., 2002).
Fleming et al. (2016) demonstrated 
that one may also easily aggregate the 
single-hazard-specific risk curves to 
obtain a ‘total risk’ curve without con-
sidering potential interactions between 
the hazards. Figure 2.23 shows the 
wind, storm and earthquake risks for 
the city of  Cologne. The various ag-
gregations of  the risk probabilities, for 
instance for loss in the order of  EUR 
100 million, indicate enhanced loss 
probabilities from between 15 % and 
35 % for the individual hazards and up 
to 56 % in 50 years when combined.
Risk matrix proposed by the European Commission
Source: European Commission (2010)
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Hazard, vulnerability and risk curves 
are the quantitative equivalent to the 
hazard, vulnerability (damage) and risk 
matrices. On the other hand, there is a 
distinct difference between them: the 
curves only make use of  two dimen-
sions, frequency and impact, to char-
acterise risk, whereas matrices use 
three dimensions, by additionally in-
troducing colour codes. The third di-
mension expresses different levels of 
risk from ‘low’ to ‘high’ with differ-
ent colours, which gives extra weight 
to either the impact or the likelihood 
(see, for instance, Figure 2.21).
This is an added value of  risk ma-
trices, since the additional colour 
code makes it possible to compare 
high-probability and low-consequenc-
es events with low-probability and 
high-consequences ones, for instance.
To extract similar information from 
risk curves, probabilities and loss can 
simply be multiplied (P×L). The lines 
of  equal loss–probability products, 
P×L, in a logarithmic risk curve plot 
would be straight diagonal lines (Fig-
ure 2.24, left). In the case of  a sin-
gle-risk scenario with a given annual 
probability, the loss-probability-prod-
uct directly represents the average an-
nual loss (impact). This is not the case 
for the risk curve, which includes the 
loss from all possible hazard intensi-
ties. However, one may easily show 
that in this case it represents the con-
tribution to the average annual loss 
per increment of  logarithmic proba-
bility. Thus, from additionally display-
ing the exceedance probability as a 
function of  the loss-probability-prod-
uct instead of  the loss alone, one may 
learn which part of  the risk curve, in 
terms of  return periods, will contrib-
ute most to the average annual loss. 
In the case of  Cologne (Figure 2.24, 
Risk curves for the city of Cologne
Source: Grünthal et al. (2006)
FIGURE 2.22
Risk curves and their aggregations for the city of Cologne
Source: Fleming et al. (2016)
FIGURE 2.23
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right), storms and floods contribute 
the most in the range of  small return 
periods, whereas for earthquakes the 
return periods of  around 1 000 years 
have the highest contribution to the 
average annual loss.
The probabilistic concept of  risk 
curves is used for both economic 
losses of  a potential disaster and the 
indirect, socioeconomic impacts, as 
long as these are tangible. As exam-
ples, Garcia-Aristizabal et al. (2015a) 
mention losses in work productivity, 
losses due to missing income, costs of 
evacuation and the costs of  medical 
assistance as well as effects of  the loss 
of  functionality of  systems and net-
works including disruptions of  pro-
ductivity and the means of  produc-
tion. Garcia-Aristizabal et al. (2015a) 
also describe how the information 
from the socioeconomic context can 
be integrated straightforwardly into 
the quantitative multi-layer risk frame-
work by harmonizing the metrics 
of  the different loss indicators and 
producing the single loss exceedance 
curves and their sum, respectively, 
equivalent to the methodology used 
for direct losses. However, this needs 
to introduce quantitative vulnera-
bility/fragility information for each 
of  the different indicators or even 
their respective vulnerability/fragility 
curves, which still is the bottleneck of 
the method.
2.5.2.3 
Hazard interactions: 
cascading events 
and Co.
Multilayer single-risk assessments, 
as described in the previous section, 
analyse the risks coming from differ-
ent perils separately. Assuming inde-
pendence between the hazard-specif-
ic risks, they simply add them up to 
obtain the overall hazard in a region. 
However, in a complex system like 
nature, processes are very often de-
pendent on each other, and interact. 
There are various kinds of  interac-
tions between hazards that often lead 
to significantly more severe negative 
consequences for the society than 
when they act separately. A multilayer 
single-risk perspective does not con-
sider this, but a multihazard approach 
does.
Classification of hazard 
interactions
The complexity of  interactions be-
tween hazards has led to a multitude 
of  terms in use for describing differ-
ent types of  interdependencies. The 
term ‘cascades’ has been used, for 
instance, by Carpignano et al. (2009), 
Zuccaro and Leone (2011), Choine et 
al. (2015) and Pescarol and Alexander 
(2015); ‘chains’ by Xu et al. (2014), 
among others; and ‘interaction haz-
ard networks’ by Gill and Malamud 
Risk curves and P x L - curves for the city of Cologne (Exceedance probability versus loss (left) and versus its 
product with loss (right)
Source: courtesy of author
FIGURE 2.24
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(2016). Further terms in use are ‘co-
inciding hazards’ (Tarveinen et al., 
2006; European Commission, 2010), 
‘coupled events’ (Marzocchi et al. 
2009), ‘domino effects’ (Luino, 2005), 
‘follow-on events’ (European Com-
mission, 2010) and ‘triggering effects’ 
(Marzocchi et al., 2009). More of  such 
terms are presented and explained in 
Kappes et al. (2012).
Gill and Malamud (2014, 2016) sug-
gested classifying the different haz-
ard interaction types into five groups 
(Box 1). In the first group, the ‘trig-
gering relationship’, the secondary 
(triggered) hazard, might be of  the 
same type as the primary (triggering) 
one or different, for instance an earth-
quake that triggers another one or a 
rainfall event that triggers a landslide, 
respectively. In the second group, the 
‘increased probability relationship’, 
the primary hazard, does not directly 
trigger a secondary event but chang-
es some aspects of  the natural envi-
ronment, leading to an increase of 
the probability of  another hazard. 
For instance, in the event of  a wild-
fire, vegetation is destroyed, which 
can result in an increased vulnerabil-
ity of  a slope to landslides (Gill and 
Malamud,  2014). In the third group, 
‘decreased probability relationship’, 
the probability of  a secondary hazard 
is decreased due to a primary hazard 
(third group), therefore it does not 
pose a problem to risk management. 
Gill and Malamud (2014) gave the ex-
ample of  a heavy rainfall event that 
increases the surface moisture con-
tent, whereby reducing the depth to 
the water table and consequently de-
creasing the probability of  a wildfire. 
Similarly, the spatial and temporal co-
incidence of  events, the ‘coincidence 
relationship’ (fourth group), may be 
considered as some kind of  interac-
tion, because although independent of 
each other, together they can increase 
the impacts beyond the sum of  the 
single components if  the hazards had 
occurred separately in time and space. 
An example can be seen in the coin-
cidence of  the Mount Pinatubo vol-
cano eruption in 1991 with Typhoon 
Yunya (Gill and Malamud, 2016), 
where the combination of  thick and 
heavy wet ash deposits with rainfall 
triggered both lahars (Self, 2006) and 
structural failures (Chester, 1993). In 
the fifth group, the ‘catalysis/imped-
ance relationship’ between hazards, a 
triggering relation between two haz-
ards may be catalysed or impeded by 
a third one. A volcanic eruption, for 
instance, can trigger wildfires, but this 
triggering interaction may be impeded 
by a tropical storm.
Furthermore, anthropogenic and 
technological hazards may interact 
with natural hazards, not only by 
the trigger and increased probability 
relationships, but also by catalysis/
impedance relationships. These may 
include, for example, storms imped-
ing an urban fire-triggered structural 
collapse or storm-triggered floods, 
which are catalysed by a blocking of 
drainage due to technological failures.
Based on geophysical environmental 
factors in the hazard-forming envi-
ronment, Liu et al. (2016) proposed 
a different classification scheme for 
hazard interactions by distinguishing 
between stable environmental factors, 
which form the precondition for the 
occurrence of  natural hazards, and 
trigger factors, which determine the 
frequency and magnitude of  hazards. 
Dependent on these environmental 
factors, one may divide the hazard 
relationships into four classes: inde-
pendent, mutex (mutually exclusive), 
parallel (more than one hazard trig-
gered in parallel) and series relation-
ships (one hazard follows another). 
Classification schemes for hazard 
interactions help to ensure that all 
possible hazard interactions among 
different hazards are considered in a 
Classification of hazard interactions 
Source: Gill and Malamud (2014, 2016)
(1) Triggering relationship
(2) Increased probability relationship
(3) Decreased probability relationship
(4) Coincidence relationship
(5) Catalysis/ impedance relationship
BOX 2.1
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multihazard risk assessment (Liu et 
al., 2016).
Methods
Among the available methods to inte-
grate hazard interactions into disaster 
risk assessment, there are qualitative, 
semi-quantitative and quantitative 
ones. Qualitative methods settle for 
qualitative descriptions and classifica-
tions of  interactions with the aim of 
identifying the most important hazard 
relations in a region. Semi-quantita-
tive approaches are mainly based on 
so-called hazard-interaction matrices 
(not to be confused with the hazard 
matrix addressed in  Chapter 2.5.2.2). 
They offer a structured approach to 
examine and visualise hazard interac-
tions and to see how strong these in-
teractions are, aiming not only at the 
identification of  important hazard re-
lations but also at getting insight into 
the evolution of  the system when dif-
ferent hazards interact. This kind of 
matrix has been used, for instance, by 
Tarvainen et al. (2006), De Pippo et 
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Matrix approach for the identification of hazard interactions.
Source: Liu et al. (2015)
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al. (2008), Kappes et al. (2010), Gill 
and Malamud (2014), Mignan et al 
(2014) and Liu et al. (2015). Figure 
2.25 gives an example of  how this 
matrix approach can be used in mul-
tihazard assessment: first, the matrix 
is set up in a way that all potentially 
interacting hazards in the region un-
der consideration are occurring in the 
matrix’s diagonal (Figure 2.25a). The 
possible interactions are described in 
a clockwise scheme (Figure 2.25b), 
which results in the influences of  a 
hazard on the system appearing in 
the related matrix row and the influ-
ences of  the system on the hazard in 
the hazard’s column (Figure 2.25c). 
In addition, a coding between 0 and 
3 is used (Figure 2.25d) to semi-quan-
titatively describe how strong the in-
teractions are between the different 
hazards, respectively, and are entered 
into the matrix (Figure 2.25e). Liu et 
al. (2015) propose this scheme to be 
used as second level in their three-lev-
el framework from qualitative to 
quantitative multirisk assessment in 
order to decide whether it is justified 
to go to the third quantitative level of 
assessment or not.
Gill and Malamud (2014) have used a 
similar kind of  matrix to characterise 
the interaction relationships between 
21 natural hazards, both qualitative-
ly as well as semi-quantitatively. This 
matrix identifies and describes haz-
ard relations and potential cascades 
as well as characterises the different 
relationships between the intensity 
of  the primary hazard and the poten-
tial intensity of  the secondary hazard 
in both the triggering and increased 
probability cases. Moreover, they were 
able to indicate the spatial overlap and 
temporal likelihood of  each triggering 
relationship.
Quantitative methods for integrating 
hazard interactions into disaster risk 
assessment are mainly based on event 
tree and fault tree strategies (see the 
event tree example in Figure 2.26 for 
volcano eruption forecasting) com-
bined with probabilistic approaches 
for quantifying each branch of  the 
tree. Among them, the concept of 
Bayesian event trees, where the weight 
assigned to a branch of  a node in the 
tree is not a fixed single value but a 
random variable drawn from a proba-
bility distribution function, is of  par-
ticular interest. It allows the rigorous 
propagation of  uncertainties through 
the different computation layers when 
simulating all the hazard relations in a 
complex chain. The event tree struc-
ture (Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002; Mar-
zocchi et al., 2004, 2008, 2010; Selva 
et al., 2012) is particularly suitable for 
describing scenarios composed by 
event chains. Neri et al. (2008), for in-
stance, compiled a probability tree for 
future scenarios at the volcano Mount 
Vesuvius, including various eruption 
styles and secondary hazards associat-
ed with them. Marzocchi et al. (2009, 
2012) also employed a probabilistic 
event tree to analyse triggering ef-
fects in a risk assessment framework. 
Moreover, Neri et al. (2013) used a 
probability/scenario tree for multi-
hazard mapping around the Kanlaon 
volcano in the Philippines. However, 
the available quantitative studies in 
this field that explicitly consider haz-
ard interactions remain rare (Liu et al., 
2015).
The probabilistic framework to be 
combined with an event tree strategy 
for quantifying hazard interactions 
has been discussed in Marzocchi et 
al. (2004, 2008, 2010 and 2012); Sel-
va (2013); Garcia-Aristizabal and 
Marzocchi (2013); Gasparini and 
Garcia-Aristizabal (2014); and Gar-
cia-Aristizabal et al. (2015a). It is 
equivalent to the probabilistic frame-
work for the multilayer hazard assess-
ment introduced in Chapter 2.5.2.2, 
where the single hazards are quanti-
fied by their hazard curves, respective-
ly, and are combined with vulnerabil-
ity curves to obtain the probability of 
potential loss. The difference, howev-
er, is that in the case of  interactions 
between two perils, the secondary 
hazard’s probabilities for all possible 
intensity scenarios will form a hazard 
surface rather than a hazard curve 
(Figure 2.27). 
So far, vulnerability 
has been considered as 
static. Like exposure, 
vulnerability is also 
highly dynamic 
regardless of whether it 
is physical, functional or 
socioeconomic
This is because the probability of  a 
hazard event that has been affected by 
another one depends on the intensi-
ties of  both the primary and second-
ary events.
Long-term event databases on a cer-
tain hazard may already contain the 
secondary events arising from inter-
actions with other primary hazards 
(Marzocchi et al., 2012). Hence, for 
long-term problems, e.g. when the 
tsunami hazard over the next 50 years 
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is to be assessed, there is no need to 
apply a multihazard methodology. A 
multilayer single hazard one would do, 
as was demonstrated by Garcia-Aristi-
zabal et al. (2015b) with regard to fu-
ture projections of  the climate-related 
triggering of  floods, drought and de-
sertification in the area of  Dar es Sa-
laam (Tanzania) until 2050. However, 
in the short term (e.g. hours to days), 
for instance, when heavy rain chang-
es the landslide occurrence probabil-
ity in a time horizon of  a few days, a 
multihazard approach is necessary to 
account for this interaction.
Marzocchi et al. (2012) also gave a 
simple example showing how the 
adoption of  a single-hazard perspec-
tive instead of  a multihazard one 
could be misleading in a short-term 
problem. Their example addresses the 
possible collapse of  a pipe bridge in 
the Casalnuovo municipality in south-
ern Italy, which has an increased prob-
ability, when volcanic activity triggers 
heavy ash loads. The collapse in an 
industrial centre could cause an ex-
plosion and subsequent air and water 
contamination. In this example it ap-
peared that one would underestimate 
the probability of  a pipe bridge col-
lapse and, hence, the industrial risks 
(explosion, contamination) that might 
follow from it by more than one or-
der of  magnitude, if  the secondary 
ash loads from volcanic activity were 
neglected.
A full hazard curve to quantify hazard 
interactions is still rare, although Gar-
cia-Aristizabal et al. (2013) have shown 
that this is possible when they present-
ed hazard curves for volcanic swarms 
and earthquakes triggered by volcanic 
unrest in the region of  Naples.
Application to climate 
change
Based on the concept of  risk curves 
above, it is not immediately visible 
the extent to which the probabilistic 
framework is also suitable for treat-
ing the interactions of  climate change 
with natural hazards. The reason is 
that the framework has its origins 
in stationary processes, whereas an 
impact of  climate change on natu-
ral hazards, resulting in more or less 
gradual changes regarding the haz-
ards’ frequencies and their intensity 
extremes, represents a non-stationary 
process. The methodology applied to 
it has to account for this (see, for in-
stance, Solomon et al., 2007; Ouarda 
and El Adlouni, 2011; Seidou et al., 
2011, 2012). The problem is rendered 
even more difficult by the fact that the 
probabilities of  future extremes could 
be outside the data range of  past and 
present observations and, hence, we 
cannot draw on experience, i.e. on 
existing data catalogues. A solution 
to the problem comes from extreme 
value theory, as this theory aims at 
deriving a probability distribution of 
events at the far end of  the upper and 
lower ranges of  the probability distri-
butions (Coles, 2001), where data do 
not exist or are very rare. 
The generalised extreme value distri-
bution, combined with a non-station-
ary approach (the so-called non-sta-
tionary GEV model), is therefore, 
widely applied today to predict the 
effects of  climate change on mete-
orological hazards. Examples are El 
Adlouni et al. (2007) and Cannon 
(2010) for precipitation, Siliverstovs 
et al. (2010) for heat waves, Seidou et 
al. (2011, 2012) for floods and Gar-
cia-Aristizabal et al. (2015b) for ex-
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Event tree scheme for eruption forecasting
Source: Selva et al. (2012)
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treme temperature and precipitation. 
How this approach can be integrated 
into the above probabilistic frame-
work for multihazard and multihazard 
risk assessment was demonstrated by 
Garcia-Aristizabal (2015b), who suc-
ceeded in harmonising the outcome 
of  the non-stationary GEV model 
application to Dar es Salaam in Tan-
zania in the form of  time-dependent, 
high-resolution probabilistic hazard 
maps and hazard curves.
2.5.2.4
Dynamic vulnerability: 
time- and 
state-dependent 
The different types of 
vulnerability dynamics
One may distinguish between two 
types of  vulnerability dynamics, the 
time-dependent and the state-depend-
ent one. In the first, we refer to more 
or less gradual changes of  vulnerabil-
ity with time. In the second, vulnera-
bility depends on a certain state of  a 
system that may change abruptly, due 
to a natural hazard event, for instance. 
If  a load on a system (e.g. snow on a 
roof) determines the relevant vulner-
ability state, the expression would be 
‘load-dependent vulnerability’; if  it is 
about a pre-damage state (e.g. a build-
ing that has been pre-damaged by a 
seismic main shock and threatened 
by aftershocks), the term ‘pre-dam-
age-dependent vulnerability’ is em-
ployed. 
The term ‘time-dependent vulnera-
bility’ is used in the engineering com-
munity for distinguishing between the 
gradual deterioration of  a building’s 
fragility due to corrosion and the 
abrupt changes when an earthquake 
strikes.
Time-dependent 
vulnerability
Time-dependent vulnerability dynam-
ics may have many origins, depending 
on the problem under consideration 
and the dimension of  vulnerability 
involved, i.e. social, economic, phys-
ical, cultural, environmental or insti-
tutional (for the dimensions of  vul-
nerability see Birkmann et al. 2013). 
Vulnerability changes due to the age-
ing of  structures, for instance, have 
been addressed by Ghosh and Padgett 
(2010), Choe et al. (2010), Giorgio et 
al. (2011), Yalcinev et al. (2012), Kar-
apetrou et al. (2013) and Iervolino et 
al. (2015 a), among others. Münzberg 
et al. (2014) pointed to power outag-
es, where the consequences and hence 
the vulnerability of  the public may 
progressively change within hours or 
days. Moreover, Aubrecht et al. (2012) 
made short-term social vulnerability 
changes in terms of  human exposure 
in the diurnal cycle subject of  dis-
cussion. In the long term, especially 
when regarding the possible effects of 
climate change and globalisation over 
the next decades, the interacting so-
cial, economic and cultural factors will 
probably be the most important driv-
ers of  vulnerability dynamics. These 
include demographic, institutional 
and governance factors (IPCC, 2012; 
Aubrecht et al., 2012; Oppenheimer 
et al., 2014). Some of  them could be 
related to the rapid and unsustaina-
ble urban development, international 
financial pressures and increases in 
socioeconomic inequalities, as well as 
failures in governance and environ-
Example of a hazard surface, Hij, describing hazard interaction as a prob-
ability surface that depends on all possible intensities, Ai and Bj, of the 
primary event ‘A’ and of the secondary event ‘B’, respectively
Source: Garcia-Aristizabal and Marzocchi (2013)
FIGURE 2.27
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mental degradation (Oppenheimer et 
al. 2014).
State-dependent 
vulnerability
The more abrupt state-dependent 
vulnerability changes occur when two 
hazards interact on the vulnerability 
level and the first one alters the expo-
sure or the state of  exposed elements 
in a way that changes the response of 
the elements to the second one. This 
second event may or may not be of 
the same hazard type as the former, 
and is either independent or depend-
ent on the first one. An example for 
load-dependent vulnerability can be 
found in Lee and Rosowsky (2006), 
who discussed the case of  a wood-
frame building loaded by snow and 
exposed to an earthquake. According-
ly, Zuccaro et al. (2008), Marzocchi 
et al. (2012), Garcia-Aristizabal et al. 
(2013) and Selva (2013) gave the ex-
ample of  the seismic vulnerability of 
buildings loaded by ash due to volcan-
ic activity (Figure 2.28, below). In ad-
dition, Selva (2013) presented an ex-
ample for state-dependent exposure. 
In this case, strong local earthquakes 
changed the exposure to a tsunami by 
people escaping from their damaged 
buildings and concentrating in sea-
side areas, which is where tsunamis 
hit. Pre-damage-dependent seismic 
vulnerability/fragility is important for 
earthquake aftershock risk assessment 
(Figure 2.28, above) and so has been 
addressed by Bazurro et al. (2004), 
Sanchez-Silva et al. (2011), Polese et 
al. (2012, 2015) and Iervolino et al. 
(2015a, 2015b), among others.
Integration into a 
probabilistic framework
In the case of  the ageing of  struc-
tures, whereas one may easily inte-
grate time-dependent vulnerability 
into a probabilistic multirisk assess-
ment approach, for instance by means 
of  time-dependent fragility functions 
(see Ghosh and Padgett, 2010; Kara-
petrou et al., 2013), this is not the case 
for the long-term vulnerability chang-
es relevant to climate change and glo-
balisation. Despite the existence of  a 
few studies in the climate change re-
search community that have made an 
attempt to project probabilistic risk 
curves into the future (e.g. Jenkins et 
al., 2014), the use of  vulnerability/
fragility curves does not seem to be 
common. According to Jurgilevich et 
al. (2017), the main bottleneck in as-
sessing vulnerability and exposure dy-
namics and projecting them into the 
future is poor availability of  data, par-
ticularly for socioeconomic data. An-
other bottleneck relates to the uncer-
tainty and accuracy of  the projections. 
Whilst one might have data about the 
future population, these data are often 
useless for assessing the future levels 
of  education, income, health and oth-
er important socioeconomic aspects. 
This may be the reason why vulner-
ability assessments are still mostly 
based on present socioeconomic data, 
whereas current climate change pro-
jections go up to the year 2100 (Car-
dona et al., 2012). In light of  the signif-
icant uncertainties involved in future 
projections of  vulnerability, climate 
change-related literature has suggest-
ed the production of  a range of  alter-
native future pathways instead of  one 
most plausible vulnerability scenario 
(Dessai et al., 2009; Haasnoot et al., 
2012, O’Neill et al., 2014, among oth-
Two examples of state-dependent seismic vulnerability: pre-damage-de-
pendent vulnerability (above) and load-dependent vulnerability (below)
Source: Mignan (2013) 
FIGURE 2.28
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ers). Still, dynamics of  vulnerability or 
exposure are presently only included 
in half  of  the future-oriented studies 
related to climate change. Moreover, 
the inclusion of  dynamics in both is 
observed in less than one third of  the 
studies oriented to the future (Jurgile-
vich et al. 2017).
Following Garcia-Aristizabal and 
Marzocchi (2013), Garcia-Aristiza-
bal et al. (2015 a) and Gasparini and 
Garcia-Aristizabal (2014), the situa-
tion is different for the pre-damage- 
and load-dependent vulnerabilities. 
One may easily integrate them into 
a probabilistic multirisk approach by 
extending the above framework for 
multilayer single-risk and multihazard 
risk assessment to account for hazard 
interactions on the vulnerability level. 
The main difference of  such an ex-
tended multirisk approach compared 
to the former one is the fact that 
vulnerability/fragility is introduced 
into the multirisk framework as a 
vulnerability/fragility surface instead 
of  a curve (see Figure 2.29). This is 
because vulnerability, in the case of 
these interactions, depends on both 
the variable state of  the exposed el-
ements as well as on the intensity of 
the secondary event. In the case of 
load-dependent fragility/vulnerabili-
ty, a load, for instance an ash load due 
to volcanic activity (see the fragility 
surface in Figure 2.29), determines 
the variable state of  the exposed el-
ements. For pre-damage-dependent 
fragility/vulnerability, the load pa-
rameter of  the fragility/vulnerability 
surface is substituted by a parameter 
describing the pre-damage state.
In order to get a feeling of  how dif-
ferent the results of  the multirisk 
approach can be from those of  the 
single-risk approach, let us take the 
example of  seismic risk in the Arenel-
la area of  Naples, which was modified 
by ash loads. Garcia-Aristizabal et al. 
(2013) found that, in this case, the ex-
pected loss from earthquakes was re-
markably sensitive to the thickness of 
an ash layer from volcanic activity as-
sumed to load the roofs of  the area’s 
buildings. Whereas for a 24-cm ash 
layer the expected loss from earth-
quakes increased by less than 20% 
compared to the case without load, it 
reached an amplification factor of  six 
for a 41-cm thick layer.
A simple example demonstrating 
what the effect of  pre-damage-de-
pendent vulnerability may quantita-
tively amount to can be deduced from 
the damage- and pre-damage-depend-
ent fragility curves provided by Abad 
(2013) for a hospital in Martinique 
(French West Indies). For a ground 
motion of  5 m/s2 at the building’s 
resonance, the probability of  reaching 
a damage state 4 (near to collapse or 
collapse) is found from their curves to 
be roughly 7 % if  pre-damage is not 
accounted for. On the other hand, as-
suming a pre-damage state 3 on a scale 
up to 4 results in a collapse probabil-
ity of  more than 30 %, an increase of 
nearly a factor of  five.
Iervolino et al. (2015b), among oth-
ers, have extended the concept of 
pre-damage-dependent vulnerability 
to account for the accumulation of 
damage in a series of  aftershocks. 
Moreover, Sanchez-Silva et al. (2011) 
and Iervolino et al. (2013, 2015a) 
Ash load-dependent, two-dimensional seismic fragility surface
Source: Garcia-Aristizabal and Marzocchi (2013)
FIGURE 2.29
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proposed to take into account both 
age-dependent and state-dependent 
vulnerabilities in one model of  the 
time-variant failure probability of 
structures.
Matrix city
The ‘Matrix city’ framework, pro-
posed by Mignan et al. (2014) for a 
quantitative multihazard and mul-
tirisk assessment that accounts for 
interactions on both the hazard and 
the vulnerability levels and considers 
time-dependent vulnerability, is con-
ceptually quite different from the one 
introduced so far. It consists of  a core 
simulation algorithm based on the 
Monte Carlo method. This method 
simulates a large number of  stochastic 
hazard-intensity scenarios, thereby al-
lowing for a probabilistic assessment 
of  the risk and for the recognition of 
more or less probable risk paths. As 
each scenario is represented by a time 
series, the method is also appropri-
ate for assessing the risks associated 
with non-stationary processes, such 
as the hazards and/or vulnerabilities 
under climate change. Intra- as well as 
interhazard intensity interactions are 
introduced by a so-called hazard cor-
relation matrix. 
This matrix is of  the same type as the 
hazard interaction matrix used by Gill 
and Malamud (2014) for qualitatively 
and semi-quantitatively characteris-
ing interaction relationships between 
natural hazards, but by entering the 
one-to-one conditional probabilities 
of  the secondary hazards it is applied 
in a quantitative way. For creating a 
hazard/risk scenario, the Monte Carlo 
method draws the probabilities from 
a Poisson distribution. So far, Matrix 
city has only been used with generic 
data to demonstrate the theoretical 
benefits of  multihazard and multirisk 
assessment and to show how multirisk 
contributes to the emergence of  ex-
tremes. It has been successfully test-
ed, but ‘identifying their real-world 
practicality will still require the appli-
cation of  the proposed framework to 
real test sites’ (Mignan et al., 2014).
2.5.3
Implementation of 
MRA into DRM: 
Present state, 
benefits and barriers
2.5.3.1
State of implementation
Multirisk is not systematically ad-
dressed among DRM in EU countries 
(Komendantova et al., 2013a, 2013b, 
2014, 2016; Scolobig et al., 2013, 
2014a, 2014b). Single-hazard maps are 
still the decision support tool most 
often used in DRM, even more often 
than single-risk maps. Along with the 
missing link between scientific multi-
risk assessment and decision-making 
in DRM comes a general lack of  inte-
grated practices for multirisk govern-
ance.
2.5.3.2
Expected benefits
The practitioners involved in the Ma-
trix study emphasised the following 
benefits:
• ranking and comparison of  risks.
• Improvement of  land-use plan-
ning, particularly as the multirisk 
approach provides a holistic view 
of  all possible risks. It may influ-
ence decisions about building re-
strictions, which themselves may 
influence urban and economic 
planning, for example by regulating 
the construction of  new houses 
and/or economic activities.
• Enhanced response capacity, be-
cause a multirisk approach would 
allow planning for potential dam-
age to critical infrastructure from 
secondary events and preparation 
for response actions.
• Improvements in the efficiency of 
proposed mitigation actions, cost 
reductions, encouraging awareness 
of  secondary risks and the devel-
opment of  new partnerships be-
tween agencies working on differ-
ent types of  risk.
2.5.3.3
Barriers
Barriers to effectively implementing 
multirisk assessment into DRM are 
found in both the science and prac-
tice domains as well as between them. 
In addition, individual perceptual and 
cognitive barriers may play a role in 
both domains (Komendantova et al., 
2016).
Barriers in the science domain mainly 
relate to an unavailability of  common 
standards for multirisk assessment 
across disciplines. Different disciplines 
use different risk concepts, databases, 
methodologies, classification of  the 
risk levels and uncertainties in the 
hazard- and risk-quantification pro-
cess. There is also an absence of  clear 
definitions of  terms commonly agreed 
across disciplines, including the term 
‘multirisk’ itself, for which there is no 
consensus as regards its definition. 
These differences make it hard for var-
ious risk communities to share results, 
and hence represent a barrier to dia-
logue on multirisk assessment.
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A lack of  quantitative information on 
the added value of  multirisk assess-
ment is perhaps more worrying for 
risk managers than for scientists. The 
risk managers who participated in the 
Matrix study pointed out that there 
are not enough quantitative multirisk 
scenarios or their comparisons with 
single risk ones available from which 
they could learn about the added value 
of  multirisk. Furthermore, they miss 
criteria or guidelines that would help 
them to select the scenarios to be in-
cluded in a multirisk assessment. Most 
worrying for them, however, seem to 
be the strong limitations quantitative 
multirisk assessment methods, in their 
opinion, have when one regards their 
user friendliness. According to them, 
a high degree of  expertise is often 
required to use the scientific tools, 
resulting in a restriction of  their ap-
plication to only a narrow number of 
experts.
Multirisk is presently not 
systematically addressed 
among DRM in EU 
countries. The barriers 
to the implementation 
of MRA include a lack of 
agreed definitions
Moreover, poor cooperation between 
institutions and personnel, especially 
when risks are managed by authori-
ties acting at different governmental 
levels, was identified as a major rea-
son for a lack of  integrated practic-
es for multirisk governance in the 
practical domain (Scolobig et al., 
2014a). Decentralised and central-
ised governance systems have their 
own weaknesses and strengths in this 
regard (Komendantova et al., 2013a; 
Scolobig et al., 2014b). Furthermore, 
in some cases a multirisk approach 
is perceived as competing with rath-
er than complementing single-risk 
approaches. The Matrix study also 
argued that in many European coun-
tries the responsibility for DRM has 
steadily been shifted to the local level 
(often to the municipal level) without 
providing sufficient financial, techni-
cal and personnel resources for im-
plementing necessary programmes 
(Scolobig et al., 2014a). This is a clear 
obstacle for implementing multirisk 
methodologies.
Finally, there are individual cognitive 
barriers to implementing multirisk as-
sessment approaches into the DRM 
decision-making processes, i.e. barri-
ers related to how people perceive the 
problem of  multirisk. Komendanto-
va et al. (2016) presented the case of 
the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, 
where the hazard was underestimat-
ed, simply because large earthquakes 
had been absent during the previous 
decades. Similar consequences are ob-
served when building codes for earth-
quake-resistant structures are not fol-
lowed, a problem that still exists all 
over the world, including in Europe. 
Individual cognitive barriers may only 
be overcome by raising awareness.
Overcoming these barriers will re-
quire a long-term commitment on be-
half  of  risk modellers and officials as 
well as strong partnerships for a ‘step-
by-step’ approach to progressively 
implementing multirisk methodology 
into practice.
 
2.5.4
Conclusions and key 
messages
Partnership 
A better integration of  scientific 
knowledge of  multirisk assessment 
into developing policies and practic-
es will require a long-term commit-
ment from both sides, science and 
practice, and building new partner-
ships between them. Such partner-
ships should enhance the knowledge 
transfer between science and prac-
tice and, among others, should help 
involve practitioners as well as their 
requirements in the scientific devel-
opment of  multirisk methodology at 
an early stage. Common efforts will 
be particularly necessary for simplify-
ing existing methods for practical use. 
Furthermore, scientists are asked to 
provide practitioners with more sce-
narios demonstrating the added value 
of  multirisk assessments in various 
situations, and together they should 
collaborate in establishing criteria for 
appropriate scenarios to be included 
in a multirisk assessment. 
More specifically, it might also be 
worthwhile considering the common 
development of  a multirisk rapid re-
sponse tool for assessing potential 
secondary hazards after a primary 
hazard has occurred. As lack of  data 
is a crucial weakness in multirisk as-
sessments, partnerships should also 
extend their collaboration to sharing 
data and building common integrat-
ed databases, in particular for demo-
graphic, socioeconomic and environ-
mental data. 
Such partnerships could be realised 
with common projects or by creat-
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ing so-called multirisk platforms for 
common methods and data, and/or 
establishing so-called local multirisk 
commissions, institutional areas with 
an interdisciplinary and multisector 
character for discussing and acting on 
multirisk issues.
Knowledge
Although a theoretical framework 
for multirisk assessment and scenar-
io development is in place, there is 
still a need for further harmonisation 
of  methods and particularly terms 
across the scientific disciplines. More-
over, more quantitative scenarios on 
present and future risks in a multirisk 
environment are needed, particularly 
with regard to potential indirect ef-
fects and chain-shaped propagations 
of  damage into and within the soci-
oeconomic system. Such scenarios 
are still rare, mainly because of  two 
reasons. First, the comprehensive da-
tabases needed for a multirisk assess-
ment either do not exist, are not freely 
available or are insufficient; there is a 
need for establishing such databas-
es between the disciplines. Second, 
quantitative fragility/vulnerability in-
formation, in particular fragility/vul-
nerability curves and surfaces, respec-
tively, have so far been developed only 
for a few specific cases, mostly related 
to the direct impact of  a disaster, but 
hardly to its indirect consequences; 
these, however, in many cases may be 
more important than the direct ones. 
Therefore, the scientific knowledge 
base needs to be extended to quan-
titative vulnerability information, 
vulnerability curves and surfaces for 
indirect disaster impacts as, for in-
stance, the loss in work productivity, 
loss of  the functionality of  systems 
and networks, costs of  evacuation, 
costs of  medial assistances and much 
more.
Innovation
A multi-risk modelling approach will 
be required in order to capture the 
dynamic nature and the various inter-
actions of  the hazard and risk relat-
ed processes driven by both climate 
change and globalization. Moreover, 
solutions for risk assessments are 
needed that are no longer exclusively 
aiming at the best possible quantifica-
tion of  the present risks but also keep 
an eye on their changes with time and 
allow to project these into the future.
The future challenges 
have two dimensions, one 
focused on empowering 
good decisions in practice 
and another on improving 
our knowledge base for 
better understanding 
present and future risks
Developing an integrative model for 
future risk that considers not only the 
potential climate change-induced haz-
ard dynamics, but also the potential 
dynamics of  complex vulnerability 
components and the involved uncer-
tainties will require the expertise of 
all these disciplines. A strong partner-
ship will be required between the nat-
ural sciences, the social and economic 
sciences, as well as the climate change 
research community.
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DRM requires a combination of  skills knowledge and data that will not be held 
within one firm, one industry, one institution, one discipline, one country or 
even necessarily one region. Europe contains a concentration of  expertise on 
DRM, perhaps unique in the world; the opportunities here are greatest and 
should be seized.
Historically, many in industry and the private and public sectors  found it chal-
lenging to engage with academia. For example, industry often works within 
tight timescales, wanting to hear a single right answer with certainty, wanting 
dissemination of  what is known now as opposed to  new research and wanting 
it in a form that can be easily incorporated into existing models and processes 
not requiring detailed assessment, adjustment and review. But there is an in-
creasing awareness of  what science has to offer, which often leads to an even 
greater demand for collective engagement. This engagement has been encour-
aged by EU research projects encouraging public/private/academic linkages 
all involved in   DRM, where practitioners, scientists and policymakers need to 
actively seek engagement with others working in the broad DRM space: within 
their organisation and within their sector, as well as more broadly. This is easy 
to say but rather more difficult to do.
Only positive interaction will make the practitioner aware of  what is possible: 
what new data, models and techniques are available and how these may be 
adapted for practical use within their organisation or department. The practi-
tioner lies in the centre of  the process. It is they that understand the gaps of 
knowledge and data, where true value for additional research lies. But often un-
consciously there may be ‘group think’ — an accepted way of  working that is 
not adequately challenged. It is healthy to develop links with other practitioners 
in their field, in other sectors or industries and in academia. Increasing knowl-
edge and expertise can be both a push and a pull: both learning from others 
and also using in-house expertise to drive knowledge for the common good.
Areas where other practitioners or academics may have valuable information 
include the fields of  data, methodologies and models. Knowledge may be si-
loed: restricted to particular risks,  hazard or  exposure types. The practitioner 
is in a position to break down these silos, spotting where data or processes in 
one area may have value in another. This is particularly true when looking at 
the interaction of  hazards, secondary hazards and non-physical impacts such 
as business interruption and broader economic loss.
It is important to learn from other sectors facing similar issues and learn from 
their experience. For example, methods have been developed in the insurance 
industry to model and manage catastrophe risk that can be applied almost di-
Recommendations
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rectly to societal risk including to people, property and the environment. There 
are quick wins available; early adopters are not starting from a clean sheet but 
building on a framework that is already well founded. No innovation is risk 
free, but development of  a risk management strategy for  a city, for example; is 
based upon well-developed methodologies and so is very likely to deliver real 
value and be seen to deliver real value.
Science can respond to identified needs but only if  it hears the call, as it were. 
Very often the need is not for new research but for directed application of 
what is known within academia,  not elsewhere. Information and data need to 
be offered in forms that are accessible, appropriate   and affordable. More work 
is required to build publicly available datasets and models (for example the 
global earthquake model initiative). Where governments hold data, it is impor-
tant to balance the desire to exploit that data for profit against the greater good 
of  making the information available to all those who can use it to develop tools 
that ultimately benefit and protect the broader European population.
Before embarking on a   DRM project, like for any other project it is important 
to understand what the objectives of  the project are: what needs to be done 
and when it needs to be done.   DRM is an area where there is always a need 
for further understanding and  knowledge in each of  the three pillars of  risk 
assessment: hazard, exposure and vulnerability. Each element requires different 
skills, different data and different techniques; the process can seem daunting. 
There are many real examples of  best practice, methodologies, data sources 
and assessment and analytical techniques to act as a template. The process will 
not necessarily be smooth, but  the process of  developing understanding and 
awareness is arguably where the real value lies. It is important not to let the 
fear of  lack of  knowledge or data prevent this vital work from commencing. 
Innovative thinking is required to meet the challenges of  a lack of  data and 
partial information endemic in the process, for example new methods to assess 
exposure by remote sensing or vulnerability, particularly to economies and eco-
systems. The challenge is to focus innovation  on where it has the most value, 
a proper risk assessment process will provide a guide to where the greatest 
requirement for innovation and further research lies.
Risk assessment and analysis provides an objective basis against which policy 
decisions can be made and transparently justified and the cost and benefits of 
different strategies and options can be compared in an objective way, open to 
scrutiny and challenge.  All models are assumption dependent, but   it is impor-
tant that the policymaker has some knowledge of  the limitations of  the model-
ling done and the key assumptions upon which it depends. The issue is balance: 
clearly a policymaker cannot be expected to be a risk management expert, but 
uncritically relying on one source of  information can lead to political as well as 
practical risk — a culture of  challenge and evidence- based analysis is required. 
It is important that policymakers are able to interpret the risk assessments giv-
en to them. European insurance regulators demand that directors of  insurance 
companies are able to understand and defend risk assumptions and decisions 
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made within the firm; they cannot hide behind the judgement of  employees or 
consultants however well qualified. The same scrutiny is applied to policymak-
ers and practitioners in the public sector who respond to disasters. Whilst not 
hiding behind experts, it is important that policymakers can demonstrate that 
appropriate expertise has been engaged and risk management decisions have 
been made firmly founded.
At its best,   DRM not only adds to the information available to policymakers, 
but it also creates a new way of  looking at risk within organisations. Risk man-
agement should not be seen as just the responsibility of  a risk management 
department but should be understood by all those involved in decision-making. 
Embracing risk management and risk modelling has transformed the insurance 
industry in the last  30 years, making it infinitely more aware of  the risks that 
it and its clients face and  much more able to meet their needs (and pay their 
claims). It is a virtuous circle: greater knowledge feeds an understanding of 
what is missing and a drive to fill those gaps; it demands an engagement with 
academia, the adoption of  best science and the development of  best practice 
via interaction with other practitioners. The process of  improvement becomes 
self-sustaining, increasing knowledge and understanding to the benefit of  all. 
Europe demands better   DRM, so the opportunity must be seized.
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Earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are the most hazardous geophysical processes that have their origin in the Earth’s lithosphere (i.e. in the out-ermost solid part of  the Earth). Both events are driven by common fun-damental geodynamic procedures, namely the motion of  the lithospheric 
plates and the resulting deformation that takes place, mainly at the plate bound-
aries but, on some occasions, in the interior of  the plates too. 
The largest and more frequent earthquakes occur without the involvement of 
volcanic activity. However, sometimes the latter is accompanied by strong earth-
quakes. Every year, thousands of  people lose their lives due to large destruc-
tive earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. In addition, extensive loss of  property, 
negative economic consequences, both tangible and intangible, as well as social 
disruption occur as a result of  such events. Earthquakes may produce disastrous 
effects due to the ground shaking relatively close to their sources, say at distanc-
es of  a few hundreds of  kilometres at most. While volcanic eruptions produce 
multiple hazards, some of  which, such as tephra fall, may cause disastrous results 
far away or even on a global scale.
When earthquakes and volcanic eruptions occur in submarine environments or 
close to coastal zones, the surface of  the sea can be suddenly disturbed, thus 
generating large sea waves known as tsunamis. The catastrophic results pro-
duced by earthquakes and volcanic eruptions are often dramatically increased 
due to the associated tsunamis that may cause destruction at great distances 
from their seismic or volcanic sources. However, catastrophic tsunamis can be 
also generated from other processes, such as coastal or submarine landslides 
impacting the sea-water surface. Such landslides may be the result of  gravity or 
ground shaking caused by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions.
Protecting population from geophysical risks such as earthquakes, volcanic erup-
tions and tsunamis, and mitigating the risks of  such events is not an easy task be-
cause these phenomena are highly complex and usually unpredictable. Therefore, 
the assessment of  their potential impact (i.e. the level of  associated risks) is not a 
trivial procedure. However, the assessment of  risk associated not only with these 
three types of  geophysical processes but also with other types of  natural hazards 
is characterised by some commonalities. The first is that one has to assess the 
level of  hazard, in other words, to estimate some of  the important elements or 
parameters of  the phenomenon per se. For hazard assessment purposes of  inter-
est are the frequency of  occurrence of  the geophysical event (e.g. earthquake), in 
a given magnitude level and the probability to exceed or not to exceed this level 
in a given time interval. Depending on the probability model selected to apply 
the hazard assessment could be time independent or time dependent, the latter 
being more realistic but also less easy to apply. Another approach is to consider 
scenario-based hazard assessment, for example by selecting an extreme, a realistic 
or another scenario for the occurrence of  the geophysical event in the future.
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Both the probabilistic and the scenario-based hazard approaches are susceptible 
to a variety of  uncertainties. Lack of  knowledge and of  data leads to epistemic 
uncertainly but the intrinsic uncertainty associated with the statistical perspec-
tive in order to understand the physical processes leads to the so-called aleatory 
uncertainty, which in practice is associated with randomness (Woo, 2010). Re-
gardless of  the method applied to estimate hazard, a common practice valuable 
for preparedness, risk management and decision-making is the preparation of 
suitable maps illustrating the level of  the various types of  hazards in a given area. 
For example, volcanic activity may threaten an area with various types of  hazard, 
such as lava flows, tephra falls, etc. In such cases, the preparation of  appropriate 
maps is needed to express the level of  hazard of   each type of  hazard.
The assessment of  hazard, however, is a representation of  the phenomenon 
only and does not describe the expected impact of  the geophysical events. For 
the estimation of  the expected impact (risk), the vulnerability of  the various 
assets that are exposed to the geophysical event should be taken into account 
(UNISDR, 2015). A wide range of  vulnerabilities may be considered for pop-
ulation as well as for engineered structures (e.g. buildings) and other proper-
ties. But, again, the issue of  time dependence is important. For example, levels 
of  human exposure and vulnerability in a coastal zone threatened by tsunamis 
are quite different in the daylight hours of  the summer season from those in 
the evening hours of  the winter season. Eventually, for a qualitative or quan-
titative risk assessment, the results of  the hazard, exposure and vulnerability 
assessments should be combined by applying techniques that depend on data 
availability. For better hazard assessment, the datasets regarding the record of 
the natural phenomena can be drastically improved with the expansion of  the 
existing instrumental networks and other recording systems. Moreover, better 
socioeconomic data, such as those referring to populations and buildings, can 
help to improve risk components such as exposure and vulnerability.
The mitigation of  risk can be achieved by a variety of  actions that can be un-
dertaken by decision-makers, civil protection authorities and other stakeholders. 
Of  particular importance among these actions are the early warning systems 
(EWSs). These systems are composed of  detection, monitoring of  precursors 
and forecasting of  probable event, analysis of  risk, dissemination of  meaningful 
and timely warnings or alerts of  the possible extreme events and activation of 
emergency plans to prepare and respond. Some hazards are difficult to predict 
(e.g. earthquke) due to lack of  knowledge, data or adequate measuring tech-
niques of  the precursors that lead to hazardous event. Early warning, however, 
takes place also when the event has already started. From the first recording 
stage and before the catastrophic culmination of  the event, we may have some 
estimation of  the maximum level of  severity of  the event and the expected time 
and location of  its catastrophic stage. Other actions aiming to mitigate and man-
age risks may include preparedness, training, education and public awareness.
This chapter describes several recent developments across the different disci-
plines of  earthquake, volcanic and tsunami risk assessment and highlights a mul-
titude of  resources currently available to the disaster risk reduction community.
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3.1 Geophysical risk: 
earthquakes
Vitor	Silva, Mauro Dolce, Laurentiu Danciu, Tiziana Rossetto,
Graeme Weatherill
3.1.1
Earthquake sources 
and seismotectonic 
setting
3.1.1.1 
Global distribution of 
earthquakes
The global distribution of  earth-
quakes, as shown in Figure 3.1, is one 
of  the key insights into the shape of 
the Earth’s lithospheric plates and 
their direction of  movement. The vast 
majority of  earthquakes are generated 
at boundaries, where plates converge, 
diverge or move laterally past one an-
other (Bird 2003). The greatest pro-
portion of  seismicity, and by far the 
largest proportion of  seismic energy 
release, occurs in regions where lith-
ospheric plates converge with one an-
other. These convergent boundaries 
may manifest as regions of  subduc-
tion, where an oceanic plate is forced 
beneath a less dense plate, that is, ei-
ther a continental or a younger oce-
anic plate. In a convergent boundary 
between continental plates, tecton-
ic compression may produce fold-
ing and faulting and shortening and 
thickening of  the plates within the 
collision zone (orogenesis or moun-
tain building). The Himalaya Moun-
tain Range is an example of  this type 
of  convergent boundary. Both types 
of  regional environments are charac-
terised by regions of  high seismic ac-
tivity and host faults that are capable 
of  generating very large earthquakes. 
In Europe, convergence between the 
European and African plates mainly 
results in a large belt of  compression 
in the western Mediterranean and 
subduction in the Calabrian, Hellenic 
and Cypriot arcs of  the Central-East-
ern Mediterranean.
Divergent plate boundaries represent 
areas where the shallow crust is be-
ing pulled apart. These may manifest 
as rift zones, such as the East African 
Rift, where the shallow continental 
crust is undergoing extension, result-
ing in moderate to high seismicity 
and volcanism. Earthquakes great-
er in magnitude than M7 are rare in 
such environments. Nonetheless, ex-
tensional zones can be highly active 
and many areas, even those unrelated 
to divergent boundaries, such as the 
Apennines regions of  central Italy or 
the Corinth Gulf, have seen repeated 
destructive earthquakes over the cen-
turies. Transform and transcurrent 
plate boundaries manifest where the 
relative movement of  plates is lateral. 
Understanding past 
earthquakes and their 
impact on society is 
the first step to assess 
and eventually mitigate 
seismic risk.
This can be seen in several large active 
fault systems, such as the San Andre-
as Fault (California), the North Ana-
tolian Fault (Turkey) and the Dead 
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Sea Transform Fault (Israel, Jordan). 
These active fault systems may ex-
tend over many hundreds of  kilo-
metres and may experience frequent 
moderate-to-large earthquakes (M6 
to M7.5). Owing to their proximity to 
many large urban centres, these sys-
tems can pose a significant threat to 
society (e.g. Istanbul). While the vast 
majority of  earthquakes tend to oc-
cur in the regions of  highest tectonic 
stress close to plate boundaries, tec-
tonic earthquakes can occur within 
the lithospheric plates themselves. 
Intraplate regions are generally char-
acterised by low rates of  tectonic 
deformation, so the recurrence inter-
vals between large events are typically 
significantly longer (in the order of 
thousands to tens of  thousands of 
years) than those of  plate boundaries. 
Although large intraplate events are 
infrequent, they can produce strong-
er shaking than their plate boundaries 
counterparts, and this is often felt 
over a larger area, as in the case of  the 
1811-12 New Madrid earthquakes in 
the east of  the United States.
3.1.1.2 
Past major earthquakes
From the time of  the earliest civi-
lisations to the advent of  the era of 
instrumental recording, descriptions 
of  earthquakes can be found in many 
historical sources. Global archives 
of  historical earthquakes include the 
United States National Geophysical 
Data Center (NGDC n.d.) and the 
Global Historical Earthquake Archive 
(Albini et al., 2014). A few historically 
relevant events are described herein.
There have been reports of  earth-
quakes in the Mediterranean region, 
the Middle East, China and Japan 
since the fifth century BCE. Notable 
earthquakes in early civilisations in-
clude the 464 BCE Sparta (Greece) 
event and the 227 BCE Dodecanese 
Islands event, the latter noted for its 
destruction of  the lighthouse statue 
of  the Colossus of  Rhodes. As more 
historical sources survive from mid-
The global distribution of earthquakes in the period 1900 CE to 2014 CE
Source:  Weatherill et al. (2016), Storchak et al. (2015) and global plate boundaries from Bird (2003)
FIGURE 3.1
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to-late antiquity (300 CE to approxi-
mately 750 CE), descriptions of  the 
destruction caused by major events 
can help to determine the size and lo-
cation of  large earthquakes. Records 
exist of  many catastrophic earth-
quakes in the Mediterranean and Mid-
dle East, including the 365 CE sub-
duction earthquake in Crete, which 
had an estimated magnitude between 
M8.0 and M8.3. From 1000 CE to 
1500 CE, many major earthquakes 
occurred in this region, including the 
1457 Erzincan earthquake (estimated 
to have caused 32 000 deaths) and the 
1202 Damascus earthquake (estimat-
ed to have caused 30000 deaths).
The 16th to 18th centuries saw a con-
siderable expansion of  geographical 
coverage of  earthquake records, as 
settlements were established across 
the Americas and trade expanded 
between Europe and Asia. The 1556 
Xian (China) earthquake (M≈8) is 
believed to be the most deadly on 
record, having caused an estimated 
830 000 deaths (Bilham, 2004). Dur-
ing the same period in Europe and 
the Middle East, two events stand 
out. The first is the 1509 Istanbul 
earthquake, which ruptured much of 
the North Anatolian Fault in the Sea 
of  Marmara, resulting in thousands 
of  deaths. The second is the 1755 
Lisbon earthquake (M=8.5 ± 0.3, 
Martínez Solares and López Arroyo, 
2004) and its accompanying tsunami. 
The devastation to the city of  Lisbon, 
and to many towns along the Atlan-
tic coast of  Portugal, Spain and Mo-
rocco, contributed to between 60 000 
and 100 000 deaths.
The 19th and 20th centuries marked 
the watershed between the era of 
historical observation and scientific 
investigation. Earthquakes such as 
those of  1906 in San Francisco, USA 
(M7.8), 1908 in Messina, Italy (M7.2), 
and 1923 in Kanto, Japan (M7.9), 
formed the catalyst for innovations 
in seismic design in these countries. 
From the second half  of  the 20th 
century to the present day, we have 
witnessed some of  the largest earth-
quakes recorded, including those of 
1960 in Valdivia, Chile (M9.4), 2004 
in Banda Aceh, Indonesia (M9.1), and 
2011 in Tohoku, Japan (M9.0), with 
Seismic recording stations with data contributing to the ISC.
Source: authors
FIGURE 3.2
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a combined total death toll of  more 
than 300 000 people.
In Europe, the 20th century has seen 
fewer catastrophic events. Nonethe-
less, since the 1908 Messina earth-
quake, Italy has experienced sever-
al significant events, such as those 
of  1915 in Avezzano (M7.0), 1980 
in Irpinia (M6.9), 2009 in L’Aquila 
(M6.3), and 2016 in Norcia (M6.2). The 
most important events that occurred 
in Greece include the earthquakes 
of  1953 in Kephalonia (Ms=7.2), 
1978 in Thessaloniki (Ms=6.5), 1986 
in Kalamata (Ms=6.0), 1999 in Ath-
ens (Ms=5.9) and 2015 in Lefka-
da (Mw=6.4). Turkey has also been 
struck by many major events, such 
as the 1903 Malazgirt (M6.7), 1939 
Erzincan (M7.8) and 1999 Izmit and 
Duzce (M7.6 and M7.2) earthquakes.
3.1.1.3 
Monitoring seismic 
activity
The recording and archiving of  seis-
mic events throughout history is fun-
damental to our understanding of 
the earthquake process. For much of 
recorded history, our knowledge of 
the occurrence and location of  earth-
quakes has come from descriptive re-
cords made by contemporary scholars 
and, in later centuries, from public 
administrative archives. Quantifica-
tion of  the location and size of  earth-
quakes is made possible, albeit with 
substantial uncertainty, via the use of 
macroseismic intensity, a descriptive 
metric that aims to classify the extent 
of  earthquake damage for many loca-
tions using a standard scale. System-
atic recording of  seismic waves us-
ing more precise seismometry began 
at the end of  the 19th century. The 
modern era of  instrumental seismol-
ogy was transformed, however, in the 
early 1960s with the establishment of 
the World-Wide Network of  Seismo-
graph Stations, which deployed more 
than 120 continuously recording sta-
tions. The International Seismological 
Centre (ISC) has maintained the most 
comprehensive bulletin of  parameter-
ised seismic events since 1964. The 
ISC bulletin defines the location and 
size of  earthquakes from an integrat-
ed network of  approximately 14 500 
seismic stations (see Figure 3.2), with 
data fed in from various local and 
regional seismic networks across the 
globe (Storchak et al., 2015). Today, 
hundreds of  seismic recording net-
works are in operation worldwide, the 
vast majority of  which contribute to 
the production of  the ISC compre-
hensive bulletin of  seismicity.
3.1.2
 Earthquake hazard 
assessment
3.1.2.1 
Seismic hazard 
assessment 
methodologies
Characterisation of  the effects of 
earthquakes on the built environment 
requires several datasets. Regarding 
hazard assessment, these can include 
earthquake catalogues (historical and 
instrumental), active geological faults, 
geodetic estimates of  crustal defor-
mation, seismotectonic features and 
paleoseismicity. The quality, accuracy 
and quantity of  these input datasets 
dictate the choice of  methodology for 
seismic hazard assessment. Conse-
quently, seismic hazard may be ana-
lysed in two main ways: deterministi-
cally, in which a single earthquake 
scenario is identified, or probabilisti-
cally, in which all potential earthquake 
scenarios are explicitly considered 
along with their likelihood of  occur-
rence. 
Earthquake hazard 
assessment identifies 
the likelihood of ground 
shaking across a region. 
This is a fundamental 
component in hazard 
mapping for design 
codes and seismic risk 
assessment.
Deterministic approaches may be 
perceived as conceptually simpler and 
more conservative. The probabilistic 
approach requires complex mathe-
matical formulations to account for 
uncertainties in earthquake size, lo-
cation and time of  occurrence, and 
the outputs relate various levels of 
ground shaking that may be observed 
at a site to their corresponding ex-
ceedance probabilities in a given time 
period. This relationship between 
ground shaking and probability con-
stitutes a hazard curve. The expected 
ground shaking for a pre-established 
probability of  exceedance within a 
time span (e.g. 10 % in 50 years) or 
a return period (e.g. 475 years) can 
be calculated for a given region, thus 
enabling the production of  a hazard 
map.
These maps are used to define the 
seismic action in design codes, such 
as the Eurocode 8 (CEN, 2005). By 
adopting a methodology in which un-
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certainties are explicitly incorporated 
into the process, the probabilistic ap-
proach avoids the potential subjectiv-
ity associated with the identification 
of  adverse scenarios, and provides 
a more objective formulation of  the 
likelihood of  ground shaking. For 
critical infrastructures such as nuclear 
facilities, the probabilistic approach is 
now the standard practice (Renault, 
2014).
In recent decades, Probabilistic Seis-
mic Hazard Analysis (PSHA) has 
reached an evident level of  maturity 
(e.g. Petersen et al., 2015; Woessner et 
al., 2015). Since its inception by Cor-
nell (1968) and McGuire (1976), sev-
eral crucial developments in PSHA 
can be identified, such as the complex 
representation of  seismic sources, 
the derivation of  new models to de-
scribe the recurrence of  earthquakes 
and sophisticated equations to predict 
the resulting ground motion. These 
developments have occurred against 
the backdrop of  continued improve-
ments in modelling software to allow 
for complex calculations. The flexibil-
ity of  the probabilistic framework has 
contributed to the credibility of  the 
method and acceptance by engineers, 
planners and regulatory bodies.
The quality of  the input datasets 
guides the choice of  the methodolo-
gy for the development of  the PSHA 
model (Giardini, 1999). In this con-
text, three main approaches can be 
identified:
• historical — defining statistical 
seismogenic sources to describe 
the historical record of  seismicity 
(location in space and time, mag-
nitude frequency distribution of 
large earthquakes);
• time-independent — incorporating 
geological and geodetic evidence 
with both instrumental and histor-
ical earthquake catalogues to de-
rive a seismogenic model covering 
earthquake cycles up to thousands 
of  years; and
• time-dependent — which accounts 
for periodic trends in earthquake 
recurrence to predict the likeli-
hood of  earthquakes occurring in a 
source given the time elapsed since 
the previous event.
The historical approach is informed 
exclusively by the observed earth-
quake record, the duration of  which is 
often insufficient to evaluate the com-
plex phenomena of  earthquake cycle. 
Conversely, time-dependent models 
require a detailed paleoseismological 
history of  a seismogenic source. In 
most regions of  the world such in-
formation is not yet available, and, 
therefore, the application of  time-de-
pendent seismic hazard analysis is still 
limited to only a few regions (e.g. Cal-
ifornia, Japan). Among the many out-
puts of  PSHA, it is possible to iden-
tify the predominant seismic source 
contributing to the seismic hazard at a 
site in terms of  its spatial and magni-
tude properties, in a process known as 
disaggregation (Bazzurro and Cornel, 
1999). This information can be used 
to select events for deterministic anal-
ysis (scenarios) or selection of  ground 
motion records.
Various software packages, both open 
and proprietary, are available for the 
calculation of  seismic hazard using 
deterministic or probabilistic ap-
proaches. OpenQuake (Pagani et al., 
2014) is one such package and was 
used in recent regional projects for 
seismic hazard assessment in Europe, 
the Middle East, South and Central 
America, Caribbean and Africa.
3.1.2.2 
Sources of uncertainties in
hazard assessment
Seismic hazard assessment is char-
acterised by a large spectrum of  un-
certainties, generally categorised as 
epistemic and aleatory. The epistemic 
uncertainty leads to multiple hazard 
curves, while the aleatory variabil-
ity controls the shape of  the hazard 
curves (Bommer and Abrahamson, 
2006).
Sources of  epistemic uncertainty may 
take the form of  alternative models, 
both for the seismogenic source and/
or ground motion, or may describe 
the uncertainty in the parameterisa-
tion of  specific models. Concerning 
the seismogenic source, alternative 
models may describe different ge-
ometric configurations of  the source, 
different models of  magnitude re-
currence or alternative models to re-
late the magnitude of  the earthquake 
to the dimensions of  the rupture. 
Ground Motion Prediction Equa-
tions (GMPEs) describe the expected 
ground motion at a site, given the size 
and characteristics of  the earthquake 
source, site-to-source distance and 
the local geological conditions. Given 
the wide variety of  GMPEs, select-
ing all those that are appropriate for 
modelling the intrinsic epistemic un-
certainty can be challenging (Bommer 
et al., 2010; Cotton et al., 2006; Dan-
ciu et al., 2016; Kale and Akkar, 2013; 
Scherbaum et al., 2009). For Europe, 
a set of  GMPEs has been suggested 
based on several studies (Delavaud et 
al., 2012; Zafarani and Mousavi, 2014; 
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Kale et al., 2015).
The concept of  aleatory uncertainty in 
PSHA is intended to represent those 
elements of  the earthquake process 
that may be considered irreducibly 
random, for which the specific value 
can be described only in terms of  a 
probability distribution. For example, 
the magnitude and location of  a fu-
ture rupture cannot be predicted with 
absolute certainty, but the probability 
of  future rupture magnitude and loca-
tions can be estimated. Consequently, 
these parameters are considered to be 
aleatory uncertainties, the probability 
distributions of  which are explicitly 
accounted for in the process of  cal-
culating the hazard curve. In addition 
to these uncertainties, the variabili-
ty in the ground motion models is a 
dominant factor in seismic hazard es-
timates. GMPEs also quantify the var-
iability of  the ground motion given 
the source, path and site conditions, 
and various studies (e.g. Strasser et al. 
2009, Douglas 2010) have recognised 
Reference seismic hazard map depicting peak ground acceleration levels for a 10 % probability of exceedance 
in 50 years for a reference rock condition of Eurocode 8 Type A.
Source: adapted from Woessner et al. (2015)
FIGURE 3.3
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that neglecting the ground motion 
variability leads to an underestimation 
of  the hazard.
3.1.2.3 
Seismic hazard in 
Europe
The 2013 European Seismic Hazard 
Model (Woessner et al., 2015) is the 
latest seismic hazard model to be fully 
harmonised across the Euro-Medi-
terranean region. This model was de-
veloped within the SHARE (Seismic 
Hazard Harmonization in Europe — 
SHARE, n.d.) project funded by the 
European Union’s 7th Framework 
Programme (FP7) for Research and 
Innovation. SHARE provides a sig-
nificant improvement compared with 
previous efforts, mainly as a result of 
a number of  factors:
• the new European historical and 
instrumental earthquake catalogue 
(SHEEC, n.d.);
• the homogeneous database of  the 
fully parameterised seismic faults 
(more than 68 000 km of  mapped 
faults) (Basili et al., 2013);
• the new regional reference geodetic 
mapping;
• the creation of  a generic model for 
maximum magnitude for the entire 
region;
• the characterisation of  uncertain-
ties associated with ground motion 
(Delavaud et al., 2012);
• the consideration of  multiple 
methods to forecast earthquake ac-
tivity;
• the development of  three inde-
pendent seismogenic models de-
picting the expected recurrence of 
earthquakes; and
• the consideration of  epistemic un-
certainties for model components 
and hazard results.
The OpenQuake engine was used 
to perform the hazard calculations, 
the input models and main results 
of  which can be found in the Euro-
pean Facility for Earthquake Hazard 
and Risk (EFEHR, n.d.). Moreover, 
SHARE promoted discussions with 
representatives of  Sub-Committee 8 
(SC8 — CEN, 2005) of  the Eu-
ropean Committee for Standardi-
zation (CEN) Technical Commit-
tee 250 (CEN/TC250) ‘Structural 
Eurocodes’, in order to ensure the 
compatibility of  the hazard output 
specifications with the Eurocode 8 
engineering requirements. Addition-
al SHARE achievements include a 
critical overview of  regulations from 
seismically active countries (i.e. Italy, 
United States, New Zealand, Japan 
and Canada), the use of  seismic risk 
assessment in the calibration of  seis-
mic design actions in codes (Silva et 
al., 2015) and the minimum capacity 
of  buildings designed without seismic 
actions to evaluate the minimum haz-
ard level below which seismic zona-
tion is not necessary. 
Figure 3 illustrates the reference seis-
mic hazard map in terms of  peak 
ground acceleration for a 10 % prob-
ability of  exceedance in 50 years for a 
reference rock condition of  Euroco-
de 8 Type A (vs,30 = 800 m/s).
3.1.3
 Exposure and  
vulnerability
3.1.3.1 
Characterization of the 
built-up environment and 
population 
The development of  an exposure 
model capable of  providing infor-
mation about the location, value and 
vulnerability classification of  the el-
ements exposed to earthquakes de-
pends highly on the intended scale 
of  the risk analysis. For a local as-
sessment, a building-by-building data 
collection campaign can be organised, 
in which mobile devices are used to 
geo-reference and classify assets ac-
cording to their structural attributes. 
Recently, the Global Earthquake 
Model (GEM) has released an An-
droid application (Inventory Data 
Capture Tool) capable of  performing 
such a task, using a building taxon-
omy (Brzev et al., 2013). At a larger 
scale, satellite remote sensing and in 
situ omnidirectional imaging repre-
sent innovative and efficient proce-
dure to rapidly characterise the built 
environment (Wieland et al., 2012). 
For large-scale exposure modelling 
(e.g. regional or national), the use of 
building census surveys and socioeco-
nomic data might be preferable. 
These datasets contain information 
about the number of  buildings or 
dwellings, usually classified according 
to a set of  attributes relevant for de-
fining vulnerability (e.g. construction 
material, number of  storeys, age of 
construction). A mapping scheme is 
often developed in order to establish 
the link between the information con-
tained in a census survey and a set of 
vulnerability classes (e.g. Erdik et al., 
2003a; Crowley et al., 2009; Silva et 
al., 2014a). The result is usually a res-
idential exposure model at the small-
est administrative level with the dis-
tribution of  the number of  buildings 
across a set of  vulnerability classes, 
associated replacement cost and num-
ber of  occupants. For industrial and 
commercial buildings, similar datasets 
CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISK: HAZARD RELATED RISK ISSUES - SECTION I
145
are usually not available. Instead, so-
cioeconomic data such as number of 
workers in the different sectors (e.g. 
manufacturing, mining, retail) can be 
utilised to estimate an approximate 
built-up area and replacement cost. 
Within the FP7 European project on 
the network of  European research 
infrastructures for earthquake risk 
assessment and mitigation (NERA) 
(Crowley et al., 2012), building data 
from all of  the European countries 
were collected and used to calculate 
the fraction of  each building class at 
the first administrative level. These 
results were input into the exposure 
database of  GEM to derive exposure 
datasets at the national level. Satellite 
imagery and volunteered geographical 
information (VGI) are rapidly chang-
ing the manner in which exposure 
modelling is performed. High-reso-
lution datasets (e.g. Global Human 
Settlements Layer (Pesaresi et al., 
2016)) now have sufficient temporal 
and spatial depth to delineate built-up 
areas. This information can be used 
to improve the spatial resolution of 
existing datasets, or to develop new 
ones based on the observed building 
footprints. This approach is usually 
combined with data collected in the 
field in order to understand the most 
common types of  construction for 
each area. VGI can also contribute 
significantly to the improvement or 
development of  exposure datasets. 
For example, OpenStreetMap con-
tains critical information for large 
urban centres such as Berlin, Tokyo, 
Kathmandu or Jakarta. A description 
of  various exposure modelling tech-
niques can also be found in Pittore et 
al. (2016).
3.1.3.2 
Vulnerability 
assessment 
methodologies 
Vulnerability is defined as the sus-
ceptibility of  assets (e.g. people, 
buildings, infrastructure) exposed to 
earthquake hazards to incur losses 
(e.g. deaths, downtime and econom-
ic loss). Vulnerability functions (see 
Figure 3.4) can be derived ‘directly’ 
from regression on historical loss data 
(empirical), through the elicitation of 
expert opinion (heuristic), or by us-
ing numerical simulations (analytical). 
Vulnerability functions can also be 
derived ‘indirectly’ from the combina-
Vulnerability (above) and fragility (below) functions.
Source: adapted from Yepes et al. (2016)
FIGURE 3.4
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tion of  a fragility function and a dam-
age-to-loss model. A fragility function 
(see Figure 3.4) describes the propen-
sity of  assets (e.g. buildings) to sustain 
damage under earthquake effects and 
can be developed empirically, heuris-
tically or analytically (i.e. where a nu-
merical model simulates the response 
of  a structure under increasing hazard 
intensities) or through a combination 
of  such approaches (hybrid). A dam-
age-to-loss model instead relates val-
ues of  loss to thresholds of  damage. 
Approaches for mathematically de-
riving indirect vulnerability functions 
from fragility functions and loss mod-
els are explained in detail in Rossetto 
et al. (2014a).
Empirical approaches to earthquake 
vulnerability and fragility function 
definition are extensively used in the 
insurance industry, and the academic 
literature in this field has been rapid-
ly increasing over the past four dec-
ades (Ioannou and Rossetto, 2015). 
A number of  sources for post-earth-
quake damage or loss data are avail-
able (e.g. surveys commissioned by 
authorities in order to assess struc-
tural safety or to evaluate the cost of 
repair for insurance, tax reductions 
or government aid distribution pur-
poses), and the reliability of  empiri-
cal relationships is heavily dependent 
on the quality and size of  the adopted 
observational databases. Owing to the 
nature of  empirical data, vulnerability 
and fragility functions that are based 
on severely biased datasets and mainly 
on aggregated data can be found in 
the literature (Rossetto et al., 2015). A 
rating system for comparing the reli-
ability of  different empirical fragility 
functions is presented in Rossetto et 
al. (2014b). In addition, GEM has re-
cently published a set of  guidelines 
(Rossetto et al., 2014a) for the con-
Global vulnerability model coverage in the GEM vulnerability database.
Source: Yepes et al. (2016)
FIGURE 3.5
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struction of  empirical functions from 
single or multiple earthquake event 
databases.
Heuristic fragility and vulnerability 
functions have been derived either 
where there was limited information 
regarding past earthquakes or where 
the asset was difficult to model nu-
merically (ATC 13, 1985; Jaiswal et al., 
2012).
Characterisation of assets 
and population in a region 
and their susceptibility to 
suffer damages or losses 
is one of the key elements 
by which to understand 
risk.
An abundance of  analytical fragility 
functions exists, which are predom-
inantly derived for buildings and 
bridges. A variety of  analysis methods 
and structural models with different 
levels of  complexity (e.g. Martins 
et al., 2016; Akkar et al., 2005) have 
been used to construct such fragil-
ity functions. The adequacy of  the 
adopted approach to represent the 
fragility of  the structure depends on 
the structure’s expected behaviour 
under ground shaking. A rating sys-
tem for comparing the reliability of 
different analytical fragility functions 
is presented in Rossetto et al. (2014b) 
and guidelines for the construction 
of  analytical vulnerability and fragility 
functions for low- to mid-rise build-
ings can be found in D’Ayala et al. 
(2014) and for tall buildings in Porter 
et al. (2014).
It is clear that each approach to the 
construction of  fragility and vulner-
ability functions (i.e. empirical, ana-
lytical, heuristic and hybrid) has its 
advantages and disadvantages. How-
ever, in each case, for the function to 
be credible and useable, it is essential 
that the sources of  uncertainty are 
identified and that the uncertainty as-
sociated with the functions is quanti-
fied. This is not common, and major 
sources of  uncertainty are commonly 
ignored (e.g. record-to-record varia-
bility, uncertainty in the damage cri-
teria, building-to-building variability).
3.1.3.3 
Existing exposure and vul-
nerability databases
Despite the usefulness of  exposure 
information, the availability of  open 
databases of  exposure is quite limited. 
GEM released an exposure database 
in 2014 (Gamba, 2014) with building 
information on a global scale, but with 
different levels of  detail depending 
on the country. The number of  build-
ings and dwellings was mostly calcu-
lated using population data (GRUMP, 
CIESIN, 2004), and national or sub-
national mapping schemes. For Eu-
rope, these mapping schemes were 
developed using the results from the 
European project NERA. It is also 
worth mentioning the exposure da-
tabase proposed by the United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) Prompt 
Assessment of  Global Earthquakes 
for Response (PAGER) group, which 
also comprises worldwide informa-
tion at the national scale (Jaiswal et 
al., 2010).
With regard to vulnerability databas-
es, recently, several institutions have 
collected fragility and vulnerability 
functions from the literature. The 
most notable examples are the GEM 
database of  vulnerability and fragility 
functions for buildings, described in 
Yepes et al. (2016), and the FP7 Eu-
ropean project SYNER-G database 
for infrastructure fragility (Crowley et 
al., 2014; Pitilakis et al., 2014). Figure 
3.5 illustrates the global coverage of 
earthquake vulnerability functions in 
the GEM database. It highlights a lack 
of  vulnerability functions for many 
developing countries at risk. Moreo-
ver, all these databases indicate a pre-
dominance of  fragility over vulnera-
bility functions and damage-to-loss 
models. The paucity of  vulnerability 
functions for developing countries 
can be attributed to a lack of  past 
event loss data to build or calibrate the 
vulnerability models, and the difficulty 
associated with modelling non-engi-
neered buildings. Apart from vulner-
ability functions, a number of  indices 
exist that provide relative measures of 
vulnerability across geographical are-
as and that incorporate socioeconom-
ic measures. Forms of  such empirical 
vulnerability indices are used in the 
Global Assessment Reports (support-
ed by the Global Risk Data Platform 
of  UNEP/GRID-Geneva) and by 
the USGS’s PAGER group.
3.1.4
 Seismic risk  
assessment, loss 
estimation and risk 
mitigation
3.1.4.1 
Early warning systems 
and near-real time loss 
assessment
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Emergency rescue reports from sever-
al past earthquakes indicate that more 
than 90 % of  successful rescues occur 
within the first 24-48 hours (Oliveira 
et al., 2006). Successful rescues de-
pend greatly on the preparedness of 
the local authorities and the efficient 
allocation of  limited resources shortly 
after seismic events. For this reason, a 
number of  systems have been devel-
oped in the last decades either to trig-
ger early warnings or to rapidly assess 
the expected damages. EWS (Zollo et 
al., 2009; Alcik et al., 2009, Hoshiba et 
al., 2008) aim to launch alerts seconds 
before the arrival of  the destructive 
seismic waves, usually through the 
interpretation of  the amplitude of  P 
waves. This lead-time may be useful to 
initiate emergency measures, such as 
the controlled shutdown of  gas pipe-
lines and critical facilities and speed 
reduction of  rapid-transit vehicles, 
and to advise the population to follow 
the necessary precautions (Wu and 
Kanamori, 2008). Several European 
projects have investigated the effec-
tiveness of  such systems for the Euro-
pean territory (SAFER, n.d.; REAKT, 
n.d.), but currently a large-scale opera-
tional system does not exist.
Near-real time loss assessment sys-
tems focus on the estimation of  the 
expected damage using existing ex-
posure and vulnerability models, and 
ground shaking computed shortly 
after the seismic event. The USGS 
PAGER group has developed one of 
the best-known systems, which pro-
vides first-order estimates of  human 
and economic losses at a global scale 
(Wald et al., 2012). At the national 
level in Europe, a few systems have 
also been developed for Italy, Bul-
garia, Romania, Portugal and Turkey 
(e.g. Erduran et al., 2012; Erdik et al., 
2003b). The ongoing pilot project 
ARISTOTLE (n.d.), funded by EU 
budget, will provide scientific support 
to European Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre (ERCC) in the 
period 2016-17, not only for earth-
quakes, but also for other hazards 
such as tsunamis, volcanic activity and 
meteorological hazards.
3.1.4.2 
Evaluation of  
earthquake scenarios
The assessment of  earthquake scenar-
ios can play a critical role in the devel-
opment of  risk-reduction measures. 
These may include the creation of 
emergency plans, the development of 
Seismic risk (left), social vulnerability (centre) and integrated risk (right) for Portugal
Source: adapted from Burton and Silva (2015)
FIGURE 3.6
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infrastructure to support the affected 
regions or the organisation of  earth-
quake risk awareness campaigns. For 
example, Anhorn and Khazai (2014) 
investigated the suitability of  shelter 
spaces in the Metropolitan Area of 
Kathmandu (Nepal), considering a set 
of  potential destructive earthquakes. 
Likewise, Mendes-Victor et al. (1994) 
and ERSTA (2010) estimated the ex-
pected economic and human losses 
for high-magnitude events in the city 
of  Lisbon and the Algarve region, 
respectively. These results were used 
by the Portuguese Civil Protection 
authorities to elaborate seismic risk 
emergency plans. Scenario events may 
be based on past historical earthquakes 
(e.g. Bendimerad, 2001) or may be 
defined through the investigation of 
seismogenic sources around the re-
gion of  interest (e.g. Ansal et al., 2009). 
The distribution of  ground shaking 
at the location of  the collection of 
assets is used with fragility or vulner-
ability functions to assess damage or 
losses, respectively. Several software 
packages can be used for the assess-
ment of  earthquake scenarios such as 
Earthquake Loss Estimation Routine 
(ELER) (Hancilar et al., 2010), Open-
Quake (Silva et al., 2014b) or SEismic 
Loss EstimatioN using a logic tree 
Approach (SELENA) (Molina et al., 
2010).
Several past European initiatives have 
covered the development of  earth-
quake scenarios for large urban cen-
tres. The RISK-EU (2001-4; Mouroux 
and Le Brun, 2006) and LESSLOSS 
(2004-7; Calvi and Pinho, 2004) pro-
jects explored the impact of  several 
seismic events in urban centres such 
as Bucharest, Catania, Nice, Lisbon, 
Istanbul, Sofia and Thessaloniki. 
More recently, the European project 
STREST (Harmonized approach to 
stress tests for critical infrastructures 
against natural hazards) (STREST, 
n.d.) explored the impact of  specif-
ic seismic events in critical facilities, 
such as industrial structures in Central 
Italy. 
Hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability are the key 
elements for seismic risk 
assessment to estimate 
the consequences of 
earthquakes and the 
potential for human 
and economic losses, 
which can support 
decision-makers in the 
development of risk-
reduction strategies.
These projects featured the involve-
ment of  several stakeholders to en-
sure that the final results would be 
useful for disaster risk management 
(DRM).
3.1.4.3 
Probabilistic seismic 
risk assessment 
The assessment of  probabilistic 
earthquake losses can be performed 
through two main approaches: clas-
sic PSHA-based risk or probabilistic 
event-based risk analyses (Cornell, 
1968; McGuire, 2004; Silva, 2016). 
These methodologies have been fea-
tured in software packages such as 
CAPRA (ERN-AL, 2009), Open-
Quake (Silva et al., 2014b), SELE-
NA (Molina et al., 2010) or HAZUS 
(FEMA, 2003).
An example of  a probabilistic earth-
quake loss assessment is presented in 
Figure 3.6 for Portugal (first panel). 
In this study, average annual losses at 
the county level were calculated us-
ing a time-independent PSHA mod-
el (Silva et al., 2014a). This informa-
tion can inform local governments, 
civil protection authorities and other 
stakeholders in the development of 
risk-reduction measures. These can 
include the improvement and/or 
enforcement of  seismic codes (e.g. 
Spence, 2004), the development of 
retrofitting campaigns (e.g. Erdik and 
Durukal, 2008), the improvement of 
urban planning (Sengezer and Koç, 
2005), the development of  financial 
mechanisms to transfer the risk from 
the public sector to the international 
reinsurance market (e.g. Bommer et 
al., 2002), or the strategic allocation of 
funds for risk reduction and preven-
tion. For example, in 2009, the Italian 
Government invested almost EUR 1 
billion in a seismic prevention pro-
gramme at the national scale, led by 
the Civil Protection Department. In 
order to understand how to distribute 
the funds across the different regions 
in Italy, a seismic risk assessment 
study was conducted and the funds 
were distributed proportionally to 
the earthquake risk (Dolce, 2012). An 
effort to assess quantitatively earth-
quake risk in Greece in terms of  eco-
nomic impact was developed by Papa-
dopoulos and Arvanitides (1996).
Despite the usefulness of  such met-
rics, they neglect local socioeconomic 
conditions. For this reason, several so-
cial scientists (e.g. Carreño et al., 2007; 
Khazai and Bendimerad, 2011) have 
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explored the concept of  integrated or 
holistic risk. This approach aims to 
aggravate or attenuate the direct risk 
(e.g. average annual losses) according 
to a social vulnerability index. This 
index is derived considering a large 
number of  socioeconomic indicators 
such as crime, education, poverty, age 
or unemployment. The distribution of 
socioeconomic vulnerability and inte-
grated risk for Portugal is presented 
in Figure 3.6 (Burton and Silva, 2015). 
These results reflect the earthquake 
resilience of  different regions within 
the same country, and, thus, where 
a longer recovery time should be 
expected in the event of  a disaster. 
Within the Horizon 2020 (H2020) 
framework, the SERA project (Seis-
mology and Earthquake Engineering 
Research Infrastructure Alliance for 
Europe) will cover the probabilistic 
earthquake loss assessment for all Eu-
ropean countries.
It is also important to understand that 
modern societies strongly rely on in-
ter-related systems (building stock, 
power, water supply, transportation), 
and that a natural catastrophe might 
initiate a cascading effect, whereby one 
disaster triggers another. These effects 
have been explored in the two Euro-
pean projects Syner-G and STREST.
3.1.5
 Conclusions and key 
messages
In the last decades, earthquakes have 
been responsible for approximately 
one-fifth of  global annual economic 
losses, and for a death toll of  more 
than 25 000 people per year. This can 
have a serious impact on sustainable 
development, the creation of  jobs 
and the availability of  funds for pov-
erty reduction initiatives. This chapter 
has described several recent develop-
ments across the different disciplines 
of  earthquake risk assessment and 
has highlighted a multitude of  re-
sources currently available to the dis-
aster risk-reduction community. The 
key messages from this chapter are 
summarised below.
Partnership
The assessment of  the impact of 
earthquakes incorporates many scien-
tific fields, such as seismology, earth-
quake engineering and social sciences. 
Neglecting any of  these fields will in-
evitably reduce the accuracy, reliabili-
ty and usefulness of  the resulting risk 
metrics. The process of  risk identi-
fication should involve stakeholders 
from the public and private sectors, 
and should support ongoing national 
and international initiatives with the 
mandate to calculate, communicate 
and reduce earthquake risk.
Knowledge
In the past two decades, the Europe-
an Union has funded a large number 
of  projects that have significantly ad-
vanced the science of  earthquake haz-
ard, vulnerability and risk modelling. 
Other national and international pro-
grammes have also produced datasets, 
models and tools that are fundamen-
tal for the assessment of  earthquake 
risk. Leveraging on this wealth of 
resources will reduce the replication 
of  efforts. It is important to investi-
gate efficient approaches to the ap-
plication of  existing earthquake risk 
knowledge into DRM, as described in 
the preceding section.
Innovation
Earthquake risk assessment has 
reached a considerable level of  matu-
rity, which requires complex software 
packages (e.g. ELER, HAZUS, Open-
Quake, CAPRA or SELENA). It is 
fundamental to incorporate the wide 
spectrum of  uncertainties from the 
different risk components (exposure, 
vulnerability, hazard). Satellite image-
ry and VGI are enabling the character-
isation of  the built environment with 
unprecedented temporal and spatial 
detail. Moreover, the development of 
risk-reduction strategies should not 
only rely on the direct (or physical) 
impact, but should also incorporate 
socioeconomic aspects, thus consid-
ering the capability of  the society to 
recover from destructive events.
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3.2 Geophysical risk: 
volcanic activity
Sue	Loughlin, Sara Barsotti, Costanza Bonadonna, Eliza Calder
3.2.1
Volcanoes and 
volcanic activity
Volcanoes provide spectacular evi-
dence of  the dynamic nature of  plan-
et Earth and bring many long-term 
benefits to society, including rich 
soils, tourism and geothermal ener-
gy. Some erupt frequently and others 
may appear benign for generations, 
which means the risk they pose may 
be underestimated. Understanding 
the risk first requires characterisation 
of  the volcano and knowledge of  the 
type, magnitude and frequency of 
past eruptions.
3.2.1.1 
Global distribution of 
volcanoes and volcanoes 
in Europe
There are about 1 550 known terres-
trial volcanoes that have erupted in 
the past ≈10 000 years and are there-
fore likely to erupt again in the future; 
they are described as ‘active’ (Siebert 
et al., 2010; Cottrell, 2014). 
Volcanic eruptions may 
cause local to global 
impacts; in order to 
understand and mitigate 
risks, the first step is to 
recognise a volcano as 
active and to characterise 
its past activity.
Most have formed along colliding or 
diverging tectonic plate boundaries 
(e.g. the Pacific margins, the Mediter-
ranean, the Lesser Antilles and Ice-
land; Figure 3.7) and these account for 
>94 % of  known historical eruptions 
(Siebert et al., 2015); the remainder 
have formed above mantle ‘hotspots’ 
(e.g. Hawaii).
In Europe, volcanism from Spain 
(Bartolini et al., 2015) to Armenia (Sa-
vov et al., 2016) is mainly caused by the 
convergence of  the northward-mov-
ing African and Arabian lithospher-
ic plates with the Eurasian plate and 
microplates in the Aegean Sea and 
Anatolia (Figure 3.8). In Iceland, vol-
canism is caused by a combination of 
rifting at the Mid-Atlantic Ridge and 
a ‘hotspot’. There are 32 volcanoes 
in Iceland (Ilyinskaya et al., 2015), 47 
known volcanoes in continental Eu-
rope (Siebert et al., 2010), and many 
more in autonomous regions, Euro-
pean dependencies and territories in 
the Atlantic (Canary Islands, Azores, 
Cabo Verde, Tristan da Cunha, As-
cension Island), the Lesser Antilles 
(Montserrat, Guadeloupe, Martiniq-
ue, Saba) and the Indian Ocean (La 
Réunion). About 15 million people in 
Europe live within just 30 km of  an 
active volcano; of  these, more than 
2.2 million live within 20  km of  the 
Campi Flegrei caldera in Italy and 
more than 675 000 live within 10 km 
of  Vesuvius (Siebert et al., 2010).
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3.2.1.2 
Eruption type, duration, 
frequency and size
Globally, about 70 volcanoes erupt 
each year and at any one time at 
least 20 are erupting (Siebert et al., 
2010, 2015). Eruptions are complex 
time-dependent events, which often 
exhibit distinct phases including ef-
fusive (e.g. lava flows/domes) and/or 
explosive types of  activity (e.g. Gud-
mundsson et al., 2012) over durations 
of  hours to decades (Brown et al., 
2015). 
Major controls on eruption type in-
clude magma chemistry, rheology and 
volatile content. Eruptions can be 
measured using magnitude (erupted 
mass), but volume is often used as 
a proxy for magnitude for explosive 
eruptions (e.g. the Volcanic Explosiv-
ity Index, see Newhall and Self  1982, 
Pyle 2015). 
Some volcanoes erupt frequently (e.g. 
Stromboli and Etna), whereas others 
(e.g. Campi Flegrei) erupt infrequently, 
with hundreds of  years between erup-
tions (e.g. Selva et al., 2012; Brown et 
al., 2014).  Global data show a power 
law relationship between magnitude 
and frequency, such that larger mag-
nitude eruptions are less frequent 
(Deligne et al., 2010). In order to un-
derstand the distribution of  eruption 
types and magnitudes in time and 
space at a given volcano (and, there-
fore, the likelihood and type of  future 
The locations of known Holocene (past ≈ 10.000 years) terrestrial volcanoes of the world, most of which form 
near tectonic plate boundaries (Bird, 2003).
Source: Smithsonian Institution (2013)
FIGURE 3.7
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eruptions), geological and geochron-
ological studies are an essential start-
ing point (e.g. Druitt et al., 1999; Orsi 
et al., 2004; Thordarson and Larsen, 
2007; Hicks et al., 2012).
3.2.1.3 
Causes of volcanic 
unrest and eruptions
Eruptions are caused by complex pro-
cesses including magma overpressuri-
sation. Most eruptions are preceded by 
one or multiple episodes of  ‘volcanic 
unrest’ as magma moves towards the 
Earth’s surface (Acocella et al., 2015; 
Parks et al., 2015). The movement of 
magma through the crust (and its in-
teraction with hydrothermal systems) 
causes pressure changes, which result 
in ground deformation and earth-
quakes, and also induces detectable 
changes in mass and/or density (Frey-
mueller et al., 2015). During magma 
ascent, volatiles (gases) separate and 
are either retained in the magma as 
bubbles or escape to interact with the 
hydrothermal system or be released at 
the surface. (Aiuppa et al., 2013). An 
episode of  volcanic unrest may last 
for a matter of  days to a number of 
years (average ≈500 days), and under-
standing the processes driving unrest 
and eruption is an essential part of 
effective early warning (Cashman et 
al. 2013, Sparks and Cashman 2017). 
Volcanoes that erupt infrequently 
(e.g. calderas) may experience many 
episodes of  unrest (e.g. De Natale 
Maximum known Volcanic Explosivity Index (0-8) of eruptions at European volcanoes in the past ≈10 000 
years, based on the Smithsonian Institution Volcanoes of the World database (VOTW4.22). Volcanoes with 
unknown eruption histories are marked as black triangles.
Source: Smithsonian Institution (2013)
FIGURE 3.8
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et al., 2006). In contrast, in a global 
study of  228 volcanoes active be-
tween 2000 and 2011 (many of  which 
erupt frequently) the  ‘Volcanic unrest 
in Europe and Latin America’ project 
(VUELCO) funded by the European 
Union’s 7th Framework Programme 
(FP7) showed that 47 % of  docu-
mented periods of  volcanic unrest 
led to an eruption (Phillipson et al., 
2013). Some episodes of  detected un-
rest may not be caused by magma and 
may be entirely tectonic or caused by 
hydrothermal phenomena (e.g. Segall, 
2013; Biggs et al., 2009).
3.2.2
Monitoring systems 
and early warning 
Volcano observatories are the official 
institutions in charge of  monitoring 
volcanoes. They may be dedicated to 
a single volcano (e.g. the Montserrat 
Volcano Observatory) or may operate 
from national institutions and be re-
sponsible for multiple volcanoes in a 
country (e.g. the Icelandic Met Office 
and Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e 
Vulcanologia). Some institutions have 
responsibility for volcanoes and vol-
cano observatories overseas (e.g. In-
stitut de Physique du Globe de Paris). 
Volcano observatories have a key role 
in early warning. They collect multiple 
streams of  diverse data, analyse the 
data in near real-time, determine the 
level of  threat and make decisions on, 
for example, raising alert levels (Villa-
grán de León, 2012). These decisions 
must be based on sound evidence 
(Marzocchi et al., 2012; Bretton et al., 
2015). The quality, range and sophis-
tication of  monitoring methods has 
increased dramatically in recent years 
(Sparks et al., 2012), with advances in 
computing underpinning improve-
ments in power, speed, data trans-
mission, data analysis and modelling 
techniques. Long-term monitoring at 
quiescent volcanoes is necessary to 
establish baselines, and satellite re-
mote sensing provides many oppor-
tunities as the spatial and temporal 
resolution of  data improves (e.g. Har-
ris et al., 2016; Bagnardi et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, only a small fraction 
of  the world’s 1 550 volcanoes have 
sufficient ground monitoring and the 
necessary accompanying institution-
al capacities to effectively support 
DRM, despite evidence that volcano 
monitoring is cost-effective (Newhall 
et al., 1997).
3.2.2.1 
Geophysical monitoring 
(seismic, deformation, gas, 
infrasound) and the need for 
global monitoring
Episodes of  unrest are highly variable 
in character, so forecasting the onset 
of  an eruption remains a significant 
challenge (Chiodini et al., 2016; Selva 
et al., 2015; Marzocchi and Bebbing-
ton, 2012; Sigmundsson et al., 2010). 
Accelerating rates of  seismicity and 
deformation may be detected before 
eruptions (Sigmundsson et al. ,2010; 
Saltogianni et al., 2014; Cannavò et 
al., 2015) and tracking the location 
of  volcano-tectonic earthquakes in 
near real time (Thorkelsson, 2012; 
Sigmundsson et al., 2015, Pallister 
and McNutt, 2015; Falsaperla and 
Neri, 2015) may facilitate eruption 
forecasting. Long-period earthquakes 
and micro-earthquakes can be key 
indicators of  imminent eruption, es-
pecially during an ongoing eruption 
(McNutt et al., 2015). Cyclic patterns 
of  activity can also enable forecasting 
of  hazardous events (Voight et al., 
1999; Loughlin et al., 2002). Borehole 
strainmeters have successfully been 
used to forecast eruptions of  Hekla 
in Iceland (Roberts et al., 2011).
If appropriate monitoring 
is in place at a volcano, it 
may be possible to issue 
short-term forecasts of 
eruptions and volcanic 
activity and to provide 
early warnings for 
different hazards.
Although satellite passes are not yet 
frequent enough to use Interferomet-
ric Synthetic Aperture Radar (InSAR) 
as a forecasting tool, it can be used in 
combination with other data to gain 
tremendous insights into volcanic 
unrest and eruption (e.g. Gudmunds-
son et al., 2016; Spaans and Hoop-
er, 2016). InSAR is useful to detect 
deformation at remote volcanoes and 
at regional scales (Biggs et al., 2014; 
Parks et al., 2015).
Gas emissions (Silva et al., 2015; 
Aiuppa et al., 2013; Chiodini et al., 
2015), the chemistry, temperature and 
level of  crater lakes and groundwater 
(Hernández et al., 2007), and the geo-
chemistry and flow rates of  glacial riv-
ers (Kristmansdóttir et al. ,1999) may 
all show detectable changes before 
and during eruptions. Gas emissions 
can be monitored using ground-based, 
airborne or satellite remote sensing 
(Aiuppa et al., 2007, 2010; Nadeau et 
al., 2011; Conde et al., 2013). The gas 
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most easily detected and monitored 
in the atmosphere during eruptions is 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) (Oppenheimer 
et al., 2013; Flower et al., 2016).
Petrology and geochemistry can be 
used in near real time to character-
ise eruptive materials and understand 
magmatic properties and dynamics 
(Hartley et al., 2016; Pankhurst et 
al., 2014). Rapid analysis of  tephra 
can detect whether or not there is a 
magmatic component to phreatic 
(steam-driven) eruptions (Suzuki et 
al., 2013).
Environmental monitoring such as 
dissolved constituents in rainwater, 
ash leachates (Witham et al., 2005) 
and particulate (air quality) monitor-
ing can potentially provide informa-
tion about both eruptive behaviour 
and probable impacts on health, 
the environment, infrastructure and 
buildings (Gislason et al., 2015).
3.2.2.2 
Additional and emerging 
monitoring methods
Volcanic infrasound is a technique 
that detects, locates and characterises 
shallow or aerial acoustic sources at 
volcanoes (Fee and Matoza, 2013; Ul-
ivieri et al., 2013). During the H2020 
Atmospheric dynamics Research In-
fraStructure in Europe 2 (ARISE2) 
project, episodes of  lava fountaining 
at Etna were recorded ≈600 km away, 
providing evidence that near-real-
time notification of  ongoing volcan-
ic activity at a regional scale can be 
achieved (Johnson and Ripepe, 2011; 
Marchetti et al., 2016).
Establishing mass eruption rate (a pa-
rameter needed to effectively forecast 
ash dispersal) and characterising ash 
clouds in near real time is a current 
challenge (Ripepe et al., 2013; Lamb 
et al., 2015; Marzano et al., 2013, 
2016). Monitoring the extrusion rate 
of  lava is crucial to anticipate the 
evolution of  active lava flow fields or 
stability of  lava domes. Time series 
digital elevation models (DEMs) col-
lected by satellite at Merapi volcano in 
2010 (through the International Space 
Charter), combined with ground 
monitoring, enabled increasing extru-
sion rates to be identified, leading to 
a rise in alert level and timely evacu-
ations that saved thousands of  lives 
(Surono et al., 2012; Pallister and Su-
rono, 2015). Extrusion rates can be es-
tablished from the ground, unmanned 
aerial vehicles or aircraft using a va-
riety of  methods (e.g. Wadge et al. 
2014a, 2014b; Harris et al., 2005).
Characterisation of  heat sources (Fig-
ure 3.9) during volcanic unrest and 
eruption can support scientific under-
standing of  eruptive behaviour and 
timely response (Harris et al., 2016). 
During the 2014-15 Bárðarbunga 
eruption in Iceland, the Middle Infra-
Red Observation of  Volcanic Activi-
ty (MIROVA) system (Coppola et al., 
2015) was used to chart the evolution 
of  the eruption when access was lim-
ited and visibility was poor.
In seismology, deterministic eruption 
forecasting based on the failure fore-
cast method (FFM) is showing poten-
tial (Boué et al., 2016).
Time series observations of  volca-
noes and their emissions using static 
or video cameras can yield important 
insights into hazardous processes. 
Citizen science, including community 
Measuring the temperature of pyroclastic flow deposits in Montserrat 
(block and ash flow deposits).
Source and Copyright BGS/Government of Montserrat
FIGURE 3.9
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monitoring, can fill observational and 
information gaps, raise awareness of 
hazards and risk, and engage com-
munities at-risk (e.g. Stevenson et al., 
2013; Stone et al., 2014; Wallace et al., 
2015). During the 2014-15 eruption at 
Bárðarbunga volcano, Iceland, people 
could document their experiences of 
poor air quality due to the gas-rich 
eruption online (IMO, n.d).
WOVOdat is a searchable, web-ac-
cessible global relational database 
containing time-series monitoring 
data from more than 100 eruption ep-
isodes; this will allow global trends in 
unrest and eruption data to be interro-
gated to assist forecasting at individu-
al volcanoes (Venezky and Newhall, 
2007; Widiwijayanti et al., 2015).
3.2.2.3 
Communication, reporting 
and alert levels
During unrest or eruption, scientists 
communicate in a variety of  ways 
(reports, forecasts, alert levels) using 
a variety of  media (email lists, short 
message service (SMS), social media, 
television and radio) to suit the needs 
of  information users (Solana et al., 
2008; Haynes et al., 2008a; Mothes 
et al., 2015). Such users are diverse 
and include civil aviation authorities, 
civil protection authorities, business-
es, tourist operators, the media and 
the public. Ideally, the content and 
format of  such communications are 
tailored to users’ needs (e.g. Lechner 
et al., 2017; Doyle et al., 2014) and us-
ers have considered in advance their 
thresholds for action (e.g. Marzocchi 
et al., 2012; Hicks et al., 2014). During 
an emergency, joint formal reports 
can be particularly effective if  scien-
tists and civil protection authorities 
work well together, and if  the content 
and format has been designed specifi-
cally with users in mind (e.g. Scientific 
advisory board of  the Icelandic Civil 
Protection, 2015).
A volcano Early Warning System 
(EWS) requires that monitoring data 
are collected and interpreted by scien-
tists, the level of  threat is determined 
Summary of alert levels and civil protection system response for Vesuvius volcano, Italy. Alert levels are es-
tablished by INGV Vesuvio based on changing monitoring parameters. The civil protection system responds in 
each operative phase according to the alert level and the emergency plan.
Source: authors
FIGURE 3.10
ALERT LEVEL STATE OF THE VOLCANO ERUPTION PROBABILITy TIME OF ERUPTION OPERATIVE PHASE
Base
No significant variation of monitored pa-
.rameters
Very low Undefined
Caution
Significant change of monitored param-
.eters
Low
 Indefinite, or not less than
.several months
I
Caution
Warning
 Further significant change in monitored
.parameters
Medium From months to weeks
II
Warning
Alarm
Appearance of phenomena and/or evolu-
 tion of monitored parameters suggesting
.a pre-eruption dynamic
High From weeks to days
III
Alarm
Operative Phase I: Verification of contingency plans, constant contact between scientists and civil protection, checking of 
functionality and immediate availability of resources, infrastructure and services needed for subsequent alert levels.
Operative Phase II: Voluntary evacuation of red zone to alternative accommodation outside the zone of risk. All involved 
in the emergency plan alert and prepared for Phase III.
Operative Phase III: Evacuation of the red zone within three days.
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and a decision to alert stakeholders is 
made (Fearnley, 2013). Some volcano 
observatories use Volcanic Alert Lev-
els (VALs) to communicate changes 
in the status of  volcanic activity that 
imply a changing probability of  erup-
tion (Gardner and Guffanti, 2006; 
Fearnley, 2013; Winson et al., 2014) 
or changing types of  hazard (Potter et 
al., 2014). Notification of  a change in 
VAL is usually accompanied by situa-
tion-specific information in the form 
of  a more detailed report. VALs are 
developed to suit local situations and, 
as such, they vary worldwide. Some 
focus on unrest and eruption fore-
casting (Figure 3.10) and others ac-
knowledge the changing phenomena 
and hazards of  long-lived eruptions 
(Potter et al., 2014). In situations in 
which major and costly mitigation ac-
tions are triggered by volcanic EWSs 
(e.g. the evacuation of  urban areas), 
quantitative, objective and rational 
scientific decision-making is essential 
to avoid accusations of  ‘false alarms’ 
(see Chapter 3.2.3, Hincks et al., 
2014).
The global network of  nine Volcanic 
Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) was 
set up by the International Civil Avi-
ation Organization (ICAO) following 
aircraft encounters with ash clouds in 
the 1980s (Guffanti et al., 2010). Vol-
cano observatories provide reports 
to VAACs to support the initiation 
of  ash dispersal models and have the 
option to set an ‘aviation colour code’ 
representing the status of  volcanoes 
in the context of  likelihood of  erup-
tion and potential for ash emissions 
(Lechner et al., 2017). This system can 
run in parallel to a VAL system.
In situations on the ground in which 
it is acknowledged that there may be 
little time for response , alerts may be 
sent out to authorities and the pub-
lic via SMS, telephone, radio or social 
media (e.g. IMO, 2016; Stone et al., 
2014; Mothes et al., 2015). EWSs for 
lahars and jökulhlaups (glacier floods 
in Iceland) are variable in terms of 
components but, in general, require 
monitoring (e.g. acoustic flow moni-
tors) to detect flows in proximal en-
vironments that can alert authorities 
to sound sirens downstream so that 
communities can be evacuated.
3.2.3
Volcanic hazard 
assessment
Volcanic hazards are diverse and 
they can occur in different combina-
tions and interact in different ways 
throughout the unrest, eruption and 
post-eruption period. 
Volcanoes generate 
multiple hazardous 
processes, the short- and 
long-term forecasting 
of which involve diverse 
methods to anticipate 
hazard footprints in order 
to enable anticipation and 
mitigation of impacts.
Scientists are improving their ability 
to assess and forecast these hazards, 
their likely ‘footprints’, interactions 
and impacts over different timescales. 
Short-term and long-term forecasts, 
to support crisis response and plan-
ning, respectively, are based on a vari-
ety of  different approaches depending 
primarily on data availability. Deter-
ministic and probabilistic approaches 
to hazard are used and are appropriate 
in different circumstances. .
3.2.3.1 
Hazard forecasting
Short-term forecasts can enable com-
munities across broad areas to prepare 
for imminent hazards and impacts. 
For example, simple simulations of 
expected atmospheric dispersal and 
deposition of   volcanic tephra based 
on monitoring/observation param-
eters, can be made available (e.g. for 
Etna at INGV (n.d.)  and for Mount 
St Helens at USGS (2015),  Hasega-
wa et al., 2015). Similarly, short-term 
dispersal forecasts of  SO2 (which may 
adversely affect human and live-stock 
health) can enable mitigation actions 
to be taken (e.g. Gislason et al., 2015). 
Such forecasts can also be achieved 
for lava flows and lahars, and, in some 
places, mitigation of  lava flow impacts 
has been attempted using engineering 
measures.
Volcanic hazard process models still 
need further development to better 
simulate key processes; this is espe-
cially true for pyroclastic flows, surges 
and lahars, the assessment of  which 
currently lags behind that of  tephra 
dispersal and fall. The ability to model 
interacting hazards is also important, 
such as rainfall-triggered lahars (Jones 
et al., 2015), eruption column collapse 
into pyroclastic flows or pyroclastic 
flows into lahars.
Long-term volcanic hazard assess-
ment is primarily based on charac-
terising the past eruptive activity of 
a volcanic system and understanding 
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the recurrence rates of  eruptions and 
the range of  possibilities for future 
eruptions. Such assessments are of-
ten presented as hazard maps. Ideally, 
geological and historical studies are 
needed to establish eruption histo-
ries but sometimes such information 
is not available, further fieldwork is 
needed, or data simply doesn’t exist. 
For example, fine-grained deposits 
(e.g. ash fall, surges, lateral blasts) 
may be missing from the geological 
record, so thorough consideration 
of  knowledge gaps and uncertainties 
is paramount in any hazard analysis 
(e.g. Engwell et al., 2013; Sparks et al., 
2013, Bonadonna et al. 2012, 2015). 
Volcanologists can study analogue 
volcanoes and global databases to ad-
dress knowledge gaps (e.g. Ogburn 
et al., 2015), or use methods such as 
expert elicitation in order to consider 
and quantify uncertainties (Aspinall, 
2006, 2010). Uncertainty should be 
acknowledged in all scientific deci-
sion-making, forecasts and assess-
ments.
3.2.3.2 
Volcanic hazard maps
Volcanic hazard maps can commu-
nicate information about one or a 
range of  hazards including lahars, 
pyroclastic flows and surges, tephra 
fall (Macedonio et al., 2008), ballis-
tics, lava flows (Richter et al., 2016), 
and, sometimes, less frequent haz-
ards such as debris avalanches and 
monogenetic eruptions. An Interna-
tional Association of  Volcanology 
and Chemistry of  the Earth’s Interior 
(IAVCEI) working group is reviewing 
current global practice (>200 pub-
lished hazard maps). They defined 
five major classes of  hazard map and 
found that >60 % of  maps are based 
primarily on the geological history 
of  the volcano (Figure 3.11), despite 
incomplete eruption histories that 
do not represent all past and possi-
ble future scenarios. Furthermore, 
>83 % of  hazard maps use a quali-
tative ‘high-medium-low’ description 
to indicate likelihood of  impact, but 
the meanings behind these terms are 
open to broad interpretation (Calder 
et al., 2015).
The IAVCEI working group have 
established that there is no single ap-
proach that suits all situations; differ-
ent approaches may be suitable for 
different needs. Nevertheless, there is 
consensus that quantitative, account-
able and defendable hazard maps are 
increasingly needed. 
The group aims to collectively define 
FIGURE 3.11
Synthetic examples (not a real volcano) of the appearance of five hazard 
map types found during the review: 
(a) geology-based map, 
(b) integrated qualitative map, 
(c) administrative map, 
(d) modelling-based map and 
(e) probabilistic map. 
Copyright: Cambridge University Press
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good practices. Scientific priorities 
to enhance hazard maps include (1) 
improved methods for probabilistic 
analysis, especially for lahar, pyroclas-
tic flows and surges, (2) establishing 
methods to undertake hazard assess-
ments for data-poor volcanoes and (3) 
approaches for multihazard, multisce-
nario probabilistic modelling (Calder 
et al., 2015). Although probabilistic 
volcanic hazard maps exist for a few 
of  the world’s best studied volcanoes, 
they are far from being the norm.
Haynes et al. (2007) recognised that 
maps are rarely well understood by 
users and that three-dimensional (3D) 
visualisation can significantly help un-
derstanding.
3.2.3.3 
Probabilistic volcanic hazard 
assessment 
A variety of  methods are used, often 
in combination, to generate probabil-
istic volcanic hazard assessments over 
different timescales.
For example, statistical methods can 
be used to assess recurrence rates and 
locations of  vents, which, when com-
bined with numerical simulations of 
volcanic processes (e.g. lava flow em-
placement, tephra dispersal and fall), 
can create hazard curves for specific 
locations or hazard maps for larger ar-
eas (Connor et al., 2015). There may 
be high uncertainty in vent location, 
particularly if  a volcano has vents dis-
tributed across its flanks or the area 
is a volcanic field comprising multiple 
eruption centres (Connor et al., 2012; 
Bebbington and Cronin, 2010). 
Because of  the variety and poten-
tial complexity of  volcanic hazards, 
probabilistc hazard maps commonly 
attempt to communicate information 
about only a single hazard at a time 
(Figure 3.11e). For example, volcan-
ic flows are tyically displayed as the 
spatial variation of  inundation prob-
ability over a given period of  time. 
Tephra fall might be assessed using 
contours of  probability given a haz-
ardous threshold of  tephra thickness 
(Jenkins et al., 2015a) or contours of 
tephra thickness given a certain prob-
ability in order to better assess the 
associated impact (e.g. Bonadonna, 
2006; Biass et al. 2014, 2016a). Prob-
abilistic hazards assessments can be 
local to global in scale. 
The first probabilistic assessment of 
global tephra fall hazard has been at-
tempted for the 2015 United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (UNISDR) Global Assess-
ment Report, based on a method de-
veloped for the regional scale (Jenkins 
et al., 2012, 2015a).
Once volcanic unrest begins there are 
multiple potential eruptive outcomes 
(scenarios) due to the dynamic com-
plexity of   volcanic systems. In this 
situation, probabilistic methods pro-
vide a basis for scientists to explore 
those outcomes, allocate probability 
estimates to them (Marzocchi et al., 
2012; Selva et al., 2010) and commu-
nicate them to authorities to support 
rational decision-making (e.g. Sparks 
2003, Marzocchi et al., 2007). The 
results can be tested using statistical 
procedures and allow comparisons 
between volcanoes and other natural 
and non-natural hazards (e.g. Scan-
done et al., 1993; Bayarri et al., 2015). 
Current probabilistic approach-
es build on the idea of  event trees 
(Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002) and on 
Bayesian statistics (e.g. Papadopou-
los and Orfanogianaki, 2005). The 
probability estimates allocated to each 
outcome/scenario might be empiri-
cal, or be based on expert discussion 
and elicitation, numerical simulations 
or a combination of  methods (e.g. 
Aspinall, 2006, 2010; Marzocchi and 
Bebbington, 2012). These methods 
are also useful if  applied regularly at 
long-lived or frequently active volca-
noes where probabilities change and 
assessments can be compared over 
time (Pallister et al., 2010; Wadge and 
Aspinall, 2014). Similar approaches 
have now been applied at Vesuvius 
(Neri, 2008), Teide-Pico Viejo, Tener-
ife (Martí et al., 2008), and Auckland 
Volcanic Fields, New Zealand (Lind-
say et al., 2010). The same principle 
has also been developed to generate 
tools (e.g. Marzocchi et al., 2008).
3.2.4
Volcanic risk 
assessment 
and mitigation
3.2.4.1 
Vulnerability and exposure
Vulnerability is complex, dynamic 
and spatially variable with many fac-
ets including systemic, social, func-
tional and economic vulnerability (e.g. 
Enhancing resilience of  communi-
ties and territories facing natural and 
na-tech hazards (ENSURE) project, 
Menoni et al., 2012). Exposure con-
tributes to vulnerability (Cutter 2013) 
and includes the people and assets 
exposed to the hazards. Volcanic un-
rest and eruptions tend to unfold over 
weeks to years, thereby enhancing the 
dynamic complexity of  factors that 
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contribute to vulnerability and expo-
sure (Galderisi et al., 2013; Zuccaro et 
al., 2014).
Volcanic tephra fall is the hazard that 
most frequently affects large popula-
tions and assets and has reasonable 
vulnerability estimates in risk mod-
els (Spence et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 
2015). Jenkins et al. (2014), as part 
of  the Mitigate and Asses risk from 
Volcanic Impact on Terrain and hu-
man Activities (MIA-VITA) project, 
developed guidelines and methodol-
ogies for carrying out initial physical 
vulnerability assessments. This built 
on previous projects including the 
SPeeD project at Vesuvius and the 
EXPLORIS project (e.g. Zuccaro et 
al., 2008; Marti et al., 2008). Jenkins 
et al. (2015) categorised tephra fall 
impacts by sector and considered the 
relationship between hazard inten-
sity (in that case ash thickness) and 
damage or disruption to each sector 
(buildings, critical infrastructure, ag-
riculture). More data need to be col-
lected to inform estimates of  physical 
vulnerability of  buildings and infra-
structure, through: (1) collection of 
post-eruption damage data (e.g. Bax-
ter et al., 2005; Wilson et al., 2011; 
Biass et al., 2016a, 2016b; Charbon-
nier et al., 2013; Jenkins et al., 2015b), 
(2) experimental testing of  materials 
failure, or (3) using theoretical calcu-
lations of  material strengths (e.g. Jen-
kins et al., 2014). Damage data and 
experimental data remain sparse so 
theoretical calculations can contribute 
to the development of  vulnerability 
functions, which provide the proba-
bility of  a certain level of  damage as a 
function of  hazard intensity (Jenkins 
et al., 2014; see also Chapter 2.4).
A dynamic pressure scale for building 
Soufrière Hills Volcano and Plymouth, the capital of Montserrat, in Octo-
ber 1997.
Copyright: British Geological Survey/Government of Montserrat
FIGURE 3.12
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damage by pyroclastic surges (Baxter 
et al., 2005), developed after expe-
riences in Montserrat (Figure 3.12) 
and at Mount St Helens, has contrib-
uted to simulation work at Vesuvius 
and other European volcanoes in the 
EXPLORIS project (Baxter et al., 
2008).
Studies on social vulnerability in vol-
canic risk are increasing in number 
and showing the value of  semi-quanti-
tative and qualitative assessments (e.g. 
Sword-Daniels, 2011; Sword-Daniels 
et al., 2014). Hicks and Few (2015) 
showed that during long-term erup-
tions, coping capacity, maintenance 
of  well-being, recovery of  losses and 
rebuilding of  livelihoods are highly 
variable within populations and tend 
to be linked to preceding socioeco-
nomic conditions (Birkman, 2007). 
Socio-economic impacts are most 
likely to be experienced by those 
with pre-existing and inter-related 
sociocultural, political and econom-
ic vulnerabilities (Wisner et al., 2012; 
Gaillard 2008). Volcanic activity can 
have a disproportionate effect on live-
lihoods and economy because of  high 
systemic vulnerability (Wilson et al., 
2011, 2014; Jenkins et al., 2015a).
Comprehensive quantitative assess-
ment of  the impacts of  all types 
of  volcanic hazard is relatively new 
but is most advanced for tephra fall 
(Craig et al., 2016; Elissondo et al., 
2016; Wilson et al., 2011, 2012, 2014; 
Magill et al., 2013). Socioeconomic 
impacts due to tephra fall are most 
likely to be documented in long-lived 
eruptions (e.g. Sword-Daniels, 2011; 
Sword-Daniels et al., 2014).
3.2.4.2 
Risk assessment 
methodologies
Volcanic risk assessment is not as ad-
vanced as assessment of  other haz-
ards such as flooding, earthquakes and 
tropical cyclones. For the long-lasting 
eruption at Soufriere Hills Volcano, 
Montserrat, volcanic risk has been 
assessed in a regular and consistent 
way for 20 years (Aspinall et al., 2002; 
Aspinall, 2006; Wadge and Aspinall, 
2014). After deriving event scenario 
probabilities and their uncertainties 
by elicitation, risks and uncertainties 
are quantified using Monte Carlo 
modelling, and the risk is presented 
as (1) societal risk expressed quanti-
tatively as a curve of  the probability 
of  exceeding a given number of  fa-
talities, (2) individual risk given as an 
annualised probability of  death (from 
the volcano) for any person living in a 
specific area and (3) occupational risk 
given for people working under cer-
tain conditions in specific areas.
An example of  a volcanic risk mod-
el is the KazanRisk loss model (risk-
frontiers.com/kazanrisk.htm), which 
uses numerical dispersal modelling 
of  ash fall in Greater Tokyo to esti-
mate potential losses associated with 
building damage, clean-up and reduc-
tions in agricultural productivity. At 
regional to global scales, the CAPRA 
risk modelling platform (ecapra.org) 
has been used to provide preliminary 
estimates of   potential building dam-
age around active volcanoes in the 
Asia-Pacific Region using simplified 
volcanic  hazard  outputs from a sta-
tistical emulator (Jenkins et al., 2015a).
Because some crucial aspects of  vul-
nerability must be assessed qualita-
tively, there is a need to find innova-
tive ways to integrate qualitative with 
quantitative data to assess volcanic 
risk (Hicks and Few, 2015). Nov-
el interdisciplinary approaches are 
now being developed (e.g. STREVA 
project) that combine volcanological 
techniques, probabilistic decision sup-
port and social science methods to 
ensure that the benefits of  even un-
certain and incomplete knowledge are 
acted upon to reduce risk (e.g. Hicks 
et al., 2014; Barclay et al., 2014). Stir-
ling (2010) highlighted that different 
analytical methods suit different epis-
temic conditions and acknowledging 
the state of   knowledge is a good start 
in enabling effective risk analysis and 
communication..
‘Forensic analysis’ of  past disasters 
provides a strong basis for learning 
(e.g. Voight 1990, Loughlin et al. 2002, 
Thordarson and Self, 2003; Bird et al., 
2010; Ragona et al., 2011), and lon-
gitudinal studies can reveal valuable 
insights into causal processes behind 
impacts and disasters (e.g. Integrat-
ed Research on Disaster Risk FOR-
IN project 2011). Such approaches 
are also being applied to understand 
recovery processes that are complex 
and can last for decades (Sword-Dan-
iels et al., 2015).
3.2.4.3 
Civil Protection, scientists 
and risk management
Volcano observatories and civil pro-
tection authorities, working together 
as well as with the public, have re-
duced fatalities due to volcanic ac-
tivity worldwide. At least 50 000 lives 
were saved in the 20th century (Auker 
et al., 2013) and even more have been 
saved since 1985 (Voight et al., 2013). 
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Mutual understanding and trust de-
velop with an investment of  time and 
effort (Haynes et al., 2008a, 2008b) 
and it is too late to start when an 
emergency begins. Effective commu-
nication and decision-making during a 
rapidly changing emergency situation 
(Fischoff, 2013; Doyle et al., 2014) 
will be facilitated by good planning, 
preparation and response protocols 
(Doyle et al., 2015; Bretton et al., 
2015). Interdisciplinary and transdis-
ciplinary approaches can bring a wide 
range of  methods and experiences 
together (e.g. communities, scientists, 
authorities) to facilitate better under-
standing, analysis and communication 
of  hazard and risk (Hicks et al., 2014; 
Barclay et al., 2014, 2015).
Volcanic unrest and eruptions can be 
prolonged, which may cause disrup-
tion and have long-term socioeco-
nomic impacts. Tephra fall can cause 
damage and disruption across sec-
tors and has potential health impacts 
(Horwell and Baxter, 2006; Carlsen 
et al., 2012); therefore, planning for 
clean-up and recovery is essential 
(Hayes et al., 2017).
Preparedness for volcanic unrest and 
eruption often takes the form of  con-
tingency plans,which can be practised 
(Figure 3.13) by scientists, authorities 
and other stakeholders, including the 
public (Hicks et al., 2014). Different 
types of  exercises have been reported 
around the world (Figure 3.13), rang-
ing from the training of  small groups 
to international reaction-chain exer-
cises (Lindsay et al., 2010; Ricci et al., 
2013). In high-risk urban settings (e.g. 
Naples), there are significant costs to 
mitigation actions, even to exercises, 
so direct and indirect costs and bene-
fits need to be carefully considered to 
support decision-making (Marzocchi 
et al., 2012; Woo, 2014).
The 2010 eruption of  Eyjafjallajökull 
volcano in Iceland demonstrated that 
even small eruptions can have global 
impacts (Ragona et al., 2011). There-
fore, international collaboration is es-
sential to ensure that lessons learned 
and scientific progress are translated 
into planning and preparation across 
all sectors (Schmidt et al., 2011, 2015; 
Bonadonna et al., 2012).
3.2.5
Conclusions and key 
messages
Partnership 
Long-term collaboration and effec-
tive partnerships between scientists 
(operational and research) and civil 
protection authorities are particularly 
important for effective evidence-based 
risk management and emergency re-
sponse. The recent FUTUREVOLC 
and MEDSUV projects (FP7) showed 
how Europe-wide research partner-
ships can support such national and 
Europe-wide DRM efforts in particu-
lar. Engagement with users of  scien-
tific and civil protection advice can 
improve the format and content of 
outputs, enhancing understanding, up-
take and effective decision-making at 
all levels. The knowledge and experi-
ence of  those at risk is increasingly rec-
ognised as important and their involve-
ment in the design and development of 
DRM strategies can be highly effective.
An evacuation exercise for the entire population of Tristan da Cunha, 
South Atlantic. 
Source: photograph courtesy of Anna Hicks
FIGURE 3.13
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Knowledge
Hazard, impact, vulnerability, loss and 
recovery data are sparse in volcano-
logy but are needed to produce better 
hazard and risk assessments. Detailed 
study of  all future eruptions and their 
impacts is needed. Despite an overall 
need for increased quantification in 
volcanic risk, interdisciplinary collab-
oration is recommended to capitalise 
on both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to risk, particularly in 
situations in which data are scarce. 
Progress in process understanding is 
needed to enable better anticipation 
of  hazardous events. Frameworks 
for the optimal combination of  haz-
ard and vulnerability analysis across 
multiple temporal and spatial scales is 
needed for comprehensive risk assess-
ments and proactive policies of  risk 
reduction.
Innovation
There is an ongoing need for devel-
opment in monitoring techniques, 
integrated analysis of  ground and 
space data, hazard and vulnerability 
assessment methodologies and in-
terdisciplinary/transdisciplinary sci-
ence. A next important step for the 
volcanology community as a whole 
is to enhance innovation in hazard 
and risk assessment strategies. There 
is an increasingly urgent need for 
near-real-time global monitoring and 
a reporting platform to support the 
anticipation of  volcanic events that 
have wide-reaching or humanitarian 
impacts. This will require collabora-
tive approaches and innovative inte-
gration of  data in a wide variety of 
formats and at different spatial and 
temporal resolutions.
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3.3 Geophysical risk: 
tsunamis
Gerassimos	A.	Papadopoulos, Stefano Lorito, Finn Løvholt,
Alexander Rudloff, François Schindelé
3.3.1
Tsunamis in the 
global ocean
3.3.1.1 
Tsunami physics, 
generation mechanisms and 
impact
The word tsunami comes from the 
Japanese for ‘harbour wave’. Tsuna-
mis are sea waves with periods that 
typically range from a few minutes to 
about 1 hour. The wavelength rang-
es from tenths to hundreds of  kilo-
metres depending on the causative 
source. The majority of  tsunamis 
(≈80 %) are produced by submarine 
earthquakes that are characterised by 
a shallow focus (≤100 km), a large 
magnitude and a faulting mechanism 
with a significant vertical component. 
Volcanic eruptions and landslides also 
produce tsunamis. Subduction zones 
(i.e. major lithospheric plate bounda-
ries) are particularly prone to tsunami 
generation (e.g. Figure 3.14). Meteor-
ological effects may also cause wave 
phenomena resembling tsunamis 
(meteotsunamis).
In the deep ocean, tsunami speed de-
pends on the water depth, D. At first 
approximation, the shallow water 
wave speed C is:
  
 , 
where g is gravity acceleration. 
In deep water, the wave amplitude 
may remain small, typically ranging up 
to a few metres. The waves become 
higher and shorter in shallow water 
and may have run-up heights that ex-
ceed several tens of  metres (Figure 
3.15); exceptional landslide tsunamis 
have even been recorded that reach 
several hundreds of  metres vertically 
(Miller et al., 1960).
Tsunamis may have catastrophic con-
sequences, such as loss of  life, de-
struction of  infrastructure, buildings 
and vessels, and economic and social 
impacts, the last of  which may be 
felt both locally and remotely. In to-
tal, 16 major tsunamis killed 250 900 
people in 21 countries between 1996 
and 2015 (UNISDR/CRED 2016). 
The great Sumatra tsunami of  26 De-
cember 2004, which was caused by an 
M9.3 magnitude earthquake, caused 
the deaths of  226 000 people in 12 
Indian Ocean nations (Figure 3.16). 
Tsunamis are long-period 
sea waves generated by 
earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions and landslides. 
They may have large 
wave heights in coastal 
zones, and can cause 
destruction to populations, 
infrastructures, properties 
and the natural 
environment.
The Tohoku tsunami of  11 March 
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2011 that hit north-east Japan (Pacific 
Ocean) following an M9.0 earthquake 
was also devastating (Figure 3.17). 
The maximum run-up exceeded 40 
metres, and the tsunami penetrated 
more than 5 km inland in places. The 
estimated total death toll was about 
19 000 people, nearly 90 % of  whom 
died as a result of  the tsunami. The 
direct economic loss was reported 
to be USD 210 billion (EUR 198 bil-
lion), which was orders of  magnitude 
higher than for the 2004 Sumatra tsu-
nami, the cost of  which was estimated 
to be USD 4.4 billion ((EUR 4.1 bil-
lion) (Løvholt et al., 2015). The Fuk-
ushima nuclear power plant was dam-
aged by the tsunami and there was a 
meltdown of  three reactors.
For earthquakes, intensity is an esti-
mation of  the event impact, which 
is measured using empirical scales 
such as the 12-grade Mercalli–Sie-
berg scale, which was introduced 
more than a century ago and is grad-
ually improving. Magnitude measures 
earthquake size in terms of  the ener-
gy released. Richter (1935) introduced 
an initial magnitude scale, which was 
later improved by the concept of  mo-
ment-magnitude (Kanamori, 1977). 
However, no standard and satisfac-
tory tsunami magnitude scales have 
been proposed so far owing to the 
lack of  appropriate tsunami instru-
mental records. Therefore, tsunami 
intensity, expressing the event impact 
(e.g. using the six-grade tsunami in-
tensity scale introduced by Sieberg 
(1927)), is still a rough proxy of  the 
event size. A 12-grade scale was in-
troduced by Papadopoulos and Ima-
mura (2001), which is similar to the 
one used in seismology: for example, 
a tsunami of  grade 6 intensity indi-
cates a slightly damaging event, while 
a grade-10 tsunami is very destructive. 
However, for tsunami risk and vulner-
ability assessments, one has to turn to 
more stringent tsunami metrics, such 
as the expected tsunami run-up height 
and onshore flow depth, to calculate 
possible damage and losses.
3.3.1.2 
Major tsunami sources in 
the Earth
Large tsunamis occur frequently 
along the ‘Ring of  Fire’ in the Pacif-
ic Ocean. Landmark examples in-
clude the 1960 (Chile), 1964 (Alaska) 
and 2011 (Japan) tsunamis, which 
were all of  a large magnitude and oc-
curred along subduction zones. The 
large number of  tsunamis in the Pa-
cific Ocean (NGDC/WDS, n.d.) are 
caused by widely different sources, 
such as non-subduction earthquakes, 
landslides and volcanoes.
Subduction zone earthquakes also 
occur in the Indian Ocean, along 
the Sunda Arc and in Makran (Paki-
stan). Thrust faulting earthquakes, 
such as the one that occurred in 
2004 in Sumatra, and large volcanic 
eruptions, such as that of  27 August 
1883 in Krakatoa (Sunda Strait, In-
donesian Arc), produced devastating 
transoceanic tsunamis. Tsunamigenic 
zones are also present in the North-
East Atlantic and the Mediterranean 
(NEAM) region, the Caribbean Sea, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Tsuna-
mis can also occur in areas with little 
earthquake activity.
3.3.1.3 
Tsunamis in the North  
Eastern Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean region
In the NEAM region, the historical 
tsunami record is rich thanks to many 
relevant documents that have been 
preserved throughout history. Ge-
ological evidence both onshore and 
offshore, such as sediment deposits, 
boulders having been moved inland 
and geomorphological changes, has 
contributed to the identification of 
paleotsunamis (e.g. Papadopoulos et 
al., 2014). Apart from a few mega or 
basin-wide tsunamis, more than 300 
smaller tsunamis, either local or re-
gional, have been documented so far 
(Figure 3.18).
The main geotectonic structure pro-
ducing tsunamis in the Mediterrane-
an Sea is the Hellenic Arc subduction 
zone (see Figure 3.14). Large earth-
quakes (M≈8.5), presumably recur-
ring at intervals of  hundreds to thou-
sands of  years, generate basin-wide, 
destructive tsunamis, such as those 
that occurred in AD 365 and 1303 in 
Crete, and the large Minoan (17th cen-
tury BCE) tsunami produced by the 
giant eruption of  the Santorini volca-
no. Strong tsunamis also occur in less 
active regions, such as the Algerian 
thrust (North Africa, e.g. Schindelé et 
al., 2015), the Calabrian Arc (south-
ern Italy) and the Cyprus Arc. Several 
other seismic, volcanic and landslide 
tsunami sources are distributed in 
the Mediterranean Sea, including in 
closed basins (e.g. the Corinth Gulf, 
Central Greece), the Marmara Sea 
and the Black Sea. In the North-East 
Atlantic, the area offshore south-west 
Iberia constitutes a major source of 
basin-wide destructive tsunamis (e.g. 
the one caused by the Lisbon earth-
quake (M≈8.5) on 1 November 1755). 
However, local tsunamis occur in the 
Azores Islands, in the English Chan-
nel and in Norwegian fjords, the last 
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The Hellenic subduction zone of the African lithospheric plate beneath the Eurasian plate in the South Aegean 
Sea is a cause of tsunami generation from strong submarine earthquakes  
Source: Mouslopoulou et al. (2015) 
(a) Stars indicate the epicentres of the large tsunamigenic earthquakes of AD 365 (west) and 1303 (east) off the 
island of Crete. Yellow arrows indicate plate movement from Global Positioning System stations. G, Gavdos Island; 
WF, Western Fault; GF, Gavdos Fault; EF1, Eastern Fault 1; EF2, Eastern Fault 2.
(b) Subduction cross-sections in western (a-a') and eastern (b-b’) Crete. Black line indicates plate interface. The 
weakly locked portion of the interface is highlighted in yellow (vertical scale changes with depth). A large earthquake 
in one of the faults of the area causes upward displacement of the crust and pushes the water column upwards, 
thus producing a large tsunami.
FIGURE 3.14
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of  which are associated with coastal 
landslides.
Nearly all the tsunami sources in the 
NEAM region are located at a short 
distance from coastlines, and tsunami 
travel times are very short, in most 
cases less than 30 minutes. The near-
field issue is of  crucial importance for 
the effective operation of  Tsunami 
Early Warning Systems (TWSs) both 
in the NEAM region and elsewhere 
(e.g. Schindelé, 1998).
3.3.2
Monitoring systems
3.3.2.1 
Seismograph networks
National institutions maintain their 
own seismic networks all around the 
globe, including in the NEAM re-
gion, to pursue their main mission 
of  national seismic monitoring. Data 
archiving and/or real-time data ex-
change occurs within the framework 
of  international organisations, con-
sortia and federated networks. The 
sustainability of  the European com-
ponent of  these services is supported 
by national and EU funding and by 
the European Plate Observing System 
European Research Infrastructure 
Consortium, which is a pan-Euro-
pean long-term infrastructure pro-
gramme. For example, the permanent 
stations available at the time of  writ-
ing through the European Integrated 
Data Archive portal (EIDA, 2017) are 
illustrated in Figure 3.19. This inte-
gration of  national networks into a 
single system allows for a better and 
more rapid characterisation of  strong 
(M6-6.9) to major and great (up to M8 
or more) earthquakes. This important 
Schematic explanation of some commonly used tsunami terms. 
The term “run-in” is also in use instead of inundation. 
The term “tsunami amplitude” is in use by some authors to describe ei-
ther tsunami height at shore or wave amplitude in the open sea.
Source: Papadopoulos et al. (2014); modified from IOC (1998)
Brick building in Sri Lanka destroyed by the large Sumatra tsunami of 26 
December 2004.
Source: photograph courtesy of G. A. Papadopoulos
FIGURE 3.15
FIGURE 3.16
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asset feeds a vital data bank that can 
be exploited for a better understand-
ing of  the seismic potential of  a re-
gion, which is also a fundamental tool 
for seismic and tsunami monitoring 
and the long-term assessment of  tsu-
nami hazard and risk.
In high-magnitude earthquakes (e.g. 
Sumatra 2004), the very long rup-
ture duration along the seismic fault 
makes it difficult to form a rapid as-
sessment of  earthquake magnitude, 
which, however, is a prerequisite for 
an effective TWS. This is a problem 
known as ‘earthquake magnitude sat-
uration’. The 2004 event spurred the 
development of  ad hoc seismological 
techniques (e.g. Lomax and Michelini, 
2009a, 2009b), including improve-
ments in inversion methods for finite 
source models (e.g. Shearer and Bürg-
mann, 2010). In several areas there is 
a significant gap in coverage due to 
the lack of  sufficient seismic station 
coverage. This is the case along the 
coasts of  North Africa. In the North-
East Atlantic, the coverage is also 
limited owing to the absence of  land 
areas. These limitations in turn affect 
the accuracy and rapidity of  the as-
sessment of  tsunami potential when 
an earthquake is not surrounded by 
a sufficient number of  nearby seis-
mic stations. Improvements in station 
coverage would reduce both the num-
ber of  false alarms and the uncertain-
ty of  real-time tsunami forecasting 
provided by TWSs.
3.3.2.2 
Global Navigation 
Satellite System 
networks
An alternative way to overcome the 
problem of  earthquake magnitude 
saturation is to use the Global Nav-
igation Satellite System (GNSS) to 
measure large earthquake magnitudes. 
The underlying idea is that GNSS 
stations, which do not saturate when 
measuring large co-seismic ground 
displacements, can be closer to the 
source than the seismic broadband 
stations, and thus may contribute to 
faster TWS response times.
The monitoring of 
earthquakes, crustal 
deformation and sea-
level changes through 
geophysical networks 
constitutes the 
cornerstone for tsunami 
monitoring and early 
warning. Innovative 
solutions are needed for 
substantial monitoring 
improvement.
Global Navigation Satellite System 
is the modern terminology used for 
geo-spatial positioning systems in 
general, including Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and several regional 
networks (e.g. GLONASS, Galileo, 
BeiDou). Numerous national and 
international organisations maintain 
permanent networks of  receivers that 
Large fishing boats that were moved ashore by the Japanese tsunami of 
11 March 2011.
Source: photograph courtesy of G. A. Papadopoulos
FIGURE 3.17
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contribute to this global system. At 
a European level, one of  the most 
important is the EUREF Permanent 
Network (EUREF, 2011), to which 
more than 100 organisations actively 
contribute. In addition to their appli-
cations in geodesy and geophysics, 
GNSS data transmitted in real time 
can significantly improve the earth-
quake monitoring and tsunami fore-
casting capabilities of  the TWSs. The 
2004 Sumatra event triggered world-
wide efforts for the augmentation 
of  TWSs with a GNSS-based com-
ponent (Blewitt et al., 2006; Sobolev 
et al., 2007; Song, 2007; Falck et al., 
2010; Babeyko et al., 2010). Follow-
ing the 2011 Tohoku tsunami disaster, 
thanks to the exceptional Japanese 
GEONET network, it was possible to 
show the feasibility of  a GNSS-based 
TWS (Ohta et al., 2012; Hoechner et 
al., 2013). In addition, Chile and the 
United States, among others, are now 
actively progressing in the same direc-
tion (e.g. Melgar et al., 2016).
In the Mediterranean, the Istituto 
Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcano-
logia (INGV; Italy) and the Nation-
al Observatory of  Athens (NOA; 
Greece), as well as other Tsunami 
Service Providers (TSPs) acting in 
the Intergovernmental Coordina-
tion Group for the Tsunami Ear-
ly Warning and Mitigation System 
in the North-eastern Atlantic, the 
Mediterranean and connected seas 
(NEAMTWS/IOC/UNESCO) (see 
Chapter 3.3.3.4), operate GPS net-
works transmitting data in real time. 
These networks provide a good cov-
erage around the Ionian Sea (Figure 
3.20), where several potentially tsu-
namigenic seismic sources are situat-
ed (e.g. Basili et al., 2013). In coop-
eration with GFZ (Germany), these 
centres are assessing the feasibility 
of  the incorporation of  GNSS-based 
solutions in their operations, within 
the framework of  the EU-FP7 pro-
ject ASTARTE (2013); the instal-
lation of  new stations is ongoing in 
both Greece and Italy, funded by the 
MIUR (Italian Ministry of  University 
and Research) Italian Flagship project 
RITMARE (Figure 3.21). This is an 
innovative prospect for the NEAM 
TWS, given that no operational exam-
ples are in place so far in the exist-
ing major tsunami warning systems. 
Of  potential innovative interest is 
also the development of  transoceanic 
submarine cabled observing systems 
composed of  electro-optical seabed 
cables with optical repeaters for the 
transmission of  data (Howe et al., 
Geographical distribution of the tsunami sources reported in the Europe-
an-Mediterranean region from antiquity to the present. K is the maximum 
tsunami intensity in the 12-grade Papadopoulos and Imamura (2001) 
scale.
Source: Papadopoulos (2015)
FIGURE 3.18
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2016). Adding environmental sensors 
to the repeaters would provide an un-
paralleled global network of  real-time 
data for ocean climate and sea level 
monitoring and disaster mitigation 
from earthquake and tsunami hazards.
3.3.2.3 
Measuring sea 
level changes
The measurement of  sea-level chang-
es is performed by permanent tide 
gauge stations installed at coastlines, 
as well as by ocean buoys, which are 
floating devices on the sea surface 
that report the sea level by measuring 
the pressure on the bottom of  the 
sea. Tide gauges are useful for long-
term multihazard purposes and geo-
dynamic and oceanographic studies 
(e.g. climate change), but they are also 
useful in tsunami warning if  the time 
interval between the data points and 
the data latency are sufficiently small. 
Broadband seismic sensors operating in the NEAM region (data retrieved from ORFEUS Data Centre). Different 
colours indicate different institutions operating sensor networks.
Source: figure prepared by M. Charalampakis, National Observatory of Athens, Greece
FIGURE 3.19
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Tide gauges have registered tsunamis 
since the mid-19th century. For the 
NEAM region, about 310 stations 
contribute data to the inventory pro-
vided by the Flanders Marine Institute 
(VLIZ) in Oostende, Belgium, and 
UNESCO/IOC (2017) (Figure 3.22). 
However, only a few are available in 
real time, which is a necessity for early 
warning. The European Commission 
(JRC) offers sea-level data redundan-
cy by means of  its web service (Web-
critech, n.d.). In recent years, JRC has 
provided more than 20 new Inexpen-
sive Devices for Sea Level (IDSL) 
measurements in the NEAM region 
(Annunziato, 2015).
Ocean buoys are linked with pressure 
sensors on the ocean floor called tsu-
nameters. The pressure change caused 
by the passage of  a tsunami is trans-
mitted to the linked buoy and then 
to the monitoring centres by satellite. 
Incorporation of  such offshore meas-
urements is desirable to detect a tsu-
nami well in advance of  its arrival at 
the coasts. Measurements of  offshore 
sea levels are achieved by the Deep-
Ocean Assessment and Reporting of 
Tsunami (DART) buoys, which oper-
ate in the Pacific, Indian and western 
Atlantic Oceans. However, there is no 
clear consensus among the scientific 
community as regards the suitability 
of  the DART system in more narrow 
and confined regions such as NEAM, 
owing not only to their high cost but 
also to the near-field issue characteris-
ing tsunami early warning operations 
in the NEAM region. 
Other types of  sea-level measurement 
include floating GPS systems and the 
undersea pressure cables, both of 
which are used operationally by Ja-
pan. The first of  these measures the 
sea-level change by the differential 
measurement with respect to a fixed 
point on Earth; the second uses a se-
ries of  pressure measurements that 
are connected to land stations via sub-
marine cables.
3.3.3 
Tsunami risk 
assessment and 
reduction
3.3.3.1
Lessons learned from key 
tsunami events
The mega tsunamis of  2004 (Suma-
tra) and 2011 (Japan) not only had 
tragic consequences, but also changed 
our thinking on how to deal with 
such low-frequency but high-impact 
events (e.g. Lorito et al., 2016). Both 
tsunamis led to a reanalysis of  pre-
vious models for predicting where 
large earthquakes might recur and 
how large they might be. At present, 
we cannot rule out the occurrence 
of  similar megathrust earthquakes 
along any subduction zone across the 
Earth, including the Mediterranean 
Sea (e.g. Kagan and Jackson, 2013). 
Harsh lessons have also been learned 
from more localised tsunamis occur-
ring after smaller earthquakes. 
The 1998 Papua New Guinea event 
was an eye-opener for the tsunami 
Map showing stations of the INGV RING (purple dots) and NOANET (red 
dots) networks. Yellow triangles are the new planned stations, the instal-
lation of which has been ongoing since October 2016. 
Source: Michelini and Charalampakis (2016). 
FIGURE 3.20
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community, as it proved that subma-
rine landslides after an earthquake 
may cause massive tsunamis. The 25 
October 2010 Mentawai (off  Suma-
tra) tsunami was caused by an M7.7 
‘slow’ earthquake, which is character-
ised by a relatively small magnitude 
compared with the size of  the asso-
ciated tsunami. The shaking from 
this event was not very strong, but 
it lasted for a long time. This may be 
one reason why many people did not 
self-evacuate, which unfortunately 
led to more than 400 casualties (Syn-
olakis, 2011). These types of  event are 
termed ‘tsunami earthquakes’ (Polet 
and Kanamori, 2009); however, their 
mechanism is still not completely un-
derstood, and the estimation of  their 
frequency and possible locations re-
mains elusive.
3.3.3.2
Tsunami hazard, 
vulnerability and risk 
assessment
Tide gauge stations operating in the NEAM region. Different colours indicate different institutions operating 
sensor networks.
Source: IOC/UNESCO; figure prepared by M. Charalampakis, NOA, Greece
FIGURE 3.21
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Tsunami hazard measures the likeli-
hood that a tsunami of  a certain size 
will hit a coastal location in the future, 
that is, the probability of  a tsunami 
exceeding a run-up height of  10 me-
tres within a period of  50 years. Like-
wise, building vulnerability describes 
the probability of  tsunami damage 
and exposure relates to the people, 
buildings or assets that are subject 
to potential losses. The tsunami risk 
measures the probability of  future 
tsunami consequences and any poten-
tial losses. In simple terms, the tsu-
nami risk is the convolution between 
tsunami hazard, vulnerability and ex-
posed elements at risk.
Rare but often destructive events 
dominate tsunami risk worldwide. 
Historical tsunami records are too 
short to reveal run-up heights at the 
level of  hazard for which we need to 
prepare. This is a fundamental dif-
ference between tsunamis and earth-
quakes, floods or cyclones, for exam-
ple, for which destructive events can 
be found in regional historical records 
and for which the hazard posed by 
future events can be more robustly 
extracted from the available data. The 
considerable uncertainty characteris-
ing the assessment of  tsunami hazard 
in most locations needs to be reduced 
by corroborating, or even replacing, 
the statistical analysis of  past events 
with the statistical and physics-based 
modelling of  potential future sources, 
in combination with numerical mod-
elling of  tsunami generation, propa-
gation and inundation (e.g. Geist and 
Parsons, 2006; Burbidge et al., 2008; 
Power et al., 2013).
Traditionally, the tsunami threat was 
analysed by modelling the inundation 
for just a few scenarios, sometimes 
termed worst-case scenarios. In this 
way, neither the relative likelihood of 
events of  different sizes (the natural 
or aleatory uncertainty) nor the degree 
of  belief  that one has regarding differ-
ent plausible but alternative models of 
the same phenomenon (the epistemic 
uncertainty) is generally addressed. 
Moreover, the worst-case approaches 
are prone to overlook the hazard and 
risk posed by more frequent, smaller 
events, which may dominate the risk 
at certain locations exactly because 
they are more frequent.
Tsunami risk 
management requires 
synergy between the 
scientific community, 
decision-makers, civil 
protection authorities and 
other stakeholders for 
hazard, vulnerability and 
risk assessment, warning 
systems operation, 
preparedness, training 
and emergency planning.
Presently, however, probabilistic tsu-
nami hazard (PTHA) and probabilis-
tic tsunami risk assessments (PTRAs) 
are progressively replacing the tradi-
tional worst-case scenarios methods, 
which nevertheless remain an impor-
tant initial screening tool. Probabilis-
tic methods allow systematic analyses 
to be made of  how the sources of 
uncertainty affect the hazard and risk 
assessment, which are inherently large 
for tsunamis. All of  this information 
is vital for any risk-reduction planning 
measure, including the cost–bene-
fit analysis in comparison with other 
risks at a given site. PTRA (Løvholt 
et al., 2015) is already conducted at 
a global scale for the 2015 UNISDR 
Global Assessment Report (UNISDR, 
2015a). A global analysis of  epistemic 
uncertainty was incorporated in a fol-
low-up global PTHA study (Davies 
et al., 2016). Previous hazard and risk 
analyses in the NEAM region have 
been based mostly on scenario anal-
ysis (e.g. Tinti and Armigliato, 2003; 
Tinti et al., 2005; Lorito et al., 2008; 
Tonini et al., 2011). More recently, 
studies dealing with new PTHA meth-
ods have been applied in the NEAM 
region, mostly for earthquake sourc-
es (Grezio et al., 2010; Sørensen et 
al., 2012; Lorito et al., 2015; Omira et 
al., 2016; Selva et al., 2016). Some risk 
scenarios have been developed within 
the EU FP7 ASTARTE project, and 
approaches to PTRA have also been 
explored within the EU FP7 STREST 
project, which deals with natural haz-
ard multirisk assessment for non-nu-
clear critical infrastructures.
One important ongoing initiative is 
the TSUMAPS-NEAM project (n.d.), 
funded by EU budget, which in 2017 
will provide the first official commu-
nity-based and homogeneous regional 
PTHA for the NEAM region. Recent-
ly, probabilistic tsunami hazard maps 
have been developed on a national 
scale (e.g. in Italy, Greece, Portugal), 
which will probably benefit from the 
existence of  the regional assessment.
To date, approaches for tsunami risk 
analysis are not well standardised. 
To improve the situation, the Global 
Tsunami Model initiative (n.d.) aims 
to provide a coordinated response to 
tsunami hazard and risk assessment 
worldwide. 
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This effort has already been endorsed 
by the Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery and UNIS-
DR, with the goal of  contributing to 
the implementation of  the 2015–30 
Sendai framework for disaster risk re-
duction (UNISDR, 2015b). Although 
the GTM is not yet fully operation-
al, several GTM partners have been 
involved in the TSUMAPS-NEAM 
multiple-expert integration process 
and review, in an important first step 
towards standardisation.
Another difficulty in reliably assess-
ing tsunami risk is that vulnerability 
is a highly time-dependent parameter, 
owing not only to changes in the built 
environment and socioeconomic sit-
uations in the long term, but also to 
temporal variations in exposure (e.g. 
seasonal and daily variations of  pop-
ulation).
3.3.3.3
Early warning systems: 
a worldwide overview
The objective of  a TWS is to identi-
fy earthquake tsunami sources, detect 
tsunamis in advance and issue warn-
ings to communities at risk, to prevent 
loss of  life and to reduce damage. A 
typical TWS has four main compo-
nents: risk knowledge, monitoring 
and warning, dissemination and com-
munication, response capability. A 
national TWS has operated in Japan 
since the 1950s. In the Pacific Ocean, 
a coordinated TWS involving many 
nations was established in 1965 and 
has been operating under the IOC/
UNESCO umbrella. In the aftermath 
of  the devastating 2004 Sumatra tsu-
nami, the national delegates at the 
IOC/UNESCO meeting decided to 
establish three international systems, 
one in each of  the Indian Ocean, Car-
ibbean Sea and the NEAM region. At 
present, four international systems 
operate under the IOC umbrella (Fig-
ure 3.22). All four systems operate 
based on National Tsunami Warning 
Centres (NTWCs) coordinated by 
The four major TWSs operating around the globe under the coordination of IOC/UNESCO and the TSPs already 
established.
Source: IOC/UNESCO, modified by A. Rudloff, GFZ, Germany
FIGURE 3.22
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Decision matrix for the Mediterranean basin, proposed by the ICG/NEAMTWS/IOC/UNESCO system in November 
2010. Since then, NTWCs have slightly updated/modified this DM but its main structure remains operational. 
The DM adopted for the North-East Atlantic is similar.
Source: IOC/UNESCO, elaborated by the authors
the relevant Intergovernmental Co-
ordination Groups (ICGs). Germany 
strongly supported efforts to build up 
a national TWS in Indonesia (Rudloff 
et al., 2009; Münch et al., 2011).
The identification of  earthquake 
sources is made possible by seismo-
graph networks, while GNSS net-
works have the potential to achieve 
the rapid and accurate assessment 
of  magnitude for large earthquakes 
in the future. Tsunami detection 
and confirmation is achievable using 
sea-level records from tide gauges, 
which are also useful for warning dis-
tant places. Many European Member 
States have invested a lot during the 
past decade to upgrade their sea-level 
networks for faster and better tsuna-
mi detection, but much remains to be 
done for an effective warning system. 
However, offshore instrumentations 
of  the DART type are very expensive 
in comparison with tide gauge net-
works. Japan has implemented cable 
systems that include pressure sensors, 
seismometers and accelerometers. 
Such equipment is expensive but lasts 
more than a decade and has a very low 
maintenance cost.
Setting up an end-to-end TWS re-
quires partnership and coordination 
among different national and inter-
national institutions and organisa-
tions, including those responsible 
for seismic and sea-level monitoring, 
civil protection authorities and com-
munities at risk. Moreover, it requires 
considerable financial investment to 
support tsunami research, to build, 
maintain and upgrade comprehen-
sive monitoring networks, and to raise 
community awareness and prepared-
ness. 
There is also a need to develop clear 
TABLE 3.1
     
Focal 
depth 
Epicentre 
location 
Mw Tsunami potential Tsunami message type 
Local Regional Basin 
<100km 
Offshore or 
close to the 
coast (≤40 km 
inland) 
>5.5 and 
≤6.0 
Weak potential for 
local tsunami Advisory Information Information 
>6.0 and 
≤6.5 
Potential for a 
destructive local 
tsunami (<100 km) 
Watch Advisory Information 
Offshore or 
close to the 
coast 
(≤100km 
inland) 
>6.5 and 
≤7.0 
Potential for a 
destructive regional 
tsunami  
(<400 km) 
Watch Watch Advisory 
>7.0 
Potential for a 
destructive basin-
wide tsunami 
Watch Watch Watch 
≥100km 
Offshore or 
inland 
≤100km 
>5.5 Nil Information Information Information 
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legal frameworks for each country, 
whereby the roles and responsibilities 
of  the institutions and organisations 
involved will be clearly defined.
3.3.3.4
Tsunami warning 
systems in the NEAM region: 
the NEAMTWS/IOC/ UNESCO 
and JRC/EC initiatives
Since the establishment of  the 
ICG/NEAMTWS/IOC/UNESCO 
system in 2005, the member coun-
tries have worked together to build 
up the system. Initially the system was 
based on four NTWCs, which, since 
the summer of  2012 (France, Greece, 
Turkey) and spring of  2014 (Italy), 
have acted as candidate TSPs (CTSPs) 
for all ICG Member States interest-
ed in subscribing to the service. The 
current average time to issue tsunami 
warnings is approximately 8-12 min-
utes. Tsunami messages are also sent 
to the IOC (Paris), the ERCC (EU, 
Brussels) and the JRC (Ispra). Follow-
ing a table-top accreditation proce-
dure by international experts, the CT-
SPs were successfully evaluated and 
nominated as TSPs at the 13th ICG 
Session, Bucharest, September 2016. 
Since the operational NEAM TWS 
started (summer 2012), the system 
was activated in about 25 earthquake 
events of  M≥5.5. The NTWCs of 
Portugal and Romania are preparing 
to start acting as CTSPs soon.
The TSPs are supported in their op-
erations by a decision matrix (DM), 
namely a simplified and conservative 
set of  empirical rules for the possibility 
for tsunami generation depending on 
the earthquake magnitude, epicentre 
and focal depth (Table 1). The tsuna-
mi severity scales with the earthquake 
magnitude range to produce three 
tsunami message types: Tsunami In-
formation, Tsunami Advisory, Tsuna-
mi Watch. The magnitude range also 
determines the maximum distance at 
which a tsunami impact is likely to be 
caused at coastlines. Therefore, local 
(≤ 100 km), regional (≤400 km) and 
basin-wide tsunami message types are 
considered. Tsunami arrival times in 
pre-defined coastal forecast points 
are calculated and inserted in the alert 
message. Next, sea-level data analysis 
is undertaken to monitor and confirm 
the tsunami by issuing ongoing alert 
messages or to cancel the message 
if  no tsunami is detected. The above 
procedure underlines the importance 
of  seismograph and tide gauge net-
works in tsunami warning operations.
Regular communication tests among 
TSPs and continuous staff  training 
are of  utmost importance given that 
tsunamis are infrequent events. A 
good example was the Global Tsu-
nami Informal Monitoring Service 
(2013-16), coordinated by the JRC. 
Several national TWSs of  the NEAM 
region participated. After a strong 
(M≥7), potentially tsunamigenic, 
earthquake, the TWSs staff  initiated a 
monitoring procedure for the collec-
tion of  tsunami-related information 
and records (e.g. in tide gauges) and 
reported this to the JRC.
Tsunami Service Provider operations 
might be of  great importance not 
only for early warning, but also for 
prompt scientific advice on post-dis-
aster management in a multihazard 
context. The ongoing pilot project 
ARISTOTLE, funded from budget of 
Tsunami evacuation building in Japan 
Source: photograph courtesy of G.A. Papadopoulos
FIGURE 3.23
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European Union, is providing scientif-
ic support not only on tsunamis but 
also on other types of  natural haz-
ards, including earthquakes, volcanic 
activity and meteorological hazards, 
to ERCC in the period 2016-17.
3.3.3.5
Preparedness-
Education-Training 
and the role of 
Civil Protection
The mitigation of  tsunami risk should 
rely not only on early warning but also 
on the synergy of  several actions, in-
cluding preparedness and emergency 
planning, exercises, training, educa-
tion and public awareness. For such 
activities, the civil protection and oth-
er national authorities have a key role 
to play in order to make the down-
stream component of  the TWS effec-
tive down to its ‘last mile’.
A key preparedness element is the 
designation of  ‘hazard zones’ along 
tsunami-prone coastal segments, 
which entails an inherently political 
cost–benefit assessment, relying on 
the input scientific information pro-
vided through hazard and risk assess-
ment. Hazard zones are necessary for 
long-term risk management actions, 
including urban and emergency plan-
ning. Evacuation during the early 
warning stage is facilitated by the ex-
istence of  hazard zones, since every-
body needs to know beforehand the 
area that should be evacuated. Desig-
nation of  appropriate evacuation 
buildings is also important for vertical 
evacuation (Figure 3.23).
Inaccurate hazard assessment may 
result in an underestimation of  the 
hazard zone, which can have tragic 
consequences. Japanese tsunami haz-
ard maps prior to 2011 were based on 
historical earthquake records with up-
per bound earthquake moment mag-
nitudes that were too small (Geller, 
2011). This is probably reflected in 
the (ex post) insufficiently cautionary 
risk management of  the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant (Synolakis and 
Kanoglu, 2015). In some coastal ar-
eas, evacuees felt sufficiently safe to 
move just outside the hazard zone 
limits. However, the 2011 tsunami 
proved larger than the ‘design tsuna-
mi’ and killed many people outside 
the hazard zones.
Awareness and preparedness may be 
enhanced by table-top drills based 
on tsunami scenarios, such as the 
NEAMWAVE12 (2012) and NEA-
MWAVE14 (2014), which involved 
TSPs, civil protection authorities and 
the ERCC. Operational exercises also 
offer a good basis on which to test and 
improve emergency plans and rescue 
capabilities (e.g. POSEIDON-2012, 
supported by EU budget, was an ex-
ercise performed on Crete, Greece). 
Education and public awareness are 
very important, since their aim is to 
teach people about tsunami risk and 
ways to reduce it.
3.3.4
Conclusions and key 
messages
Tsunamis are caused mainly by sub-
marine earthquakes but also by land-
slides, volcanic eruptions or other 
causes. Complex cascading effects in-
volving more than one tsunami gener-
ation mechanism should not ignored 
(e.g. tsunamis caused by landslides 
that are triggered by earthquakes).
Tsunamis are characterised as 
low-probability but high-impact 
events. While they are most frequent 
in the Pacific, the tsunami hazard is 
also present in the Indian Ocean, the 
NEAM region, the Caribbean Sea and 
elsewhere. The assessment of  tsuna-
mi hazard and risk is susceptible to a 
variety of  uncertainties, including our 
limited knowledge of  the likelihood 
of  infrequent tsunami sources, or the 
complexity of  the tsunami inunda-
tion.
Partnership
The assessment of  the impact in-
corporates many fields of  physical 
sciences, hazard modelling, engineer-
ing and social sciences. Neglecting 
any of  these fields will inevitably re-
duce the accuracy, reliability and use-
fulness of  the resulting risk metrics. 
The process of  risk identification 
should involve stakeholders from the 
public and private sectors and should 
leverage ongoing national and inter-
national initiatives with the mandate 
to calculate, communicate and reduce 
geophysical risks.
Even the most advanced TWS is not 
effective without a well-trained down-
stream component. Tsunami risk 
mitigation thus requires synergies be-
tween the scientific and technological 
communities, decision-makers, civil 
protection authorities and other stake-
holders. The common aim should be 
continual exercise and training, educa-
tion and public awareness; this is vi-
tal, since the public perception of  the 
risk from infrequent events naturally 
tends to fade over time, until the next 
catastrophe happens.
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Knowledge
A thorough understanding of  tsu-
nami hazard and risk should not be 
based solely on the analysis of  past 
events, but must exploit broader sci-
entific analysis and modelling in order 
to assess the potential for future haz-
ards. Exposure and vulnerability (e.g. 
of  populations) are time-dependent 
parameters, which makes risk assess-
ment a complex procedure. Standards 
and best practices for tsunami hazard 
and risk assessment need to be further 
established by the international com-
munity, in order to better support pre-
paredness and emergency planning.
Innovation
The experiences of  the past 20 years 
or so leave no doubt that TWSs that 
are well suited to the rapid detection 
of  large magnitude earthquakes are 
necessary. Well-developed instrumen-
tal networks of  seismographs, tide 
gauges and tsunameters substantially 
support TWSs. However, major gaps 
still exist in the coverage of  large areas 
(e.g. North Africa). The present TWS 
performance could be improved by 
filling in network gaps. An important 
issue, however, is the constant TWS 
maintenance, which requires regular 
funding and technical support.
Technological innovations that may 
drastically improve TWS performance 
include the utilisation of  GNSS net-
works for rapid and accurate large 
earthquake magnitude calculation. 
Of  innovative value is the utilisa-
tion of  submarine cable systems for 
the transmission of  seismic, tsunami 
and other signals recorded on the sea 
floor for multihazard purposes, in-
cluding seismic, volcanic and tsunami 
early warning, climate monitoring and 
other future societal needs. Satellite 
data (e.g. buildings, road networks) 
will become more and more valuable 
for risk assessment.
Civil protection authorities should 
elaborate plans to determine coast-
al hazard zones as well as to ensure 
that tsunami warnings arrive on time 
to local authorities and the gener-
al public. In parallel, best practices 
for evacuation procedures should be 
elaborated and communicated to the 
public. These are issues of  critical 
importance given that many tsunami 
sources in the NEAM and beyond are 
located in the near-field domain; thus, 
coastal populations are threatened by 
the fact that any tsunami could reach 
the coastline in less than 30 minutes.
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Εarthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunamis are characterised as low-proba-
bility but high-consequence events. The assessment of  the impact of  such cata-
strophic events incorporates many fields of  physical sciences, hazard modelling, 
engineering and social sciences. Neglecting any of  these fields will inevitably 
reduce the accuracy, reliability and usefulness of  the resulting risk metrics. The 
process of  risk identification should involve stakeholders from the public and 
private sectors and should leverage ongoing national and international initiatives 
with the mandate to calculate, communicate and reduce geophysical risks.
In the past two decades or so, the European Commission has supported a large 
number of  projects that have significantly advanced the science of  earthquake, 
volcanic and tsunami hazard modelling and risk assessment. Other national and 
international programmes have also produced datasets, models and tools that 
are fundamental for the assessment of  geophysical risks. Leveraging on this 
wealth of  resources will reduce the replication of  efforts. It is also important 
that the international community investigates efficient approaches to, and de-
velops standards and best practices for, hazard and risk assessment based on 
existing risk knowledge to enable effective DRM, including preparedness and 
emergency planning.
Existing instrumental networks support EWSs mainly for earthquakes and tsu-
namis and, to a lesser degree, volcanic eruptions. However, major gaps still exist 
in the instrumental coverage of  large areas. The present performance of  TWSs 
for the protection of  populations should be improved by filling the gaps in these 
networks. However, even the most advanced EWSs are not effective without a 
well-trained downstream component. Geophysical risk mitigation thus requires 
synergies between the scientific and technological community, civil protection 
authorities and other stakeholders. The common aim should be continual exer-
cises and training, education and public awareness; this is vital, since the public 
perception of  risk from infrequent events naturally tends to fade over time, until 
the next catastrophe happens.
Geophysical risk assessment is fundamental to incorporate the wide spectrum 
of  uncertainties from the different risk components (hazard, exposure and vul-
nerability). Satellite imagery and VGI are enabling the characterisation of  the 
built environment with unprecedented temporal and spatial detail. Moreover, 
the development of  risk-reduction strategies not only should rely on the direct 
(or physical) impact, but should also incorporate socioeconomic aspects, thus 
considering the capability of  the society to recover from destructive events.
Recommendations
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The following subchapters cover the principal hydrological risks and, in the case of  landslides, hazards that are triggered through hydrological events. In the case of  floods, the subchapters cover fluvial, flash and pluvial floods, as well as coastal flooding caused by wave actions and 
storm surges:
• Fluvial floods occur when river levels rise and burst or overflow their banks, 
inundating the surrounding land forming the river’s floodplain. This can 
occur in response to storms with higher than normal rainfall totals and/or 
intensities, to seasonal strong weather systems such as monsoons or winter 
stormtracks, or to sudden melting of  snow in spring.
• Flash floods can develop when heavy rainfall occurs suddenly, particularly 
in mountainous river catchments, although they can occur anywhere. Strong 
localised rainfall, rapid flood formation and high water velocities can be 
particularly threatening to the population at risk and are highly destructive.
• Heavy rainfall may cause surface water flooding, also known as pluvial 
flooding, particularly in cities where the urban drainage systems become 
overwhelmed.
• Floods can also be generated by infrastructure failure (e.g. dam breaks), gla-
cial/lake outbursts and groundwater rising under prolonged very wet con-
ditions, which cause waterlogging. In many cases, flooding occurs as a result 
of  more than one of  the generating mechanisms occurring concurrently, 
making the prediction of  flood hazards and impacts even more challenging, 
and the probable resulting damage more severe.
• Coastal flooding is caused by a combination of  high tide, storm surge and 
wave conditions. Development on flood plains increases the risk as does 
coastal erosion and sea level rise. 
• Landslide occurrence is related to causal factors, which create a propensity 
for a slope to fail and trigger the specific external event that induces land-
slide occurrence at that particular time. In most cases, but not all, the timing 
of  failure is associated with a trigger event.
• Heavy rainfall is a key factor in generating landslides, primarily through the 
generation of  pore water pressures and a reduction in the effective normal 
stress. The second key factor for landslide generation is the impact of  seis-
mic events.
Floods and landslides affect a large number of  people across the world every 
year, with severe socioeconomic impacts. Severe fluvial flooding repeatedly af-
flicts European populations, with trans-national events often being the most 
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damaging. It is estimated that GBP 150 billion (EUR 177 billion) of  assets and 
4 million people are currently at risk from coastal flooding in the United King-
dom alone, for example. Significant advances have been made in recent years 
to map these risks, to develop and set up EWSs for better preparedness and to 
improve the communication of  risks to decision-makers and the public. How-
ever, variations in socioeconomic factors (land use, demography, migration) as 
well as changes in climate and weather patterns may lead to rapid changes in 
flood and landslide risk in the future and will require increased levels of  adap-
tation.
This chapter describes the current knowledge regarding the drivers, impacts 
and key tools to manage risks for these hazards. It identifies a set of  challenges 
and gaps for key stakeholders to further reduce and better manage their risks 
and to be prepared for future changes in risk.
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3.4 Hydrological risk: floods
Hannah	Cloke, Giuliano di Baldassarre, Owen Landeg,
Florian Pappenberger, Maria-Helena Ramos
3.4.1
Introduction:
flood hazards
and impacts
In principle, flooding is a natural phe-
nomenon that affects all river basins 
around the world in more or less reg-
ular intervals and that fulfils essential 
functions in the natural ecosystem. 
However, owing to human settle-
ments being established within flood-
plains and common development 
practices not leaving room for rivers 
under flood conditions, flooding is 
mostly considered for its negative 
rather than its positive effects (Watson 
and Adams, 2010). Alfieri et al. (2016) 
estimate flood impact at the Europe-
an Union level to be ≈EUR 6 billion 
per year, affecting 250 000 people per 
year. Although flood impact assess-
ment is an essential step by which to 
optimise flood mitigation measures, 
there are many sources of  uncertain-
ty that affect such complex estimates. 
For example, uncertainty may come 
from sparse and short datasets, poor 
knowledge of  hydraulic structures 
such as dams and weirs along rivers, 
assumptions and extrapolations in 
statistical analyses of  extreme floods, 
and depth-damage functions. The es-
timation of  flood damages also de-
pends on several assumptions (Merz 
et al., 2010). It involves challenges 
in defining damages for different el-
ements at risk (e.g. houses, public 
spaces, industries), and transferring 
solutions in space (from one region to 
another) and in time (from one flood 
event to another).
Flooding causes long-term damage to 
health, with immediate impacts such 
as drowning, physical trauma, infec-
tions and chemical hazards, and also 
affects well-being, livelihoods and 
social cohesion. It is also not always 
easy to identify the local consequenc-
es of  flooding, such as the effects 
caused by displacement, the destruc-
tion of  homes, delayed recovery and 
the disruption of  access to health 
services (WHO, 2013). Flooding can 
also cause damage to critical infra-
structure and can interrupt health and 
social care service delivery and busi-
ness supply chains (National Flood 
Resilience Review, 2016; Landeg and 
Lawson, 2014). Finally, flooding is 
also frequently associated with power 
outages, which themselves can have 
a detrimental impact on health and 
businesses (Klinger et al., 2014) and 
a knock-on effect on other critical 
infrastructure such as railways and 
wastewater services.
Flood disasters affect 
a large number of 
people across the world 
every year, with severe 
social and economic 
impacts. Severe flooding 
repeatedly affects 
European populations, 
with trans-national events 
often being the most 
damaging.
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The vulnerability of  riverside com-
munities around the world is particu-
larly worrying in the light of  migra-
tion pressures, socioeconomic drivers 
and climatic change. Even those who 
live flood-adapted lifestyles are not 
resilient to severe floods that occur 
only rarely, particularly when the last 
big flood was beyond living memory 
(Garde-Hansen et al., 2016) and in 
light of  the impacts of  future climate 
change.
In this subchapter, the main drivers 
of  flood hazard are introduced and 
flood hazard and risk mapping are 
discussed, particularly at the region-
al scale. Flood predictability is then 
considered, along with a review of 
the added value of  flood monitoring, 
flood forecasting and EWSs.
3.4.2
Living with floods
Learning to live with flooding means 
that we recognise that flooding will 
continue to happen, as it is a natural 
phenomenon. There are many uncer-
tainties in knowing when and where a 
flood will happen, both in the imme-
diate term and in terms of  probable 
climate change timescales, and when 
it does flood there is inevitably some 
disruption to our lives. However, there 
are many things that we can do to pre-
pare better for floods and manage the 
risk, including strengthening compo-
nents of  flood prevention, flood pre-
paredness, flood response and flood 
recovery, which are part of  the dis-
aster cycle (Figure 3.). Interventions 
can be taken during a flood to limit 
the impact of  the disaster, including 
the evacuation of  settlements or the 
creation of  additional flood relief 
space through the opening of  dykes 
or dams. This response is followed by 
a recovery phase after the disaster has 
passed, which includes relief  meas-
Hazards and risk event cycle
Source: courtesy of authors
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ures, reconstruction and event analy-
sis. Often, this phase is aligned with 
the aim to achieve a similar economic 
standard to that before the event. 
Our best strategy for 
flood management is 
learning to live with 
flooding, that is, preparing 
ourselves today to be 
better adapted for flood 
risks tomorrow. 
The combination of a 
strong flood risk 
management policy, 
advanced early warning 
technology and increased 
international collaboration 
have the potential to 
reduce flood risk and 
improve disaster response 
from the local to the 
global scale. This requires 
different disciplines of 
knowledge, scientists, 
policymakers and 
practitioners to work 
closely together.
If  society has learned from the event, 
then any recovery is followed by a dis-
aster risk-reduction phase, which in-
cludes preventive measures (e.g. cre-
ating natural retention in catchments, 
changing land use, rethinking urban 
design, planning and architectural 
norms, and implementing structur-
al flood defences) and precautionary 
measures (e.g. supporting insurance 
mechanisms, refitting buildings, train-
ing and using EWSs). The aim is to 
minimise the vulnerability of  socie-
ty and to prepare it for an adequate 
response and recovery after the next 
event. The diversity in the way soci-
eties prepare for, respond to and re-
cover from floods is largely governed 
by their experience with flood risk 
management and the magnitude of 
the floods that they have historically 
experienced (Thieken et al., 2007).
Improving flood preparedness re-
quires contributions from many 
different disciplines of  knowledge. 
Efforts are needed in terms of  (1) 
improving risk governance, including 
institutional governance, legal pro-
visions and financial instruments for 
planning, prevention and crises man-
agement, (2) understanding hazard 
modelling, incorporating meteorolog-
ical forcing, hydrological, river and ur-
ban drainage processes, (3) forecasts 
and predictions, from short to long 
lead time ranges, and (4) emergency 
response recovery, including coordi-
nation of  local operations, assistance 
to affected communities and recovery 
of  disrupted services. Communica-
tion with and engagement of  the pub-
lic, water managers and decision-mak-
ers is key to effectively integrate these 
layers and to improve flood prepared-
ness.
3.4.3
Drivers of flood 
hazard
Floods happen for a variety of  rea-
sons, but the main drivers are usually 
related to high rainfall, snowmelt and 
high river flow conditions (see Chap-
ter 3.6). Fluvial floods occur when 
river levels rise and burst or overflow 
their banks, inundating the surround-
ing land that forms the river’s flood-
plain. This can occur in response to 
storms with higher than normal rain-
fall totals and/or intensities, seasonal 
strong weather systems such as mon-
soons or winter stormtracks, or the 
sudden melting of  snow in spring. 
The spring 2006 flood in the upper 
part of  Elbe river basin is an exam-
ple of  a flood event driven by snow-
melt combined with precipitation 
(Younis et al., 2008). With the rapid 
increase in temperature in April, snow 
that was present in the catchment 
was completely melted in 7-14 days. 
While temperature is generally easi-
er to forecast than precipitation, the 
assessment of  the quantities of  snow 
accumulated in the catchment during 
the winter season can be a challenge 
for many EWSs.
Floods can be triggered 
by rivers bursting or 
overflowing their banks, 
storm surges in the ocean, 
tsunamis, groundwater 
rising, glacial outbursts 
or dam failures and from 
surface water runoff in 
our cities after heavy rain.
The severity of  fluvial floods can be 
enhanced when the landscape is al-
ready saturated with water. Runoff 
due to rainfall cannot infiltrate the 
ground and, instead, flows directly to 
the river channel, rapidly contribut-
ing to increased river levels. This oc-
curred in the winter 2013/14 floods 
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in the south of  the United Kingdom, 
where an unusual series of  storms 
led to widespread flooding (Hunting-
ford et al., 2014; Muchan et al., 2015), 
and in the 2013 floods in Germany 
(Schröter et al., 2015).
Flash floods can develop when heavy 
rainfall occurs suddenly, particular-
ly in mountainous river catchments, 
although they can occur anywhere 
(Gaume et al., 2009; Brauer et al., 
2011). In flash floods, the rate at which 
river water levels rise is very rapid and 
the flood forms quickly. High levels 
of  localised rainfall, rapid flood for-
mation and high water velocities can 
be particularly threatening to the pop-
ulation at risk and highly destructive. 
Challenges in the management of 
flash floods include the short prepa-
ration time to activate flood alerts and 
emergency response, the sudden na-
ture of  the phenomenon, which of-
ten catches the population at risk by 
surprise, the difficulties of  numerical 
weather prediction models in fore-
casting localised convective storms, 
and the lack of  quantitative data at 
small catchment level to improve the 
understanding and modelling of  flash 
floods (Collier, 2007; Leichti et al., 
2013; Alfieri et al., 2011).
Heavy rainfall may cause surface wa-
ter flooding, also known as pluvial 
flooding, particularly in cities where 
the urban drainage systems become 
overwhelmed. In these cases, event 
monitoring from telemetric rain gaug-
es or meteorological radar needs to be 
coupled with hydrological, hydrau-
lic and drainage system models for 
flood mapping (Liguori et al., 2012). 
Challenges remain with regard to es-
timating accurately rainfall displace-
ment over an urban area, as well as 
with regard to precise knowledge of 
the capacity of  the sewer system as a 
result of, for instance, debris block-
ages, infrastructure failure (broken or 
cracked pipes) or a reduction of  plu-
vial capacity (Chen et al., 2016).
Floods can also be generated by in-
frastructure failure (e.g. dam breaks), 
glacial/lake outbursts, storm surges 
and wave overtopping at the coast 
(see Chapter 3.6), and groundwater 
rising under very wet prolonged con-
ditions, thereby causing waterlogging 
(Macdonald et al., 2012). In many cas-
es, flooding occurs when more than 
one of  the generating mechanisms 
happen concurrently, making the pre-
diction of  flood hazards and impacts 
even more challenging, and the prob-
able resulting damage more severe. 
In addition, longer-term drivers of 
flood impacts are also of  concern in 
many vulnerable areas. They include 
changes in land use, population and 
geomorphology and the impacts of  a 
changing climate (Alfieri et al., 2015; 
Slater et al., 2015). These issues are 
not straightforward to determine be-
cause of  the many uncertainties in-
volved in using climate and socioec-
onomic models to drive flood hazard 
predictions and the difficulties in their 
evaluation (Cloke et al., 2013; Hall 
et al., 2014; Hirabayashi et al., 2013; 
Kendon et al., 2016; Vormoor et al., 
2015).
3.4.4
Flood hazard and 
risk mapping
Flood risk can be calculated from 
the hydrological flood hazard by in-
cluding information on the exposure 
and vulnerability of  populations and 
assets. They are needed at different 
spatial scales, from local and nation-
al to global scales, and at different 
temporal scales, from upcoming days 
to decades. Flood risk management 
measures are key to flood hazard and 
risk mapping. Flood risk management 
is considered at the European level 
by the Floods Directive 2007/60/EC 
(European Commission, 2007) which 
directs EU Member states to ade-
quately assess and manage their flood 
risk. This involves mapping the flood 
hazard extent, assessing the flood risk 
and producing flood risk manage-
ment plans, which also consider the 
longer-term drivers of  land use and 
climate change.
Flood hazard can be calculated by 
assessing the probability of  any par-
ticular area being flooded. Usually, it 
is undertaken with respect to a par-
ticular level of  flood, for example, the 
0.01 Annual Exceedance Probabili-
ty threshold (also commonly known 
as the ‘100-year flood’ with a return 
period of  100 years, which is better 
understood as a flood that has a 1 % 
probability of  occurring at any given 
location in any given year). Flood risk 
takes the flood hazard and combines 
this with information on the potential 
damage to society, such as vulnera-
bility and the exposure of  assets and 
populations in the floodplain. Ap-
proaches can be different depending 
on the temporal and spatial scales at 
which the flood hazard and risk as-
sessment are applied, on the model-
ling tools and data available and on 
the type of  flood hazard (e.g. if  it is a 
fluvial, surface water or coastal flood).
A fully comprehensive flood risk map 
requires a great number of  data, a se-
ries of  floods events over a long peri-
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od and a chain of  models and assess-
ments (Sampson et al., 2014, Dottori 
et al., 2016), although simpler map-
ping based solely on flood events or 
other historical information can also 
be useful (Boudou et al., 2015). 
Flood hazard and flood 
risk maps are required 
for land use planning, 
floodplain management, 
disaster response 
planning and financial 
risk planning. They can be 
produced at increasingly 
higher resolutions using 
flood modelling tools. 
Uncertainties can be 
taken into account 
by using probabilistic 
methods. A focus on 
flood hazard impacts can 
enhance communication 
to the public.
For fluvial floods, a full risk mapping 
requires long-term series of  hydrome-
teorological data, satellite data on the 
flood extent for the assimilation of 
spatial information, large datasets on 
population/asset exposure and flood 
protection standards (Scussolini et 
al., 2016), and commercially sensitive 
damage data from insurance compa-
nies, which are often not openly ac-
cessible. Longer timescale changes in 
flood risk are usually assessed through 
scenarios of  climate change and soci-
oeconomic development (Apel et al., 
2008; Winsemius et al., 2013). These 
can take into account flood policies, 
such as the implementation of  flood 
protection measures, as well as the 
interaction of  human and physical 
systems, such as the adaptation effect 
and the failed levee effect (Di Bal-
dassare et al., 2015; Collenteur et al., 
2015).
Flood hazard maps can be produced 
by using hydraulic models to simulate 
water flow along rivers, over flood-
plains and in urban surface water 
accumulation zones. Simulations are 
often combined with Geographic In-
formation System (GIS) techniques to 
build flood maps. This ideally requires 
substantial observed data for model 
calibration and validation. For fluvial 
floods, hydraulic models can use time 
series of  historical river flows, histori-
cal rainfalls or time series of  synthetic 
design rainfall events, in conjunction 
with catchment hydrology rain-
fall-runoff  models. However, even 
the most sophisticated approaches 
have difficulty producing robust esti-
mates of  extreme events (Sampson et 
al., 2014), which can be problematic 
if  these maps are the only resourc-
es used to support decision-making 
processes, such as urban planning. 
Describing flood inundation hazard 
and risk using probabilistic methods 
is therefore encouraged (Romanow-
icz and Beven, 2003; Pappenberger 
et al., 2006). For example, flood in-
undation hazard can be mapped from 
the development and set-up of  flood 
inundation models, a sensitivity analy-
sis using observations, the use of  the 
multiple acceptable (‘behavioural’) 
model parameter sets to perform ‘en-
semble’ (multiple) simulations using 
an uncertain synthetic design event, 
or an ensemble of  scenarios, as input 
to the flood inundation models (Di 
Baldassarre et al., 2010). Probabilistic 
methods can be used, as they assume 
that, whichever model is chosen, it 
will not perfectly represent all flood 
propagation and inundation process-
es involved. This can be very impor-
tant when modelling flood inundation 
in changing environments, when they 
are subject either to strong land use 
changes or to climate changes.
Regional-scale fluvial flood hazard 
mapping has been improved by the 
use of  satellite data assimilation and 
flood models to map flood inunda-
tion pathways. Global flood hazard 
maps can also be useful in the assess-
ment of  flood risk in a number of 
different applications, including (re)
insurance and large-scale flood pre-
paredness. These maps can be creat-
ed using large-scale computer models 
of  rainfall-runoff  processes in river 
catchments and river routing. They 
may, however, require the use of  a 
variety of  post-processing methods 
to better adjust simulations to local 
measurements (Pappenberger et al., 
2012; Ward et al., 2013; Winsemius 
et al., 2013; Dottori et al., 2016). At 
the local scale, surface water flood 
hazard mapping (pluvial flooding) has 
benefited from recent improvements 
to fine-scale surface water modelling, 
particularly in cities, on 1-metre or 
2-metre grids, integrating topography, 
land use, urban structures and poten-
tially also subterranean drainage and 
flooding impacts (Tyrna et al., 2016; 
Palla et al., 2016).
All numerically produced flood haz-
ard maps, regardless of  their spatial 
scale, require validation in order to be 
useful. This can be very challenging 
because of  a lack of  robust observed 
data. On local, regional or national 
scales, validation can be undertaken, 
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at least to some extent, on the basis of 
past observations of  inundation ex-
tents, from satellite, ground-based ob-
servations or community-based data 
sources, as well as from river stage and 
discharge measurements from river 
gauges. In contrast, the accuracy of 
global maps is far more challenging, as 
globally consistent observations can 
rarely be obtained. Trigg et al. (2016), 
for instance, describe several differ-
ent global flood hazard maps, which 
have been individually validated with-
in a limited context. The estimates of 
global flood hazard obtained are com-
pared to analyse their consistency and 
to provide an estimate of  model un-
certainty. In Africa, the agreement be-
tween the different models is relatively 
low (30-40 %), with major differences 
in magnitude and spatial extent par-
ticularly observed for deltas, arid/
semi-arid zones and wetlands, which 
are all areas that suffer from a lack of 
data for validation. Such discrepan-
cies can have significant impact: for 
example, the models showed a large 
discrepancy in the Nile delta, where 
approximately 95 % of  the popula-
tion of  Egypt lives. This highlights 
the fact that any global flood hazard 
map should be used with caution and 
that multimodel products may be use-
ful (Trigg et al., 2016). The role of 
databases and post-event analyses is 
key to improve our understanding of 
global flood hazard and risk (de Moel 
et al., 2015).
3.4.5
Flood monitoring, 
forecasting and early 
warning systems
The predictability of  hydrological 
systems varies because of  the large 
number of  non-linearities in these 
systems, the challenges in the observ-
ability of  the state of  the hydrologi-
cal variables, the presence of  outliers 
(rare occurrences), the variability of 
external forcing and the numerous 
interactions among processes across 
scales (Bloschl and Zehe, 2005; Ku-
mar et al., 2011; Peña et al., 2015; La-
vers et al., 2011). Different types of 
floods are predictable with different 
time ranges. Flash floods driven by 
convective rainfall are notoriously 
challenging to predict ahead in time 
to produce effective early warnings 
(Collier, 2007; Berenguer et al., 2005), 
whereas slower developing floods in 
large catchments can be predicted 
several days ahead of  time with the 
use of  probabilistic flood forecasting 
systems (Emerton et al., 2016). The 
use of  satellites and EWSs based on 
computer-intensive forecasts has re-
cently enabled distinct improvements 
in our ability to provide effective in-
formation on the likelihood and se-
verity of  upcoming flooding and the 
extent of  the affected area (Alfieri et 
al., 2013; Revilla-Romero et al., 2015). 
This information can be provided to 
agencies, responders, stakeholders 
and the public in various forms, in-
cluding interactive watch or warning 
maps and flood guidance statements 
(e.g. FFC, n.d.; Vigicrues, 2017).
However, there is substantial uncer-
tainty in predicting floods, which 
stems from the uncertainty in the 
atmosphere, the complexity of  the 
land-surface processes and the imper-
fection in the computer models used 
to represent them (Cloke and Pap-
penberger, 2009; Rodríguez-Rincón 
et al., 2015). Ensemble techniques 
can be used to represent the main 
sources of  predictive uncertainty. 
These use multiple simulations based 
on different model set-ups, model pa-
rameters, initial conditions, data, etc. 
Rather than just providing one ‘best 
guess’ prediction, ensembles provide 
a whole range of  model realisations 
and equally possible predictions for 
the future. Information can be ob-
tained on which scenarios are most 
likely to happen and on the worst 
possible scenario (given our current 
knowledge of  initial conditions and 
process representation). This can be 
useful to communicate forecast un-
certainty and to help stakeholders to 
take more informed decisions (Cloke 
and Pappenberger, 2009; Stephens 
and Cloke, 2014; Zsótér et al., 2016). 
The HEPEX initiative (Hydrologic 
Ensemble Prediction Experiment, 
n.d.) seeks to advance the science and 
practice of  hydrologic ensemble pre-
diction and its use in risk-based deci-
sion-making by engaging researchers, 
forecasts and users in several commu-
nity activities.
Real-time monitoring and rapid map-
ping of  floods based on satellite data 
have been implemented at a variety of 
scales and by a number of  different 
actors to detect flooding severity and 
extent in affected areas. For instance, 
the Copernicus Emergency Man-
agement Service—Mapping (2017) 
integrates satellite remote sensing 
and available in situ data to provide 
stakeholders with timely and accu-
rate geospatial information in emer-
gency situations and humanitarian 
crises (not just for floods, but also 
other hazards). It operates for the full 
emergency management cycle and 
can be broadly divided into (1) a Rap-
id Mapping component, which pro-
vides on-demand information within 
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hours or days, usually immediately in 
response to a disaster event, and (2) 
a risk and recovery mapping to sup-
port activities in the area of  preven-
tion, preparedness and disaster risk 
reduction. Another activity in the area 
of  monitoring flooding from space 
and their impacts is the Dartmouth 
Flood Observatory (n.d.). Maps are 
published to provide an overview of 
flooding impact and extent, and a day-
to-day record of  flooding occurrenc-
es is built for analyses at a later stage.
The use of  space-based information 
facilitates international flood detec-
tion, response, future risk assessment, 
and community-wide hydrological re-
search. Improvements in rainfall data 
assimilation to meteorological mod-
els (e.g. Ballard et al., 2016) and soil 
moisture, discharge and water level 
data or flood inundation characteris-
tics to flood models (e.g. Garcia-Pin-
tado et al., 2015; Alvarez-Garreton et 
al., 2015) have also provided improve-
ments in flood forecasting and hazard 
mapping. Many other vital data have 
emerged, derived from ground-based 
imagery flood monitoring, crowd-
sourcing, unmanned aerial vehicles, 
rapid flood mapping and post-event 
data collection by authorities, re-
searchers and local communities (e.g. 
Walker et al., 2016; Le Coz et al., 2016; 
Perks et al., 2016).
Numerical weather prediction models 
have now improved to the point that 
operational centres can set up hydro-
meteorological systems that are able 
to forecast river flow and flooding on 
larger catchments several days, and 
even weeks, ahead of  an upcoming 
flood event at global scales (Emerton 
et al., 2016). Transnational forecasting 
and warning systems can be of  par-
ticular benefit, as they provide con-
sistent and comparable information 
for rivers that cross national bound-
aries. They can also be useful as sup-
port information for all nations that 
do not have adequate flood forecast-
ing and warning capabilities (Alfieri 
et al., 2012; Thiemig et al., 2015). As 
Emerton et al. (2016) argue:
Flood forecasting and 
EWSs are identified as key 
preparedness actions for 
flood risk management 
and can be implemented 
at local scales through 
to continental and 
global scales. Radar 
and numerical weather 
forecasting systems 
can be used as inputs 
to flood forecasts, but 
uncertainties should be 
taken into account using 
ensemble (probabilistic) 
forecasting techniques.
Operational systems currently have 
the capability to produce coarse-
scale discharge forecasts in the medi-
um-range and disseminate forecasts 
and, in some cases, early warning 
products in real time across the globe, 
in support of  national forecasting 
capabilities. With improvements in 
seasonal weather forecasting, future 
advances may include more seamless 
hydrological forecasting at the glob-
al scale alongside a move towards 
multi-model forecasts and grand en-
semble techniques, responding to the 
requirement of  developing multi-haz-
ard EWSs for disaster risk reduction.
Flood magnitude and return period 
(or average frequency of  occurrence) 
can be assessed for single points on a 
river. However, for those applications 
that require a measure of  flood sever-
ity across an entire region, or ‘flood-
iness’, as, for example, in the case of 
initiating and forecasting the need for 
humanitarian actions, floodiness indi-
ces can be used to provide a spatial 
view of  the risk of  flooding (Stephens 
et al., 2015). Although several applica-
tions still rely on rainfall forecasts as 
a proxy for imminent flood hazard, 
Stephens et al. (op. cit.) have shown 
that monthly floodiness is not well 
correlated with precipitation, which 
demonstrates the need for hydrome-
teorological EWSs at such scales.
3.4.6
Copernicus 
Emergency 
Management Service: 
floods (EFAS and 
GloFAS)
The European Flood Awareness Sys-
tem (EFAS, 2016; operational since 
2012) and GloFAS (GloFAS, 2017; 
due to become operational in ear-
ly 2017) aim to provide early flood 
information to national authorities 
to support national capabilities, par-
ticularly with earlier and probabilis-
tic information. EFAS additionally 
provides information to the Europe-
an Commission’s ERCC to support 
flood disaster response.
The EFAS project was initiated fol-
lowing the severe 2002 flooding that 
took place across Europe and has 
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since been enhanced with research de-
velopments and user feedback. Large-
scale systems not only save lives by in-
creasing flood preparedness, but also 
have a significant economic benefit. 
Pappenberger et al. (2015) provide 
evidence of  the monetary benefit in 
cross-border continental-scale flood 
EWSs. The potential monetary ben-
efit of  EFAS was estimated by com-
bining warning information with ex-
isting flood damage cost information 
and calculations of  potential avoided 
flood damages. The benefits were es-
timated to be of  the order of  EUR 
400 for every euro invested (Pappen-
berger et al., 2015).
The benefits of  an EWS can also be 
demonstrated in individual cases of 
flood warning. For example, EFAS 
proved to be useful in the widespread 
flooding that occurred in the Bal-
kans region in south-eastern Europe 
in 2014. Weeks of  continuous rain, 
combined with an exceptional storm 
on 13 May, led to heavy flooding in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia, but 
also in Slovakia, southern Poland 
and the Czech Republic. The impact 
GloFAS forecasts of the River Ganges floods in 
July/August 2016.
a) forecast map showing river pixels with upcoming 
floods; 
b) forecast ensemble hydrograph for the Ganges at 
Begusarai (Bihar) on 8 July 2016; 1 week before the 
flooding started and 18 days before the peak; 
c) forecast ensemble hydrography on 21 July 2016, 
showing the flood peak on 27 July with 98% probability 
of exceeding the severe alert threshold (20 year return 
period) and 50% probability of exceeding the 50-year 
return period. 
The colours of the triangles and pixels in (a) and shad-
ing in (b,c) are: purple represents severe alert of ≥ 20 
year return period; red, high alert of ≥ 5 year return 
period; yellow, medium alert of ≥ 2 year return period.
Source: GloFAS (2017)
FIGURE 3.25
a)
b) c)
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of  flooding was so severe that Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and Serbia requested 
assistance from the European Union 
through the EU Community Civil 
Protection Mechanism. EFAS pro-
vided early warnings from 11 May 
onwards and notified national author-
ities and the ERCC operating within 
the Commission’s Directorate-Gen-
eral for Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection (DG ECHO). This facil-
itated a coherent European disaster 
response during the numerous emer-
gencies.
There is likely to be a 
substantial monetary 
benefit in cross-border 
continental-scale 
flood EWSs. In Europe, 
transnational flood early 
warning is undertaken 
by the Copernicus 
Emergency Management 
Service: Floods, which 
consists of the European 
Flood Awareness System 
(EFAS) and its global 
twin system, the Global 
Flood Awareness System 
(GloFAS).
Similar examples can be provided for 
GloFAS. In August 2016, flooding 
occurred along the Ganges River in 
India. According to India’s Central 
Water Commission, the Ganges in the 
Patna district was just 8 cm below the 
highest recorded water level, which 
forced thousands to flee their homes 
into relief  camps. GloFAS was able 
to provide flood forecast informa-
tion several weeks in advance (Figure 
3.25). However, it is also clear that sig-
nificant training is still required in or-
der for such forecasts to be useful and 
to enable decisions from probabilistic 
information (Pagano et al., 2014). 
Training needs to be provided within 
the relevant context of  international, 
regional and local organisations. For 
example, GloFAS has provided train-
ing through the RIMES (Regional 
Integrated Multi-Hazard Early Warn-
ing System) and UN-ESCAP (Unit-
ed Nations — Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and Pacific), 
with participants from national hy-
drometeorological services in Bangla-
desh, Bhutan, Nepal, India, China and 
Pakistan (via the internet) and repre-
sentatives from several international 
organisations.
In a recent case study in Uganda, 
Coughlan de Perez et al. (2016) have 
shown that global systems combined 
with local expertise and knowledge 
have the potential to assist in reducing 
flood disaster impacts by triggering 
preventative action before flooding. 
The system for forecast-based financ-
ing automatically triggers action when 
a flood forecast arrives and before a 
potential disaster. While not a perfect 
indicator of  flooding, GloFAS fore-
casts proved to be reliable in fore-
casting a specific chance of  flooding 
(exceedance of  a pre-defined danger 
level) and was useful as an EWS.
3.4.7
Communicating
uncertainty and
decision making
Decisions are taken at different stag-
es in the production of  a forecast, as 
well as after its public release (e.g. as a 
flood warning, often based on expert 
judgement). Human expertise is in 
constant interaction with automated 
tasks in flood forecasting (Pagano et 
al., 2016) and controls much of  the 
output information of  a flood fore-
casting system. Training and refore-
casting of  critical events increases 
the capacity to deal with uncertain-
ty information and enables optimal 
decisions to be made (Ramos et al., 
2013; Crochemore et al., 2016; Arnal 
et al., 2016). Risk-based decision-sup-
port frameworks have to be tailored 
to the problem in question but also 
flexible to allow different flooding 
situations and, often, unprecedent-
ed flood events, to be handled (Dale 
et al., 2014). Challenges at present 
include providing tailored warnings 
that are acted upon by responders 
and the public (Demeritt et al., 2013; 
Dittrich et al., 2016), and developing 
decision-support systems that can in-
tegrate the different stages of  flood 
risk management, without losing in-
formation on uncertainty, warning 
time, forecast accuracy and reliability. 
This should help decision-makers to 
understand the strengths and weak-
nesses of  a forecasting system for dif-
ferent scales and events.
Similarly, flood hazard and risk map-
ping also involves many layers of  data 
collection and modelling output dis-
play. It is crucial that communication 
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is ensured at all stages and that essen-
tial information for decision-making 
is not lost (see Chapter 4). Communi-
cation not only targets decision-mak-
ers at public or private companies, 
but also involves communication to 
the public and to experts (Environ-
ment Agency, 2015) who may prefer 
information to be described in terms 
of  possible impacts. The visualisation 
of  model outputs and maps is part 
of  the communication process (Pap-
penberger et al., 2013). Usually, com-
munication will cover information 
on alerts, watches and warnings, risk 
maps and vulnerable areas that can 
be potentially affected by floods of 
different magnitudes and return pe-
riods (100-year flood, 10-year flood, 
etc.), but also guidance on using and 
interpreting maps. It is important that 
communication follows Open Ge-
ospatial Consortium (OGC) stand-
ards, such as providing information 
as Web Mapping Services (WMS) or 
WaterML, so that it can be easily in-
tegrated into other systems and be 
more effective. The communication 
of  flood hazard and risk and the asso-
ciated uncertainties should be a strong 
focus at all stages in the prevention, 
preparedness, response and recovery 
cycle. It should also be active during 
recovery in order to facilitate post-
event surveys, to speed up recovery 
with the help of  local communities or 
to convey lessons learned (Marchi et 
al., 2009; Stephens and Cloke, 2014; 
Javelle et al., 2014).
Efficient communication is also de-
pendent on how users perceive risk 
and understand uncertainty, and tend 
to act in the face of  uncertain infor-
mation (Ramos et al., 2010; Bubeck 
et al., 2012). A two-way approach can 
enhance, and even modify, established 
links between modelling outputs (haz-
ard and risk maps) and social actions. 
Through an increased understanding 
of  user needs and institutional and so-
cial vulnerability drivers (Rufat et al., 
2015, Daupras et al., 2015), existing 
bottlenecks in flood response, such as 
areas of  difficult access or with high 
rates of  injuries and fatalities, can be 
detected and targeted in the maps. 
With time, behaviour changes can 
even bring modifications to the vul-
nerability zones and can modify flood 
risk maps that cross flood vulnerabil-
ity with hazard. In this process, build-
ing trust and confidence is essential. 
Uncertainties are not necessarily 
unwelcome by the public and stake-
holders (McCarthy et al., 2007), and 
explicitly acknowledging uncertainty 
in flood risk mapping is also valuable 
for decision-makers (Michaels, 2015). 
The communication of  uncertainty 
can help modellers and forecasters by 
strengthening a relationship of  confi-
dence between them and the users of 
their products.
Flood forecasts and flood 
risk maps have associated 
uncertainties and are 
useful if decision-makers 
can understand and act 
upon the information 
provided, so forecasting 
and mapping must be in 
harmony with user needs 
and requirements to bring 
added value to the whole 
process of flood hazard 
and risk management.
One uncertainty that it is essential to 
consider in all aspects of  flood risk 
management is the projected future 
changes in flooding risks to commu-
nities, businesses and infrastructure. 
This means considering adaptive 
management approaches in the design 
of  flood risk management policy and 
infrastructure (Gersonius et al., 2013). 
The degree of  uncertainty in the im-
pacts of  climate change projections 
requires the consideration of  flexi-
ble adaptation pathways. Regardless 
of  the sources of  uncertainties, more 
needs to be done in flood risk man-
agement policy and practice to make 
our societies resilient to future flood 
risk (CCC, 2017; EEA, 2017).
3.4.8
Conclusions and 
key messages
Flood disasters affect a large num-
ber of  people across the world every 
year, with severe social and economic 
impacts. Severe flooding repeatedly 
affects European populations, with 
trans-national events often being the 
most damaging.
Partnership
Our best strategy for flood manage-
ment is to learn to live with flooding, 
that is, to prepare ourselves today to 
be better adapted for flood risks to-
morrow. The combination of  strong 
flood management policy, advanced 
early warning technology and in-
creased international collaboration 
has the potential to reduce flood risk 
and improve disaster response from 
the local to the global scale. This re-
quires stakeholders from different 
disciplines, scientists, policymakers 
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and practitioners to work closely to-
getherin partnership.
Knowledge
Flood hazard and flood risk maps are 
required for land use planning, flood-
plain management, disaster response 
planning and financial risk planning. 
They can be produced at increasingly 
high resolution for fluvial and surface 
water flooding (and coastal flooding) 
using flood modelling tools. Uncer-
tainties can be taken into account by 
using probabilistic methods. A focus 
on flood hazard impacts can enhance 
communication to the public.
Innovation
Flood forecasting and EWSs are in-
novations that are key preparedness 
actions for flood risk management 
and can be implemented at local 
scales through to continental and 
global scales. Radar and numerical 
weather forecasting systems can be 
used as inputs to flood forecasts, but 
uncertainties should be taken into ac-
count using ensemble (probabilistic) 
forecasting techniques.
There is probably a substantial mon-
etary benefit in cross-border conti-
nental-scale flood EWSs. In Europe, 
transnational flood early warning is 
undertaken by the Copernicus Emer-
gency Management Service: Floods, 
which consists of  EFAS and its global 
twin system, GloFAS.
Flood forecasts and flood risk maps 
have associated uncertainties and are 
useful if  decision-makers can under-
stand and act upon the information 
provided, so forecasting and mapping 
must be undertaken in harmony with 
user needs and requirements to bring 
added value to the whole process of 
flood hazard and risk management.
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3.5 Hydrological risk: 
landslides
Nicola	Casagli, Fausto Guzzetti, Michel Jaboyedoff, 
Farrokh Nadim, David Petley
3.5.1
Introduction
The term landslide encompasses a 
wide variety of  phenomena, from the 
simple fall of  rock blocks from verti-
cal rock faces, through to topples and 
landslides that are dominated either 
by a sliding motion or by flows of  soil 
and/or rock. Landslides are strongly 
correlated with other types of  natu-
ral hazards, such as floods, droughts, 
wildfires, earthquakes, tsunamis and 
volcanoes, and are often involved in 
cascading events of  multihazard dis-
asters.
Climate change, the increased suscep-
tibility of  surface soil to instability, 
anthropogenic activities, growing ur-
banisation, uncontrolled land use and 
the increased vulnerability of  popu-
lations and infrastructure contribute 
to the growing landslide risk. In the 
Thematic Strategy for Soil Protec-
tion (European Commission, 2006), 
landslides are considered one of  the 
main threats to European soils. In 
this framework, landslide disaster risk 
reduction should be properly under-
taken in order to reduce the impact 
of  landslides on humans, structures 
and infrastructures. In areas with 
high demographic density, protection 
works often cannot be built owing 
to economic or environmental con-
straints, and is it not always possible 
to evacuate people because of  societal 
reasons. Forecasting the occurrence 
of  landslides and the risk associated 
with them, and defining appropriate 
EWSs, are, therefore, essential needs.
The societal and economic impact of 
landslide risk is difficult to assess and 
it is underestimated, since a relevant 
part of  related damage is attributed 
to other natural hazards, in multihaz-
ard chains (e.g. seismically induced 
failures, rainfall induced debris flows, 
lahars and rock avalanches associated 
with volcanism).
An established worldwide scientific 
landslide community has flourished in 
the last decades, thanks to several in-
ternational organisations, such as the 
International Consortium on Land-
slides and the Landslide Joint Tech-
nical Committee, which periodically 
organise the World Landslide Forums 
and the International Landslide Sym-
posia, respectively. Regular landslide 
sessions are also organised at the 
General Assembly of  the European 
Geoscience Union each year.
The term ‘landslide’ 
describes a variety of 
processes that result 
in the downward and 
outward movement 
of slope-forming 
materials, including rock, 
soil, artificial fill or a 
combination of these.
In this subchapter, the main causes 
and triggers of  landslides and their 
socioeconomic impact at European 
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level are described, before some gen-
eral concepts and methodologies on 
landslide zoning (inventory, suscep-
tibility and hazard maps) and EWSs 
based on the analysis of  landslide 
monitoring data and rainfall data are 
introduced.
3.5.2 
Landslide causes and 
triggers
The most recent landslide classifica-
tion is found in Hungr et al. (2014). 
It discerns five main types of  move-
ment: falls, topples, slides, spreads 
and flows. Many landslides consist of 
a variety of  movement types occur-
ring in sequence. For example, large 
landslides in high mountainous are-
as often start as rock falls involving 
freefalling rock that detaches from a 
cliff, which upon impact at the cliff 
toe may spontaneously transition into 
a very high-energy rock avalanche 
(Hutchinson, 1988). The properties 
of  the flow change further as the 
landslide entrains or deposits debris 
and water.
Landslides vary greatly in size. At the 
largest scale, a single landslide can in-
volve up to some cubic kilometres of 
rock and soils. At the other end of  the 
scale, a small boulder has the poten-
tial to cause loss of  life, if  it strikes an 
individual, or to cause mass fatalities 
if, for example, it causes a train to de-
rail. In general, the potential to cause 
loss scales with size of  the landslide, 
largely because of  the scaling of  the 
kinetic energy and the affected area.
A key causal factor for landslides is 
the topographic setting of  the poten-
tial site. In general, the propensity to 
failure usually increases as the slope 
angle increases, from essentially zero 
on a flat surface to a significantly high-
er level when slopes are steep. How-
ever, the relationship with geological 
factors is highly non-linear, and below 
a key gradient, any given slope is like-
ly to be stable under most conditions. 
Slopes naturally evolve into a stable 
state under any given set of  environ-
mental conditions, primarily through 
landsliding processes. External fac-
tors disrupt the slope equilibrium to 
induce instability; thus, for example, a 
migrating river channel or an unusual 
flood may erode the toe of  a slope, 
increasing the slope gradient and the 
likelihood of  failure. The slope will 
then naturally evolve back to its sta-
ble gradient through time, perhaps by 
means of  another landslide that re-
moves the excess material.
A second set of  causal factors relates 
to the type of  material involved in 
the potential instability and its geo-
technical properties, such as internal 
friction and cohesion. In hard rock 
masses, stability is usually defined not 
by the intact strength of  the material 
but by the joints, fractures and faults. 
The strength of  these discontinuities 
may be dramatically lower than the 
intact rock strength, especially where 
they are lined with a weaker materi-
al. Where such a discontinuity has 
an orientation that promotes failure, 
the resistance of  the slope to land-
sliding can be dramatically reduced. 
Therefore, in many cases, analysis of 
susceptibility depends on an under-
standing of  the role played by these 
discontinuities. Furthermore, the 
strength of  slope materials degrades 
through the processes of  weathering, 
which may physically and chemically 
alter the constituent minerals or may 
break an intact mass into smaller, 
weaker pieces. Therefore, the suscep-
tibility of  a slope to failure may in-
crease with time.
Earth materials interact closely with 
hydrology and hydrogeology. Water 
is probably the most important fac-
tor that promotes slope instability. 
In many cases, water influences the 
strength parameters of  geological 
materials, generally reducing strength 
when materials become saturated. 
Pore water pressure changes the ef-
fective stress state of  a slope, typically 
reducing resistance to shear forces, 
and promoting instability. The lack of 
understanding of  hydrological con-
ditions is a frequent cause of  failure 
in managed slopes; the 1966 Aber-
fan disaster in South Wales for ex-
ample (Bishop et al., 1969), in which 
more than 140 people were killed by 
a landslide from a mine waste tip, 
was primarily the result of  the con-
struction of  the tip on a spring and 
watercourse, which promoted condi-
tions of  full saturation after periods 
of  heavy rainfall. However, water can 
also have more complex relationships 
with instability. For example, in some 
materials partially saturated condi-
tions can provide additional strength 
through the generation of  suction 
forces, while in others saturated con-
ditions can promote soil liquefaction 
after failure, turning a slow landslide 
into a highly mobile and highly de-
structive flow.
Land use can also be a key factor in 
landslide causation. Some types of 
vegetation can improve stability by 
providing additional strength to the 
soil via root systems, and by regulating 
the infiltration of  water and drawing 
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down pore water pressures through 
transpiration. In general, forested 
slopes are more stable than those left 
bare, and there is a large body of  ev-
idence to support the argument that 
there is increased mudflow activity 
after fires have removed vegetation 
(Cannon and Gartner, 2005; Shakesby 
and Doerr, 2006) and increased land-
sliding after careless logging (Jakob, 
2000). In general, the removal of  veg-
etation promotes instability. Growing 
new vegetation is a difficult (but effec-
tive where successful) way to restore 
stability. Deforestation highlights the 
action of  humans as the final key fac-
tor. As people modify the landscape, 
the likelihood of  landsliding changes. 
In many cases, humans promote in-
stability by cutting slopes to steeper 
angles, removing vegetation, changing 
hydrology and increasing weathering 
rates.
Landslide occurrence is 
related to causal factors, 
which create a propensity 
for a slope to fail, and 
triggers, namely the 
specific external event 
that induces landslide 
occurrence at a particular 
time.
In most cases, the timing of  failure is 
associated with a trigger event. This 
is not always true, however; there is 
increasing evidence that slopes can 
fail through progressive mechanisms 
that involve the weakening of  slope 
through time until stability is com-
promised, but such events are rare, 
although they can be destructive. 
However, most landslides are asso-
ciated with a clearly defined trigger. 
Heavy rainfall is a key factor in gener-
ating landslides, primarily through the 
generation of  pore water pressures 
and thus a reduction in the effective 
normal stress. For example, the annu-
al global landslide cycle is dominated 
by the effects of  rainfall associated 
with the South Asian and East Asian 
monsoons (Petley, 2010). The impact 
of  the South Asian monsoon on the 
southern edge of  the Himalayas, al-
lied with the topography and materi-
als of  the region, makes this the glob-
al hotspot for landslide occurrence. 
However, the same correlation holds 
true everywhere.
The second key factor, and possibly 
the most important in terms of  loss 
of  life, is the impact of  seismic events. 
Large earthquakes in mountain chains 
can trigger extraordinary numbers of 
landslides. Recent events include the 
2005 Kashmir (Pakistan) earthquake 
and the 2008 Sichuan (China) earth-
quake, both of  which killed more 
than 20 000 people in landslides. The 
Sichuan earthquake alone triggered 
more than 100 000 landslides. At 
present, the nature of  the interaction 
between seismic waves and slopes is 
poorly understood, and forecasting 
the impacts of  a future earthquake 
in terms of  landslides is fraught with 
difficulty. However, the high levels of 
loss suggest that this will be a key area 
of  research in the future.
Humans can also be a key trigger of 
landslides. The construction of  hy-
droelectric stations can be significant. 
The Three Gorges Dam in China, the 
world’s largest hydroelectric project, 
is expected to lead to the ultimate 
relocation of  1.4 million people ow-
ing to the construction of  a 650-km 
long reservoir and the increased land-
slide risk; similar problems can be 
also found in Europe but to a lesser 
extent. The Vajont rock slide (Italy) 
resulted in the deaths of  more than 
2 000 people in 1963, when rock 
fell into the reservoir impounded by 
the highest arch dam in the world at 
the time. Humans trigger landslides 
through slope cutting (especially for 
road construction), deforestation, ir-
rigation, undercutting and changes in 
hydrology and blasting, among many 
other activities. Mining activities have 
a particularly large impact. In more 
developed countries, mining is there-
fore strictly regulated; sadly, in less af-
fluent countries, regulation lags con-
siderably, and losses are much higher.
Finally, in active volcanic areas, land-
slides can be a major problem. Some 
of  the highest levels of  loss have 
occurred as a result of  the high-mo-
bility volcanic landslide known as a 
lahar, and volcanic flank collapses, 
which can be tsunamigenic, may be 
the largest terrestrial landslides pos-
sible. Some of  the deadliest landslide 
events on record have occurred in 
volcanic areas. Active volcanism pro-
motes instability (the 1980 Mount St 
Helens eruption started with a land-
slide that depressurised the volcano), 
and dome collapse is common. Vol-
canic deposits regularly mobilise into 
high-energy flows, and hydrothermal 
activity can cause material strength 
degradation over large areas. Major 
debris avalanches, partially submarine, 
were triggered by the 2002 eruption 
of  Stromboli volcano (Italy) and they 
caused tsunamis, in a typical multihaz-
ard domino effect (Tinti et al., 2006).
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climate data in Europe for the last 
two centuries demonstrate a shifting 
pattern in frequency and intensity of 
extreme weather events (IPCC, 2012, 
2013). Along with the changes in cli-
mate and weather patterns, demogra-
phy, land use and other factors driving 
the landslide risk are changing rapid-
ly (UN, 2015). Indeed, projections 
through the 21st century for Europe 
indicate that societal changes may 
lead to a larger increase in the impacts 
from landslides and other natural haz-
ards than climate change. Therefore, 
the changes in the socioeconomic im-
pact of  landslides should be consid-
ered at two different timescales. The 
influence of  climate change on the 
spatial and temporal characteristics 
of  landslide risk will be noticeable by 
the end of  the century. At a shorter 
timescale of  one to two decades, the 
rapid changes in anthropogenic fac-
tors such as urbanisation and land use 
change drive the dynamic risk pattern 
that we face today.
3.5.3
The socio-economic
impact of landslides 
in Europe and climate 
change
The fast-paced changes in society, cli-
mate change and the human impact 
on the environment have a major 
impact on the frequency and spatial 
distribution of  landslides. Annual 
Estimate of changes in the exposure of Europe’s population to landslides in the 21st century 
Source: SafeLand (2013)
FIGURE 3.26
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Regional climate model (RCM) sim-
ulations from the EU FP6 project 
ENSEMBLES (Van der Linden and 
Mitchell, 2009) predicted a consistent 
large-scale pattern of  heavy precipita-
tion changes in Europe. The simula-
tions generally showed an increase in 
heavy precipitation over northern and 
central Europe in winter, although 
some inconsistencies were found 
among the predictions from different 
models in mountainous regions and 
at the foothills of  the mountains. In 
summer, most models agree on an 
increase in heavy precipitation over 
Scandinavia and reduced precipita-
tion in southern Europe. The larg-
est inconsistencies were found in the 
transition zone across central Europe, 
which separates areas with positive 
trends in the north and areas with 
negative trends in the south. Con-
sidering both the expected changes 
in patterns of  extreme precipitation 
events and changes in other factors 
driving the landslide risk, the EU FP7 
project SafeLand assessed the expect-
ed changes in climate-driven landslide 
activity (magnitude, frequency) in Eu-
rope in the next 100 years. 
It must be emphasized 
that any prognosis of 
the changes in the socio-
economic impact of 
landslides due to climatic 
change involves a high 
level of uncertainty.
The SafeLand study estimated that 
landslide hazard threatens about 4 % 
of  European citizens today. In addi-
tion to the people directly threatened 
in their homes, 8 000-20 000 km of 
roads and railways are exposed to high 
landslide hazard, causing additional 
direct threats to life and economic as-
sets as well as problems for emergen-
cy response and recovery operations 
(Jaedicke et al., 2013). The SafeLand 
prognosis was that about 0.7% of  the 
total European population will ex-
perience an increase in landslide risk 
by the end of  the century, although 
in some parts of  Europe the risk will 
be reduced. The spatial pattern of 
the expected change in the European 
population exposed to landslide risk 
is depicted in Figure 3.26. The main 
changes in landslide risk at the Euro-
pean scale shown in the figure are due 
to the changes in population pattern 
caused by migration and urbanisation.
The SafeLand project also made a 
detailed study of  the changes in land-
slide risk pattern at local scale for 
selected sites in Europe for the peri-
od 1951-2050. For these studies, the 
climate simulations were downscaled 
to simulate localised heavy precipita-
tion events in regions where rain-in-
duced landslides occur on a regular 
basis. The downscaled climate mod-
els predicted an increase in landslide 
hazard at all sites. These results dif-
fered from the predictions provided 
by larger scale climate models at some 
locations. These differences might be 
explained by the refinement in the 
climate model used, which, for exam-
ple, considered the influence of  local 
topography on precipitation. This 
demonstrated that large-scale mod-
els are useful to evaluate the relative 
spatial variations of  landslide activ-
ity, while local scale models are nec-
essary for urban planners and local 
authorities to estimate the future risks 
associated with landslides and other 
hydro-meteorological hazards in their 
communities or regions of  interest.
In addition, the large uncertainties in 
population and traffic evolution sce-
narios, land use changes and political 
decisions regarding urban develop-
ment require that the key parameters 
driving landslide risk are accurately 
monitored and that the prognosis of 
landslide risk is continuously updated 
as new information becomes available 
and more accurate and refined climate 
change models are developed.
3.5.4
Landslide zoning: 
inventory, 
susceptibility and 
hazard maps
The mapping of  landslides underpins 
disaster risk reduction strategies, inte-
grating socio-economic impacts, and 
therefore the challenge is to analyse 
their causes and triggers in our chang-
ing environments. Owing to the ex-
traordinary breadth of  the spectrum 
of  landslide phenomena, no single 
method exists to identify and map 
landslides and to ascertain landslide 
susceptibility and hazard.
In addition to predicting ‘where’ a 
slope failure will occur, landslide haz-
ard forecasts ‘when’ or ‘how frequent-
ly’ it will occur, and ‘how large’ it will 
be (Guzzetti et al., 2005).
The simplest form of  landslide map-
ping is a landslide inventory map, 
which shows the location and, where 
known, the date of  occurrence and 
the types of  landslide that have left 
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discernible traces in an area (Guzzetti 
et al., 2012). Landslide inventory maps 
can be prepared by different tech-
niques, depending on their scope and 
the extent of  the study area. Small-
scale inventories (≤1:200 000) are 
compiled mostly from data obtained 
from the literature, through inquiries 
to public organisations and private 
consultants, by searching chronicles, 
journals, technical and scientific re-
ports, or by interviewing landslide 
experts. Medium-scale landslide in-
ventories (1:25 000 to 1:200 000) are 
most commonly prepared through 
the systematic interpretation of  aerial 
photographs at scales ranging from 
1:60 000 to 1:10 000, and by integrat-
ing local field checks with historical 
information. Large-scale inventories 
(>1:25 000) are prepared, usually for 
limited areas, using both the interpre-
tation of  aerial photographs at scales 
greater than 1:20 000, very high-reso-
lution satellite images or digital terrain 
models, and extensive field investiga-
tions.
An archive inventory shows infor-
mation on landslides obtained from 
the literature or from other archive 
sources. Geomorphological invento-
ries can be further classified as histor-
ical, event, seasonal or multitemporal 
inventories. A geomorphological his-
torical inventory shows the cumula-
tive effects of  many landslide events 
over a period of  tens, hundreds or 
thousands of  years. In a historical in-
ventory, the age of  the landslides is 
not distinguished, or is given in rela-
tive terms (i.e. recent, old or very old). 
An event inventory shows landslides 
caused by a single trigger, such as an 
earthquake, rainfall event or snowmelt 
event, and the date of  the landslide 
corresponds to the date (or period) of 
the triggering event. Examining mul-
tiple sets of  aerial or satellite images 
of  different dates, multitemporal and 
seasonal inventories can be prepared. 
A seasonal inventory shows landsides 
triggered by single or multiple events 
during a single season, or a few sea-
sons, whereas multitemporal invento-
ries show landslides triggered by mul-
tiple events over longer periods (years 
to decades).
Landslide susceptibility is 
the probability of spatial 
occurrence of slope 
failures, given a set of 
geo-environmental 
conditions. Landslide 
hazard is the probability 
that a landslide of a given 
magnitude will occur in a 
given period and in a 
given area.
Conventional methods to prepare 
landslide inventory maps rely primar-
ily on the visual interpretation of  ste-
reoscopic aerial photography, aided 
by field surveys. New and emerging 
techniques, based on satellite, air-
borne and terrestrial remote sensing 
technologies, promise to facilitate the 
production of  landslide maps, reduc-
ing the time and resources required 
for their compilation and systemat-
ic update. These can be grouped in 
three main categories, including the 
analysis of  surface morphology, chief-
ly exploiting very-high-resolution 
digital elevation models captured for 
example by LiDAR (light detection 
and ranging) sensors, the automatic 
or semi-automatic interpretation and 
analysis of  satellite images, including 
panchromatic, multispectral and syn-
thetic aperture radar (SAR) images, 
and the use of  new tools to facilitate 
field mapping.
Qualitative and quantitative methods 
for assigning landslide susceptibil-
ity can be classified into five groups 
(Guzzetti et al., 1999): 
1. geomorphological mapping, 
based on the ability of  an expert 
investigator to evaluate and map 
the actual and potential slope in-
stability conditions;
2. analysis of  landslide inventories, 
which attempts to predict the fu-
ture landslide spatial occurrence 
from the known distribution of 
past and present landslides (typi-
cally, this is obtained by preparing 
landslide density maps); 
3. heuristic or index-based ap-
proaches, in which investigators 
rank and weight the known in-
stability factors based on their as-
sumed or expected importance in 
causing landslides; 
4. process-based methods that rely 
on simplified physically based 
landslide modelling schemes to 
analyse the stability/instabili-
ty conditions using simple limit 
equilibrium models, such as the 
‘infinite slope stability’ model, or 
more complex approaches;
5. statistically based modelling con-
tingent on the analysis of  the 
functional relationships between 
known or inferred instability 
factors and the past and present 
distribution of  landslides. Re-
gardless of  the method used, it is 
important that the susceptibility 
zonations are validated using in-
dependent landslide information, 
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and that the level of  uncertainty 
associated with the zonation is 
given (Rossi et al., 2010).
Landslide hazard is more difficult to 
obtain than landslide susceptibility, 
since it requires the assessment of  the 
temporal frequency of  landslides and 
the magnitude of  the expected fail-
ures (Guzzetti et al., 2005). The tem-
poral frequency (or the recurrence) of 
landslides, or of  landslide-triggering 
events, can be established from ar-
chive inventories and from multitem-
poral landslide maps covering suffi-
ciently long periods. Furthermore, 
where a landslide record is available, 
an appropriate modelling framework 
needs to be adopted (Witt et al., 
2010). Alternatively, for meteorologi-
cally triggered landslides, one can in-
fer the frequency of  landslide events 
from the frequency of  the triggering 
factors, for example the frequency 
(or the return period) of  intense or 
prolonged rainfall periods. The un-
certainty inherent in the prediction of 
triggers that may result in landslides 
adds to uncertainty inherent in the 
prediction of  occurrence of  land-
slides. 
To determine the magnitude of  an 
expected landslide, investigators most 
commonly revert to determining the 
statistics of  landslide size (area or 
volume). Accurate information on 
landslide area can be obtained from 
high-quality geomorphological inven-
tories. Determining the volume of  a 
sufficiently large number of  land-
slides is more problematic, and usual-
ly investigators rely on empirical rela-
tionships linking landslide volume to 
landslide areas (Guzzetti et al., 2009; 
Larsen et al., 2010; Catani et al., 2016).
Finally, when determining landslide 
hazard as the joint probability of 
landslide size (a proxy for magnitude), 
the expected temporal occurrence of 
landslides (frequency) and the expect-
ed spatial occurrence (landslide sus-
ceptibility), great care must be taken 
to establish if, or to what extent, the 
three probabilities are independent. 
In many areas, given the available in-
formation and the local settings, this 
may be difficult to prove (Guzzetti et 
al., 2005). We expect that the quanti-
tative assessment of  landslide hazard 
will remain a major scientific chal-
lenge in the next decade.
Such identification of  areas suscepbti-
ble to landslide hazard is essential for 
the landslide risk assessment and pos-
sible implementation of  effective dis-
aster risk reduction strategies. These 
strategies (Dai et al., 2002) include 
land-use planning, development con-
trol land, the application of  building 
codes with different engineering solu-
tions, acceptance, and monitoring and 
early warning systems. Land planning 
control reduces expected elements at 
risk. Engineering solution is the most 
direct and costly strategy for reducing 
either the probability of  landsliding or 
the probability of  spatial impact of  a 
landslide. One approach is correction 
of  the underlying unstable slope to 
control initiation of  landslides (such 
as stabilisation of  slope, drainage, 
retaining walls or planting), and the 
other is controlling of  the landslide 
movement (such as barriers/walls 
to reduce or redirect the movement 
when a landslide does occur). The ac-
ceptance strategy defines acceptable 
risk criteria (Fell, 1994;Fell and Hart-
ford, 1997); and the monitoring and 
warning system strategy reduces ex-
pected elements at risk by evacuation 
in advance of  failure.
3.5.5
Landslide
monitoring and 
early warning
These systems require a fine assess-
ment of  the socioeconomic impact 
of  landslides, which must be based 
on accurate landslide mapping, as well 
as an understanding of  their causes. 
EWSs for landslides are based on the 
reliable continual monitoring of  rel-
evant indicators (e.g. displacements, 
rainfall, groundwater level) that are 
assumed to be precursors to trig-
gering landslides or reactivations. 
When values for these indicators ex-
ceed predefined thresholds, alarms 
are transmitted directly to a chain of 
people in charge of  deciding the lev-
el of  warning and/or emergency that 
must be transmitted to the relevant 
stakeholders, following a predefined 
process (Figure 3.27). In some cases, 
warnings can also be automatically 
transmitted. Usually, one to five alert 
levels are used (Blikra, 2008; Intrieri 
et al., 2013): the highest level may lead 
to emergency warnings to the popula-
tion, evacuations or the use of  sirens 
and loudspeaker messages in several 
languages to force people to move to 
a safer place, as in the case of  tsuna-
mis induced by landslides. 
An EWS needs to be set up with spe-
cific requirements. First, the potential 
impacts must be defined based on a 
risk analysis informed by hazard map-
ping, including the impact of  global 
changes (Corominas et al., 2014). In 
addition, the causes and triggers of 
disasters must be thoroughly analysed 
and the development of  local coping 
capacities must be included (Dash 
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Landslide types determine, first, if  the 
appropriate EWS must be site specific 
or regional (Intrieri et al., 2013), and 
also if  it is dedicated to identifying trig-
gering conditions and/or to detecting 
an ongoing event (Sättele et al., 2016). 
For example, monitoring systems 
of  debris-flow or shallow landslide 
EWSs are usually based on thresholds 
of  rainfall amount over a period of 
time. These thresholds are based on 
rainfall intensity-duration, cumulat-
ed event rainfall-duration (Guzzetti 
et al., 2008), or antecedent precipita-
tion (including snow depth) measures 
and soil moisture (Baum and Godt, 
2010; Jakob et al., 2012). An extended 
monitoring of  those indicators usual-
ly makes it possible, therefore, to set 
regional alarms. Landslide types also 
constrain the maximum lead time or 
time of  reaction after the alarm trans-
mission (Sättele et al., 2016). In some 
specific cases, debris-flow catchments 
are equipped with monitoring sys-
tems such as ultrasonic and seismic 
sensors that detect the debris-flow 
movements (Marchi et al., 2002) and 
automatically send a warning message 
to shorten the reaction time as much 
as possible.
For site-specific systems, displace-
ments measured by different sensors 
and pore water pressure and/or pre-
cipitation are usually used (Michoud 
et al., 2013). Various sensors can be 
set to monitor displacements, includ-
ing extensometers (cable or laser) and 
crackmeters that measure the distanc-
es between two points, and total sta-
tions that are also used to provide dis-
tances and 3D positions using targets 
positioned on site. Moreover, GPSs 
and Gladwin, 2007).
The number of  EWSs dedicated to 
landslides has greatly increased since 
the beginning of  the 21st century be-
cause of  the progress made in elec-
tronics, communication and com-
puter programs for monitoring and 
imaging. In addition, the innovations 
in satellite technologies and ground 
remote sensing have greatly im-
proved the capacity of  remote imag-
ing measurements versus in situ point 
measurements (Tofani et al., 2013). 
Implementing an EWS depends on 
the context, namely (1) the type of 
landslide (Hungr et al., 2014), (2) the 
disaster scenarios considered, (3) the 
degree of  awareness of  the stakehold-
ers, including populations, and (4) the 
allocated resources (e.g. budgetary, 
human).
(A) Illustration of the components of a modern EWS that does not show the energy sources and the two or 
three levels of redundancy. (B) Flow chart of the activities of the implementation and operation of an EWS 
(modified from Intrieri et al., 2012). The blue box in (b) indicates the action linked to the monitoring system.
Source: courtesy of authors
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are nowadays widely used, which can 
give the real 3D position of  a point 
(Gili et al., 2000). All the above tech-
niques usually provide data only at 
specific point locations; thus, several 
of  them must often be set up in a net-
work to monitor areal deformations. 
Inclinometers give deformations at 
depth along boreholes, providing es-
sential data on the changes in depth 
of  landslide behaviour (Blikra, 2008). 
For the last few years, ground-based 
interferometric radar (GB-InSAR) 
has been used for the most critical 
landslides (Casagli et al., 2010; Blikra, 
2012; Rouyet et al., 2016). It provides 
a map of  the distance changes, from 
the GB-InSAR to the landslide sur-
face, at a millimetre scale and with 
a time resolution of  a few minutes. 
Satellite InSAR images are also used 
to monitor long-term displacement 
trends, with results being strongly 
dependent on the type of  treatment. 
In optimal cases, the time resolution 
is about 6 days, with millimetre pre-
cision and metre spatial resolution 
(Berger et al., 2012). Finally, as land-
slides react to water infiltration, many 
instruments are dedicated to monitor 
water: rain gauges, piezometers, ther-
mometers, barometers, moisture con-
tent sensors and other meteorological 
data. Pore water pressure changes 
monitored with piezometers usually 
have a good correlation with slope 
movements (Michoud et al., 2013).
Behind the implementation of  the 
monitoring part of  EWSs is the un-
derstanding of  the landslide mech-
anisms, that is, the identification of 
the main parameters controlling the 
movements of  the landslide (Intrieri 
et al., 2012 and 2013). For this pur-
pose, the design of  a landslide con-
ceptual model (LCM) is fundamental, 
since it will guide the type and the lo-
cation of  the sensors to install, and it 
is required to forecast landslide failure 
scenarios. The updating of  an LCM 
must be continual during the whole 
life of  an EWS. In addition, landslide 
failures may trigger other hazardous 
events in a cascade effect, such as 
tsunamis or dam breaks, that have to 
be considered in the EWS. The rea-
sons why an EWS is implemented are 
either the identification of  an unac-
ceptable risk level or an increase in, or 
abnormal, landslide activity. Although 
the LMC implementation process 
provides reasons to fix appropriate 
sensors that will monitor the most 
significant failure initiation indicators, 
there are usually many practical con-
straints, such as topography, access, 
visibility and available resources.
Landslide monitoring 
and EWSs are tools to 
forecast the potential 
occurrence of disasters, 
thus contributing to 
the implementation of 
effective disaster risk-
reduction strategies.
Ideally, the first data from a monitor-
ing system are used to calibrate and 
fix alarm thresholds usually based on 
displacement velocities or accelera-
tions, or pore water pressure or pre-
cipitations (Cloutier et al., 2015). This 
approach can be supported by failure 
forecast models, such as the Fukuzo-
no method, or by more complex mod-
els (Crosta and Agliardi, 2003; Feder-
ico et al., 2012). The alarm thresholds 
will be used to trigger chains of  ac-
tions that will involve different lev-
els of  people depending on the alert 
level, from technicians and experts to 
officers and politicians who will be 
involved in the assessment of  the ab-
normal situations and who will have 
to make decisions (Froese and More-
no, 2014). This starts from the initial 
check of  the situation and the coher-
ence of  the movement detection of 
the sensors (to avoid false alarm), and 
it can end with an evacuation decision. 
It requires that the monitoring system 
is reliable and is therefore redundant 
in terms of  sensors, communication 
and the stakeholders involved. Pre-de-
fined crisis units must follow decision 
trees to propagate or stop the warn-
ing at each level. This also necessitates 
the requirement to verify constantly 
that the observed landslide behaviour 
is still following the expected course, 
which also implies that the threshold 
and alarm levels can be reassessed by 
the crisis units.
The most important actions that can 
be prompted by EWS high-alert levels 
are evacuations and a rapid set-up of 
protection measures. They imply that 
all stakeholders, including the relevant 
population, must be prepared through 
education and training to implement 
the appropriate response.
In addition, the methods used to emit 
and communicate the emergency sit-
uation must be adapted to the local 
population culture. It must be stressed 
that all stages of  implementation or 
operation must include feedback to 
the other stages. Frequent feedback 
and updates are a key point. They 
must also include the reappraisal of 
the indirect effects (cascade). A final 
problem relates to communication to 
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the general population, which, to be 
effective, needs trust and training and 
must be an efficient means by which 
to communicate and emit warnings 
and actions within the noise of  our 
‘connected world’. It appears that 
only 38 % of  the EWSs have more 
than one communication vector to in-
form the population (Michoud et al., 
2013).
3.5.6
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership
Understanding landslide risk requires 
a multihazard approach, based on 
networking and partnership between 
different scientific disciplines, with 
transdisciplinary research that aims 
to identify those socioeconomic and 
institutional elements that require at-
tention in landslide DRM.
Knowledge
Knowledge of  landslide risk is a 
multidisciplinary task that requires 
an understanding of  processes and 
mechanisms, spatial and time predic-
tion, vulnerability assessment, mon-
itoring and modelling of  the effects 
related to environmental and climate 
change.
Innovation
The effectiveness of  landslide risk 
mitigation measures critically depends 
on scientific innovation and techno-
logical development for rapid map-
ping, monitoring and early warning.
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3.6 Hydrological risk: wave 
action, storm surges and 
coastal flooding
Kevin	Horsburgh, Inigo Losada, Michail Vousdoukas, 
Ralf Weisse, Judith Wolf
3.6.1
Overview of
coastal flood risk
Coastal flooding is one of  the most 
significant risks to life and infrastruc-
ture both globally and for Europe, 
with wide-ranging social, economic 
and environmental impacts. For ex-
ample, in the United Kingdom alone, 
it is estimated that GPB 150 bil-
lion (EUR 177 billion) of  assets and 
4 million people are currently at risk 
from coastal flooding (Environment 
Agency, 2009). In Europe, long-term 
investment in operational flood warn-
ing systems has largely ensured that 
fatalities due to coastal flooding are 
avoided; however, the damage to in-
frastructure and clean-up costs are 
still significant. For example, during 
storm Xaver (4-8 December 2013) 
which brought the highest ever ob-
served water levels to many Euro-
pean coastlines, there was no loss of 
life due to coastal flooding (although 
there were 15 fatalities directly asso-
ciated with falling trees and vehicles). 
However, the financial impact of  the 
severe coastal flooding was estimat-
ed by Credit Suisse to be more than 
EUR 1.5 billion. 
In contrast to European weather 
systems, tropical cyclones can cause 
storm surges of  up to 10 metres, 
which continue to cause devastating 
loss of  life in parts of  South-East 
Asia. In 1970, a devastating storm 
surge resulted in approximately a 
quarter of  a million deaths in Bang-
ladesh. Over the past decade, there 
has been considerable activity in the 
development of  crucial flood warning 
systems for vulnerable tropical are-
as such as Bangladesh (DMB, 2010; 
WMO, 2010), resulting in the saving 
of  tens of  thousands of  lives. How-
ever, despite the improving availabil-
ity of  coastal warning systems, trop-
ical cyclones continue to cause havoc 
when this is a lack of  preparedness. 
On 8 November 2013, Typhoon Hai-
yan (known as typhoon Yolanda in 
the Philippines) caused catastrophic 
damage throughout the Philippines, 
with the majority of  the death toll (es-
timated to be more than 6 000 peo-
ple) attributable to the storm surge 
that struck Tacloban City. 
Coastal flooding is caused 
by a combination of 
high tides, storm surges 
and wave conditions. 
Development on 
floodplains increases 
the risk as do coastal 
erosion and 
sea-level rise.
Coastal flood risk is growing because 
of  long-term mean sea-level rise and 
possible future changes in stormi-
ness (Church et al., 2013), as well as 
continued population growth and 
development in flood-exposed areas 
(Hallegatte et al., 2013). Irrespective 
of  any future change in storm climate 
(which would affect storm surges and 
waves), mean sea-level rises will result 
in more instances of  extreme sea-lev-
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el thresholds being reached. 
Coastal flooding occurs when a com-
bination of  high tide, storm surges and 
wave conditions is sufficiently severe 
to overtop or breach coastal defenc-
es and cause inundation of  low-lying 
areas. Extreme high waters around 
Europe are normally caused by a 
combination of  high tides and severe 
weather events (with the exception 
of  the Mediterranean Sea where tides 
are small). Extra-tropical cyclones 
(the prevailing European weather 
systems) produce storm surges that 
can increase tidal levels by 3-4 metres 
in exceptional cases. The still water 
level (defined as the sea level before 
short-period waves are taken into ac-
count) can be further elevated at the 
coast by wave set-up caused by wave 
breaking. Storms then also produce 
large wind and swell waves, which 
can overtop coastal defences/beach-
es and cause flooding and erosion. A 
further factor that drives coastal flood 
risk is socioeconomic change (Thorne 
et al., 2007). Changes in land use and 
increasing asset values in floodplain 
areas have led to increased exposure 
to flooding (Horsburgh et al., 2010). 
Changes in coastal morphology can 
also influence flood pathways and 
thus flood risk (Thorne et al., 2007; 
Nicholls et al., 2015). As erosion is ex-
pected to dominate coastal morpho-
logical change in the future because 
of  mean sea-level rises, this will add to 
the overall flood risk.
Waves and storms are a significant fea-
ture of  global climate and have been 
included in many assessments of  cli-
mate, including the latest assessment 
(AR5) of  the Intergovernmental Pan-
el on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013). 
Recently, recognition of  the central 
role of  waves in atmosphere–ocean 
interactions has led to an initiative to 
include wave models more directly 
into climate model projections (Cav-
aleri et al., 2012; Hemer et al., 2012). 
The largest waves in European waters 
are found on the Atlantic boundaries, 
where waves can propagate over large 
fetches from the Atlantic Ocean. Many 
factors affect the height of  waves in 
European waters, but for the Atlantic 
margin, the persistence and strength 
of  westerly winds are particularly im-
portant (Wolf  and Woolf, 2006), as are 
the intensity and frequency of  storms. 
Waves are affected by currents and 
water depth and are locally modified 
by coastal geometry and man-made 
structures. Waves decrease in height in 
shallow water as a result of  energy dis-
sipation by bottom friction and wave 
breaking; this reduction in wave ener-
gy at a particular location may reduce 
over time, if  the sea level rises, unless 
the coastal morphology in areas of 
mobile sediment can adapt at a similar 
rate (Woolf  and Wolf, 2013). Extreme 
waves represent a hazard for any off-
shore operation or construction. Haz-
ards may be due to, for example, large 
individual or significant wave heights, 
steep waves, crossing seas, or rapidly 
developing sea states (Toffoli et al., 
2005). At the coast, wave overtop-
ping or the impact of  the waves on 
structures may become important. On 
longer timescales, changes in coastal 
wave climate may cause changes in the 
sedimentation and erosion patterns 
that in the long run will have impacts 
on sediment and shoreline dynamics 
(Wong et al., 2014). As sea levels rise 
and the rate of  rise accelerates, low-ly-
ing coastal regions may be inundated, 
allowing waves to penetrate further in-
land, thus causing further damage.
 
3.6.2
Natural variability of 
waves, storm surges 
and mean sea level
All components of  sea level display 
considerable natural variability, which 
influences the frequency of  flooding 
on all timescales. Natural variability 
in the wave, storm surge and mean 
sea-level components ranges from 
variability associated with stochastic 
processes, to those displaying seasonal 
and longer period changes associated 
with regional climate (e.g. the qua-
si-decadal cycle known as the North 
Atlantic Oscillation - NAO). Europe 
experienced an unusual sequence of 
extreme storms over the winter of 
2013-2014, resulting in some of  the 
most significant coastal flooding since 
the catastrophic North Sea storm 
surge of  1953 (Matthews et al., 2014; 
Haigh et al., 2016).
 
Sea-level change at any particular lo-
cation depends on many regional 
and local processes as well as global 
climate drivers, so regional sea-lev-
el change will differ from the global 
average. The fifth assessment report 
(AR5) of  the IPCC concluded that 
it is very likely that the average rate 
of  global averaged sea-level rise was 
1.7 mm per year between 1901 and 
2010 (IPCC, 2013). For the more re-
cent period 1993-2010, this had risen 
to 3.2 mm per year, with consistency 
between tide-gauge and satellite al-
timeter data. It is likely that similarly 
high rates occurred between 1920 and 
1950. Although there is a great deal of 
local variability in the measured values, 
mean sea levels around Europe (from 
tide gauge records) mostly exhibit 
CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISK: HAZARD RELATED RISK ISSUES - SECTION II
221
bining the global models of  eustatic 
sea-level change (i.e. sea-level rise due 
to volume changes as well as geologi-
cal changes to ocean basins) with lo-
cal models of  GIA modified localised 
effects at the coast (e.g. Smith et al., 
2012). A further complication is that 
sea-level change is affected by large-
scale gravitational adjustment in re-
sponse to polar ice melt. Mitrovica et 
al. (2001) showed how rapid melting 
of  major ice sources gives rise to spa-
tial changes in the Earth’s gravity field 
(as well as to the volume of  water in 
the oceans); their model predicts a fall 
in relative sea level close to the source 
of  melting as the gravitational interac-
tion between ice and ocean is reduced, 
but a correspondingly larger rise in sea 
level further from the melt source.
Storm surges are the large-scale in-
creases in sea level due to a storm. 
They can increase sea levels by 
3-4 metres in European coastal seas 
and may last from hours to days and 
span hundreds of  square kilometres. 
They are caused by wind stress at the 
sea surface and the horizontal gradient 
of  atmospheric pressure (Pugh and 
Woodworth, 2014), although the mag-
nitude of  any particular storm surge is 
influenced by many factors, including 
the intensity and track of  the weather 
system, bathymetry and coastal topog-
raphy. The same factors control storm 
surges caused by mid-latitude weather 
systems (extra-tropical cyclones) and 
tropical cyclones (hurricanes). In re-
gions of  high tidal range, storm surg-
es represent the greatest threat when 
they coincide with tidal high water: 
most operational forecasting centres 
now systematically refer to the combi-
nation of  a storm surge and tidal high 
water as a storm tide.
In a strongly tidal region such as the 
European shelf, it is important to 
understand the interaction between 
storm surges and tides. Such interac-
tions have been extensively studied 
(e.g. Rossiter, 1961; Prandle and Wolf, 
1978). The dominant mechanism for 
tide-surge interaction is increased wa-
ter levels as a result of  meteorological 
forcing that induce a phase shift in the 
tidal signal (Horsburgh and Wilson, 
2007); many properties of  a non-tidal 
residual time series (i.e. the time series 
of  sea-level observations minus tidal 
predictions) are simply artefacts of 
small changes to the timing of  pre-
dicted high water. The most useful 
measure of  storm surges is the skew 
surge, which is the difference between 
the maximum observed sea level and 
the maximum predicted tidal level, re-
gardless of  their timing during the tid-
al cycle (de Vries et al., 1995). Hence, 
each tidal cycle has one predicted high 
water value and one associated skew 
surge value. The advantage of  using 
the skew surge is that it is a simple and 
unambiguous measure of  the storm 
surge. Williams et al. (2016) have now 
shown that the magnitude of  high wa-
ter exerts no influence on the size of 
the most extreme skew surges. This 
is the first systematic proof  that any 
storm surge can occur on any tide, 
which is essential to understand worst-
case scenarios. The lack of  surge gen-
eration dependency on water depth 
emphasises the dominant natural 
variability of  weather systems. Weak 
seasonal relationships between skew 
surges and tidal high waters have been 
identified, and the inclusion of  these 
in statistical methods will improve the 
estimates of  extreme sea levels.
Storm surges are, of  course, generated 
by storms, and there has been much 
20th century rises that are consistent 
with the global mean value, although 
the central estimate around the Unit-
ed Kingdom is slightly lower than that 
of  the global value (Woodworth et al., 
2009). There is high confidence that 
the rate of  observed sea-level rise in-
creased from the 19th  to the 20th  cen-
tury (Bindoff  et al., 2007; Woodworth 
et al., 2011) and there is evidence of  a 
slow long-term acceleration in the rate 
of  sea-level rise throughout the 20th 
century (Church and White, 2011). 
All components of sea 
level exhibit natural 
variability. There is no 
convincing evidence of 
observed changes in 
European storminess. 
Changes in extreme levels 
are driven by mean sea-
level change. 
Whether the faster rate of  increase in 
sea level during the period from the 
mid-1990s reflects an increase in the 
longer-term trend or decadal variabil-
ity is still not clear. For planning and 
engineering purposes, it is sea level 
with respect to the local land level that 
is of  primary interest; furthermore, 
the Earth itself  is moving as it recov-
ers from ice loading during the most 
recent ice age. A key process that af-
fects vertical land motion is the vis-
coelastic response of  the solid Earth 
to deglaciation, termed glacial isostatic 
adjustment (GIA). An accurate under-
standing of  regional sea-level change 
is a particular area that involves com-
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recent research aimed at understand-
ing past and future changes in storm-
iness over Europe due to the chang-
es in mid-latitude storms over the 
North-East Atlantic. Trends in severe 
wind storms around the United King-
dom are difficult to identify, owing to 
the low numbers of  such storms, their 
decadal variability and the unreliabili-
ty of  direct wind speed observations 
(Wang et al., 2009). 
Wang et al.’s analysis shows that 
storminess conditions in this region 
have undergone profound decadal 
or longer timescale fluctuations, with 
considerable seasonal and regional 
differences. The most notable differ-
ences are seen between winter and 
summer, and between the North Sea 
area and other parts of  the region. 
Over the last century the number of 
winter storms has decreased and then 
increased again. The observational 
evidence indicates that the strength 
of  mid-latitude sea-level pressure 
(SLP) gradients and associated west-
erly circulation has increased in the 
northern hemisphere, especially dur-
ing winter, since at least the late 1970s 
(Woolf  and Wolf, 2013). The behav-
iour of  North Atlantic storm tracks 
is key to understanding present and 
future changes in storminess. Future 
climate model projections have a large 
variability between models and a low 
signal-to-noise ratio for Europe com-
pared with other mid-latitude regions 
(Hawkins and Sutton, 2009). Wooll-
ings (2010) identifies future Europe-
an climate as particularly uncertain 
because (1) the spread between the 
predictions of  current climate models 
is still considerable and (2) Europe is 
particularly strongly affected by sever-
al processes, which are known to be 
poorly represented in models, such as 
the small-scale structure of  storms. 
Some of  this variability seems to be 
related to the large-scale atmospheric 
patterns such as the NAO, which is 
related to the SLP difference between 
Iceland and the Azores. However, it is 
not clear that this relationship will per-
sist into the future.
Wave climate in the North-East Atlan-
tic and in European seas is to a large 
extent determined by the large-scale 
atmospheric circulation, the statistics 
of  large-scale extra-tropical storms 
and smaller scale regional and local 
wind systems. Natural climate variabil-
ity or anthropogenic changes in such 
factors will affect the wind climate, 
which results in corresponding chang-
es to the wave climate. Changes in lo-
cal wind climate will affect the wind 
sea, while changes in remote storm 
statistics will have an effect on the 
swell component of  the wave climate. 
For the North-East Atlantic, Wolf  and 
Woolf  (2006) performed a number of 
sensitivity experiments with a numer-
ical wind–wave model. By using syn-
thetic wind fields, varying the strength 
of  the prevailing westerly winds and 
the frequency and intensity of  storms, 
as well as the location of  storm tracks 
and the storm propagation speed, they 
found that variations in the strength of 
the westerly winds was most effective 
at changing mean and maximum sig-
nificant wave height, while variations 
in other parameters had little effect on 
the mean wave height. Intensity, track 
and storm propagation speed, how-
ever, significantly affected maximum 
wave height. Generally, in all Europe-
an Shelf  seas and in the North-East 
Atlantic, pronounced seasonal varia-
bility in wave climate is seen with the 
highest waves in autumn and winter 
(e.g. Dodet et al., 2010; Arkhipkin et 
al., 2014).
Based on the assessment of  literature 
analysing data from in situ measure-
ments, satellite altimeter observations 
and wave model hindcasts, the IPCC 
AR5 concluded that it is likely that 
mean significant wave heights have 
increased in regions of  the North At-
lantic over the past half-century and 
that it is likely that these trends large-
ly reflect natural variations in wind 
forcing (Church et al., 2013). For the 
North Sea and Baltic Sea, recent work 
is summarised in Huthnance et al. 
(2016) and Hünicke et al. (2015), in-
dicating that wave height in these seas 
varies substantially on inter-annual 
and decadal timescales but does so far 
not show significant long-term trends. 
Using 20 years of  buoy data for the 
Bay of  Biscay, Dupuis et al. (2006) 
reported a tendency towards decreas-
ing wave heights, which is consistent 
with the findings published in Dodet 
et al. (2010). For the Mediterranean 
Sea, Lionello and Sanna (2005) report-
ed decreasing mean winter values of 
significant wave height in the period 
1958–2001, while for the Black Sea, 
Arkhipkin et al. (2014) reported no 
significant change in corresponding 
storm activity.
The IPCC (2013) confirms that at 
most locations mean sea level is the 
dominant driver of  observed changes 
in sea-level extremes, although large-
scale modes of  variability such as the 
NAO may also be important. There 
is evidence of  increases in extreme 
water levels over the past 100-200 
years around many parts of  the global 
coastline, including Europe (e.g. Me-
nendez and Woodworth, 2010). While 
changes in storminess could contrib-
ute to changes in sea-level extremes, 
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vation has since been validated and 
extended using altimeter wave data 
and models and attributed largely to 
changes observed in the North Atlan-
tic atmospheric circulation patterns, 
principally the NAO (Woolf  et al., 
2002, 2003; Wolf  and Woolf, 2006). 
Owing to the lack of  long-term data-
sets, numerical models are often used 
to extend the time series, and many 
global and regional wave hind-casts 
and reanalyses are now available (e.g. 
ERA-Interim, ERA-20C from the 
European Centre for Medium-range 
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF, n.d.). 
Datasets covering more 
than 30 years of wave 
observations are essential 
for flood hazard analysis. 
All coastal European 
countries store sea-
level data. There are 
fewer wave datasets 
but satellite data are 
increasingly useful.
Long time series are increasingly 
available from satellite observations, 
although these are less reliable in the 
coastal zone. Improved algorithms 
now allow these data to be used clos-
er to the coast (e.g. Gommenginger et 
al., 2010). Long time series data can 
also be generated using proxy data 
from time series of  other variables 
(e.g. SLP data can be used as a proxy 
for storminess or can be generated 
from long hindcasts of  dynamical 
models). Projections of  future im-
pacts that the relationships between 
proxy variables will remain the same 
in a future climate or may be made by 
running dynamic models into the fu-
ture. Local impact models are highly 
dependent on the accuracy of  projec-
tions of  storminess in global climate 
models (where storminess may be de-
fined as a measure of  the frequency 
and intensity of  storms).
Sea-level data from most European 
nations are archived and made avail-
able through their national data re-
positories. For instance, the British 
Oceanographic Data Centre is re-
sponsible for the remote monitoring 
and retrieval of  sea-level data from 
the tide gauge network. These are 
then processed and quality controlled 
prior to being made available for sci-
entific use. Several other European 
nations offer a similar facility (e.g. 
Système d'Observation du Niveau des 
Eaux Littorales, SONEL,  in France 
and National Oceanographic Data 
Committee, NODC, of  the Nether-
lands). For long-term sea-level anal-
ysis, a global record of  sea levels is 
available from the Permanent Service 
for Mean Sea Level, which is respon-
sible for the collection, publication, 
analysis and interpretation of  sea-lev-
el data from the global network of 
tide gauges (PSMSL, 2017).
In order to better understand his-
torical magnitudes and footprints of 
coastal flooding events for the Unit-
ed Kingdom, a systematic database of 
extreme sea level and coastal flooding 
has been compiled, covering the past 
100 years (Haigh et al., 2015; www.
surgewatch.org). Using records from 
tide gauges, all sea levels that reached 
or exceed the 1 in 5 year return level 
were identified. These were attribut-
ed to 96 distinct storms, the dates of 
there is little or no evidence for ei-
ther systematic long-term changes in 
storminess or any detectable change 
in storm surges (IPCC, 2012). The 
scientific consensus is that any chang-
es in extreme sea levels at most loca-
tions are caused by the observed rise 
in mean sea level (e.g. Woodworth 
and Blackman, 2004; Menendez and 
Woodworth, 2010; Wahl and Cham-
bers, 2016).
3.6.3
Datasets for coastal 
flood hazard analysis
 
The importance of  having long time 
series data for assessing the statistics 
of  extremes is well known (e.g. Weisse 
et al., 2009). A long time series of 
wave observations (at least 10 years 
and, ideally, 30 years) is required to 
describe the wave climate (Wolf  et al., 
2011). Such knowledge is required to 
characterise coastal vulnerability and 
to plan coastal management strate-
gies. We know that there is also a large 
amount of  inter-annual and inter-dec-
adal variability, which can obscure 
any observation of  long-term trends. 
There are few long-term wave data-
sets for European waters. One exam-
ple is the United Kingdom Met Office 
Marine Automatic Weather Station 
(MAWS) system, which consists of 
various met-ocean recording systems, 
some of  which have been main-
tained for several decades. A review 
by Hawkes et al. (2001) assessed the 
data available and led to the establish-
ment of  the CEFAS Wavenet network 
(n.d.). Data collected from the Seven 
Stones Light Vessel since 1962 led to 
the earliest observation of  an increase 
in wave height in the North Atlantic 
(Bacon and Carter, 1991). This obser-
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which were used as a chronological 
base from which to investigate wheth-
er historical documentation exists for 
a concurrent coastal flood. For each 
event, the database contains informa-
tion about the storm that generated 
that event, the sea levels recorded 
during the event, and the occurrence 
and severity of  coastal flooding that 
resulted. This database is continu-
ously updated. Similar databases for 
Europe-wide flooding could be con-
ceived and created.
3.6.4
Future climate 
projections of waves, 
storm surges and 
mean sea level
 
The IPCC (2013) has projected glob-
al sea-level rise for the period 2081-
2100, compared with 1986-2005, to be 
0.29-0.82 metres. The precise range 
varies with the assumed Represent-
ative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 
scenario, which describes the radiative 
imbalance in Earth’s atmosphere due 
to greenhouse gas emissions. Unlike 
in the previous IPCC report, these 
projections now include a contribu-
tion from changes in ice-sheet out-
flow, for which the central projection 
is 0.11 metres (it should be noted that 
there is only medium confidence in 
the range of  projected contributions 
from models of  ice sheet dynamics). 
Nevertheless, these new projections 
are broadly similar to those in the 
earlier AR4 assessment (IPCC, 2007). 
It is very likely that the rate of  glob-
al mean sea-level rise during the 21st 
century will exceed the rate observed 
during the period 1970-2010 for all 
RCP scenarios. Regional patterns of 
sea-level change in the 21st century 
still differ between models. However, 
about 70 % of  the global coastlines 
are projected to experience a sea-lev-
el change within 20 % of  the global 
mean sea-level change. 
Some studies use simple statistical, 
so-called ‘semi-empirical’, models 
that relate 20th-century (e.g. Rahm-
storf, 2007) or earlier (e.g. Vermeer 
and Rahmstorf, 2009; Grinsted et al., 
2010) temperature or radiative forcing 
(Jevrejeva et al., 2010) with sea-level 
rise, in order to extrapolate future 
global mean sea level. These models 
are motivated by evidence in the pal-
aeo record of  a connection between 
global mean sea level and temperature 
over glacial/interglacial timescales.
These models result in wider rang-
ing, and typically larger, projections 
of  sea-level rise than those obtained 
from physical process-based mod-
els. For example, Rahmstorf  (2007) 
has projected sea-level rise by 2100 
under a range of  climate scenarios 
to be between 0.50 and 1.40 metres, 
and Vermeer and Rahmstorf  (2009) 
suggested the higher range of  0.75 
to 1.90 metres. Church et al. (2011) 
note that these models may overesti-
mate future sea levels because of  the 
exclusion of  key non-linear process-
es and climate feedback mechanisms. 
In addition, future rates of  sea-level 
rise may correlate less well with global 
mean temperature if  ice sheet dynam-
ics play an increased role in the future. 
Many national authorities have intro-
duced high-end scenarios to aid con-
tingency planning, the value of  which 
justifies the numerous assumptions 
made. For the United Kingdom (Lowe 
et al., 2009), this low-probability but 
high-impact value was estimated to 
be 1.9 metres, which is consistent 
with physical constraints on glacier 
movement (Pfeffer et al., 2008); this 
value also encompasses the majori-
ty of  semi-empirical model projec-
tions. For comparison, Katsman et 
al. (2011) used an alternative method 
to develop a high-end scenario of  a 
0.40- to 1.05-metre sea-level rise (ex-
cluding land subsidence) on the coast 
of  the Netherlands by 2100. More re-
cently, Jevrejeva et al. (2014) obtained 
a probability density function of  the 
global sea level in 2100, suggesting 
that there is a 5 % or smaller proba-
bility of  a global sea-level rise greater 
than 1.8 metres; this low probability 
upper limit combined expert opinion 
and process studies and also indicates 
that other lines of  evidence are need-
ed to justify any larger sea-level rise 
this century. It is very likely that global 
mean sea-level rise will continue be-
yond the 21st century. The thermal ex-
pansion of  the ocean as a result of  in-
creased temperatures takes place over 
centuries to millennia; therefore, ther-
mal expansion will continue beyond 
2100, even if  greenhouse gas con-
centrations are stabilised immediately 
(which is unlikely). Contributions to 
sea-level rise from ice sheets are ex-
pected to continue beyond 2100, but 
glacier contributions will decrease as 
the amount of  glacial ice diminishes. 
Some models suggest sea-level ris-
es of  between 1 metre and 3 metres 
in response to carbon dioxide (CO2) 
concentrations above 700 parts per 
million. Studies of  the last interglacial 
period (e.g. Kopp et al., 2009) indicate 
a very high probability of  a sea-lev-
el rise of  2 metres over 1 000 years, 
and cannot rule out values in excess 
of  4 metres.
Overall there is low confidence in 
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towards the end of  the century and 
for the high-concentration pathway. 
Changes in storm surges and waves 
enhance the effects of  sea-level rise 
along the majority of  northern Euro-
pean coasts, locally with contributions 
up to 40 %. In southern Europe, epi-
sodic extreme events tend to stay sta-
ble, except along the Portuguese coast 
and the Gulf  of  Cadiz where reduc-
tions in surge and wave extremes off-
set sea-level rise by 20-30 %.
Global mean sea level 
will rise between 
0.3 metres and 
0.8 metres this century. 
Larger rises are possible. 
There is low confidence 
in storm surge and 
wave projections 
due to climate 
model limitations.
Regarding possible future wave cli-
mate changes, the IPCC AR5 notes 
low confidence in projections of  fu-
ture storm activity and hence in pro-
jections of  wind waves (Church et al., 
2013). For the Baltic Sea, Groll et al. 
(2017) found changes in the wave cli-
mate towards higher significant wave 
height for most regions that were 
consistent across their ensemble sim-
ulations. They noted that these chang-
es result not only from higher wind 
speeds but also from a shift towards 
more westerly winds. In a compa-
rable study for the North Sea, Groll 
et al. (2014) found a robust signal 
in eastern areas, where wave height 
was projected to increase towards 
the end of  the 21st century in most 
of  the analysed projections. For the 
west European Shelf, Zachariouda-
ki et al. (2011) found an increase in 
mean and extreme winter significant 
wave height south-west of  the Unit-
ed Kingdom and the west of  France. 
Elsewhere, decreases were found. 
This is consistent with the results pro-
vided by Charles et al. (2012), Men-
taschi (2017) and Perez et al. (2015) 
who projected a general decrease in 
wave heights in the Bay of  Biscay 
and Atlantic Europe by the end of 
the 21st century. Zacharioudaki et al. 
(2011) further emphasised that swell 
and wind sea may show different de-
velopments. For the north-west Med-
iterranean Sea, Casas-Prat and Sierra 
(2013) found some increase in mean 
and extreme projected wave heights 
but noted that these changes were 
very much dependent on changes in 
wave direction and thus on wind di-
rection in the global models that were 
not uniform. The findings are consist-
ent with those for the Mediterranean 
Sea reported by Lionello et al. (2008, 
2010), who projected a shift in the 
wave height distribution towards low-
er values. Similar changes are report-
ed in Perez et al. (2015), who further 
noted that the decreases were larger 
for long-term and high-emissions sce-
narios.
The effect of   sea-level rise on tides 
remains an open scientific question, 
since previous studies are not reach-
ing consensus. There is observational 
evidence of  changes in tidal constit-
uents in the 20th century (Mawdsley 
et al., 2015) however the significance 
of  the driving processes remains yet 
unresolved (Woodworth, 2010). Re-
gional modelling efforts have shown 
that sea-level rises exceeding 2 m can 
future storm surge and wave height 
projections because of  the lack of 
consistency between models, and 
limitations in the model capability to 
simulate extreme winds (IPCC, 2012). 
Numerous studies have used regional 
climate model forcing to drive storm 
surge and wave models to infer chang-
es in extreme sea level for the Medi-
terranean (Conte and Lionello, 2013; 
Jordà et al., 2012; Marcos et al., 2011), 
North Sea (Debernard and Røed, 
2008; Gaslikova et al., 2013; Howard 
et al., 2010; Woth et al., 2006), as well 
as the Atlantic coast of  Europe (Lowe 
et al., 2001; Lowe et al., 2009; Lowe et 
al., 2010; Marcos et al., 2012) and Bal-
tic Sea (Gräwe and Burchard, 2012; 
Meier, 2006; Meier et al., 2004), while 
the first pan-European study was by 
Vousdoukas et al. (2016a). Some of 
these studies suggested increasing 
levels of  storm surge along parts of 
northern Europe.  
While extreme sea levels could 
change in the future, both as a result 
of  changes in atmospheric stormi-
ness and of  mean sea-level rise, it is 
very likely that mean sea-level rise will 
continue to be the dominant control 
on upwards trends in extreme future 
coastal water levels. Vousdoukas et al. 
(2017; 2016a) concluded that that by 
the end of  this century the 100-year 
extreme sea-level along Europe’s 
coastlines is on average projected to 
increase by 57 cm for RCP4.5 and 
81 cm for RCP8.5. The North Sea re-
gion is projected to face the highest 
increase in ESLs, amounting to nearly 
1 m under RCP8.5 by 2100, followed 
by the Baltic Sea and Atlantic coasts 
of  the UK and Ireland. Mean sea-lev-
el rise is shown to be the main driv-
er of  the projected rise in extreme 
sea-level, with increasing dominance 
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affect tidal amplitudes and phases 
(Pickering et al., 2012). For smaller 
sea level rises (~1 m) some studies 
find significant tidal changes (Arns 
et al., 2015; Idier et al., 2017; Pelling 
and Green, 2014) whilst others report 
negligible effects (Lowe et al., 2001; 
Sterl et al., 2009; Vousdoukas et al., 
2017). 
3.6.5
Tools and methods 
for assessing coastal 
flood hazard
 
Downscaling from global to regional 
climate change projections is vital for 
the study of  meaningful local impacts 
(Wolf  et al., 2015). Downscaling is 
generally taken to refer to the genera-
tion of  locally relevant data from the 
output of  Global Circulation Mod-
els (GCMs). The aim is to use glob-
al-scale projections, using accepted 
greenhouse gas emissions scenarios, 
to generate regionally specific and 
useful forecasts, with increased spatial 
and temporal resolution, and includ-
ing processes that are not resolved in 
the coarser resolution model. Down-
scaling can be done in several ways: 
(1) using process models, (2) using 
empirical/statistical relationships, and 
(3) using hybrid methods (e.g. pattern 
recognition). Nesting an RCM into 
an existing GCM is an example of 
the first method, termed dynamical 
downscaling. An RCM is a dynam-
ic model that gives higher resolution 
results than a GCM. Downscaling 
can also be done using statistical re-
gression. This aims to capture the es-
sential relationships (often calibrated 
using relationships in the current cli-
mate) between the global model and 
local variables.
Extreme events are linked to coastal 
flooding and for that reason inunda-
tion maps are a crucial element for 
coastal management and engineer-
ing practices (Ferreira et al., 2006), 
and evaluation of  adaptation options 
(Cooper and Pile, 2014; Hinkel et al., 
2010). The most common and simple 
way to obtain inundation maps is the 
static inundation approach consider-
ing as  flooded all the areas with el-
evation lower than the forcing water 
level, extensively used for studies of 
different scales (Hinkel et al., 2014; 
Hinkel et al., 2010; Vousdoukas et al., 
2012b). 
Statistical or dynamical 
downscaling methods 
can be used to derive 
local information from 
global climate models. 
Reducing uncertainties 
and connecting physical 
models to decision 
tools will assist coastal 
management.
However, given the high complexity 
of  coastal flooding processes, sever-
al recent studies showed that that the 
static approach resulted in substan-
tial overestimation of  the flood ex-
tent compared to dedicated hydraulic 
models, especially in flatter terrains 
(Breilh et al., 2013; Gallien, 2016; 
Ramirez et al., 2016; Seenath et al., 
2016; Vousdoukas et al., 2016b).
Intermediate approaches have been 
developed which are capable of  re-
ducing the computational cost by 
taking into consideration either only 
water mass conservation (Breilh et 
al., 2013), or aspects of  flooding hy-
drodynamics (Dottori et al., 2016), 
or the presence of  obstacles (Perini 
et al., 2016; Sekovski et al., 2015). 
More elaborate and more computa-
tionally intensive are dynamic mod-
els like LISFLOOD-FP (Bates et al., 
2010), which despite being originally 
developed for simulating river flow 
processes, have been proven to be 
reliable also for coastal flooding ap-
plications, such as the reproduction 
of  storm surge events (Ramirez et 
al., 2016; Smith et al., 2012) and the 
evaluation of  future scenarios of  sea 
level rise (Purvis et al., 2008). Final-
ly, process-based models specialized 
for coastal hydro- and morpho-dy-
namics (Lesser et al., 2004; McCall et 
al., 2010; Roelvink et al., 2009; Vous-
doukas et al., 2012a) would appear 
as the optimal option, however they 
come with the disadvantages of  (i) 
increased computational costs, which 
are almost prohibitive for large scale 
application; and (ii) the fact that they 
require information about the near-
shore topography in detail which is 
often not available. 
Outputs from climate models of  var-
ious resolutions are often used to 
force hydrodynamic impacts models 
such as wave and storm surge mod-
els (leading to models of  coastal im-
pacts such as flooding and erosion). 
Issues for these model couplings are 
(1) quantification of  model accuracy 
for past events and (2) understanding 
the uncertainty for future projections. 
This uncertainty consists of  (1) un-
certainty in greenhouse gas emissions, 
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Innovation
There are a number of  priority knowl-
edge gaps that need to be addressed 
to improve the ability of  the scientific 
community to assess the hazard-relat-
ed risk associated with sea-level ex-
tremes, storm surges and waves. First, 
we require an improved understand-
ing of  the processes controlling time 
mean regional sea-level rise, in order 
to provide accurate regional projec-
tions. This implies a more sophisti-
cated combination of  ocean and solid 
Earth models, as well as sustained and 
accurate monitoring of  sea level so 
as to better analyse regional variabil-
ity. Sea-level projections also demand 
improved modelling of  physical pro-
cesses that couple the ocean and the 
cryosphere in order to explore the 
plausibility of  rates of  sea-level rise 
outside that suggested by the current 
models. 
Improved process 
understanding of 
regional sea-level 
change is essential, as 
are improvements to the 
representation of weather 
systems in climate 
models. Multidisciplinarity 
is needed to deliver 
economic planning tools.
To better understand the possibility 
of  changes to future storminess and, 
therefore, storm surges and waves, re-
quires improved high-resolution mod-
elling of  mid-latitude weather systems 
in climate models.  This would lead to 
a more complete assessment of  future 
changes in the wave and storm surge 
climate with reduced uncertainty. 
(2) uncertainty in climate model pro-
jections of  sea level and storms and 
(3) uncertainty in the surge and wave 
models. As models improve, the mod-
el uncertainty may be reduced but 
there remains uncertainty in the emis-
sions and some of  the model physics. 
Increasingly, the outputs of  physical 
models such as those described above 
are combined with socioeconomic 
data to provide a set of  decision tools 
that allow coastal managers to assess 
and mitigate risk. 
These so-called ‘broad-scale assess-
ment tools’ (e.g. Gouldby et al., 2008) 
connect marine science to engineer-
ing and economics and are now wide-
ly used in national analyses of  coastal 
flood hazard, helping to define the 
scale of  the problem and the poten-
tial mitigations.
3.6.6
Conclusions and 
key messages
 
Partnership
There is a need for improved multi-
disciplinary connections between 
oceanographers, coastal engineers 
and coastal planners to deliver deci-
sion tools based on sound physical 
and economic models.
Knowledge
Flood severity analysis would bene-
fit from a community-wide Europe-
an database and analysis of  historic 
storm events that resulted in coastal 
flooding, building on the model of 
Haigh et al. (2015).
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A set of  recommendations relating to the abovementioned hazards has been 
identified, based around the three pillars of  the Disaster Risk Management 
Knowledge Centre (DRMKC):
Partnership
Recommendation 1: Improving preparedness for hydrological risks requires 
contributions from many different disciplines of  knowledge. Efforts are need-
ed to improve (1) risk governance, including institutional governance, legal pro-
visions and financial instruments for planning, prevention and crises manage-
ment; (2) our understanding of  hazard modelling; (3) forecasts and predictions, 
from short to long lead time ranges; and (4) emergency response recovery, 
including coordination of  local operations, assistance to affected communities 
and recovery of  disrupted services. Communication with and engagement of 
the public and decision-makers is key to effectively integrate these layers and 
to improve preparedness.
Recommendation 2: Risk-based decision-support frameworks have to be tai-
lored to the problem in question but also need to be flexible to allow different 
situations to be dealt with as well as often unprecedented hydrological events. 
Warnings need to be tailored to the specific circumstances so that responders 
and the public can act accordingly. Information sharing and increased commu-
nication with all stakeholders is therefore essential and needs to be fostered 
further.
Knowledge
Recommendation 3: Hydrological hazard and risk maps should be developed 
using probabilistic methods to reflect the uncertainty in the underlying data 
and models and to produce more robust estimates of  risk. This is especially 
relevant considering the sensitivity of  hydrological risks to a changing environ-
ment such as land use changes or climate change.
Recommendation 4: Forecasting and EWSs are identified as key prepared-
ness actions for hydrological risk management and can be implemented at local 
scales as well as at continental and global scales. Continued efforts to improve 
these systems are necessary to increase preparedness and society’s resilience to 
hydrological risks.
Recommendation 5: Hydrological forecasts and risk maps have associated 
uncertainties that require adaptive management approaches in the design of 
flood risk management policy and infrastructure. The large uncertainty in the 
impacts of  climate change projections requires flexible adaptation pathways to 
be considered.
Recommendations
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Recommendation 6: An improvement of  the understanding of  the processes 
controlling hydrological risk including a better representation of  weather sys-
tems in climate models is necessary, in order to improve regional projections of 
hydrological risk under a changing climate.
Innovation
Recommendation 7: Operational flood EWSs currently have the capability to 
produce coarse-scale discharge forecasts in the medium-range and to dissemi-
nate forecasts and, in some cases, early warning products in real time across the 
globe, in support of  national forecasting capabilities. With improvements in 
seasonal weather forecasting, future advances may include more seamless hy-
drological forecasting at the global scale alongside a move towards multimodel 
forecasts and grand ensemble techniques, responding to the requirement of 
developing multihazard EWSs for disaster risk reduction.
Recommendation 8: Improved decision-support systems need to be devel-
oped that can integrate the different stages of  flood risk management, without 
losing information on uncertainty, warning time, forecast accuracy and reliabil-
ity. This will help decision-makers to understand the strengths and weaknesses 
of  a forecasting system for different scales and events.
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The following subchapters cover meteorological, climatological and bi-ological risks. In terms of  meteorological risks, hazards from different types of  storm systems as well as extremes of  temperature are covered. Climatological risks include droughts and wildfires, and the biological 
risks posed by epidemics and pandemics are also examined. Each of  these 
hazards is described in turn:
• There are two types of  storm in meteorology: (1) the hazardous weather 
phenomena themselves (e.g. windstorms, rainstorms, snowstorms, thun-
derstorms and ice storms) and (2) the meteorological features in the at-
mosphere or storm systems that are responsible for the adverse weather. 
The latter includes tropical cyclones, extra-tropical cyclones and convec-
tive systems.
• Temperature extremes are rare high- or low-temperature events that may 
occur over a range of  time and geographical scales. They usually occur be-
cause of  a change in the weather pattern over a few days or several weeks.
• In terms of  climatological risks, droughts result either from a shortfall in 
precipitation over an extended period of  time, from its inadequate timing 
in relation to the needs of  the vegetation cover, or from a negative water 
balance due to increased potential evapotranspiration caused by high tem-
peratures.
• Wildfires refer to fires affecting grasslands, shrublands and other non-for-
est land covers. Although they are mainly initiated by human actions, their 
intensity and the effects they cause are mainly driven by fuel condition and 
availability, vegetation structure and prevalent meteorological and topo-
graphic conditions, and thus they are termed a natural hazard.
• An epidemic is the widespread, and often rapidly extending, occurrence of 
an infectious disease in a community or population at a particular time. A 
pandemic is the extension of  an epidemic to many populations worldwide 
or over a very wide area, crossing many international boundaries and af-
fecting a large number of  people.
All of  these hazards can lead to a range of  substantive direct and indirect 
impacts on human activity and infrastructure. Compared with other meteoro-
logical disasters, extreme temperatures (particularly high rather than low tem-
peratures) can cause the most severe consequences in terms of  human lives 
lost. Droughts can affect extended areas and large populations, putting socio-
economic systems and the environment at risk. Wildfires emit large volumes 
of  smoke and gases that can aggravate respiratory problems, resulting in the 
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deaths of  susceptible individuals. Demographic, physical, socioeconomic, be-
havioural and institutional factors may moderate a population’s vulnerability to 
most hazards, particularly temperature extremes and epidemics. Thunderstorm 
asthma is a term used to describe an observed increase in acute bronchospasm 
cases following severe thunderstorms, which can have significant impacts on 
individuals’ health and on health services.
Of  particular concern is the evidence that human-related climate change is 
increasing the frequency of  these hazards. The accelerated growth in global 
mean temperature since 1975 and the projected increase over the next several 
decades have implications for the occurrence of  temperature extremes. A num-
ber of  researchers have also highlighted the potential changes in fire climate 
regimes in different parts of  the world, which may result in increased fire risk 
and an exacerbation of  the effects of  wildfires.
However, these hazards do not always occur in isolation and can often interact 
with or influence one another. This is explained in chapter 2.5 where evolution 
of  risk can be even so complicated that one hazard changes the vulnerability 
conditions for the next. For example, epidemics of  Rift Valley fever often com-
mence when a period of  drought is followed by flooding or intense rainfall, 
so climate perturbations may herald an increased risk of  outbreaks in at-risk 
regions. Similarly, prolonged droughts and heat waves dry out fuels, creating 
conditions which can exacerbate uncontrollable wildfires.
The following subchapters describe the current knowledge regarding the risk 
assessment and management of  each hazard in detail, identifying a set of  rec-
ommendations for key stakeholders to reduce and manage their risks.
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3.7 Meteorological risk: 
extra-tropical cyclones, 
tropical cyclones and 
convective storms
Thomas	Frame, Giles Harrison, Tim Hewson, Nigel Roberts
3.7.1
Storm types 
and associated 
hazardous 
phenomena
3.7.1.1 
Storms
Conceptually, there are two types of 
storm in meteorology: (1) the hazard-
ous weather phenomena themselves 
(such as windstorms, rainstorms, 
snowstorms, hailstorms, thunder-
storms and ice storms (freezing rain)), 
and (2) the meteorological features in 
the atmosphere — the ‘storm sys-
tems’ — that can be said to be re-
sponsible for this adverse weather 
(notably tropical cyclones, extra-trop-
ical cyclones and convective systems). 
These storm systems, which are a 
focal point in the following discus-
sion, can be distinguished from one 
another by their mechanism of  de-
velopment (growth), their structure, 
their geographic location, their spatial 
scale and their typical lifetime. Other 
types of  storm system do exist, but 
these can be considered subtypes of 
the three systems listed above. 
3.7.1.2 
Extra-tropical cyclones
Extra-tropical cyclones are large ro-
tating weather systems that occur in 
the extra-tropics (more than 30° lat-
itude away from the equator). They 
consist of  an approximately circular 
region of  low surface pressure, of  a 
radius of  100-2 000 km, accompa-
nied by cold and warm fronts. They 
typically develop in regions of  strong 
horizontal temperature gradients, 
which are commonly denoted on a 
weather chart as a cold or quasi-sta-
tionary front. In turn, such fronts of-
ten connect to a pre-existing decaying 
extra-tropical cyclone, which itself  is 
situated some way downstream (typ-
ically to the north-east). At the same 
time, high up in the atmosphere 
(around 10 km altitude) one com-
monly finds a jet stream relatively 
close by. Indeed, the intensity of  an 
extra-tropical cyclone is closely relat-
ed to the strength of  this jet stream. 
The strongest extra-tropical cyclones 
occur in winter months when the jet 
stream is at its strongest. 
Storm systems can be 
distinguished from each 
other by their mechanism 
of development (growth), 
structure, geographic 
location, spatial scale and 
typical lifetime.
Periods when the jet stream is unusu-
ally strong can lead to two or more 
strong cyclones occurring within days 
of  each other. The total lifecycle of 
an extra-tropical cyclone from birth 
(genesis) through to development 
and on to decay (lysis) can occasion-
ally be more than 10 days; however, 
somewhere in the range of  2-5 days 
is much more typical (Ulbrich, 2009).
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The major hazards associated with 
extra-tropical cyclones are high winds 
and precipitation (rain and snow). 
Precipitation occurs primarily along 
fronts and, on average, is not particu-
larly intense relative to that delivered 
by tropical cyclones and convective 
storms. However, when a cyclone is 
developing, some very heavy pre-
cipitation can occur, particularly in a 
narrow band just to the left (north) of 
the cyclone track. The band is ordi-
narily between about 20 and 200 km 
wide, depending on the scale of  the 
cyclone. In addition, fronts connected 
to cyclones can sometimes become 
very slow-moving, remaining over the 
same location for many hours, and 
potentially up to 2 days, leading to 
large rainfall accumulations and po-
tential flooding.
3.7.1.3 
Tropical cyclones
A tropical cyclone is a rotating storm 
originating in tropical latitudes, with 
low surface pressure at its centre. 
These develop over warm oceans in 
tropical regions, have a radius in the 
range of  about 100-500 km, and have 
a lifetime of  between a few days and 
a couple of  weeks. They also have a 
structure in wind, rainfall, tempera-
ture, etc., that is relatively axisymmet-
ric (unlike extra-tropical cyclones, the 
structures of  which are not generally 
axisymmetric). The development and 
maintenance of  tropical cyclones re-
quires that the ocean surface is very 
warm relative to the air above, and 
that the air above has high humidity 
(Emanuel, 2003). The requirement of 
a warm ocean surface beneath means 
that tropical cyclones will decay as 
they move inland. This makes them 
primarily a hazard for oceanic and 
coastal regions as well as for small is-
lands.
For historical and cultural reasons, 
the strongest tropical cyclones are 
assigned different terminology in dif-
ferent regions of  the globe. In the 
North Atlantic and North-East Pacif-
ic, they are called hurricanes; in the 
North-West Pacific they are called ty-
phoons, and in the Indian Ocean and 
southern hemisphere they are simply 
called cyclones. The term hurricane is 
also sometimes used erroneously by 
the media to refer to extra-tropical 
cyclones that have hurricane-strength 
winds. Tropical cyclones lead to very 
intense surface winds (notably in a 
small annulus around the eye), as well 
as heavy rain and lightning. The most 
significant threat that they pose is 
coastal flooding from the associated 
storm surge.
3.7.1.4 
Convective systems
Convective storms are produced by 
a localised rapid ascent of  air, which 
is made buoyant by the heating of  air 
near the Earth’s surface or the cool-
ing of  air higher up, with the ascent 
of  the air maintained by heat supplied 
by condensation of  water vapour 
within it. The rapid ascent of  air in 
convective storms often produces 
very heavy but relatively short-lived 
rainfall, thunder and lightning, as well 
as, potentially, hail, very strong wind 
gusts and even tornadoes. At their 
simplest, convective storms consist 
of  a single short-lived convective cell, 
comprising one ascending and one 
descending column of  air (updraft 
and downdraft).
Individual cells have diameters rang-
ing from around a few hundred me-
tres up to several kilometres. How-
ever, severe convective systems can 
comprise many cells organised into 
a larger coherent structure with di-
ameters of  up to a few hundred kilo-
metres. These can persist for much 
longer than the individual cells, as 
new cells tend to replace old ones 
within the structure. For example, 
convective cells may be organised in a 
linear fashion into squall lines or dere-
cho systems. They may also form part 
of  a rotating system such as a super-
cell or a large meso-scale convective 
system. Convective storms mostly 
occur in the tropics and over land in 
summer or over the sea in winter in 
the extra-tropics.
3.7.2
Frequency and 
geographical 
distribution of
 severe storm 
related hazards
3.7.2.1 
High winds associated with 
extra-tropical 
cyclones 
Extra-tropical cyclones account for 
the majority of  recorded high surface 
winds in Europe. Their capacity to 
travel inland, and the fact that some 
cyclones are themselves very large, 
means that the winds associated with 
a single storm system can affect large 
areas. For example, as extra-tropical 
cyclone Kyrill (January 2007) travelled 
across Europe wind gusts of  25 m/s 
or more were reported over most of 
Ireland, the southern United King-
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dom, northern France, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, Germany, Switzer-
land, Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Poland (Fink et 
al., 2009; RAIN, 2016). Cyclone Kyrill 
caused 46 fatalities (EEA, 2011), cre-
ated total estimated insured losses of 
between EUR 4.5 and EUR 4.8 bil-
lion (EEA, 2011; AIR Worldwide, 
2015) and a total estimated damage 
of  EUR 7.7 billion. An example of  a 
much smaller but much more intense 
storm system for which the econom-
ic losses were about the same was 
Cyclone Lothar, in December 2009 
(Mitchell-Wallace and Mitchell, 2007; 
Roberts et al., 2014). Lothar affect-
ed only a relatively narrow swathe of 
northern France, south-west Germa-
ny and Switzerland, but wind gusts 
widely exceeded 35 m/s. An impor-
tant consideration regarding impacts 
is that damage is typically estimated 
to vary according to gust strength to 
the power of  3 (Leckebusch, 2007). 
Therefore, 35 m/s gusts are much 
more destructive than 25 m/s gusts.
Understanding of  the structure of 
extra-tropical cyclones has increased 
considerably in recent decades (see, 
for example, Browning, 2004; Hew-
son and Neu, 2015), to the extent that 
we now have a much clearer picture of 
related windstorm subtypes. Figure 
3.28, for example, shows windstorm 
footprints for the subtypes Warm 
Jet (WJ), Cold Jet (CJ) and Sting Jet 
(SJ). These subtypes are important 
because they can explain differences 
in damage levels and the geographical 
extent of  damage between different 
cyclones. For example, for Cyclone 
Kyrill, the subtypes were WJ and CJ, 
while for Cyclone Lothar they were 
probably WJ and SJ. Moreover, these 
different subtypes have very different 
associated predictability levels. WJ is 
relatively easy to predict, while SJ, the 
most extreme type, is notoriously dif-
ficult.
Storm systems lead to 
a variety of hazardous 
phenomena, including 
high winds, precipitation 
and lightning, with 
the spatial extent and 
duration of the hazard 
being strongly dependent 
on the type of storm.
Extra-tropical cyclones are ubiqui-
tous in the extra-tropics, occurring 
at all locations and all year round (al-
though they are more frequent and, 
on average, more intense in late au-
tumn/winter). Europe is affected by 
about 10 extra-tropical cyclones per 
month (based on Hoskins and Hodg-
es, 2002); however, the vast majority 
of  such cyclones do not lead to dam-
aging winds. These cyclones originate 
from three main sources. The main 
subtype affecting Europe is Atlantic 
cyclones, which typically form near 
the eastern seaboard of  the Amer-
ican continent and develop as they 
cross the Atlantic over the course of 
several days, although such cyclones 
can also form over the eastern North 
Atlantic, closer to Europe. They may 
also develop over the Mediterranean 
(Mediterranean cyclones) or in po-
lar regions (polar lows). Within the 
Mediterranean and in polar regions, 
cyclones can sometimes have some of 
the physical characteristics of  tropical 
cyclones (leading to the term ‘medi-
canes’ in the former case), although 
such storms are not as long lived and 
the most extreme cases are much less 
severe than the most extreme tropical 
cyclones (Cavicchia et al., 2014). The 
frequency with which severe cyclones 
occur is difficult to define because 
the observational record is not suffi-
ciently long (Della-Marta et al., 2009; 
Welker et al., 2016) and because cur-
rent climate models, which could in 
principle, generate very long synthetic 
representations of  the current climate 
on which to base an accurate estimate, 
typically lack the resolution needed to 
represent severe windstorms (Zappa 
et al., 2013; Donat, 2011). In addition, 
if  severe cyclones cluster as has been 
suggested by Pinto et al. (2013) and 
others, then frequency estimates such 
as return periods need to be interpret-
ed carefully.
The effect of  climate change on 
the intensity and distribution of  ex-
tra-tropical cyclones is still very uncer-
tain; however, the IPCC AR5 (IPCC, 
2014) states that it is unlikely that the 
number of  cyclones will reduce by 
more than a few per cent and that 
there could be a small northward shift 
in the average tracks of  extra-tropi-
cal cyclones relative to now. It is also 
noted that there is little evidence in 
one set of  climate change simulations 
(CMIP5) of  a change in extra-tropical 
cyclone-related wind strengths.
3.7.2.2 
High winds associated with 
tropical cyclones
With the exception of  Hurricane 
Vince in 2005 (Franklin, 2006), trop-
ical cyclones are not known to reach 
Europe, although they may enter the 
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region of  the jet stream and evolve in 
structure into extra-tropical cyclones 
in a process known as extra-tropi-
cal transition. Some recent studies 
have suggested that there may be an 
increase in these transitioning cas-
es during autumn due to a poleward 
expansion of  the region of  tropical 
cyclone development (Haarsma et al., 
2013).
In subtropical coastal regions, tropi-
cal cyclones are a major cause of  wind 
damage, particularly in the developing 
world, where infrastructure is not re-
silient to the magnitudes of  winds that 
occur. The effect of  climate change is 
likely to be a reduction or no change 
in the frequency of  tropical cyclones, 
although the average strength of  the 
associated winds is expected to in-
crease (IPCC, 2014).
3.7.2.3 
High winds associated with 
convective systems
Winds associated with convective sys-
tems can be extreme, the causes be-
ing both downbursts and tornadoes 
(weak tornadoes also occur, rarely, 
in frontal regions in extratropical cy-
clones). A key difference compared 
with cyclone-related winds is that 
convective system winds are relatively 
short-lived, and so impacts are very 
localised. Indeed, if  plotted on a map 
similar to that in Figure 3.28, foot-
prints associated with convective sys-
tems would be minuscule. Because of 
their small scale and relatively short 
lifetime, such events are difficult to 
observe and, therefore, full knowl-
edge of  their frequency and spatial 
distribution is difficult. Moreover, it is 
very likely that there is under-report-
ing, particularly in sparsely populated 
areas.
In recent decades, approximately 240 
tornado sightings have been reported 
in Europe each year (Antonescu et al., 
2016). These were mostly in summer, 
in mid to late afternoon, when con-
vective activity is highest. The small 
scale and short lifetime also mean 
that when they do occur they pres-
ent a hazard for only a very small 
area; however, the degree of  hazard 
can be exceptionally high, because of 
the extreme wind strengths that are 
possible. The direct measurement of 
tornado winds is not feasible owing 
to their destructive nature, although 
progress has been made with the in-
troduction of  mobile Doppler radar, 
which can make indirect measure-
ments remotely. Occasionally, large 
convective storm systems can form 
into squall lines (or derechoes), which 
can cause a swathe of  damaging winds 
over larger areas. One example is the 
derecho that hit Berlin in 2002 and 
caused considerable damage and four 
fatalities (Gatzen, 2004); another is 
the events of  9 June 2014 in western 
Germany that killed six (BBC News, 
2014). In both such cases, footprints 
were still no more than about 25 % of 
the size of  the red SJ zone in Figure 
3.28.
3.7.2.4 
Precipitation: rain, 
snow and hail
All storm types are associated with 
some form of  precipitation. The ex-
act nature of  this depends strongly on 
the storm itself. The most frequent 
type of  precipitation is rainfall. This 
presents a particular hazard when 
Conceptual model of the footprints of windstorms associated with extra-
tropical cyclones.
Source: Hewson and Neu (2015)
FIGURE 3.28
250
accumulations (the total amount of 
rainfall in a given time) over a local 
area or river catchment are large. This 
occurs usually from either severe con-
vective rainfall, especially when the 
convection persists or is triggered 
repeatedly over the same location, 
or just to the left of  the track of  a 
rapidly developing extra-tropical cy-
clone, or on slow-moving fronts as-
sociated with such cyclones, or in 
and just downwind of  upslope areas 
during periods of  persistent, strong, 
moist, low-level flow (orographically 
enhanced rain). In the last two cases, 
the rainfall rates themselves may not 
be very large but the stationarity of 
the pattern is a key factor. Sometimes 
even fast-moving supercell storms or 
organised squall lines can produce 
flooding simply because of  the sheer 
intensity of  the rain.
Heavy snowfall has similar causes to 
heavy rainfall, as discussed above, 
but there are two key differences. 
The first is that, in all instances, the 
low-level air clearly needs to be suffi-
ciently cold, and this tends to depend 
primarily on time of  year, but also on 
proximity to coasts and other factors. 
The second is that extreme convec-
tive snow occurs only in certain small 
areas of  certain countries, whereas 
convective rainfall extremes are much 
more evenly distributed across the 
world. Vulnerable areas lie adjacent 
to bodies of  water such as lakes or 
oceans, which provide both the mois-
ture source for the snow and perpet-
ual triggering of  convection, via the 
elevated surface temperature of  the 
water body. Over the vast majority of 
the United States, a convective snow-
fall of  50 cm in 1 day is virtually im-
possible, but around the Great Lakes, 
it is not that unusual. Water bodies 
around Europe (e.g. the Baltic Sea, 
North Sea and Adriatic Sea) can also 
trigger extreme localised convective 
snowfall.
Hail is formed only in strong convec-
tive updrafts; the stronger the updraft, 
the larger the hail can be. Since hail-
storms are small scale, it is difficult to 
get a precise picture of  the geograph-
ical distribution and frequency of  oc-
currence of  hail by size (Hand and 
Cappelluti, 2011). Pocakal et al. (2009) 
suggest that the largest hail typically 
occurs in mountainous regions where 
updraft strengths can be large owing 
to the air being forced to rise over ter-
rain. Reports of  large hail (diameter 
of  20 mm or more) within Europe 
vary between zero and three reports 
per year per 10 000 km2 depending on 
location; however, inhomogeneities in 
the observation network mean that 
confidence in published geographical 
distributions cannot be very high (see 
Hand and Cappelluti, 2011).
3.7.2.5 
Lightning
Lightning strikes usually occur in the 
presence of  convective rainfall asso-
ciated with convective storms and 
tropical cyclones, although they may 
also occur in the frontal regions as-
sociated with extra-tropical cyclones. 
The number of  lightning flashes per 
year is estimated to be of  the order 
of  1-2 billion globally (Mackerras et 
al., 1998; Christian et al., 2003), with 
approximately one-fifth of  flash-
es caused by lightning striking the 
ground and four-fifths caused by 
lightning between clouds (Mackerras 
et al., 1998). Over Europe, lightning 
strikes to the ground are estimated to 
vary between 0.1 and 4 times per year 
per square kilometre depending on 
location (Anderson and Klugmann, 
2014). The response of  lightning to a 
changing climate is poorly known, but 
it is expected to be highly sensitive to 
increasing global temperatures (Price, 
2009).
3.7.2.6 
Estimating potential 
for future severe storm 
related events
There are a number of  ways to esti-
mate ‘potential worst case scenarios’ 
in the current climate, although these 
will inevitably have error bars asso-
ciated with them. For future climate 
predictions, the problem is much 
more challenging. For the current 
climate, one method is to assume 
that small-scale extreme events, seen 
in the instrumental record, could by 
chance have occurred in a nearby lo-
cation. However, one must have due 
regard to physical mechanisms, so ex-
treme orographic rainfall, for exam-
ple, could not have occurred over flat 
plains situated close to mountains.
A second method is to use a state-of-
the-art numerical model to synthesise 
possible realisations of  the current 
climate. This is relatively common 
practice within the reinsurance in-
dustry, where extreme windstorms 
are simulated and their output is fed 
into impact models to estimate po-
tential losses. The companies then 
position themselves financially to be 
able to cover such losses should such 
a storm occur. More recently, the 
ECMWF has pioneered a method of 
using operational reforecasts to esti-
mate potential extreme rainfall events 
in the United Kingdom (Lavers et al., 
2016). The main conclusions of  this 
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study were: ‘Across half  of  the country at 
least 30 % more rainfall is possible. In some 
places, the potential maximum is substan-
tially higher, up to twice what has occurred’. 
Such an approach could be extended 
and expanded, to provide input for 
strengthening resilience networks.
A third method is to use a stochastic/
statistical approach. This approach 
involves randomly generating a large 
number of  artificial weather events 
(e.g. windstorm footprints) by, for 
example, decomposing observed 
storm structures into base elements 
using image processing techniques, 
and recombining these elements with 
random weighting factors to produce 
new storm structures. This is also em-
ployed in the reinsurance industry.
3.7.3
Forecasting 
and monitoring
3.7.3.1 
Current predictive 
capabilities and future 
developments
Weather forecasts are produced us-
ing large computer models of  the 
atmosphere that propagate the cur-
rent best estimate of  the state of  the 
atmosphere forward in time. The at-
mosphere is a chaotic system, which 
means that there are inherent physical 
limits to how far into the future ac-
curate forecasts can be made. How-
ever, over the past few decades, major 
improvements in forecast accuracy 
have been achieved through a combi-
nation of  improved computer power, 
improved models and improved use 
and quality of  observations (Bauer 
et al., 2015). Determining the extent 
to which forecasts can be further 
improved is a challenging scientific 
problem, which depends in part on 
the resolution of  computer hardware 
issues, although there is no clear ev-
idence as yet of  any plateauing out 
of  forecast accuracy. No forecast can 
ever be 100 % accurate, but larger 
scale atmospheric phenomena can be 
more accurately forecast further into 
the future than smaller scale physi-
cal phenomena (as illustrated by Ta-
ble 3.2). To quantify the uncertainty, 
weather forecasts at all lead times are 
now typically produced using multi-
ple computer forecasts (an ‘ensemble 
forecast system’) that each use slightly 
different (but plausible) initial condi-
tions; the degree to which these fore-
casts differ gives an estimate of  the 
degree of  uncertainty in the forecast.
After their initial development, tropi-
cal and extra-tropical cyclones are co-
herent structures that can be tracked 
in time until they decay. The fore-
casting problem for such storms can 
generally be thought of  as compris-
ing several components: forecasting 
the genesis of  a storm, forecasting 
its path and evolution of  its structure 
and forecasting the severity of  the as-
sociated weather.
Forecasting the genesis of  storm sys-
tems is one of  the most difficult tasks, 
as storm systems develop from small 
perturbations in regions of  instabili-
ty. A particularly challenging problem 
arises when convective cells com-
bine into more organised structures: 
this includes tropical cyclones (see 
Majumdar and Torn, 2014), mesos-
cale convective systems and derecho 
storms. The formation of  tropical cy-
clones is not completely understood, 
although several theories exist and 
some are being actively tested in field 
campaigns (Montgomery et al., 2012).
Despite a degree of 
uncertainty in forecasting, 
it has become more 
accurate over the past 
few decades, allowing 
mitigating actions to be 
taken and emergency 
services to be prepared in 
advance.
Because of  their longer lifetimes, the 
existence of  potentially hazardous ex-
tra-tropical and tropical cyclones can 
now be predicted with some confi-
dence up to about 5 days in advance. 
However, at such leads, uncertainty 
in the details of  a storm’s track, tim-
ing and intensity are likely to be very 
large (Magnussen et al., 2014; Frame 
et al., 2015). For example, it may often 
be possible to state with confidence 
that a strong extra-tropical cyclone 
will occur, but uncertainty will remain 
with regard to the path it will take and 
the strength of  winds and precipita-
tion (see third column in Table 3.2). 
Nonetheless, for some users, having 
early indications of  a very high po-
tential for an extreme event, even if 
the point probability is only 5 %, can 
still be useful. Some basic mitigating 
actions can be taken, and emergen-
cy services can be placed in a state 
of  readiness (Petroliagis and Pinson, 
2014).
Owing to their small spatial scale and 
short timescale, unorganised convec-
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tive storms cannot be forecast far into 
the future (see Table 3.2). The fore-
cast chance of  a thunderstorm occur-
ring at a particular location remains 
negligible, even at lead times of  a few 
hours. However, the background con-
ditions that may give rise to the de-
velopment of  individual storms does 
have predictive skill (i.e. prediction 
of  the instability in the atmosphere). 
It is, therefore, sometimes possible 
to provide a useful probabilistic esti-
mate that convective storms will oc-
cur somewhere within a region within 
a time window. This has motivated 
a move to short-range local-area en-
sembles running at ‘convection-per-
mitting resolutions’, requiring hori-
zontal grid spacing of  1-3 km.
For example, the Met Office 
MOGREPS-UK 12-member ensem-
ble forecast with 2.2-km grid covering 
the United Kingdom became opera-
tional in July 2012; the COSMO-DE 
2.8-km ensemble (Gebhardt et al., 
2011) became operational in a domain 
over Germany in May 2012, and the 
2.5-km AROME model has been test-
ed in several domains across Europe 
(Vie et al., 2011; Bouttier et al., 2012; 
Nuissier et al., 2016).
 3.7.3.2 
Use of observational  
updates/nowcasting
Although predicting a rapid inten-
sification phase for cyclones can be 
very problematic, there are nonethe-
less operational tools available to as-
sist with this. Commonly, forecasters 
compare imagery signatures, surface 
pressure measurements and other 
observations with their equivalent 
representation in a forecast model 
output to see if  the forecast model is 
‘on track’, and if  it is not adjustments 
are made based either on selecting 
out a suitable ensemble member or 
on physical understanding and expe-
rience. It is of  particular importance 
that forecasts are interpreted with the 
help of  qualified meteorologists and 
forecasters (Heizenreder et al., 2015).
For convective storms, the high lev-
el of  uncertainty in the location of 
storm formation and the short life-
time of  storms means that while fore-
casts can provide initial indications 
that a severe convective storm is a 
possibility, much more detailed infor-
mation is likely to emerge in near real 
time as the storm develops. For exam-
ple, in the United States the average 
lead time for tornado warnings issued 
by the National Centre for Environ-
mental Prediction (NCEP) increased 
from 3 minutes in 1978 to around 14 
minutes in 2007 (Wurman et al., 2012), 
but warnings are still based primarily 
on the detection of  tornadoes in ob-
servational data after tornadogenesis 
has occurred, and the improvement 
has been due to better observations 
and communications (Brotzge and 
Donner, 2013). Within Europe, re-
cent improvements in radar networks 
in particular mean that there is greater 
potential for tracking severe convec-
tive events in real time than previously 
existed. For example, the installation 
of  Doppler and dual polarisation ra-
dar give information about winds 
and more detailed information about 
droplet size and type within convec-
tive storms. Methods are used that 
project the track of  a storm over the 
next few hours with the assumption 
that the storm will remain intact and 
that no new storms will form. These 
‘advection nowcasting’ systems can 
be very useful for the first hour or 
so, but the rapid evolution of  storms 
can quickly damage performance. In 
the future, it is expected that convec-
tion-permitting numerical models will 
be run much more frequently (hourly 
or more often) and combined with 
advection nowcasting to give the best 
probabilistic forecast.
3.7.3.3 
Severe weather 
warnings
The technical challenge of  dissem-
inating information to the gener-
al public can increasingly be met 
through the worldwide web (e.g. 
meteoalarm.eu and National Mete-
orological services websites) and the 
adoption of  smartphone applications 
(e.g. Deutcher Wetterdeinst’s Wetter-
warn APP, or weather apps produced 
by MeteoSwiss, the Met Office and 
Finnish Meteorological Institute). 
However, by providing the potential 
for mass communication to far more 
individuals and groups than ever be-
fore, this technology also creates a 
greater challenge in maintaining the 
National Met Service as a ‘single au-
thoritative voice’ in issuing warnings 
(WMO, 2017) than was previously the 
case when mass communication was 
dominated by a small number of  me-
dia organisations.
Severe weather warnings and guid-
ance pose several other decision-mak-
ing and communication challenges. 
Determining what degree of  certain-
ty in the forecast is required to for a 
warning to be issued is a non-trivial 
problem, which requires balancing 
the risk of  missing the opportunity 
for early warning with the risk of  issu-
ing too many false alarms (Petroliagis 
and Pinson, 2014). Kox et al. (2015) 
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Estimated current predictive capabilities in Europe for different hazardous weather phenomena discussed in 
the text. For this table the maximum lead-time for deterministic predictions (*) is taken to be the point beyond 
which deterministic forecasts, of threshold exceedance at a point, are more likely to be incorrect than correct 
(i.e. the ‘Deterministic limit’, following Hewson, 2006).
The maximum lead-time for useful probabilistic predictions (**) is taken here to be the lead time at which one 
can reliably highlight when the probability of a 1 in 20 year event (for a given day), at a point, exceeds 5 %.
For thunderstorms (^), it is difficult to define the meaning of a 1 in 20 year event. Note that lead times quoted 
are approximate ‘best guess values’ for current forecasting systems based on forecaster experience and are 
for illustrative purposes.
TABLE 3.2
 Storm system  Storm type (weather) Maximum lead time 
for accurate 
“deterministic”   
predictions * 
Maximum lead time for useful 
‘probabilistic’ predictions of an 
exceptional event** 
Extra-tropical  
cyclones 
(Figure 3.28) 
Rainstorm (‘left of track’) ≈24 hours ≈72 hours 
Rainstorm (‘slow-moving front’) ≈24 hours ≈96 hours 
Rainstorm (‘orographic rain’) ≈48 hours ≈144 hours 
Windstorm — CJ ≈24 hours ≈96 hours 
Extreme windstorm — SJ ≈2 hours ≈36 hours 
Snowstorm (‘left of track’) ≈12 hours ≈48 hours 
Ice storm ≈12 hours ≈72 hours 
Tropical 
cyclones 
Rainstorm ≈72 hours ≈120 hours 
Windstorm (broadscale) ≈48 hours ≈144 hours 
Extreme windstorm (near eye) ≈12 hours ≈72 hours 
Storm surge ≈24 hours ≈72 hours 
Convective  
systems 
Rainstorm (‘flash floods’) ≈30 minutes ≈48 hours 
Hailstorm ≈15 minutes Not currently possible 
Windstorm (convective gusts) ≈15 minutes Not currently possible 
Tornado Not currently possible Not currently possible 
Thunderstorm 15 minutes N/A^ 
 Snowstorm (“Lake Effect”)         48 hours ~96 hours 
  
254
note that, although emergency servic-
es in Germany had a good grasp of 
forecast uncertainty, it was not possi-
ble to identify a particular probability 
threshold at which mitigation meas-
ures would begin. However, it was 
noted that decisions were delayed for 
low probabilities. Studies suggest that 
the general public often misunder-
stand the nature of  the hazard from 
severe weather events; for example, 
Meyer et al. (2014) found that resi-
dents of  coastal regions in the Unit-
ed States typically overestimated the 
probability of  their homes being hit 
by hurricane-force winds, but under-
estimated the damage that such winds 
could cause. They also erroneously 
perceived the greatest threat to come 
from the wind rather than the storm 
surge. Since the public response to 
weather warnings is a key element in 
their success, determining warning 
quality necessarily takes forecast ver-
ification beyond the traditional quan-
titative forecast skill measures used so 
far into the arena of  social sciences; 
for example, the Met Office in the 
United Kingdom utilises the subjec-
tive analysis of  data from social media 
posts among other sources to try to 
assess the quality of  warnings.
3.7.4
Impacts
3.7.4.1 
Human impact
Direct effects occur during the im-
pact phase of  a windstorm, causing 
death and injury as a result of  the 
force of  the wind, and the main dan-
gers include becoming airborne, be-
ing struck by flying debris or falling 
trees and road traffic accidents. Indi-
rect effects, occurring during the pre- 
and post-impact phases of  the storm, 
include falls, lacerations and puncture 
wounds, and occur when preparing 
for, or cleaning up after, a storm. 
Power outages are a key issue and can 
lead to electrocution, fires and burns 
and carbon monoxide poisoning from 
gasoline-powered electrical genera-
tors. In addition, worsening of  chron-
ic illnesses owing to lack of  access to 
medical care or medication can occur. 
Other health impacts include subse-
quent infections and an increase in 
insect bites (Goldman et al., 2013).
Owing to their large scale, severe 
extra-tropical cyclones can expose a 
very large number of  people to haz-
ards, such as injury and loss of  life, 
as can tropical cyclones if  landfall is 
made in densely populated areas.
Severe winds from convective storms 
have a highly localised and short-
lived nature, which means that they 
frequently occur without any conse-
quence for human health. However, 
when they occur in certain circum-
stances they can have severe conse-
quences: for example, an outbreak of 
convective cells caused downbursts 
of  29-37 m/s to strike the Pukkelpop 
music festival in Belgium (18 August 
2011), exposing 60 000 people to the 
associated hazard for approximately 
10 minutes. Five people were killed, 
at least 140 were injured as a concert 
tent collapsed, and trees, light towers 
and video screens were blown over. 
Nearby residences were, however, 
completely unaffected by the event 
(De Meutter et al., 2015). Intense 
long-lived tornadoes (as occur in the 
United States) can potentially expose 
a large number of  people to hazards 
due to flying debris. In Europe, torna-
does are generally weaker and much 
shorter lived than those experienced 
in the United States; however, it has 
been estimated that in Europe there 
are 10-15 tornado-related deaths 
per year (Groenemeijer and Kühne, 
2014).
Storms can lead to a 
range of direct and 
indirect impacts on people 
and on the built and 
natural environment.
Lightning presents a hazard to hu-
mans and infrastructure systems as 
well as being a major cause of  wild-
fires. Annually, there are approxi-
mately three deaths by lightning strike 
per 10 million of  the population in 
developed countries (Lorenz, 2008; 
Holle, 2008) and perhaps as many 
as 60 deaths per 10 million of  the 
population in the developing world 
(Holle, 2008). These differences are 
due to the shift in demographics of 
developed nations from a largely ru-
ral population involved in agricultural 
work to an urban population spend-
ing significantly more time indoors, 
and to the fact that buildings in de-
veloped countries mostly now con-
tain conducting elements, such as 
electrical wiring, telephone cables, or 
purpose-built lightning conductors, 
which provide safe charge transfer 
paths to ground. For example, the 
risk of  death from lightning strike in 
the United Kingdom has reduced by 
about 95 % over the past century (El-
som, 2015), and data from Elsom and 
Webb (2014) indicate that changes in 
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the nature of  buildings reduced the 
proportion of  fatal lightning strikes 
that occurred indoors from 32 % in 
the 1850s, to 5 % in 1950s, to 0 % 
during the most recent period (1988-
2012). Reductions of  a similar order 
of  magnitude have been reported in 
other developed countries (Holle et 
al., 2005), but not in developing coun-
tries, where the risk of  death remains 
greater (Holle, 2016).
Thunderstorm asthma is a term used 
to describe an observed increase in 
acute bronchospasm cases following 
severe thunderstorms. These asthma 
events have had significant impacts 
on both individuals and health servic-
es, with a range of  different aeroaller-
gens identified (Dabrera et al., 2013). 
The impact of  these rare events can 
be significant, with many without pre-
vious asthma events becoming acutely 
ill (Murray et al., 1994). Health servic-
es can be seriously affected by thun-
derstorm asthma; for example, during 
the 24/25 June 1994 thunderstorm 
asthma episode, hospital emergency 
departments ran out of  asthma-relat-
ed supplies including nebuliser face 
masks (5 of  11 departments) and drug 
therapies (8 of  11) and half  of  all the 
regional health authorities in England 
observed a 6-fold increase in asthma 
attendances in emergency depart-
ments, resulting in difficulty in service 
provision (Venables et al., 1997).
Large hail has the potential to produce 
significant head trauma and in extreme 
cases can result in death. Such ex-
treme cases with multiple deaths have 
been reported particularly in northern 
India, Bangladesh and parts of  China, 
but the details of  these are difficult to 
verify. In the United States, only eight 
deaths from hail were reported in the 
70 years prior to 2009 (Changnon et 
al., 2009), although larger numbers of 
non-fatal injuries are reported. To the 
authors’ knowledge, there have been 
no reported deaths as a direct result 
of  being struck by hail in Europe in 
recent decades, despite the occur-
rence of  damaging hailstorms such as 
that in Munich in 1984 (Heimann and 
Kure, 1985); however, hail has been a 
contributing factor in fatal traffic ac-
cidents.
3.7.4.2 
Infrastructure and 
environment
Damage from high winds associated 
with extra-tropical cyclones varies ac-
cording to the wind gust to the pow-
er of  3 (or more), so prediction of 
the correct values is crucial (but still 
very challenging). This rapid increase 
in vulnerability with wind strength 
relates to building regulations that 
specify resilience to certain standards 
(e.g. in the United Kingdom and in 
Eurocodes, 50-year return periods are 
quoted for some purposes). As winds 
nominally increase above such thresh-
olds, the building ‘failure rate’ will 
naturally accelerate rapidly.
Damage to property and crops from 
hail storms can be very costly: for ex-
ample, the Munich hailstorm of  1984 
(hail diameter 5-6 cm) caused signif-
icant damage to vegetation, build-
ings, automobiles and aircraft, leading 
to USD 500 million (equivalent to 
USD 1.2 billion -EUR 1.1 billion- to-
day) of  insured losses (Heimann and 
Kurz, 1985). A more recent hailstorm 
in Germany in July 2013 caused dam-
age worth USD 5 billion (equivalent 
to USD 5.2 billion -EUR 4.8 billion- 
today), part of  the explanation for 
the increase in potential losses being 
increased use of  ‘expensive construc-
tion materials and complex building 
façades’ (MunichRe, 2016).
Regarding damage to environment, 
more than 130 separate wind storms 
have been identified as causing notice-
able damage  to European forests in 
the last 60 years (~2/year) that, for 
example, increases the vulnerability of 
forests to wildfires (see Chapter 3.10). 
Storms are responsible for more than 
50 % of  all primary abiotic and biotic 
damage by volume to European for-
ests from catastrophic events (Gardin-
er et al., 2011; De Rigo et al.; 2016 ).
3.7.5
Conclusions and
key messages
Partnership
Collaboration between forecast pro-
viders and end users in real time is 
essential during DRM, since the in-
terpretation of  the available informa-
tion, the uncertainty associated with it 
and how this changes as new infor-
mation becomes available should be 
made in consultation with qualified 
meteorologists and National Meteor-
ological Services in particular. Infor-
mation sharing, particularly observa-
tional, impact and warning data across 
national boundaries in real time, is 
of  key importance. Improvements 
in forecasts will in part be driven by 
the interaction between fundamental 
atmosphere and ocean science with 
operational forecasting, so continued 
collaboration between forecasting cen-
tres and universities and research cen-
tres is crucial.
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Knowledge
A greater understanding of  how to 
interpret, utilise and communicate 
probabilistic forecasts is required. 
This is particularly important, since 
future developments in forecasting 
systems, particularly short-lead-time, 
high-resolution forecasts at small spa-
tial scales and long-lead-time global 
forecasts, lead to forecasts that are in-
herently probabilistic. Collaboration 
between physical scientists and social 
scientists may be important to im-
prove the communication of  forecast 
probabilities.
Innovation
Prospects for major extensions of 
the lead-time thresholds at which we 
can forecast storms are limited. We 
should instead expect continued slow 
but steady extensions of  these over 
the coming years and decades. Im-
provements in the quality of  forecast 
information for end users will also 
stem from innovative and improved 
post-processing of  forecast data for 
the diagnosis of  hazardous weather 
and end user-specific information.  
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3.8 Meteorological risk: 
extreme temperatures
Glenn	McGregor, Angie Bone, Florian Pappenberger
3.8.1
Temperature 
extremes in 
a disaster risk 
management context
Understanding temperature extremes 
in a DRM context involves getting 
to know how often temperature ex-
tremes occur, the conditions under 
which they occur and establishing 
associated direct and indirect societal 
impacts.
Knowledge about temperature ex-
tremes can inform the development 
of  strategies for managing the risk 
associated with this type of  natural 
event. That temperature extremes do 
result in disastrous consequences, in 
terms of  lives lost, is manifest via the 
observed impacts of  a range of  ex-
treme temperature events over the 
last few decades (Table 3.3). Note-
worthy is that all top 10 disasters are 
related to extreme high as opposed to 
low temperatures.
Temperature extremes, 
although rare, are 
important from a DRM 
perspective as they 
can lead to a range of 
substantive direct and 
indirect impacts on 
human activity and other 
systems.
3.8.2
What are 
temperature 
extremes?
Temperature extremes can occur over 
a range of  temporal (e.g. daily, month-
ly, seasonal, annual, decadal) and geo-
graphical scales (e.g. local to regional 
to global). They are usually defined in 
terms of  their position in a distribu-
tion of  observed temperature values 
or as a threshold value recorded at a 
meteorological or climate station.
Temperature extremes can be ex-
pressed as a probability of  occur-
rence, or as a return period (e.g. 5 % 
probability or 1 in 20  year return pe-
riod). Occasionally, the term ‘return 
period’ is misinterpreted to mean an 
event of  a particular magnitude, so 
that an event with a return period of  1 
in 20 years, having once occurred, will 
occur again only after 20 years have 
passed. This is incorrect, as at any one 
time the occurrence of  a particular 
temperature will have a specific prob-
ability associated with it. Given this, 
it is entirely possible to have two 1 in 
20 year events in successive years or 
indeed in the same year.
A threshold value will be a specific 
high or low temperature value, above 
or below which there is a discernible 
impact. These can be described in 
terms of  percentiles, for example, the 
5th or 95th percentile, meaning that 
for all the temperature observations 
recorded for a location, the highest or 
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lowest set of  temperatures are con-
sidered to fall within the lowest or 
highest 5 % of  values. Percentiles are 
a relative measure of  extreme values, 
as the value associated with a particu-
lar percentile will vary from location 
to location. For example, the 95th 
percentile value of  temperature for a 
location in southern Europe may be 
35°C, while for a northern European 
location it may be 28°C.
Probabilities, return periods and per-
centiles are just a few of  a wide range 
of  possible measures of  temperatures 
extremes. For example, Table 3.4 lists 
a set of  measures of  temperature ex-
tremes considered relevant to a range 
of  sectors of  the economy and soci-
ety (Donat et al., 2013). Among these 
are some that refer to the duration of 
high or low temperatures over sever-
al days. These are often referred to as 
heat waves or cold waves. Although 
these terms are applied extensively in 
a range of  fora, there is no standard 
definition of  what a heat wave or cold 
wave is, despite a number of  attempts 
to develop ‘universal’ heat wave and 
cold wave definitions (Allen and Sher-
idan, 2016; Lhotka and Kysely, 2015; 
Perkins and Alexander, 2013; Robin-
son, 2001; Tong et al., 2010).
Building a picture of  the nature of 
temperature extremes for a particu-
lar location or region is dependent on 
measurements from daily weather and 
climate observing stations. Accord-
ingly, a number of  daily temperature 
datasets that can be used for risk anal-
ysis have been constructed based on 
available station data (Klok and Tank, 
2009; Menne et al., 2012).
There is a range of 
temperature extreme 
metrics. Statistical 
measures including 
probabilities, return 
periods and percentiles 
can be used to describe 
their occurrence. 
Knowledge gaps exist 
concerning extreme urban 
temperatures.
In addition to observational data, 
other sources are increasingly being 
used to develop extreme temperature 
climatologies (e.g. assembled via data 
rescue and reconstruction projects, as 
well as the analysis of  diaries and oth-
er historical documents (McGregor, 
2015)). Considerable effort has also 
gone into constructing gridded tem-
perature datasets with a variety of  spa-
tial and temporal resolutions (Donat 
et al., 2013). In the case of  data-sparse 
regions, stochastic weather generators 
have also been applied to the analysis 
of  temperature extremes (Rahmani et 
al., 2016; Steinschneider and Brown, 
2013; Wilks, 2012). A range of  reanal-
ysis products such as the 20th century 
(100-year) reanalysis dataset produced 
by the ECMWF (ERA-20C, n.d.) also 
offer considerable potential for ex-
treme temperature analyses. Because 
weather and climate stations were 
originally located to be representative 
Top 10 extreme temperature disasters and associated death toll by coun-
try and date.
Source: EM-DAT (2009)
TABLE 3.3
 Country  Disaster type   Date   Total number of 
deaths 
Russian Federation   Extreme high temperature  01/06/2010  55 736 
Italy  Extreme high temperature  16/07/2003  20 089 
France  Extreme high temperature  01/08/2003  19 490 
Spain  Extreme high temperature  01/08/2003  15 090 
Germany  Extreme high temperature  01/08/2003  9 355 
France  Extreme high temperature  29/06/2015  3 275 
Portugal  Extreme high temperature  01/08/2003  2 696 
India  Extreme high temperature  26/05/1998  2 541 
India  Extreme high temperature  20/05/2015  2 248 
France  Extreme high temperature  15/07/2006  1 388 
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of  atmospheric processes over large 
regions, there are very few long-term 
urban weather stations. This has con-
strained the development of  a full 
understanding of  the complexities of 
urban temperature fields and associat-
ed extremes (Chen et al., 2012).
Accordingly, attention is now being 
turned to the development of  urban 
climate networks and information 
systems (Chapman et al., 2015; Choi 
et al., 2013; Honjo et al., 2015; Hu et 
al., 2016; Muller et al., 2013a, b). Fur-
thermore, satellite-based high spatial 
List of the temperature indices recommended by the Expert Team on Climate Change Detection and Indices 
(ETCCDI) and calculated based on Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN)-Daily station data. Percentile 
values used as the threshold for some of the indices are calculated for the base period 1961-90. 
Source: adopted from Donat et al. (2013)
TABLE 3.4
Identifier  Indicator name   Indicator definition   Units 
TXx Hottest day Monthly maximum value of daily maximum temperature °C 
TNx  Warmest night Monthly maximum value of daily minimum temperature °C 
TXn  Coldest day Monthly minimum value of daily maximum temperature °C 
TNn  Coldest night Monthly minimum value of daily minimum temperature °C 
TN10p  Cool nights Percentage of time when daily minimum temperature < 10th percentile % 
TX10p  Cool days  Percentage of time when daily maximum temperature < 10th percentile % 
TN90p  Warm nights  Percentage of time when daily minimum temperature > 90th percentile % 
TX90p  Warm days  Percentage of time when daily maximum temperature > 90th percentile % 
DTR  Diurnal 
temperature 
range  
Monthly mean difference between daily maximum and minimum 
temperature 
°C 
GSL  Growing season 
length 
Annual (1 January to 31 December in NH, 1 July to 30 June in SH) count 
between first span of at least 6 days with TG > 5°C and first span after 1 
July (1 January in SH) of 6 days with TG < 5°C. (NH stands for Northern 
Hemisphere, SH for Southern Hemisphere and TG is daily mean 
temperature) 
Days 
ID  Ice days  Annual count when daily maximum temperature < 0°C Days 
FD  Frost days  Annual count when daily minimum temperature < 0°C Days 
SU  Summer days  Annual count when daily maximum temperature > 25°C Days 
TR  Tropical nights  Annual count when daily minimum temperature > 20°C Days 
WSDI  Warm spell 
duration index  
Annual count when at least 6 consecutive days of maximum temperature 
> 90th percentile 
Days 
CSDI Cold spell 
duration index 
Annual count when at least 6 consecutive days of minimum temperature 
< 10th percentile 
Days 
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above a location or region. Many ex-
treme temperature events can there-
fore be explained in terms of  unusual 
patterns of  atmospheric circulation, 
such as ‘blocking’, which the term giv-
en to a situation in which a high-pres-
sure system becomes ‘stuck’ and does 
not move for several days. Blocking 
results in the flow of  either very warm 
or cold air over a region or cloudless 
skies that enhance heat gain or heat 
loss from the Earth’s surface. For ex-
ample, Della-Marta et al. (2007) have 
shown that heat waves over Europe 
are related to persistent and large-
scale high-pressure systems.
Unusual atmospheric 
circulation patterns, 
which are often related to 
major modes of climatic 
variability, spawn extreme 
temperature events. There 
is mounting evidence that 
human-related climate 
change is affecting 
extreme temperature 
occurrence.
Alterations to the usual pattern of 
atmospheric circulation and thus the 
occurrence of  blocking and associ-
ated extreme temperature events can 
often be traced back to interactions 
between the ocean and atmosphere 
or modes of  climatic variability, such 
as the El Niño Southern Oscillation 
(ENSO) and the North Atlantic Os-
cillation (NAO) (Donat et al., 2014; 
Hoy et al., 2013; Scaife et al., 2008). 
For example, there is evidence that 
extreme maximum temperatures can 
be significantly influenced by ENSO 
for a range of  regions across the 
world (Arblaster and Alexander, 2012; 
Kenyon and Hegerl, 2008; Parker et 
al., 2014) as well as by Madden–Julian 
Oscillation-related anomalies in trop-
ical convection (Cassou et al., 2005; 
Matsueda and Takaya, 2015). Simi-
larly, the NAO has been found to in-
fluence the occurrence of  both high- 
and low-temperature extremes across 
Europe (Burgess and Klingman, 
2015; Hoy et al., 2013; Kenyon and 
Hegerl, 2008; Moore and Renfrew, 
2012; Scaiffe et al., 2008). Changes in 
the position of  the Inter-Tropic Con-
vergence Zone also seem to alter the 
possibility of  temperature extremes in 
France and Egypt (Boe et al., 2010).
The IPCC has concluded that there 
is unequivocal evidence that humans, 
through a range of  activities and an 
intensification of  the greenhouse 
effect, are having an impact on the 
Earth’s climate (IPCC, 2013). This is 
most evident through an increase of 
the global mean temperature of  about 
0.8°C since 1880, with two-thirds of 
that increase occurring since 1975, 
at a rate of  roughly 0.15-0.20°C per 
decade (NASA, 2016). Understand-
ably, this observed increase and that 
projected for the next several decades 
has implications for the occurrence of 
high- and low-temperature extremes 
(Russo et al., 2014; Seneviratne et al., 
2012). That changing global tempera-
tures appear to be already manifesting 
themselves in an altered occurrence 
of  temperature extremes and heat 
and cold waves are evident at a range 
of  geographical scales (Fischer, 2014; 
Schar, 2016). Furthermore, there is 
emerging evidence that a number of 
recent extreme temperature events 
resolution surface temperature obser-
vations are also being applied in the 
analysis of  urban surface temperature 
fields (Azevedo et al., 2016; Hu et al., 
2015; Jin, 2012) as well as the output 
from urban climate numerical models 
(Best and Grimmond, 2015; Loridan 
and Grimmond, 2012).   
3.8.3 
Climatic variability 
and change and 
temperature 
extremes
Climatic variability refers to variations 
in climate conditions from time period 
to time period (e.g. intra-seasonal, in-
ter-annual, inter-decadal). In general, 
climatic variability is connected with 
variations in the state of  the atmos-
pheric and ocean circulation and land 
surface properties (e.g. soil moisture) 
at the intra-seasonal to inter-decadal 
timescales. Climate change in contrast 
refers to a systematic change in the 
statistical properties of  climate (e.g. 
mean and standard deviation, etc.) 
over a prolonged period (e.g. several 
centuries) as manifested by an upward 
or downward trend in, for example, 
extreme temperature values. For the 
majority of  the Earth’s climate histo-
ry, systematic changes in climate have 
occurred because of  natural causes, 
such as variations in the nature of 
the Earth’s orbit around the sun or 
solar output. However, there is now 
mounting evidence that humans are 
an important climate agent.
Weather experienced at the surface 
of  the Earth is very much influenced 
by the atmospheric circulation and 
the pattern of  air and moisture flow 
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are in part attributable to human-re-
lated changes in global temperatures 
(Easterling et al., 2016, Kim et al., 
2015; Mitchell et al., 2016).
3.8.4 
Health impacts  
of temperature  
extremes
Both high and low temperatures, in-
doors and outdoors, pose substan-
tial risks to human health, including 
increases in mortality, morbidity and 
health service use (Ryti et al., 2016; 
WMO, 2015). In many countries, the 
health impacts of  cold temperatures 
substantially outweigh those of  heat 
(Gasparrini et al., 2015).
The scale and nature of  the health 
impacts observed depends on the 
timing, intensity and duration of  the 
temperature event, the level of  accli-
matisation and adaptation of  the local 
population, infrastructure and institu-
tions to the prevailing climate, as well 
as the definitions and methodologies 
used for scientific research. As such, 
the health effects of  temperature ex-
tremes and the determinants of  vul-
nerability are, to some extent, context 
specific.
Population health impacts start to be 
observed at winter and summer tem-
peratures that are considered moder-
ate for the season and then increase as 
temperatures become more extreme, 
in what is variously described as a 
U-, V- or J-shaped curve. The precise 
threshold temperatures for health im-
pacts vary by region and country, as 
does the scale of  the health impacts 
by degree change in temperature, but 
the overall pattern remains similar 
wherever it has been studied.
For both heat and cold, the impact 
of  temperature is more marked for 
deaths than for hospitalisations (Hajat 
et al., 2016; Linares and Diaz, 2008); 
this may suggest that individuals die 
before they reach health care. Tem-
perature extremes may also result in 
illness that is not sufficiently severe to 
require hospital attention and that has 
not been captured by these studies. 
For heat, deaths and hospitalisations 
occur extremely rapidly (same day) 
and they may be followed by a de-
gree of  impact displacement (health 
impacts in the frail brought forward), 
which returns to normal within a mat-
ter of  days (Basu, 2009). The onset 
of  health impacts for cold are slower 
and persist for longer (up to 4 weeks), 
with short-term displacement effects 
not apparent (Analitis et al., 2008).
The health impacts of 
temperature extremes, 
which can be direct or 
indirect, are moderated 
by a range of social 
determinants, which 
can be broadly referred 
to as vulnerability and 
resilience.
Longer heat events are associated 
with greater health effects because of 
the longer period of  exposure (D’Ip-
politi et al., 2010), but this has not 
been consistently observed for cold 
(Ryti et al., 2016).
Severe heat events that occur towards 
the beginning of  a season have great-
er health impacts; this is likely to be 
partly due to loss of  the most vulner-
able members of  the population dur-
ing the first episode and partly due to 
population adaptation for subsequent 
events (Baccini et al., 2008). This pat-
tern is less clear for severe cold, with 
some authors indicating that cold 
weather events towards the end of 
the season are associated with greater 
mortality (Montero et al., 2010a).
There is some evidence that there 
has been a reduction in health effects 
from heat extremes over recent years 
in some countries, which suggests 
that there has been some individual 
and institutional adaptation (Arbuth-
nott et al., 2016). This is less well es-
tablished for cold risks.
3.8.4.1 
Health impacts
Health impacts may be direct (caused 
by the direct effect of  the hazard) or 
indirect (caused by the consequenc-
es of  the hazard such as changes in 
behaviour or impact on services), as 
shown in detail in Table 3.5.
a) Direct impacts
As the ambient temperature changes, 
the human body’s physiology adapts 
in order to maintain a stable body 
temperature. This includes changes to 
the circulatory, respiratory and nerv-
ous systems to allow cooling or to 
protect vital organs (Ryti et al., 2016; 
WMO, 2015).
Direct health impacts occur when a 
stable body temperature cannot be 
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Direct and indirect health impacts of temperature extremes 
TABLE 3.5
Health impacts  Heat  Cold  
Direct  
  
  
  
Increased risk of classical heat illness: 
 dehydration 
 heat cramps 
 heat exhaustion 
 heat stroke 
 
Increased risk of death from: 
 respiratory disease 
 cardiovascular disease 
 other chronic disease (e.g. mental health 
conditions and renal disease) 
 
Increased risk of hospitalisation particularly from: 
 respiratory disease 
 diabetes mellitus 
 renal disease 
 stroke 
 mental health conditions 
 
Increased risk of poor outcomes in pregnancy 
  
Increased risk of classical cold illness: 
 hypothermia 
 frostbite 
 
 
 
Increased risk of death from: 
 cardiovascular disease 
 respiratory disease 
 other chronic diseases (e.g. stroke and 
dementia) 
 
Increased risk of hospitalisation particularly from: 
 respiratory disease 
 cardiovascular disease 
 stroke 
 
 
 
Increased risk of poor outcomes in pregnancyy  
Indirect  
  
Impact on health services including:  
 increased ambulance call-outs and slower  
 response times  
 increased numbers of emergency department  
attendances   
 increased number of hospital admissions  
 storage of medicines  
 
Increased risk of accidents:  
 drowning  
 work-related accidents  
 injuries and poisonings  
 
 Increased risk of:  
 outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease  
 marine algal blooms  
 
 Potential disruption to infrastructure:  
 power  
 water  
 transport  
 productivity  
  
Impact on health services including:  
 increased ambulance call-outs and slower 
response times  
 increased numbers of emergency department 
attendances   
 increased number of hospital admissions  
  
Increased risk of accidents:  
 injuries from falls    
 traffic accidents  
 carbon monoxide poisonings  
  
Increased risk of:   
 outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease  
 social isolation  
  
Potential disruption to infrastructure:  
 power 
 water  
 transport  
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maintained (e.g. when temperatures 
are too extreme), when clothing or 
shelter is not suitable or when phys-
iological responses are impaired (e.g. 
through disease, normal ageing or us-
ing certain medications). Moreover, 
these impacts may be exacerbated 
when other demands are placed on 
the body, such as strenuous activity or 
drug/alcohol use. This produces clas-
sical temperature-related disease, such 
as hypothermia and heat stroke, both 
of  which may have a rapid onset, may 
not be quickly identified and may be 
fatal.
However, classical hypothermia and 
heat stroke are not the major cause 
of  health impacts from temperature 
extremes; most temperature-related 
deaths and illness are from chron-
ic diseases such as heart and lung 
disease (Bunker et al., 2016), which 
form an important proportion of  the 
background disease burden in Euro-
pean populations. This is because an 
already impaired physiological system 
is less able to adapt to the ambient 
temperature, and the physiological 
changes needed to regulate tempera-
ture may worsen pre-existing disease.
b) Indirect impacts
Temperature extremes also have in-
direct impacts on health, for exam-
ple through impacts on services or 
changes in individual behaviour as a 
result of  the temperature.
The impact on health services may be 
mediated through increasing demand 
for care, direct and indirect impacts 
on staff, which affect their ability to 
work, or ambulance response times 
(Thornes et al., 2014). Tempera-
tures extremes may have impacts on 
wider infrastructure that is essential 
for health, such as power, water and 
transport (USAID, 2013).
Behavioural changes may have inad-
vertent negative health consequenc-
es, replacing one risk with another, 
which is an important explanation for 
the increase in injuries associated with 
hot and cold weather (Bulajic-Kopjar, 
2000; Otte et al., 2016).
3.8.4.2 
Determinants of 
vulnerability
The major determinants of  vulnera-
bility of  a population to temperature 
extremes relate to the features of  the 
population exposed and their capacity 
to respond and adapt to the temper-
ature conditions over long and short 
time frames. Determinants of  vulner-
ability can be broadly categorised by 
demographic, health, physical, soci-
oeconomic and institutional factors, 
many of  which are inter-related and 
dynamic.
Temperature extremes rarely occur 
in isolation and related hazards such 
as snow/ice, drought/wildfires, poor 
air quality or other unrelated disasters 
may coincide in time and geography. 
Responses to these additional hazards 
may alter existing vulnerabilities and 
the capacity to adapt to temperature 
extremes.
a) Demographic determinants
The physiology of  older people and 
the very young renders them more 
vulnerable to temperature extremes. 
They may also be less able to adapt 
their behaviours or environmental 
conditions and may be more depend-
ent on others (Collins, 1986; Hansen 
et al., 2011).
New migrants or tourists may not 
understand warnings or how to seek 
help. Some studies have suggest-
ed increased risk by gender (female) 
and race (black and minority ethnic 
groups) but this may be explained 
by alternative factors such as age, in-
come, education, underlying disease 
and access to health care.
b) Health status determinants
Many physical and mental health con-
ditions increase vulnerability to ad-
verse temperatures through a direct 
effect on the body’s physiology or 
through the effect of  certain medica-
tions (Hajat et al., 2007). People with 
poor health or disability may be less 
aware of  warnings, may be less able 
to adapt their behaviours or environ-
mental conditions, and may be more 
dependent on others.
c) Physical determinants
People spend approximately 80 % 
of  their time indoors, with the elder-
ly or unwell spending longer periods 
indoors. Buildings (including homes, 
hospitals, schools and prisons) are 
not always adapted for temperature 
extremes and may have insufficient 
heating/energy efficiency or cooling 
measures (Conlon et al., 2011; Hansen 
et al., 2011).
People who have inadequate shelter 
(e.g. displaced or homeless popula-
tions) might be particularly exposed 
to temperature extremes and often 
have associated vulnerabilities such 
as poor health or economic circum-
stances.
d) Socioeconomic determinants
People who are socially isolated are 
more at risk from temperature ex-
tremes because they are less able to 
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temperature extremes (Soomaroo and 
Murray, 2012).
Employers should take action to en-
sure that employees are able to take 
necessary protective actions, such as 
increasing fluid intake, having access 
to adequate rest and shade and re-
stricting strenuous activity to cooler 
parts of  the day.
Many countries have formal plans 
and policies that promote actions to 
reduce the risk of  temperature ex-
tremes, such as the Heatwave and 
Cold Weather Plans for England (see 
Chapter 3.8.6.2).
3.8.5 
Other impacts of 
temperature 
extremes
To date, the human health impacts of 
high and low temperatures have re-
ceived a great deal of  attention in both 
the academic and technical literature 
related to DRM compared with ‘other’ 
impacts. In general, ‘other’ direct and 
indirect impacts tend to be less well 
understood than those related to hu-
man health. This, however, does not 
make them less important, as heat- or 
cold-related impacts may lead to com-
plex disasters, for example those that 
may arise from the malfunction of  en-
ergy supply systems, which may lead 
to the failure of  the critical infrastruc-
ture necessary to maintain a range 
of  human activity systems and, most 
importantly, the emergency services. 
A summary of  other impacts arising 
from low- and high-temperature ex-
tremes is given below:
It has been documented that both high 
and low temperatures have significant 
effects on plants (Barlow et al., 2015).
Extreme heat stress can reduce plant 
photosynthetic and transpiration effi-
ciencies and negatively impact plant 
root development, which acts collec-
tively to reduce the yield of  crops. In 
general, extreme high temperatures 
during the reproductive stage will af-
fect pollen viability, fertilisation and 
grain or fruit formation (Hatfield and 
Prueger, 2015).
Late frosts are particularly damaging 
to the opening buds of  plants. More 
economic losses in the United States 
are caused by crops freezing than by 
any other weather hazard (Snyder and 
Melo-Abreu, 2005). Even a single 
night with unusually low temperatures 
can lead to significant ecological and 
economic damage (Inouye, 2000). Be-
cause of  climate change, many plants 
are now coming out of  winter dor-
mancy earlier (Walther et al., 2002), 
which leaves them even more suscep-
tible to frost damage. Frosts can have 
lasting effects, as they can cause local 
extinctions and influence the geo-
graphical distribution of  some species 
(Inouye, 2000).
Livestock, such as rabbits, pigs and 
poultry, are vulnerable to extreme 
temperatures. Milk production and 
cattle reproduction decreases during 
heat waves, and millions of  birds have 
been lost as a result of  such events. 
In extreme cold weather, livestock are 
also at risk if  not protected from the 
cold (Adams, 1997).
access community support, and may 
also have additional health or other 
vulnerabilities (Bouchama et al., 2007; 
Tod et al., 2012).
Low-income groups may be less 
able to adapt to their behaviours or 
environment. Certain occupational 
groups, such as labourers, may not 
always be afforded adequate protec-
tion from temperature extremes (e.g. 
undertaking strenuous physical work 
during very hot periods) (Hanna et al., 
2011).
e) Behavioural/cultural 
determinants
When temperatures become more ex-
treme, most people take some action 
to adapt to the conditions. However, 
some factors limit the ability to adapt, 
such as age, poor health or econom-
ic circumstances, and certain belief 
or value systems may also mean that 
appropriate action is not taken in re-
sponse to the temperature conditions 
(Hansen et al., 2011; Tod et al., 2012).
Certain behaviours, intended to be 
protective, may inadvertently increase 
health risks (e.g. swimming in unsu-
pervised open waters (Fralick et al., 
2013), shovelling snow (Franklin et 
al., 1996) or using unsafe heating ap-
pliances (Ghosh et al., 2016)).
f) Institutional determinants
Health services need robust plans in 
order to manage the potential disrup-
tion and increased demand during and 
following temperature extremes; their 
ability to respond influences popu-
lation vulnerability. This also applies 
to supporting infrastructure such as 
power, water, communication and 
transport systems. Mass gatherings 
can place additional strains on ser-
vices, especially if  they coincide with 
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It is a concern that 
non-health impacts of 
temperature extremes are 
not entirely understood, 
as in combination they 
possess the potential to 
create complex disasters 
and, thus, to have far-
reaching societal impacts. 
Air quality is impacted by both heat 
waves and low-temperature events. 
Increased ozone pollution is associat-
ed with high temperatures, and nitro-
gen oxides, SO2 and particulate mat-
ter pollution is associated with low 
temperatures (Hou and Wu, 2016). 
Heat waves also affect water quality, 
bringing an increased risk of  algal 
blooms, causing the death of  fish in 
rivers and lakes and the death of  oth-
er organisms in the water ecosystem 
(Adams, 1997).
Heat waves can directly impact eco-
systems by constraining carbon and 
nitrogen cycling and reducing water 
availability, with the result of  poten-
tially decreasing production or even 
causing species mortality. Extreme 
temperature conditions can shift for-
est ecosystems from being a net car-
bon sink to being a net carbon source 
(IPCC, 2012).
The effects of  both high and low tem-
peratures can be exacerbated if  com-
bined with water shortages, leading to 
drought (for a detailed discussion, see 
Chapter 3.9).
3.8.6
Managing 
temperature 
extremes
3.8.6.1 
Forecasting 
Forecasting extreme temperatures 
on the medium (more than 3 days) 
to seasonal (up to 6 month) scale is 
an important tool for civil protection 
Ensemble forecast for maximum and minimum temperature in Durham, United Kingdom, issued on 
14/09/2016, 00 UTC (Coordinated Universal Time). The figure illustrates the maximum and minimum daily 
temperature for each day, shown as a box plot, giving a range of possible maximum and minimum tempera-
tures and, therefore, the uncertainty in the forecast; the further ahead a forecast is issued, the more uncertain 
it becomes.
Source: courtesy of authors
FIGURE 3.29
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forecasting heat and cold waves be-
yond the medium timescale.
Heat and cold wave predictability 
is also linked to a forecast model’s 
ability to predict transitions between 
circulation patterns such as blocking 
and phases of  modes of  climatic var-
iability such as ENSO and the NAO, 
as described in Chapter 3.8.3. Because 
of  their low-frequency nature and 
their teleconnections, modes of  cli-
matic variability can exhibit predicta-
bility on the subseasonal timescale. A 
further source of  predictability also 
arises from the effect of  soil mois-
ture conditions in the amplification of 
the temperature anomalies (Quesada 
et al., 2012). Therefore, accurate skill 
in predicting persistent large-scale 
high-pressure systems is fundamental 
to forecasting heat and cold waves.
The ideal method by which to eval-
(Mayes, 2012; Ilkka et al., 2012). 
However, forecasts on this timescale 
are uncertain and, therefore, multiple 
scenarios, known as ensembles, are 
used. Figure 3.29 shows such a fore-
cast for 15 days for the city of  Dur-
ham (United Kingdom). This plot 
clearly shows that the further ahead a 
forecast is issued, the more uncertain 
it becomes, with a range of  possible 
values. This poses a challenge for 
2-metre temperature composites from ERA-Interim weekly mean anomalies for heat wave events: western Eu-
rope (left), northern Europe (centre) and Russia (right).
Source: courtesy of authors
2-metre temperature composites from the ensembles forecast at 12-18 days verifying the same events as in 
Figure 3.30. Western Europe (left), northern Europe (centre) and Russia (right).
Source: courtesy of authors
FIGURE 3.30
FIGURE 3.31
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uate the skill of  an extended range 
ensemble in predicting heat and cold 
waves is to use a selection of  objective 
verification measures for probabilistic 
forecasts. In reality, verification re-
quires a far larger sample than is avail-
able. This is typically the case for any 
investigation that involves extreme 
events. Here we show the evaluation 
of  individual heat waves, as shown in 
Figure 3.30, as an example. The 2-me-
tre temperature composites, based on 
weekly mean anomalies of  ensembles 
forecasts at 12-18 days, are shown in 
Figure 3.31. Compared with the ob-
servations (Figure 3.30), the forecasts 
(Figure 3.31) generally identify the lo-
cation of  warm anomalies with a cer-
tain degree of  accuracy, although the 
amplitude is underestimated. Overall, 
the successful predictions reflect a 
persistent anti-cyclonic circulation al-
ready present in the initial conditions. 
This testifies to the critical nature of 
an extended-range forecast model to 
represent transitions to anti-cyclonic 
circulation regimes, which is consist-
ent with the cause of  so-called medi-
um-range forecast ‘busts’ (Rodwell et 
al., 2013).
Careful calibration and judicious com-
bination of  ensembles of  forecasts 
from different models into a larger 
ensemble can give greater accuracy 
than is obtained from any single mod-
el. However, comparing, verifying 
and testing multimodel combinations 
from these forecasts and quantifying 
their uncertainty as well as the han-
dling of  such a massive dataset is chal-
lenging and is the subject of  the EC-
MWF subseasonal to seasonal (S2S) 
prediction project. This is a WWRP/
THORPEX-WCRP joint research 
project established to improve fore-
Extreme Forecast Index of 2-metre temperature with a forecast range of 12-18 days verifying the week of 
8-14 August 2016. Four different forecast systems are shown. Blue areas indicate a cold spell, while red areas 
indicate a heat wave (on a weekly average). Ncep is National Centre for Environmental Prediction, ECMWF is 
the European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecasting, JMA is Japan Meteorological Agency, UKMO is the 
United Kingdom Meteorological Office.
Source: courtesy of authors
FIGURE 3.32
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tive of  sign) can be generally regarded 
as signifying that ‘unusual’ weather is 
likely, while magnitudes above 0.8 usu-
ally signify that ‘very unusual’ or ex-
treme weather is likely. Although larg-
er EFI values indicate that an extreme 
event is more likely, the values do not 
represent probabilities as such.
3.8.6.2 
Early warning systems 
Early warning systems have been de-
veloped for a number of  extreme cli-
mate events and are gaining traction 
in the area of  temperature extremes 
(Carmona et al., 2016; Kalkstein et al., 
2011; Kovats and Ebi, 2006; Lowe et 
al., 2016; McGregor et al., 2015). Such 
warning systems take the output from 
short- to medium-range forecasting 
models (Lowe et al., 2016; McGregor 
et al., 2006), such as described above, 
and usually use a threshold tempera-
ture or some related index to trigger 
an alert and/or issue a heat or cold 
warning (Antics et al., 2013; Nairn 
and Fawcett, 2015; Pascal et al., 2013). 
More often than not, a weather- or 
climate-based EWS for heat or cold, 
which is composed of  a number of 
components, is nested within a wider 
heat or cold action plan (WHO, 2008, 
2011; WMO, 2015) as shown in Fig-
ure 3.33.
The normative view regarding heat/
cold EWSs is that they should deliver 
discernible benefits for the manage-
ment of  heat- and cold-related risk 
across a range of  sectors (Fouillet et 
al., 2008). Given this, heat/cold EWSs 
are increasingly subject to evaluation 
that can consider EWS processes and/
or outcomes, using a variety of  crite-
ria. To date, such evaluations indicate 
that heat/cold EWSs yield discernible 
benefits in relation to DRM but, not-
withstanding this, there is room for 
improvement, especially as a success-
ful EWS depends heavily on a well-de-
signed set of  risk-mitigating and prac-
tical intervention strategies being in 
place (Bassil and Cole, 2010; Chiu et 
al., 2014; Ebi, 2007; Hajat et al., 2010; 
Kalkstein et al., 2011; Montero et al., 
2010b; Toloo et al., 2013a, b).
For low-temperature extremes, a range 
of  EWS and forecast products have 
been developed. Many of  these are 
focused on forecasting snow storms 
(Nakai et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2013) 
cast skill and understanding on the 
S2S timescale, and promote uptake of 
its forecast products by operational 
centres and the applications commu-
nity. Examples of  some of  S2S’s prod-
ucts can be found at ECMWF (n.d.). 
The Extreme Forecast Index (EFI) is 
one such product (Figure 3.32). This is 
an integral measure of  the difference 
between the ensemble forecast distri-
bution and the model climate distribu-
tion. The EFI takes values from –1 to 
+1. An EFI of  1 (red) indicates a heat 
wave, while an EFI of  –1 (blue) shows 
a cold spell. Experience suggests that 
EFI magnitudes of  0.5-0.8 (irrespec-
Generic structure of a heat health warning system. 
The components in the red box constitute part of a wider heat health 
action plan. This overall structure can also be applied to cold-related 
warning systems.
Source: McGregor et al. (2015)
FIGURE 3.33
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and ice storms, with an emphasis on 
critical infrastructure such as roads 
(Berrocal et al., 2010; Degaetano et 
al., 2008; Palin et al., 2016; Riehm and 
Nordin, 2012) and power lines (Cer-
ruti and Decker, 2012; Nygaard et al., 
2015; Roldsgaard et al., 2015).
Although EWSs are considered a plau-
sible DRM tool, developers and users 
of  EWSs should be aware of  some of 
the generic ‘dos and don’ts’ of  such 
systems, as outlined by Glantz (2004).
3.8.6.3 
Urban design and 
planning 
Cities have received a great deal of  at-
tention in the DRM literature because 
this is where large numbers of  peo-
ple are concentrated; they are, there-
fore, potentially at risk of  heat- and 
cold-related disasters.
In the case of  heat, cities represent a 
distinct problem because of  the so-
called urban heat island (UHI) effect 
which, during periods of  high tem-
peratures, can lead to air temperatures 
in cities being several degrees above 
those for surrounding rural areas, es-
pecially during the nocturnal hours 
(Arnfield, 2003). This ‘extra’ heat has 
the potential to place a large num-
ber of  vulnerable people in cities at 
risk of  heat-related illness (Wolf  and 
McGregor, 2013; Wolf  et al., 2014).
The UHI develops because urban ma-
terials are efficient at absorbing and 
storing heat from the sun during the 
day and releasing that heat back into 
the urban atmosphere at night, lead-
ing to higher nocturnal temperatures 
in urban areas than in rural areas. A 
further factor is the low evaporation 
rates in cities; evaporation is an en-
ergy-consuming and thus a cooling 
process. Significant quantities of  so-
called anthropogenic heat from air 
conditioning systems and vehicles can 
add to the energy available for raising 
urban air temperatures (Allen et al., 
2011; Offerle et al., 2005; Smith et al., 
2009). For example, in London, it has 
been estimated that approximately 80 
% of  the anthropogenic heat goes 
into heating of  the atmosphere (Ia-
marino et al., 2012), with the greatest 
contributions from London’s central 
activity zone, where the service sec-
tor is predominant. Given that large 
cities, such as London, will grow over 
the coming decades, anthropogenic 
heat is likely to become an important 
heat risk management issue for large 
cities.
Managing temperature 
extremes can be 
approached from a 
number of perspectives, 
including using 
forecasting technology, 
the development of EWSs 
and heat/cold action plans 
and urban design and 
town planning. 
Given the processes that generate the 
UHI, strategies that focus on man-
aging urban heat can range from the 
scale of  the individual building to the 
city. Examples include controlling for 
building material absorption and stor-
age of  energy from the sun, ensuring 
that evaporation is promoted through 
providing moist surfaces and devel-
oping green infrastructure and reduc-
ing anthropogenic heat release. 
While the specific approaches to man-
aging urban heat are potentially wide 
ranging (Alexander et al., 2016; Elias-
son, 2000; Mills et al., 2010; Phelan 
et al., 2015), the degree of  benefit 
(the intensity of  cooling and im-
provements to human thermal com-
fort) arising from urban design- and 
city planning-related heat mitigation 
measures (Norton et al., 2015; Shar-
ma et al., 2016; Sun et al., 2016;) de-
pends on considering a multitude of 
interacting and potentially conflicting 
factors (Coutts et al., 2013; Hamilton 
et al., 2014). In addition to the sci-
entific challenges (Chen et al., 2012), 
the actual mainstreaming of  urban 
climate design and adaptation princi-
ples into city planning can sometimes 
become stalled because of  a range of 
institutional barriers (Lenzholzer and 
Brown, 2011; Reckien et al., 2014; 
Ugolini et al., 2015; Uittenbroek et al., 
2013; Wolf  et al., 2015).
Relatively speaking, urban design 
for low-temperature extremes has 
received less attention in the recent 
DRM literature, no doubt as a result 
of  a perception that, in the near fu-
ture, heat, as opposed to cold, will 
pose a greater risk management prob-
lem. Interestingly, a consequence of 
the UHI effect, especially the role of 
anthropogenic heat, may bring some 
positive benefits in cities that experi-
ence harsh winter climates.
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3.8.7
Conclusions and
key messages
Partnerships
Cooperation between regional, na-
tional and international research 
communities and climate monitor-
ing agencies and citizen scientists 
is required to construct internally 
consistent extreme temperature da-
tabases and meaningful sector-rele-
vant extreme temperature metrics. 
This is particularly the case for urban 
environments where there is an ev-
er-increasing concentration of  peo-
ple who are potentially at risk from 
temperature extremes as a result of 
the urban heat island (UHI) effect. A 
systematic approach at both national 
and local levels and across all sectors, 
involving state, private, voluntary and 
community actors, is required to un-
derstand the wider societal impacts of 
temperature extremes. Partnerships 
formed between stakeholders in the 
risk management of  temperature ex-
tremes should adopt ‘a communities 
of  practice model’ in order to develop 
integrated heat and cold action plans 
that transcend vulnerability assess-
ment, weather forecasting, interven-
tion strategies, urban design and city 
planning.
Knowledge
An enhanced understanding of  the 
physical origins of  temperature ex-
tremes, as well their changing mag-
nitude and frequency, especially in 
light of  climate change, is required. 
Where possible, historic non-instru-
ment-based temperature records as 
captured in diaries and other docu-
ments could be used to augment the 
understanding of  the climatology of 
temperature extremes from the local 
to the regional level. Long-term ob-
servational series need to be sustained 
through the commitment of  resourc-
es to climate monitoring. Research 
should be undertaken to improve our 
understanding of  the effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of  extreme 
temperature-related interventions in 
a variety of  different climatic, socio-
economic and cultural contexts, with 
learning shared widely. Conceptu-
al risk models of  complex disasters 
related to temperature extremes are 
required to scope out agendas for 
knowledge development.
Innovation
In the absence of  observed weather 
station-based temperature data, the 
use of  weather generators for the cre-
ation of  temperature time series for 
extreme value analysis and alternative 
temperature observation platforms 
such as satellites in addition to the 
output from urban climate numer-
ical models should be considered as 
input into DRM analyses. The idea 
of  drawing on multiple sources of 
information from data networks, as 
encapsulated by the concept of  ‘the 
internet of  things’, offers consider-
able potential for managing disaster 
risk related to temperature extremes. 
High-resolution intra-urban mapping 
of  population vulnerability to heat 
and cold, integrated with information 
on building type and air and surface 
temperature, is an innovation that is 
likely to yield gains for extreme tem-
perature-related DRM.
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3.9 Climatological risk: 
droughts
Henny	A.J.	van	Lanen,	Jürgen	V.	Vogt	, Joaquin Andreu, Hugo 
Carrão, Lucia de Stefano, Emanuel Dutra, Luc Feyen, Giovanni 
Forzieri, Michael Hayes, Ana Iglesias, Christophe Lavaysse, 
Gustavo Naumann, Roger Pulwarty, Jonathan Spinoni, 
Kerstin Stahl, Robert Stefanski, Nikolaos Stilianakis, 
Mark Svoboda, Lena M. Tallaksen
3.9.1
Introduction
Drought is one of  the most complex 
and severe weather-related natural 
disasters and its causes and multi-
faceted impacts are often not well 
understood. Droughts can last from 
a season to multiple years, and even 
decades, and cover small watersheds 
to hundreds of  thousands of  hec-
tares. In Europe, drought is a recur-
rent phenomenon, affecting extended 
areas and large populations annually 
(Vogt and Somma, 2000). Across the 
world, millions of  people are annual-
ly exposed to droughts that seriously 
affect economic development and en-
vironment. While fatalities mainly oc-
cur in poor economies, even in more 
prosperous regions many people die 
as a result of  indirect effects (e.g. Tal-
laksen and Van Lanen, 2004; WMO 
and GWP, 2014). In Europe, almost 
80 000 excess fatalities as a result of 
heatwaves (see Chapter 3.8) and for-
est fires (see Chapter 3.10) associated 
with droughts were reported over the 
period 1998-2009 (EEA, 2011).
UNESCO notes that drought can 
have economic consequences that can 
go far beyond the immediately im-
pacted areas, such as persistent unem-
ployment and threats to food security, 
regularly leading to forced migration 
and social instability (WWAP, 2016). 
The World Economic Forum (2015) 
labelled the water crisis as first on the 
list of  factors with a risk of  severe 
impacts for the global community. 
As one of  the reasons for this crisis, 
drought is likely to become more fre-
quent and severe in the 21st century 
in many regions of  the world, espe-
cially in already water-scarce and vul-
nerable areas, including parts of  Eu-
rope (IPCC, 2012; 2014).
The key challenge is to move from 
a reactive society fighting impacts to 
a pro-active society that is resilient 
and adapted to the drought risk, for 
example through the adoption of 
pro-active risk management (WMO 
and GWP, 2014; Wilhite et al., 2014). 
This chapter demonstrates that this 
requires practitioners, policymakers 
and scientists to collaborate and use a 
consistent set of  definitions and char-
acteristics. Observed and projected 
trends in drought as a natural hazard 
need to be understood. 
Drought is a recurrent 
phenomenon that 
affects extended areas 
and large populations, 
putting societies and 
the environment at risk 
in many regions of the 
world.
The hazard has to be connected to 
its manifold primary and secondary 
impacts (e.g. on public water supply, 
food security, energy production, 
waterborne transport, health, eco-
systems). Current, but also future, 
societal exposure and context-specif-
ic vulnerability must be identified to 
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assess drought risk. If  all of  these as-
pects are known, drought risk can be 
managed through a set of  institution-
al, structural and operational meas-
ures, including monitoring and medi-
um-range to seasonal forecasting.
3.9.2
Drought definition 
and characteristics 
From a climatic point of  view, a 
drought results from a shortfall in 
precipitation over an extended period 
of  time, from the inadequate timing 
of  precipitation relative to the needs 
of  the vegetation cover, or from a 
negative water balance due to an in-
creased potential evapotranspiration 
caused by high temperatures. This sit-
uation may be exacerbated by strong 
winds, atmospheric blocking patterns 
and antecedent conditions in soil 
moisture, reservoirs and aquifers, for 
example. Droughts can also be trig-
gered in cold climates by temperature 
anomalies (Van Loon and Van Lanen, 
2012; Van Loon et al., 2014). If  this 
situation leads to an unusual and tem-
porary deficit in water availability, it is 
called a drought. Droughts are to be 
distinguished from aridity, a perma-
nent climatic feature, and from water 
scarcity, a situation in which the cli-
matologically available water resourc-
es are insufficient to satisfy long-term 
average water requirements (e.g. Tal-
laksen and Van Lanen, 2014).
Depending on the prevailing effects 
on the hydrological system and the 
resulting impacts on society and en-
vironment, drought can be distin-
guished in terms of  meteorological, 
soil moisture and hydrological factors 
(groundwater, streamflow, reservoirs) 
(Figure 3.34 and Box 3.1). The defini-
tion of  a drought, therefore, will de-
pend on the sector analysed and the 
related processes and impacts. Finally, 
the feedbacks between the hydrologi-
cal cycle and society must be consid-
ered (Van Loon et al., 2016). The im-
pacts of  drought point to a multitude 
of  drivers that turn lower than aver-
age precipitation, limited soil mois-
ture and low water levels into disaster 
events for vulnerable communities 
and economies (UNISDR, 2011).
Droughts can be characterised in 
terms of  their onset, duration, sever-
ity (accumulated deficit over the en-
tire event) and intensity (total deficit 
divided by duration).
Standardised indices are used to an-
alyse droughts in different domains 
of  the water cycle (e.g. precipitation, 
climatic water balance, soil moisture, 
river flow, groundwater). Among the 
meteorological indicators, the Stand-
ardized Precipitation Index (SPI, Mc-
Kee et al., 1993) and the Standardized 
Precipitation-Evapotranspiration 
Index (SPEI, Vicente-Serrano et al., 
2010) are the most well-known. The 
SPI is a probabilistic measure of  the 
severity of  a dry event (WMO, 2012). 
It can be calculated for different rain-
fall accumulation periods (e.g. 1-48 
months) and statistically linked to 
impacts in different economic and 
environmental sectors. The SPEI has 
similar characteristics but includes 
potential evapotranspiration. Recent 
studies have shown that including 
the potential evapotranspiration can 
provide useful drought early warning 
indicators (McEvoy et al., 2016), al-
Drought Types: Generating Processes and Impacts
Source: adapted from NDMC and Van Loon (2015)
FIGURE 3.34
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and Van Lanen, 2012). Finally, com-
bined indicators blend several physical 
indicators into an indicator of  hazard 
(e.g. US Drought Monitor (Svoboda 
et al., 2002); Combined Drought In-
dicator (Sepulcre Canto et al., 2012)).
Drought differs from 
aridity and water scarcity, 
and different drought 
types and associated 
indices have to be 
analysed to quantify the 
multiple drought impacts.
The World Meteorological Organi-
zation and Global Water Partnership 
(2016) have recently published the 
Handbook of  Drought Indicators and 
Indices, providing structured infor-
mation on commonly used drought 
indicators for identifying the spatial 
extent, onset, duration and severity 
of  drought events. This information 
supports drought practitioners in 
selecting appropriate indicators for 
drought monitoring and early warn-
ing as an integral part of  risk- based 
drought management policies and 
preparedness plans. 
 
3.9.3
Past trends and 
future projections
Historic trends and future projections 
of  meteorological droughts in Eu-
though some weaknesses occur when 
the potential evapotranspiration is 
calculated with temperature-based ap-
proaches (e.g. Thornthwaite) in dry, 
hot regions. Use of  SPI and SPEI in 
cold regions has some limitations, be-
cause these indices do not distinguish 
between rain and snow, which affects 
the water availability over the year 
(snow accumulation and melt). Soil 
moisture-related indicators such as 
the Soil Moisture-based Drought Se-
verity Index (Cammalleri et al., 2016) 
or the Palmer Drought Severity Index 
(Palmer, 1965) aim to characterise the 
impact on plant water stress; although 
no specific plant characteristics are 
included. Hydrological indicators are 
often based on threshold approaches 
to quantify the volume of  water defi-
cit in rivers and reservoirs (Yevjevich, 
1967; Hisdal et al., 2004; Van Loon 
Drought types
Depending on the effect in the hy-
drological cycle and the impacts on 
the society and environment, differ-
ent drought types are commonly 
distinguished:
Meteorological Drought: 
A deficit in precipitation or climato-
logical water balance (i.e. precipi-
tation minus potential evapotran-
spiration) over a given region and 
defined period of time with respect 
to the long-term climatology. It is 
characterised based on measured 
and estimated climate variables 
(e.g. precipitation, temperature, 
evapotranspiration).
Soil Moisture or Agricultural 
Drought: 
Characterised by reduced soil mois-
ture resulting in a deficit in water 
supply for agricultural crops and 
natural vegetation and impacts on 
crop yield and biomass production. 
A higher risk for forest fires, due to 
the accumulation of dry biomass, is 
another important impact.
Hydrological Drought: 
Characterised by reduced stream-
flows, lake levels, and groundwa-
ter reservoirs. Time-series of these 
variables are used to analyse the 
occurrence, duration and severity 
of hydrological droughts that have, 
for example, impacts on public wa-
ter supply, energy production and 
inland water transport.
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rope have been investigated by Spino-
ni et al. (2015a,b, 2016a, 2017) using 
a combination of  indicators based 
on precipitation and temperature 
from the E-OBS dataset (Haylock 
et al., 2008). The analysis considers 
droughts at seasonal and annual times-
cales and covers the period 1951-2015 
(trend analysis) and 2041-2100 (future 
projections), the latter of  which is 
based on the EURO-CORDEX mul-
timodel ensemble (Jacob et al., 2014) 
and moderate (RCP4.5) and extreme 
(RCP8.5) climate scenarios.
Drought frequency 
increased in southern 
and western Europe, but 
decreased in other parts 
of Europe. However, an 
increased frequency is 
projected, particularly 
in summer, for most of 
Europe.
Figure 3.35 demonstrates that in the 
past six and a half  decades northern 
and eastern Europe experienced a de-
crease in drought frequency and, less 
prominently, in drought severity (not 
shown), while southern and west-
ern Europe experienced an increase 
in drought frequency and severity, 
particularly over the Mediterrane-
an region (see Hoerling et al., 2012; 
Gudmundsson and Seneviratne, 
2015; Stagge et al., 2016). The noted 
increase in drought frequency and se-
verity is more widespread when ana-
lysing the SPEI, which includes the 
effect of  increasing air temperature 
on potential evapotranspiration (Spi-
noni et al., 2015b; Touma et al., 2015; 
Stagge et al., 2016).
With respect to seasonal droughts, the 
decrease of  drought frequency over 
northern Europe is more evident in 
winter, while the increase over south-
ern Europe is more evident in sum-
mer.
Figure 3.36 shows that the described 
past drought tendencies are likely to 
persist in future decades for the win-
ter months, while in the other seasons 
– especially summer – the whole of 
Europe (excluding parts of  Iceland 
and Scandinavia) is projected to ex-
perience an increase in drought fre-
quency, in particular during the last 
decades of  the 21st century. At annual 
scale, and according to both climate 
scenarios, the drying tendencies over 
southern and western Europe are 
projected to become even stronger, 
with the Mediterranean region being 
particularly strongly affected (Spinoni 
et al., 2017; Stagge et al., 2015b). The 
effects of  the projected temperature 
increase on meteorological droughts 
are likely to outbalance the effects of 
the projected precipitation increase 
over northern Europe and partly over 
eastern Europe, resulting in more 
frequent droughts for both scenari-
os in these territories by the end of 
the 21st century. The combination 
of  these effects is likely to result in 
more severe droughts over northern 
Europe according to the extreme sce-
nario (RCP8.5), while according to 
moderate scenario (RCP4.5), severity 
is not likely to increase in this region. 
The projections are considered to be 
robust with good agreement between 
the suite of  GCM and RCM models.
At the global scale, past changes in 
drought frequency and severity are 
still under debate. Sheffield and Wood 
(2008) and Sheffield et al. (2012) ana-
lysed past global and regional trends 
using a soil moisture-based drought 
index for the period 1950-2008. Their 
results indicate that on a global level 
only small changes in drought occur-
rence and extent can be detected over 
the past 60 years. However, on a re-
gional level, significant drying trends 
can be seen for parts of  the Mediter-
ranean and North, West and Central 
Africa, as well as for parts of  East and 
Northeast Asia, while in the northern 
hemisphere and in parts of  South 
America and Australia wetting trends 
are prevailing. These results are large-
ly confirmed by Spinoni et al. (2014) 
who analysed meteorological drought 
frequency, duration and severity over 
the period 1951-2010. Orlowsky and 
Seneviratne (2013) investigated fu-
ture meteorological and soil mois-
ture drought around the world using 
a multimodel set of  CMIP5 simula-
tions. Their results hint towards more 
frequent soil moisture droughts by 
the end of  the 21st century, especially 
in South Africa and Central America/
Mexico and the Mediterranean. While 
highlighting the aggravating effect of 
global warming on droughts, Tren-
berth et al. (2014) underline the im-
portance of  reliable precipitation da-
tasets and the data used to determine 
the evapotranspiration component in 
order to avoid conflicting results.
Streamflow drought originates from a 
temporary deficiency in precipitation 
and/or from temperature anomalies 
over a large area that can be further 
aggravated by other climatic factors, 
like strong winds or low relative hu-
midity (Tallaksen and Van Lanen, 
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conditions in watersheds, leading to 
a consequent increase in vulnerability 
to streamflow drought (Vörösmarty 
et al., 2000; Döll et al., 2009; Wada et 
al., 2013).
Trends in historic annual river flow in 
Europe confirm the patterns in mete-
orological drought with drying trends 
in southern and eastern regions of 
Europe, and generally wetting trends 
elsewhere (Stahl et al., 2010; 2012). 
They found positive trends (wetter) 
in the winter months in most catch-
ments. A marked shift towards drying 
trends was observed in April, gradu-
2004). Long-term precipitation reduc-
tion may further aggravate stream-
flow droughts through the depletion 
of  groundwater and the subsequent 
decrease in baseflow. In addition, 
anthropogenic drivers, such as inten-
sive water use and poor water man-
agement, can exacerbate low-flow 
Drought frequency trends between 1951 and 2015, expressed as the number of events per decade: left to 
right, winter, summer, annual. In dotted areas trends are significant at the 95 % level
Source: adapted from Spinoni et al. (2017)
Drought frequency differences between the far future (2071-2100) and the recent past (1981-2010), ex-
pressed as the number of events per decade: left to right, winter, summer, annual; upper row scenario RCP4.5, 
bottom row RCP8.5
Source: adapted from Spinoni et al. (2017)
FIGURE 3.35
FIGURE 3.36
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ally spreading across Europe to reach 
a maximum extent in August. Low 
flows have decreased in most regions 
where the lowest mean monthly flow 
occurs in summer, but vary for catch-
ments that have flow minima in win-
ter. Hannaford et al. (2013) show that 
trends are sensitive to the selected pe-
riod (sign may change) owing to dec-
adal climate variability.
Global changes in climate and so-
cioeconomic patterns are expected 
to affect the development in space 
and time of  river low flows (IPCC, 
2012). Many river basins in Europe 
are likely to be more affected by se-
vere water stress. Projected changes 
presented in different studies depend 
on the chosen drought indices (e.g. 
minimum flow, streamflow deficit), 
climate scenarios, temporal and spatial 
resolution of  the climate signal and 
the hydrological representation. How-
ever, some coherent patterns emerge. 
Research studies based on multimod-
el ensemble climate and hydrological 
projections show consistent drought 
intensification both in terms of  mag-
nitude and frequency in south-western 
Europe. The main drivers are reduced 
precipitation and increased potential 
evapotranspiration. River low flows in 
these regions are expected to increase 
in severity by up to 40 % (Feyen and 
Dankers, 2009; Forzieri et al., 2014; 
Roudier et al., 2015) and current 
100-year events could occur every 2 
to 10 years (Lehner et al., 2006). The 
20-year event of  the river deficit vol-
ume is expected to increase by over 
50 % both in the Mediterranean and 
European mid-latitudes by the end 
of  the century (Figure 3.37). In con-
trast, northern regions of  Europe will 
probably experience less severe hy-
drological droughts as a result of  ex-
pected increased precipitation, which 
will outweigh the effects of  higher 
evapotranspiration. In north-east-
ern Scandinavia and northern Rus-
sia, deficit volumes are expected to 
become more than 50 % lower. The 
projected changes are less clear in a 
transition zone (Forzieri et al., 2014; 
Roudier et al., 2015) because of  the 
high climate uncertainty in changes in 
precipitation patterns.
The spatial drought patterns in Eu-
rope are confirmed by global studies 
Future projections of river flow in Europe. Percent change in 20 year 
events of minimum flow (qmin, left) and deficit volumes (def, right) in 
the 2050s and 2080s relative to the control period (1961-1990) 
Source: adapted from Forzieri et al. (2014)
FIGURE 3.37
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Drought impacts affect almost all 
parts of  the environment and society. 
Unlike other natural hazards such as 
floods, earthquakes or hurricanes that 
result in immediately visible, mostly 
structural, damage, droughts devel-
op slowly. Frequently, drought con-
ditions remain unnoticed until water 
shortages become severe and adverse 
impacts on environment and society 
become evident. Drought impacts 
may be influenced by adaptive buffers 
(e.g. water storage, purchase of  live-
stock feed) or can continue long after 
precipitation has returned to ‘normal’ 
(e.g. owing to groundwater or reser-
voir deficits). The slowly developing 
nature and long duration of  drought, 
together with a large variety of  im-
pacts beyond commonly noticed ag-
ricultural losses, typically makes the 
task of  quantifying drought impacts 
difficult (Wilhite, 2005b).
Quantification is, however, an im-
portant task, because, of  all weather 
extremes, droughts have one of  the 
largest impacts on society. Economic 
damage from drought events can be 
catastrophic, with a single drought 
event capable of  causing billions of 
euros of  damage (EC, 2007; EEA, 
2011).
The impacts of  droughts can be clas-
sified as direct or indirect (Tallaksen 
and Van Lanen, 2004; Meyer et al., 
2013, Spinoni et al., 2016b). Exam-
ples of  direct impacts are limited pub-
lic water supplies, crop loss, damage 
to buildings due to terrain subsidence 
and reduced energy production. Indi-
rect impacts relate to the secondary 
consequences on natural and eco-
nomic resources. They may affect 
ecosystems and biodiversity, human 
health, commercial shipping and for-
estry. In extreme cases, drought may 
result in temporary or permanent un-
employment or even business inter-
ruption and lead to malnutrition and 
disease in more vulnerable countries 
(Hiller and Dempsey, 2012). Figure 
3.38 schematically illustrates possible 
direct and indirect social, economic 
and environmental impacts. Because 
of  their very nature (i.e. the depend-
ence of  livelihoods and economic sec-
tors on water), most drought impacts 
are indirect. These indirect effects can 
propagate quickly through the eco-
nomic system, affecting regions far 
from the origin of  the drought (Wil-
hite, 2002).
Drought impacts society 
and the environment 
(e.g. public water 
supply, agriculture, 
energy production, 
infrastructure, shipping, 
forestry, ecosystems 
and human health). 
Impact quantification 
is a prerequisite for 
drought management and 
policymaking. 
Since droughts affect socioeconom-
ic systems directly or indirectly, their 
damage may be tangible (market relat-
ed) or intangible (non-market related). 
The latter are particularly difficult to 
quantify as they include, for example, 
ecosystem degradation or the costs 
of  mitigation and long-term adapta-
tion measures. Impacts of  droughts 
usually cascade. For instance, a lack 
on future hydrological drought by 
Prudhomme et al. (2014) and Wan-
ders and Van Lanen (2015). The Car-
ibbean and South and Central Ameri-
ca are other hotspots where river flow 
is projected to be substantially affect-
ed, which is in line with the projected 
soil moisture decrease (Orlowsky and 
Seneviratne, 2013).
Future water consumption for domes-
tic use, tourism, energy, manufactur-
ing, agriculture and livestock sectors 
(Kämäri et al., 2011) will aggravate 
streamflow drought conditions by 10-
30 % in southern, western and cen-
tral Europe. Some regions (e.g. East-
ern Europe) that are subject to little 
or small positive impacts of  climate 
change could manifest a reversion 
of  this trend by intensive water use, 
showing more severe drought situa-
tions (Forzieri et al., 2014). Wanders 
et al. (2015) illustrate in a global anal-
ysis that future drought impacts are 
very much dependent on the extent to 
which society will adapt to the gradu-
ally changing hydrological regime.
Droughts are likely to experience a 
much faster increase in severity and 
frequency of  extreme events than 
other climate-related hazards, such 
as river floods, windstorms, wildfires 
and cold waves (Forzieri et al., 2016); 
thus, future impacts are expected to 
represent a major threat for society 
and the environment.
3.9.4
Drought impact
3.9.4.1
Drought impacts on society 
and environment
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of  water causing crop losses will sub-
sequently prevent farmers from in-
vesting in new machinery, resulting in 
losses to the farm equipment dealer 
and producers in the business chain. 
As a consequence, governments may 
have to provide aid to the different 
sectors. As droughts often affect large 
areas, sometimes over several years, 
these cascading impacts can affect 
large parts of  society. If  drought is 
severe and widespread, impacts may 
spread further in the community, as 
well as to other sectors and regions.
To foster risk management and adap-
tation strategies, drought impacts and 
the resulting damage and econom-
ic losses must be functionally linked 
with the monitored drought severity. 
Gudmundsson et al. (2014), Bachmair 
et al. (2015), Blauhut et al. (2015 and 
2016), Naumann et al. (2015) and 
Stagge et al. (2015a), among others, 
have tested modelling approaches 
that link drought indicators such as 
SPI, SPEI, soil moisture, streamflow, 
groundwater and vegetation-related 
indicators to reported impacts. All 
studies conclude that a more quan-
titative monitoring of  impacts and 
more research towards the quantifica-
tion of  the complex damage caused 
by drought is needed to improve such 
estimates. A survey by Bachmair et 
al. (2016) shows that many providers 
of  Early Warning Systems (EWS) do 
monitor impacts, but this is not yet 
done systematically or quantitatively. 
The variable strength of  the relation-
ship between drought severity and 
recorded damage can often be ex-
plained by the sector-specific drought 
vulnerability and the adaptive capacity 
of  the region affected.
The overall expected damage, esti-
mated by HELIX (2016) and based 
on the combination of  the observed 
impacts and estimated changes in the 
recurrence time of  severe droughts, 
are projected to increase in the near 
future. In some regions such as south-
ern Europe, Southeast Asia, eastern 
North America and south-east South 
America, damage could increase from 
twofold in the near future to tenfold 
in the far future compared with today 
(Figure 3.39). 
These scenarios suggest that drought 
risk may increase for many economic 
sectors and vulnerable regions unless 
appropriate mitigation and adapta-
tion measures are implemented. Since 
many regions with high population 
densities and, often, vulnerable soci-
eties relying on local agricultural pro-
duction show large expected losses in 
Figure 3.39, they remain a high prior-
ity to target better impact monitor-
ing and quantification as a basis for 
drought management and adaptation. 
3.9.4.2
Health impacts 
Between 1900 and 2015 drought af-
fected 2.3 billion people worldwide 
and led to an estimated 11.7 million 
deaths (EM-DAT, 2009). Drought-as-
sociated impacts on people are often 
linked to health (WHO, n.d.). Health 
effects can be direct (increased mor-
bidity and mortality) or indirect 
(economic disruption, infrastructure 
damage, forced migration). Health 
Schematic presentation of examples of drought impacts and their inter-
relations
Source: adapted from Jenkins (2011)
FIGURE 3.38
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Malnutrition
The World Health Organization 
(WHO) ranked malnutrition as the 
largest global health problem associ-
ated with climate change and drought 
(Campbell-Lendrum et al., 2003; 
IPCC, 2012). Exposure to drought has 
been associated with morbidity and 
mortality owing to the deterioration 
of  people’s nutritional state (Stanke et 
al., 2013; Friel et al., 2014; Sena et al., 
2014). Water shortages may result in 
reduced food production (crop failure 
and livestock loss), leading to malnu-
trition and health risks, such as low 
birth weight (WHO, 2012). Vulnera-
ble groups, such as pregnant women, 
children aged < 5 years and people 
living in shelters are mostly affected 
(Black et al., 2008; Gitau et al., 2005; 
Singh et al., 2006a, b; WHO, 1985).
Water-borne diseases
Shortage of  water, lack of  clean water 
and inadequate sanitation are typical 
during a drought. A number of  wa-
ter-borne infectious diseases have 
been linked to drought (Effler et al., 
2001; Brandley et al., 1996). A direct 
link between drought and the trans-
mission of  the pathogens is, howev-
er, difficult to observe owing to other 
concurrent environmental factors and 
human vulnerability. Drought-in-
duced stress in livestock and livestock 
use of  human water resources may 
lead to high concentrations of  path-
ogens and increase the risk of  human 
exposure and infection, particularly 
after heavy rain following a drought. 
Poor hygiene and poor water quality 
for human consumption may result in 
the transmission of  diarrheal diseases 
(WHO, 1985; Sena et al., 2014; Burr et 
al., 1978; Smoyer-Tomic et al., 2004).
Vector-borne diseases
Pathogens and vectors are sensitive 
to climatic and other environmental 
conditions, which is reflected in the 
characteristic geographic distribu-
tion and seasonal variation of  vec-
tor-borne infectious diseases (Kil-
patrick et al., 2012). While increased 
precipitation may increase mosquito 
densities owing to new aquatic hab-
impacts include (1) malnutrition, (2) 
water-, vector- and air-borne diseases, 
and (3) mental aspects (WHO, 2012). 
Population vulnerability may be en-
hanced by socioeconomic factors, 
such as poverty, that force people to 
live on lands with poor soil fertility or 
in ecosystems at risk of  drought.
Expected annual losses due to drought [in thousand USD] for the present 
(baseline) and the period 2040-60 according to seven different climate 
models and RCP8.5 (high-end scenario). 
Country losses are disaggregated according to gridded GDP values. 
Source: HELIX project (Naumann et al., 2017)
FIGURE 3.39
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itats, mosquito densities may also 
increase dramatically following a 
drought (habitat rewetting) because of 
the reduced number of  competitors 
and aquatic predators (Chase et al., 
2003). Drought may boost the density 
of  birds and mosquitoes around any 
water sources remaining and thus may 
accelerate the transmission of  patho-
gens such as West Nile virus (WNV) 
within these populations, thereby in-
creasing the risk of  WNV outbreaks 
in humans (Shaman et al., 2005; Wang 
et al., 2010). Mosquitoes, which can 
efficiently transmit pathogens such as 
the dengue and chikungunya viruses, 
may adapt to drought in urban envi-
ronments and exploit artificial aquatic 
habitats (e.g. water containers), thus 
elevating the risk of  infection in hu-
mans (Brown et al., 2014).
Airborne diseases
Drought-related processes can result 
in atmospheric dust loadings and as-
sociated dispersion of  microorgan-
isms at various scales, which may have 
significant implications for human 
health. The WHO (2015) has identi-
fied drought and dust wind activity in 
sub-Saharan Africa as a risk factor for 
regional outbreaks of  meningococcal 
meningitis. Dust storms and winds fa-
cilitate the transport of  microorgan-
isms favouring meningitis seasonality, 
which can have serious consequenc-
es for public health (Griffin, 2007, 
WHO, 2015; Agier et al., 2012). The 
mechanisms by which dust and cli-
mate may influence meningitis occur-
rence, along with outbreak location 
and severity are, however, not fully 
clear. 
An association between respiratory 
and cardiovascular diseases could be 
shown in several regions, but little at-
tention has been paid to West Africa, 
where desert winds and storms may 
cause more diseases, such as menin-
gococcal meningitis (De Longueville 
et al., 2013, Garcia-Pando et al., 2014).
Mental health
Studies on the association between 
drought and mental health point to 
fears and anxieties among the rural 
population in particular, although su-
icidal thoughts have been recorded as 
more critical symptoms. (Polain et al., 
2011; Carnie et al., 2011; Hanigan et 
al., 2012).
In summary, disease incidence is often 
more pronounced in drought-prone 
regions and affects more vulnerable 
population groups, such as children 
and the elderly, or people with diffi-
cult living conditions, which may be 
caused by poverty, for example. En-
hancing drought resilience in regions 
with high population vulnerability 
and low adaptation capacity should, 
therefore, be reflected in relief  aid 
programmes.
3.9.5
Analysing 
drought risk
Risk analysis is a major technique for 
measuring global progress in the im-
plementation of  the Sendai Frame-
work for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2015). Analysing 
risk is crucial to identify relief, cop-
ing and management responses that 
will reduce drought damage to soci-
ety. The objective of  risk analysis is 
to determine the underlying causes 
of  drought damages resulting from 
the combination of  drought hazard, 
drought exposure and drought vul-
nerability (Table 3.6).
3.9.5.1
Analysing hazard, exposure 
and vulnerability
Measuring drought hazard includes 
estimating the location, duration, in-
tensity and frequency of  water defi-
cits over land. Traditionally, drought 
hazard has been characterised by me-
teorological indicators, but a simple 
precipitation shortage often does not 
translate into immediate concerns and 
impacts on the ground. Indeed, ow-
ing to the multiple-timescale nature 
of  drought, its impacts can continue 
long after precipitation conditions 
have returned to ‘normal’ (see Chap-
ter 3.9.4). Therefore, recent scientific 
developments have focused on com-
bining meteorological indicators with 
indicators that take into account hy-
drological processes (e.g. soil mois-
ture, groundwater and river flow), 
which reflect more closely the impacts 
felt on the ground. 
Interactions between 
drought hazard, exposure 
and vulnerability underlie 
any comprehensive 
drought risk analysis, 
which is crucial for 
drought management and 
reducing drought impacts.
A review of  existing drought hazard 
indicators by Bachmair et al. (2016) 
reveals the unsolved challenges of  (1) 
designing and implementing indica-
tors able to represent drought prop-
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agricultural land and the location and 
density of  people (UNODRR, 2015). 
Since drought develops slowly and re-
sults in a great variety of  impacts in 
most parts of  the world, even in wet 
and humid regions, drought exposure 
is often measured for distinct water 
use sectors as a function of  the loca-
tion, timing, duration and amount of 
a water deficit (Dracup and Lee, 1980; 
Wilhite and Glantz, 1985). Proxy in-
dicators of  drought exposure include, 
for example, the distribution of  crop 
and livestock farming, industrial and 
household water withdrawals, and the 
human population.
Since the location, severity and fre-
quency of  droughts are difficult to 
forecast (see Chapter 3.9.6.2), and 
since exposure expands as a result 
of  economic and population growth, 
interventions to reduce drought im-
pacts need to focus on mitigating the 
vulnerability of  human and natural 
systems. This requires an understand-
ing of  who is vulnerable, to which im-
pacts and the reasons for this vulner-
ability (Gbetibouo and Ringler, 2009). 
While tools such as drought manage-
ment plans are key to deliver a struc-
tured and coordinated response when 
drought hits, drought vulnerability 
assessments (DVAs) can be used to 
support the design of  mid- and long-
term drought preparedness actions to 
increase structural resilience. As such, 
they provide a crucial link between 
drought management and water re-
sources planning, where those actions 
have to be designed and agreed upon 
in an integrated way. A broad variety 
of  factors have been used to deter-
mine vulnerability to drought (Table 
3.7). 
 
Some factors are specific to drought 
(e.g. the existence of  drought man-
agement plans or the level of  diver-
sification of  water sources), while 
others (e.g. poverty or the quality 
of  social networks) are likely to in-
fluence vulnerability to an array of 
hazards in diverse sociopolitical and 
geographical contexts (Brooks et al., 
2005; Cardona et al., 2012). A recent 
review of  46 assessments of  drought 
vulnerability (González-Tánago et al., 
2016) highlighted that data availabil-
ity still represents a major constraint 
in building sound and policy-relevant 
vulnerability assessments. In particu-
lar, it is key to invest in the system-
atic, high-resolution collection of 
data on drought impacts, water uses, 
agation across the whole hydrological 
cycle at different spatial and temporal 
scales, and (2) the systematic collec-
tion of  impact data to enable vali-
dation and a better understanding of 
the variety of  drought impacts on the 
ground.
To assess the impacts of  drought 
hazard, the first step is to invento-
ry and analyse the environment that 
can be damaged (Di Mauro, 2014). In 
the disaster risk-reduction commu-
nity, exposure refers to the different 
types of  physical entities that are on 
the ground and that can be adversely 
affected by a hazardous event, includ-
ing built-up assets, infrastructures, 
Components of drought risk analysis.
TABLE 3.6
  
  
        
  Characterisation  Relevant data  Examples of studies  
Hazard  Magnitude of a   
hydrometeorological  
deficit  
Meteorological,   
hydrological and/or  
biophysical indicators  
Sepulcre-Canto et al.  
(2012);   
Vicente-Serrano et al.  
(2010); Svoboda et al.  
(2002); Kogan (1995);  
McKee et al.(1993);  
Palmer (1965).  
Exposure  Amount of elements  
subject to drought  
hazard  
Amount and location  
of human populations,   
activities and/or  
ecosystems  
Winsemius et al. (2015);  
Christenson et al. (2014).  
Vulnerability  Susceptibility of  
exposed elements  to 
damaging effects   
of drought hazard   
  
Composite indicators  that 
include environmental, 
social, economic and/or   
infrastructural components  
Gonzélez-Ténago et al.  
(2016); Naumann et al.  
(2014);  Brooks et al.  
(2005);   
Cutter et al. (2003).  
Overall risk  Likelihood of impact  Measured in a   Blauhut et al. (2016);   
 probabilistic scale linked to  Carrão et al. (2016);   
intervention policies    Kim et al. (2015);   
  Eriyagama et al. (2009);   
Peduzzi et al. (2009).   
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non-conventional water sources and 
the quantitative and qualitative sta-
tus of  water resources. Moreover, the 
review revealed the need for greater 
transparency in the design of  drought 
vulnerability assessments and for in-
creased efforts in the validation of  the 
results.
3.9.5.2
Estimating drought risk
Definitions of  risk are commonly 
probabilistic in nature, referring to the 
potential impacts or the likelihood of 
harmful consequences (i.e. environ-
mental, economic, social and/or in-
frastructural) from a particular hazard 
to an exposed element in a future time 
period (Blaikie et al., 1994; Cardona et 
al., 2012; Carrão et al., 2016). There-
fore, the estimation of  drought risk 
requires the development of  a model 
that combines drought hazard with 
relevant indices or metrics of  drought 
exposure and vulnerability (Govern-
ment Office for Science, 2012).
An entry point for both understand-
ing and addressing drought risk is to 
use quantitative measures of  historical 
impacts as proxies for its estimation 
(Brooks et al., 2005). In particular, 
historical data relating to socioeco-
nomic losses might be used as a ret-
rospective measurement of  drought 
risk to forecast the impacts arising 
from the interaction of  hazard, ex-
posure and vulnerability. For exam-
ple, Peduzzi et al. (2009) carried out a 
global assessment of  drought risk by 
fitting the number of  human casual-
ties to the determinants of  drought 
risk by means of  a generalised linear 
regression. More recently, Blauhut et 
al. (2015; 2016) tested the capability 
of  logistic regression to predict the 
likelihood of  drought impacts (LDI) 
in Europe for different sectors of 
activity from a set of  drought risk 
determinants. Regression analyses 
are generally desirable from a risk 
assessment viewpoint because they 
may be validated from observed his-
torical data. However, relying on his-
torical impacts has some limitations 
when estimating current and future 
drought risk (Government Office for 
Science, 2012). Foremost, the number 
of  affected people and the types of 
impacts vary by region, thus hamper-
ing consistent broad-scale analyses. 
For example, drought in developing 
countries can contribute to malnutri-
tion, famine and loss of  human lives, 
whereas in developed countries it pri-
marily results in economic losses. Sec-
ond, these analyses do not account 
for shifts through time in the distri-
bution of  exposure or vulnerability 
Examples of factors included in selected drought vulnerability assess-
ments 
Source: modified from González-Tánago et al. (2016)
TABLE 3.7
        
  Sub-dimension  DVAs  Most frequent factors (#of DVAs)  
#  %  
 
Drought characteristics  
  
Climatic components: rainfail, 
evapotranspiration, temperature  
17  
  
20  
41%  
  
49%  
SPI (3), NDVI (4)  
  
Average annual precipitation (9)  
Soil characteristics and topographic 
factors  
  
Water resources: runoff storage capacity.  
Surface and groundwater  
  
Water uses  
  
20  
  
19  
  
  
11  
49%  
  
46%  
  
  
27%  
Soil water-holding capacity (10)  
  
Status groundwater (12) and surface 
water (10)  
  
Agricultural water use (9)  
Land use  17  41%  Agricultural land uses (9)  
 
Socio-cultural (demography, education, 
health, gender, drought awarness, etc.)  
29  71%  Population (24) and education (16)  
Economic and financial resources  
  
  
Institutional, Policy and Governance 
(social networks, taxes, governmental  
programs, participation, etc.)  
  
Technical, technological and 
infrastructural (irrigation, tillage, 
improved seeds, fertilisers, access to 
services, etc.)  
  
28  
  
  
14  
  
  
  
28  
68%  
  
  
34%  
  
  
  
68%  
Economic resources (20), agricultural 
income (17), employment (9)  
  
Government presence or programs (9)  
  
  
  
Irrigation (23)  
 Others (“Others”)  4  10%  Impacts  
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indicators are mathematical combina-
tions of  risk determinants that have 
no common unit of  measurement 
(OECD/JRC, 2008). For example, 
Carrão et al. (2016) used a multivariate 
and non-parametric linear program-
ming algorithm, a Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), to aggregate proxy 
indicators of  hazard, exposure and 
vulnerability into a composite statistic 
of  global drought risk (Figure 3.40). 
Its values are not an absolute meas-
ure of  economic losses or damage 
to human health or the environment, 
but a relative statistic that provides a 
regional ranking of  potential impacts 
with which to prioritise actions to re-
inforce adaptation plans and mitiga-
tion activities. Figure 3.40 illustrates 
that drought risk is generally higher 
for populated areas and regions ex-
tensively exploited for agriculture, 
such as South-Central Asia, south-
east South America, Central Europe 
and the Midwestern United States. 
This indicator, while useful for risk 
assessments in the agricultural sector, 
may not be adequate for analysinf  the 
risk in other sectors, such as energy 
production (hydropower, cooling of 
to loss, thus biasing the predictions 
(Güneralp et al., 2015). Finally, im-
pacts may be available only for short 
timescales and unavailable in some 
countries (Below et al., 2007), while 
the available records often do not in-
clude the most extreme cases to tune 
the regression models (Government 
Office for Science, 2012).
More recently, composite indica-
tors have been proposed to estimate 
drought risk, for example by Nau-
mann et al. (2014), Kim et al. (2015) 
and Carrão et al. (2016). Composite 
Global map of drought risk.
Source: Carrão et al. (2016)
FIGURE 3.40
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nuclear plants), navigation and trans-
portation (waterways), or recreation, 
which should be part of  any com-
prehensive drought risk management 
plan.
Composite indicators and impact 
models represent alternative but 
complementary ways of  approaching 
drought risk estimation at different 
scales and coordination levels. Since 
drought impacts are context specific 
and vary geographically, regression 
models are most important for local 
to national management when pre-
paredness plans and mitigation activ-
ities are put in practice, while com-
posite indicators can identify generic 
leverage points in reducing impacts 
from drought at the regional to global 
scales.
3.9.6
Managing 
drought risk
3.9.6.1
Drought monitoring
Drought monitoring and forecasting 
systems are an essential component 
of  integrated drought management. 
They provide the necessary and time-
ly information for stakeholders to 
analyse drought hazards for use with-
in their decision-making processes 
(WMO, 2006; Bailey, 2013; Wood et 
al., 2015). In recent decades, such sys-
tems have been developed at different 
The North American Drought Monitor
Source: NOAA (2017)
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Analysts:
      Canada - Trevor Hadwen    
      Mexico -  Minerva Lopez
                      Reynaldo Pascual
        U.S.A. -  Brian Fuchs
                      Richard Heim *
                       
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/nadm.html
The Drought Monitor 
focuses on broad-scale 
conditions.  Local 
conditions may vary.  
See accompanying text 
for a general summary.
Released: Thursday, October 13, 2016
   
September 30, 2016
Drought not
analyzed in
shaded areas
(* Responsible for collecting analysts'
     input & assembling the NA-DM map)
Regions in northern Canada may
not be as accurate as other regions
due to limited information.
Intensity:
D0 Abnormally Dry
D1 Drought - Moderate
D2 Drought - Severe
D3 Drought - Extreme
D4 Drought - Exceptional
S = Short-Term, typically <6 months
      (e.g. agriculture, grasslands)
L = Long-Term, typically >6 months
      (e.g. hydrology, ecology)
Delineates dominant impacts
Drought Impact Types:
L
S
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and remote sensing-based indicators, 
allowing for an assessment of  the ex-
tent and severity of  drought events 
across continents. More specific in-
dicators for water management of-
ten become available at the regional 
to local levels. While the first type of 
information is targeted at policy and 
high-end decision-makers in the water 
management sector and at the gener-
al public (i.e. awareness raising indi-
cators), the latter is targeted at water 
managers and stakeholders at the river 
basin or sub-basin level (i.e. manage-
ment indicators).
A well-known example of  continen-
tal systems is the North American 
Drought Monitor (NADM), which 
provides monthly information based 
on a suite of  hydro-meteorological in-
dicators, integrated with expert knowl-
edge into a drought map showing five 
drought intensity levels, ranging from 
abnormally dry to exceptional drought. 
A suite of  forecasting products and a 
seasonal outlook complement the pic-
ture. It is based on the concept of  the 
weekly updated US Drought Monitor 
(USDM, Svoboda et al., 2002) and the 
US National Drought Information 
System (NIDIS, Pulwarty and Verdin, 
2013), combined with information 
and expert knowledge from Canada 
and Mexico (Figure 3.41). Informa-
tion is provided in the form of  maps 
and analyst reports.
Harmonised monitoring 
and forecasting of a 
suite of drought indices 
is crucial in drought 
management and 
information interchange 
across borders. It 
contributes to a move 
from reactive to pro-
active risk management.
In Europe, the European Drought 
Observatory (EDO) provides maps 
of  10-day and monthly updates on 
the hydro-meteorological situation 
and the occurrence and evolution of 
drought events, including a 7-day fore-
cast of  soil moisture. In addition, a 
Combined Drought Indicator for ag-
riculture and ecosystem drought anal-
yses the drought propagation from a 
rainfall deficit through reduced soil 
moisture to impacts on the photosyn-
thetic activity of  the vegetation (Fig-
scales from the local or community 
scale up to the global level, illustrat-
ing the broad variety and complexity 
of  users addressed by these systems. 
Since droughts affect extended re-
gions that frequently cross national 
borders, it is important to maintain 
harmonised systems at different scales 
that provide comparable information 
and allow for an integrated monitor-
ing of  the evolving events. This is 
even more important with aquifers 
and river basins that are frequently 
transboundary and with globally in-
terconnected economies, resulting in 
primary and secondary impacts that 
are felt across many countries and 
even globally.
Available information typically in-
cludes meteorological, hydrological 
The European Drought Observatory (EDO). Example of the Combined 
Drought Indicator (CDI) for the period 21 to 30 September 2016.
Source: EDO (2017) 
FIGURE 3.42
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ure 3.42). The goal of  such combined 
indicators is to provide easy to under-
stand sector-specific information for 
decision-makers in the form of  alert 
levels (Sepulcre-Canto et al., 2012). 
Like the NADM, the EDO delivers 
analyst reports during exceptional 
events, albeit not in a regular manner. 
The EDO is implemented in a nested 
manner, allowing for information to 
be processed and stored at the appro-
priate levels (i.e. the river basin, coun-
try or continental level). To allow for 
comparability between levels, a set of 
core indicators are processed follow-
ing agreed algorithms.
Challenges to drought monitoring 
and early warning are the continuous 
availability of  indicators covering the 
various hydro-meteorological com-
ponents and their combined analysis 
into usable information for the deci-
sion-making process at different lev-
els. Important variables to monitor 
include precipitation, snow pack and 
snow water equivalent, temperature, 
evapotranspiration, river flow, reser-
voir storage, lake levels, groundwater 
levels, soil moisture and vegetation 
vigour, among others. The recent-
ly published Handbook of  Drought 
Indicators and Indices (WMO and 
GWP, 2016) provides a good over-
view of  frequently used indicators.
Cooperation between various entities 
ensures ownership at all levels, which 
is important to sustain EWSs. Nation-
al Meteorological and Hydrological 
Services (NMHSs), as well as regional 
and subregional centres, are important 
partners in this task as they routinely 
monitor many of  the required input 
variables. This, however, requires the 
exchange of  data and interoperability 
between systems.
Two other major challenges exist with 
monitoring and forecasting systems. 
The first relates to linking drought se-
verity with drought impacts in the va-
riety of  economic, social and environ-
mental sectors. Consideration of  this 
challenge is slowly being addressed 
with several studies in the United 
States and Europe (Chapter 3.9.5.1) 
and with systems such as the Global 
Drought Observatory (GDO), devel-
oped by the European Commission 
JRC for the European Union Emer-
gency Response Coordination Centre 
(ERCC) and Humanitarian Aid ser-
vices aim to include sector-specific 
vulnerabilities for assessing the Likeli-
hood of  Drought Impact (LDI). The 
GDO system shown in Figure 3.43 
presents a map of  the LDI together 
with a hierarchical list of  all affected 
countries visible in the map. The sec-
ond challenge relates to developing an 
understanding of  how decision-mak-
ers will use the information being 
disseminated from monitoring and 
forecasting systems. That challenge 
needs to be investigated through so-
cial science-based research projects 
and interactions with key users of  the 
information. An example for such in-
teraction is implemented by the US 
NIDIS system (Pulwarty and Verdin, 
2013).
3.9.6.2
Drought forecasting
Forecasting the onset or likely evolu-
tion of  an ongoing drought over the 
weeks and months ahead or over the 
The Global Drought Observatory (GDO). Example of Likelihood of Drought 
Impact (LDI) for the period 8 to 15 October 2015.
Source: GDO (2017) 
FIGURE 3.43
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where resilience is higher owing to 
the widespread availability of  irriga-
tion systems, needs are more related 
to the forecast of  long-term droughts, 
although shorter lead times are rele-
vant for water-borne transport. In 
Africa, where agriculture is mainly 
rainfed, a short-term deficit of  pre-
cipitation constitutes a higher risk. 
In these regions, the forecasts of  dry 
spells (short-term droughts of  about 
10 days) is also important (Winsemius 
et al., 2014; 2015).
Studies have demonstrated that 
droughts can be forecasted using sto-
chastic or neural networks (Kim and 
Valdes, 2003; Mishra et al., 2007) with 
a reasonably good agreement and 
with 1- to 2-month lead times. Link-
ing weather types to drought (Fleig 
et al., 2011; Kingston et al., 2013) 
and statistical downscaling methods 
using weather types can also be used 
(Lavaysse et al., 2017). Eshel et al. 
(2000), for example, used the North 
Atlantic sea level pressure precursors 
to forecast drought over the eastern 
Mediterranean. Forecasts of  droughts 
can also be produced using determin-
istic Numerical Weather Prediction 
Models. Such forecasts are highly 
uncertain as a result of  the chaotic 
nature of  the atmosphere, which is 
particularly strong on a subseasonal 
timescale (Vitart, 2014). In general, 
the published literature indicates that 
the skill of  the precipitation fields pro-
duced by Numerical Weather Predic-
tions over Europe is low (Richardson 
et al., 2013; Weisheimer and Palmer, 
2014). Predictions will be better in re-
gions where precipitation origins are 
related to large-scale structures, such 
as synoptic perturbations or oceanic 
anomalies (e.g. mid-latitudes), while 
regions with strong local drivers (e.g. 
West Africa) will record lower scores. 
However, these analyses tend to be 
performed from the point of  view 
of  weather forecasting and do not in-
corporate specific properties that are 
relevant for drought forecasting, such 
as persistence. Therefore, ensemble 
prediction systems have been devel-
oped that forecast multiple scenarios 
of  future weather. These forecasts be-
come particularly important to assess 
the risks associated with high-impact 
and rare weather events such as tropi-
cal cyclones or droughts (Hamill et al., 
2012; Dutra et al., 2013, 2014). The 
European Centre for Medium-range 
Weather Forecast (ECMWF) provides 
two different types of  ensemble fore-
casts for this time range: an extend-
ed range forecast, with lead times of 
up to 45 days, which is issued twice 
a week, and a seasonal forecast, with 
season is important to trigger actions 
for mitigating negative impacts on 
human activities and environmental 
processes. Decision-makers and end 
users require adapted and robust fore-
cast indicators that are capable of  in-
forming about the onset, possible du-
ration, intensity and end of  drought 
conditions (Chapter 3.9.6.1). The 
timescale of  this forecast is consid-
ered a challenge as it stands between 
medium-range forecasting, which is 
strongly related to initial conditions, 
and the seasonal timescale, which is 
mainly driven by oceanic variability 
and large-scale climate features such 
as the El-Niño phenomenon (Vitart, 
2014).
The lead time and duration of 
drought forecasts should be adapted 
to the needs of  the region. In Europe, 
GDO: Probabilistic Forecast for October 2016 based on SPI-3 from the 
ECMWF Ensemble system (experimental product, data courtesy ECMWF).
Source: GDO (2017) 
FIGURE 3.44
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lead times of  up to 13 months, issued 
once a month. The extended-range 
forecast incorporates more recent 
model developments and is usually 
of  higher spatial resolution (Vitart, 
2004). The seasonal forecasting sys-
tem is based on an older model cycle 
(Molteni et al., 2011), among other 
significant differences. In the case of 
droughts, an analysis including both 
the numerical forecasting skill and the 
possibilities for binary decisions to is-
sue drought warnings has shown that 
40 % of  droughts can be correctly 
forecasted 1 month in advance over 
Europe (Lavaysse et al., 2015). While 
the performance of  these subseason-
al forecasts is still behind the current 
medium-range weather forecasts, the 
ongoing efforts by academia and op-
erational centres are encouraging. An 
example of  monthly forecasting of 
the probability of  drought occurrence 
based on the ECMWF ensemble sys-
tem is shown in Figure 3.44.
Finally, the prediction skill depends 
on the indicator used. Other studies, 
for example, analysed the prediction 
of  drought based on soil moisture, 
groundwater or a multivariate index 
(e.g. AghaKouchak, 2014; Hao et al., 
2014; Mendicino et al., 2008). De-
pending on the region, results can 
be better than using meteorological 
indicators, mainly due to the larger 
persistency (lower variability) of  the 
variables. However, the correspond-
ing data availability and quality, as well 
as the skill scores, need to be carefully 
assessed.
3.9.6.3
Drought management
Most officials at all scales traditional-
ly deal with drought impacts in a re-
active fashion when a drought event 
takes place. This reactive approach, 
called crisis management, has often 
been uncoordinated and untimely 
(GSA, 2007; Wilhite and Pulwarty, 
2005). In addition, crisis management 
places little attention on trying to re-
duce drought impacts caused by fu-
ture drought events.
Drought risk management, however, 
is a paradigm that focuses on trying to 
reduce future impacts by improving 
drought monitoring and early warn-
ing, planning and mitigation strat-
egies (Wilhite et al., 2005a). It is an 
approach that is inherently proactive 
and directed at identifying who and 
what is at risk, why they are at risk and 
how individuals respond to events.
The concept of  drought risk man-
agement is illustrated in Figure 3.45, 
which demonstrates the Cycle of 
Disaster Management. Although this 
cycle applies to all natural hazards, 
which is why some of  the compo-
nents of  the cycle (such as reconstruc-
tion) apply better to other hazards, it 
is also applicable for droughts. The 
bottom half  of  the cycle represents 
crisis management, which will always 
be necessary in some form to respond 
to the drought impacts of  a current 
event. However, Figure 3.45 high-
lights that the actions of  monitoring 
The Cycle of Disaster Management illustrating the importance of risk man-
agement in reducing future drought-related impacts. 
Source: National Drought Mitigation Center, University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
FIGURE 3.45
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sustainability and natural resources 
management, leading to greater eco-
nomic and societal security at all lev-
els (GSA, 2007).
The third component of  drought risk 
management is the implementation of 
appropriate drought mitigation strat-
egies, which are the specific activities 
taken before a drought occurs that 
reduce the long-term vulnerability to 
droughts. According to the United 
Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UNISDR, 2006), 
there are currently a limited num-
ber of  tested strategies available by 
which to identify appropriate drought 
risk-reduction strategies. Further-
more, they concluded that ‘it is essen-
tial to identify and demonstrate effec-
tive approaches and opportunities for 
drought mitigation and preparedness, 
including case studies to show exam-
ples of  good as well as weak policies. 
Policymakers, scientists, media, and 
the public often need to see actions-
at-work in order to foster buy-in to 
similar efforts.’
As drought monitoring systems im-
prove in many locations (see Chapter 
3.9.6.1), and as policymakers begin 
to think about trying to implement 
drought risk management strategies, 
such as planning and mitigation, an 
important feedback loop has emerged 
whereby better drought management 
drives the need for improved drought 
monitoring and, in turn, improved 
drought monitoring encourages more 
effective drought management (Hayes 
et al., 2012). As drought plans become 
more specific in space and time, the 
need for information at higher spatial 
and temporal resolutions increases. 
An example of  this type of  coev-
olution in drought monitoring and 
risk management has occurred over 
the past decade in the United States, 
whereby improvements in the US 
Drought Monitor (USDM) (Svobo-
da et al., 2002) product have led to 
shifts in national agricultural policies, 
inspiring additional advancements 
in the spatio-temporal resolution of 
drought monitoring to support imple-
mentation of  these policies at a local 
scale.
Although progress in drought risk 
management has been slow, there has 
been some success around the world 
(Wilhite et al., 2005a). A great exam-
ple of  this at the global scale occurred 
with the High-level Meeting on Na-
tional Drought Policy (HMNDP, 
March 2013), which was co-organised 
by the WMO, the Secretariat of  the 
United Nations Convention to Com-
bat Desertification (UNCCD) and 
the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of  the United Nations (FAO), in 
collaboration with a number of  UN 
agencies, international and regional 
organisations.
The Policy Document of  the HMN-
DP (UNCDD, FAO and WMO, 2013) 
lays out the essential elements of  a 
National Drought Policy, namely:
• Promoting Standard Approaches 
to Vulnerability and Impact As-
sessment;
• Implementing Effective Drought 
Monitoring, Early Warning and 
Information Systems;
• Enhancing Preparedness and 
Mitigation Actions; and
• Implementing Emergency Re-
sponse and Relief  measures that 
reinforce National Drought Man-
agement Policy Goals.
and prediction, planning and mitiga-
tion need to take place in order to 
reduce future drought impacts. These 
actions are considered to be a part of 
a drought risk management approach.
Drought monitoring and prediction 
involves the continuous assessment 
and anticipation of  indicators of 
drought severity, spatial extent and 
related impacts. Using this informa-
tion to elicit response is called ‘early 
warning’ (Hayes et al., 2012). Because 
decision-makers require accurate early 
warning information to implement ef-
fective drought policies and response 
and recovery programmes, drought 
monitoring and prediction are essen-
tial for drought risk management and 
illustrate an important connection 
between risk and crisis management 
(Wilhite and Buchanan-Smith, 2005).
The objective of  drought planning, 
the second component of  drought 
risk management, is to reduce the im-
pacts of  drought by identifying the 
principal activities, groups or regions 
most at risk and developing strategic 
actions and programmes that address 
these risks, as well as response actions 
that can be taken during a drought 
event. Drought plans provide an ef-
fective and systematic means of  as-
sessing drought conditions, develop-
ing mitigation strategies that reduce 
risk in advance of  drought, and de-
vising response options that mini-
mise economic stress, environmental 
losses and social hardships during 
drought (Wilhite et al., 2005b). This 
overall emphasis on drought plan-
ning is fundamental to drought risk 
management at any decision-making 
level. Incorporating planning will 
help decision-makers to prepare for 
multiple hazards, including drought 
and climate change, and will promote 
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These elements are considered to be 
the key pillars of  a National Drought 
Management Policy. These pillars have 
been used in many different initiatives 
including the Integrated Drought 
Management Programme (IDMP) 
and the Windhoek Declaration of  the 
African Drought Conference (UNC-
CD, 2016). One of  the successes of 
HMNDP is that it has drawn the at-
tention of  the international organi-
sations and national governments to 
focus on proactive policies.
The strong call for a framework in 
the form of  a policy that combines 
different approaches that have been 
considered key in moving from a cri-
sis management approach to a risk 
management approach has led to the 
launch of  the IDMP by the WMO and 
the GWP at the HMNDP in March 
2013. The objective of  the IDMP is 
to support stakeholders at all levels 
by providing policy and management 
guidance and by sharing scientific in-
formation, knowledge and best prac-
tice for an integrated approach to 
drought management.
The strength of  the IDMP is to lev-
erage activities of  its various partners 
to determine the status and needs 
of  countries and to move forward 
collectively to address these needs. 
The IDMP also uses the network of 
NMHSs and related institutions affil-
iated with the WMO, the United Na-
tions specialised agency for weather, 
climate and water, and the Region-
al and Country Water Partnerships 
of  the GWP as the multistakehold-
er platform to bring together actors 
from government, civil society, the 
private sector and academia working 
on water resources management, agri-
culture and energy.
Based on one of  the tools that has 
been instrumental in the development 
of  drought preparedness plans in the 
United States, the ‘National Drought 
Management Policy Guidelines — A 
template for action’ (WMO and GWP, 
2014) were developed from existing 
material to focus on a national policy 
context and to draw on experiences 
from different countries. The pur-
pose of  these guidelines is to provide 
countries with a template that they 
can use and modify for their own pur-
poses. Countries should not blindly 
use the 10-step process. The guide-
lines should be modified and adapted 
to local needs and experiences. For 
example, the Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean countries have distinguished 
seven steps.
3.9.7
Conclusions and 
key messages
The key challenge in reducing drought 
risk is to move from the prevailing re-
active approach, fighting the highly 
diverse drought impacts, to a pro-ac-
tive society that is resilient and adapt-
ed to the risk of  drought (i.e. through 
the adoption and implementation of 
pro-active risk management). This 
requires practitioners, policymakers 
and scientists to use a consistent set 
of  drought definitions and character-
istics. Observed and projected trends 
in drought hazard need to be under-
stood and considered in the man-
agement plans. The hazard has to be 
connected to manifold impacts (e.g. 
on water supply, food security, ener-
gy production, transport, health, and 
ecosystems). Current, as well as future, 
societal exposure and context-specific 
vulnerability should be identified to 
eventually assess the evolving drought 
risk. Through knowledge of  all these 
aspects, drought risk can be managed 
through a set of  institutional, structur-
al and operational measures, including 
monitoring and seasonal forecasting. 
There is, moreover, an ongoing need 
to consider the institutional aspects of 
‘capacity’ and ‘coordination’ at nation-
al and local levels, particularly where 
the required sustained collaborative 
framework among research, moni-
toring and decision-making/manage-
ment is lacking (Pulwarty and Sivaku-
mar, 2014). Central to the above is the 
development, support and training 
of  a cadre of  professionals and pol-
icy entrepreneurs who view the role 
of  linking drought science, policy and 
risk management practices as a core 
goal over the long term.
Recommendations have been set ac-
cording to the three pillars of  DRM-
KC. Links to the various mentioned 
activities and projects are provided at 
the end of  the chapter (see Web Re-
sources for Chapter 3.9 in References 
chapter 3 - section III).
Partnership
In Europe, several drought science 
partnerships exist: (1) the European 
Drought Centre (EDC), (2) the Eu-
ropean Drought Observatory (EDO), 
and (3) the Drought Monitor for 
South Eastern Europe (DMCSEE). 
On the global level, the WMO/GWP 
Integrated Drought Management 
Programme (IDMP) fosters collabo-
ration on drought management in the 
broad sense. The EDC shares exper-
tise from scientists, water managers 
and stakeholders, and contains the 
European Drought Impact Report 
Inventory (EDII). The EDO and 
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DMCSEE monitor current drought 
conditions. The EDO also includes 
a forecast of  drought conditions and 
up-to-date information on drought in 
the media. The EDO also performs 
analyses of  past trends and of  future 
projections under different scenarios 
for the 21st century. The IDMP co-
ordinates regional initiatives around 
the globe (e.g. in Central and Eastern 
Europe, West Africa, Central Ameri-
ca and South Asia), covering a wide 
range of  drought aspects. Profession-
al networks dealing with drought in 
Europe and beyond are, for example, 
the UNESCO EURO FRIEND-Wa-
ter Low Flow and Drought network 
and the IAHS Panta Rhei Working 
Group on Drought in the Anthro-
pocene. Further development of  and 
collaboration between these partner-
ships is important to advance our 
understanding of  drought and to im-
prove our capacity to cope with this 
important threat to our societies.
Knowledge 
Recent EU drought research pro-
jects (i.e. DROUGHT-R&SPI, 
DEWFORA, PESETA) and region-
al cooperation programmes such as 
EUROCLIMA, as well as several 
national initiatives (e.g. Jucar Basin, 
Spain, Box 3.2), have advanced the 
knowledge base with better access to 
information, guidelines and services 
on: (1) drought monitoring, predic-
tion and early warning, (2) drought 
impacts and links with the hazard, (3) 
drought risk assessment, risk reduc-
tion and drought response, and (4) 
policy and planning for drought pre-
paredness and mitigation across sec-
tors. Chapters 3.9.2 to 3.9.6 illustrate 
progress made in these fields over the 
last decade. It is likely that the fre-
quency, severity and scale of  droughts 
will increase in multiple regions in Eu-
rope and elsewhere, affecting many 
economic sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
water-borne transport, energy), the 
environment (e.g. aquatic ecosystems, 
biodiversity) and human well-being 
(health). It is therefore important to 
improve societal preparedness for the 
related risks and to adapt to the future 
challenges resulting from droughts.
Innovation
The European Drought Impact Re-
port Inventory - EDII (Stahl et al., 
2016), has created a good base on 
which to learn more about the mul-
tifaceted impacts of  drought, but 
needs to be continuously updated 
and expanded to cover the whole of 
Europe. Similar inventories need to 
be established for other parts of  the 
world. This allows the establishment 
of  improved links between impacts 
and drought hazard on the one hand, 
and a better assessment of  drought 
risks and how to manage these across 
sectors on the other hand. Further-
more, context-specific drought vul-
nerability profiles for the river ba-
sins across Europe that also consider 
projections need to be elaborated. 
Scientific innovation is required on 
seamless drought prediction to ad-
dress multi-monthly and seasonal 
forecasting, as well as drought pro-
jections for the intermediate and far 
future. Drought management should 
be put in a multihazard setting, which 
requires land and water management 
that integrates policies and measures 
for the different hazards (droughts, 
floods, wildfires and heat waves). A 
follow-up of  the past EU working 
group on Water Scarcity and Drought 
is required to effectively disseminate 
progress on drought, including guide-
lines and good practices among EU 
Member States and beyond.
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Jucar Basin Case Study
Proactive and participatory drought planning and management in a semi-arid 
water-scarce system
The Jucar Basin District (JBD) 
(42 989 km2) is located near Va-
lencia in eastern Spain. Most of the 
area can be classified as semi-arid, 
and precipitation is highly variable 
in space and time. 
Multiyear droughts are common, as 
illustrated by the Standardized In-
flow Index for the naturalised flow 
into the Tous Reservoir (lower JBD) 
(Figure 3.46). The most significant 
water use is attributable to (1) ir-
rigated agriculture (400 000 ha, 
80 % of water demand), (2) urban 
areas (4.3 million inhabitants) and 
(3) industry (including hydroelec-
tricity production and nuclear plant 
cooling). The water exploitation 
index (water demand / natural re-
newable resources) is approximate-
ly 86 %. Water scarcity is acute, re-
sulting in high environmental stress 
and water quality deterioration. 
Water allocation has caused po-
litical and social conflicts between 
users and areas. Droughts have ex-
acerbated these problems and are 
projected to become even more 
frequent and severe as a result of 
climate change.
In the JBD, water has been inten-
sively exploited over centuries and 
adaptation to drought has been a 
common feature. Institutional and 
legal developments (e.g. irrigation 
district associations and water tri-
bunals) were fostered centuries ago 
and are still working. However, while 
many measures (e.g. building infra-
structures) were taken to decrease 
vulnerability, drought response re-
mained mainly reactive. In 1936, 
the participative JB Public-Private 
Partnership (JBPPP) was founded, 
and nowadays it includes many 
stakeholders (e.g. national, regional 
and local administrations, water us-
ers and environmental non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs)). 
The JBPPP does the basin adminis-
tration, enforces decisions and re-
covers costs of infrastructures build-
ing, operation and maintenance. It 
provides a very good framework 
for governance, as well as a good 
forum for conflict resolution, which 
is fundamental in drought manage-
ment. Within the JBPPP, there has 
been an improvement in knowledge 
of water resources management 
since the 1980s through the use 
of models and collaborations with 
scientists. Initially the focus was on 
individual basin components, but in 
the 1990s an integrative decision 
support systems (DSS) at the basin 
scale was designed for basin plan-
ning, with an emphasis on water al-
location and drought vulnerability 
assessment (Andreu et al., 1996). 
To ensure that approved plans pro-
vided acceptable levels of drought 
vulnerability, indicators and criteria 
about acceptable and unacceptable 
values were agreed in a participa-
tive process since 2004.
In parallel, from the year 2000, the 
JBPPP adopted a clearly proactive 
approach by developing a Special 
Drought Management Plan (SDP) 
(Estrela and Vargas, 2012). A Com-
posite Drought Operative Index 
(CDOI) (Ortega et al., 2015) was in-
troduced to monitor drought states 
(normal, pre-alert, alert and emer-
gency). CDOI maps are published 
regularly (Figure 3.46) and serve 
as early warning to trigger prede-
fined anticipation and mitigation 
measures attached to each drought 
state. The final DSS, which has been 
regularly updated, was accepted by 
all parties as a reliable tool for plan-
ning scenarios (Andreu et al., 2009). 
It includes a probabilistic approach 
(Andreu and Solera, 2006) to obtain 
more specific risk assessments (e.g. 
probabilities of deficits and reser-
BOX 3.2
CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISK: HAZARD RELATED RISK ISSUES - SECTION III
293
voir states at short and medium 
timescales, the impact of anticipa-
tion and mitigation measures) (An-
dreu el al., 2013). Anticipation and 
mitigation measures include: (1) 
more efficient water use, (2) water 
saving, (3) conjunctive use of sur-
face and groundwater, (4) financial 
compensation for giving up water 
use, (5) water rights purchase for 
environmental protection, (6) irri-
gation sluice water recirculation, (7) 
reuse of waste water, (8) enhanced 
control of water use, water quality 
and the ecological status of wa-
ter bodies, and (9) revision of ac-
tions and post analysis. In the alert 
and emergency state, the JBPPP 
Participatory Permanent Drought 
Commission (PDC) has special pow-
ers, for example to override water 
rights and priorities, to further im-
prove governance aspects, thereby 
facilitating consensus for equitable 
decisions.
The JBPPP PDC demonstrated its 
relevance during the severe 2004-
2008 drought (Andreu et al., 2013). 
The governance body had 28 ses-
sions with successful results, as 
recognised by its own stakeholders 
(Urquijo et al., 2016). It provided 
transparency and credibility to the 
decision and policymaking pro-
cesses. Drought management and 
planning in the JBD is internation-
ally recognised as exemplary (e.g. 
Schwabe et al., 2013; Kampragou 
et al., 2015; Wolters et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, improvements can 
still be made, for instance through: 
(1) refinement of monitoring of in-
dicators and real-time data gather-
ing, (2) the consolidation of meas-
ures, (3) further enhancement of 
institutional and legal aspects, (4) 
demand and supply management, 
and (5) the use of additional eco-
nomic instruments (e.g. insurance 
for irrigated agriculture). Finally, 
major challenges have been main-
taining the personal commitment 
of individuals in all sectors (knowl-
edge brokering, policymaking, 
NGOs, stakeholders in general) and 
incorporating the comprehensive 
interaction in the regular function-
ing and procedures of the institu-
tions and other bodies involved.
The Jucar Basin (south-east Spain). Standardised Inflow Index for the 
JBD (left), and CDOI maps corresponding to March 2006, January 2007 
and March 2009 (right, from left to right).
Source: self-elaboration from public domain information.
FIGURE 3.46
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3.10 Climatological risk: 
wildfires
Jesus	San	Miguel, Emilio Chuvieco, John Handmer, 
Andy Moffat, Cristina Montiel-Molina, Leif Sandahl, 
Domingos Viegas
3.10.1
Introduction – 
wildfires in the 
context of natural 
and man-made 
hazards
About 4 % of  the global vegetat-
ed area is burnt every year by fires 
(Giglio et al., 2013; Hantson et al., 
2015). Wildfires have significant im-
pacts on humans and on the natural 
environment. They affect human lives 
and livelihoods (Finlay et al., 2012) 
and result in high social and econom-
ic costs, associated not only with the 
damages, but also with the prevention 
and suppression measures put in place 
every year (Birot, 2009). Fires cause 
large increases of  atmospheric emis-
sions and pollutants (Carvalho et al., 
2011), cause soil erosion (González-
Pérez et al., 2004), reduce the provi-
sion of  goods and services by forests 
(Mavsar et al., 2013), and change land 
cover patterns and landscape ecosys-
tem dynamics (Moreira et al., 2011; 
San-Miguel-Ayanz et al., 2012).
Wildfires, which are often 
caused by humans, have 
a large impact on human 
assets and the natural 
environment, contributing 
to atmospheric pollution 
and reducing the provision 
of goods and services 
from forests and other 
ecosystems.
Wildfires are commonly considered 
natural phenomena for many ecosys-
tems, as wildfire ignition and spread 
are greatly driven by vegetation and 
meteorological conditions. Howev-
er, humans have used fire for land 
use management and hunting for at 
least the past 100 000 years (Bow-
man and Panton, 1993). Nowadays, 
human-caused wildfires have become 
a major hazard for the environment 
and human assets globally. An analy-
sis of  fire causality in Europe shows 
that more than 95 % of  the fires in 
this region are caused by negligence 
or arson (Ganteaume et al., 2013). 
Likewise, an analysis of  fire causality 
worldwide shows that most wildfires 
are caused by humans (Krawchuck 
and Moritz, 2011).
However, although wildfires are most 
often initiated by human actions, their 
intensity and their effects are mainly 
driven by fuel condition and availa-
bility, vegetation structure (Gonza-
lez-Olabarria and Pukkalaet, 2011) 
and prevalent meteorological and top-
ographic conditions. In the context of 
this subchapter, wildfires are consid-
ered a natural hazard, regardless of 
their ignition source.
 
3.10.2
Wildfires – 
definitions
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Definitions of  wildfire vary according 
to the scientific or operational context 
in which the issue is discussed. Until 
recently, in Europe, the most com-
monly used term to define and dis-
cuss wildfires that are not the result 
of  a controlled human activity (these 
would usually be called ‘prescribed 
fires’) was ‘forest fire’.
This chapter uses the 
term ‘wildfire’, as it is 
more general than the 
term ‘forest fire’ and 
includes fires that affect 
other vegetation types 
such as grasslands, 
shrublands and other 
non-forest land covers.
A forest fire, according to EU regu-
lations (EC, 2003) is a fire that starts 
in any land cover and spreads to af-
fect forest areas, these being forests as 
defined by the FAO (1998). Howev-
er, the term ‘wildfire’ is more general 
than that of  forest fire and includes 
fires that affect other vegetation types 
different from forests. This term is 
thus more applicable to fires that af-
fect grasslands, shrublands and other 
non-forest land covers.  
3.10.3
Wildfire risk
3.10.3.1
Definition
The definition of  risk used by the 
IPCC’s special report Managing the 
risks of  extreme events and disasters 
to advance climate change adapta-
tion (2012) is that risk is a function 
of  hazard, exposure and vulnerability. 
This subchapter uses these terms as 
key components of  the wildfire risk. 
In other fields, such as the prediction 
of  droughts or earthquakes, risk is 
often considered as the conjunction 
of  two factors, namely the hazard, or 
potential threat to humans and their 
welfare, and the vulnerability, or ex-
posure and susceptibility to losses.
Traditionally, wildfire risk has been as-
sessed at national or local scales using 
individual data sources and method-
ologies. This has led to local or na-
tional indices that are not comparable 
either across Europe or worldwide. 
In addition, there are differences of 
opinion over the definition of  fire 
risk. According to the FAO’s termi-
nology (FAO, 1986), forest fire risk 
is ‘the chance of  a fire starting as de-
termined by the presence and activity 
of  any causative agent’. The Vocab-
ulary of  Forest Fire Terms compiled 
by the DELFI forum (1999) supports 
this definition, stating that fire risk 
is ‘the probability of  fire initiation’. 
Other approaches consider wildfire 
risk as ‘the potential number of  igni-
tion sources’ (Hardy, 2005). It should 
be noted that fire ignition is not the 
same as fire initiation, since not every 
ignition outbreak develops into a fire.
Other authors suggest wildfire risk to 
be the probability of  wildfire occur-
ring at a specified location, and un-
der specific circumstances, together 
with its expected effects (San-Miguel-
Ayanz et al., 2003). Wildfire risk has 
also been defined as ‘the probability 
of  a fire to happen and its conse-
Proposed framework for an integrated fire risk assessment system 
Source: adapted from Chuvieco et al. (2010)
FIGURE 3.47
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tion above, fire hazard can be defined 
as the combination of  the presence of 
ignition sources, fuel availability and 
conditions for fire ignition and spread 
(fire behaviour) (Oliveira et al., 2014). 
It thus refers to the conditions un-
der which an ignition can result in a 
wildfire, as a result of  the availability 
of  fuels and their condition, and the 
prevalent meteorological conditions. 
Vulnerability refers to the suscepti-
bility of  suffering damage. This term 
is often associated with exposure, as 
vulnerability exists if  a series of  as-
sets (such as lives or property) are ex-
posed to damage by wildfires (Galia-
na-Martín and Karlsson, 2012). This 
approach is consistent with the ISO 
31000 standard.
3.10.4
Existing knowledge 
and the issue of 
scale in fire risk 
assessment
Wildfires are a recurrent phenome-
non, and their importance in the earth 
system is widely recognised (Dwyer et 
al., 1999; Bowman et al., 2009; Flan-
nigan et al., 2009; Scott et al., 2016). 
Wildfires affect many regions in the 
world and their impacts are evident in 
natural systems and human society.
Owing to the many factors that affect 
fire risk, the issue of  scale is highly 
relevant in the assessment and man-
agement of  risk. At local to national 
scales, the assessment of  wildfire risk 
is accompanied by mitigation meas-
ures aimed at reducing fire risk by 
increasing prevention and prepared-
ness. At the supranational and global 
scales, assessment aims to reduce the 
negative impacts of  wildfire by estab-
lishing international guidelines and 
agreements for best practice among 
the wildfire management organisa-
tions. Organisations such as UNISDR 
seek to establish common nomencla-
tures and methods for the assessment 
of  risks. At the European level, an ini-
tiative to compile information on Na-
tional Risk Assessment good practice 
is currently ongoing. An analysis of 
the resulting data will provide guide-
lines on good practices for the assess-
ment of  wildfire risk in Europe and, 
probably, at the global scale.
Although there is a vast 
knowledge of wildfire 
risk-related issues, 
information varies 
according to the scale at 
which risk is assessed, 
varying notably from 
local to regional or global 
scales.
Therefore, the involvement of  so 
many organisations in fire manage-
ment, from national to local level, 
means that clear definitions of  au-
thority, functions, tasks and respon-
sibilities, together with an effective 
coordination of  their inputs is essen-
tial. The influence of  the multilevel 
governance structure is a key issue 
in wildfire management (Aguilar and 
Montiel, 2011).
quences’ (San-Miguel-Ayanz, 2002), 
following the general UNISDR ter-
minology of  risk (UNISDR, 2009), 
while other definitions consider that 
fire risk is ‘the union of  two compo-
nents: fire hazard and fire ignition’. In 
this case, the overall risk depends on 
the fuel and its susceptibility to burn-
ing (i.e. hazard), and on the presence 
of  external causes (both anthropo-
genic and natural) leading to fire igni-
tion and spread.
Wildfire risk is derived 
from the combination 
of fire hazard and fire 
vulnerability, namely 
hazards related to the 
presence of fuels and 
ignition sources, and 
vulnerability related to 
the assets at risk.
The international standard on risk 
management, ISO 31000, defines risk 
as the ‘effect of  uncertainty on ob-
jectives’. For this definition of  risk, 
there needs to be a clear objective, for 
example, avoiding significant human 
impacts from wildfires. Recent studies 
at the local and global levels describe 
wildfire risk as being derived from the 
interaction of  two components, fire 
danger and vulnerability. In this case, 
fire danger is equivalent to fire hazard 
(see Figure 3.47).
3.10.3.2
Components
Considering the most recent defini-
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3.10.5
Wildfire information 
systems: regional, 
national, global
Often, fire management is the respon-
sibility of  local to regional agencies 
within a country, although these op-
erations are commonly supported by 
national governments. In developed 
countries, the increase in the number 
of  human-caused fires and the large 
economic losses caused by them have 
triggered forest fire prevention and, 
in particular, firefighting programmes.
A range of  infrastructural compo-
nents including hard infrastructure 
(e.g. control centres), plus education 
and awareness raising (strategic as well 
as tactical or responsive) are part of 
permanent programmes. Moreover, 
expenditure in firefighting equipment 
and operations has escalated in recent 
decades, especially with the increasing 
use of  aerial firefighting.
As technology has evolved in the last 
decade, modern methods for the anal-
ysis of  fire risk components and the 
evaluation of  fire effects have found 
their place in national, regional and 
global organisations. Accordingly, 
wildfire information systems often in-
clude modules for the dynamic evalu-
ation of  fire danger and the frequent 
update of  fire risk components such 
as fuel distribution, structure and 
moisture content. Satellite technology 
and Geographic Information Systems 
permit the integration of  spatial layers 
of  information to analyse spatial pat-
terns of  fire occurrence and to derive 
fire risk at different scales. National 
fire information systems to assess and 
quantify fire risk exist in nearly all Eu-
ropean countries, although they differ 
in approach. Regional initiatives of 
wildfire information systems are the 
European Commission’s European 
Forest Fire Information System (EF-
FIS) and the recent Group on Earth 
Observations (GEO) initiative to es-
tablish a Global Wildfire Information 
System (GWIS) (see Figure 3.48). 
The North American Drought Monitor
Source: HELIX project (Naumann et al., 2017)
FIGURE 3.48
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ing to the definition of  fire risk in the 
sections above, wildfire management 
requires the monitoring of  all the fac-
tors that affect fire ignition, spread 
and impact. It also requires action to 
prevent and mitigate fire impacts. Fire 
prevention must target the reduction 
of  fire ignitions as well as the man-
agement of  fuels, as these are the 
only factors affecting fire propagation 
upon which we can act. Whenever the 
fire exclusion policy is predominant, 
this fuel management is commonly 
restricted to reducing fuel spatial con-
tinuity, by fuel breaks, or fuel amount 
using grazing or mechanical means. 
Those fuel reduction operations can 
be eventually used for the generation 
of  biomass energy. In many regions, 
the result of  the fire exclusion poli-
cy is often the continuous accumu-
lation of  fuel, which, when ignited, 
can result in uncontrollable wildfires 
(San-Miguel-Ayanz et al., 2013; Vie-
gas et al., 2009). However, prescribed 
burning is not widely accepted in 
many countries, particularly because 
of  potential accidents and negative 
public perception. Policy conflict be-
tween different government depart-
ments occurs in other areas, for ex-
ample in the conversion of  land for 
certain forms of  wildlife habitat such 
as heathland, and housing develop-
ment on land surrounded by vegeta-
tion at significant risk of  ignition. It 
is important that these conflicts are 
worked through and resolved.
Since most fires are caused by hu-
mans, fire prevention activities require 
measures to prevent these ignitions, 
which can be the result of  negligent 
behaviour or criminal actions. This 
implies the implementation of  educa-
tion programmes in rural areas where 
the fires take place. In many places, it 
is necessary for these to be dynamic 
and recurrent. Fire is a common tool 
in agricultural management and the 
elimination of  these practices can be 
difficult to achieve without significant 
trade-offs. In some countries, gov-
ernment strategies tend to focus on 
cooperation with rural populations in 
the safe implementation of  prescribed 
fires (Montiel and Kraus, 2010). In 
other countries, fire is still used as the 
main tool to convert forested areas to 
agricultural or pasture land. Regard-
ing criminal actions in relation to the 
widespread deliberate burning to clear 
rain forest, for example in Indonesia 
and Brazil, strategies for cooperation 
with the local population and legal ac-
tions must be put in place.
Wildfire management 
comprises the totality of 
the fire cycle, before the 
events in the prevention 
and preparedness 
phases and the post-fire 
assessments that lead 
to the implementation of 
restoration measures.
Preparedness refers specifically to 
activities in the period immediately 
before fire initiation, notably at times 
of  the year when fire hazard is great-
est. Modern technologies for the as-
sessment of  vegetation dynamics and 
meteorological weather prediction 
systems allow forecasting of  fire dan-
ger conditions, resulting in enhanced 
preparation for firefighting. The use 
of  remote sensing techniques has be-
Both initiatives are currently under 
the umbrella of  the EU Copernicus 
Regulation. These systems benefit 
from other initiatives aimed at deriv-
ing relevant information, such as the 
Climate Change Initiative of  the Eu-
ropean Space Agency (ESA).
3.10.6
Wildfire 
management:
prevention, 
preparedness, 
impact assessment, 
restoration
The wildfire policies adopted by most 
European countries over the last cen-
tury have been based on fire exclusion 
regardless of  their specific context. 
Nowadays, this approach is wide-
ly recognised as being neither eco-
logically desirable nor economically 
feasible. Total fire exclusion policies 
have significant consequences for the 
magnitude and frequency of  wildfires, 
through an increase of  fuel accumula-
tion, the loss of  resilience to fire and 
the alteration of  fire regimes. New 
approaches to wildfire defence are 
required to improve the strategies of 
prevention and suppression (Montiel 
and San-Miguel, 2009). A further step 
is given by the concept of  integrated 
fire management (Sande Silva et al., 
2010). It involves the consideration 
of  the various aspects of  fire in sup-
pression and prevention as well as the 
use of  fire as a tool for management 
practices.
An integrated system for wildfire 
management must consider the differ-
ent phases of  the fire cycle. Accord-
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come common among forestry and 
civil protection organisations. Re-
mote sensing permits the near-real-
time assessment of  fire spread, which 
can be used in decision-making for 
the deployment of  firefighting crews 
and equipment during large wildfire 
events. Remote sensed information 
is also used to assess fire effects at 
a very low cost, which complements 
necessary field campaigns for the in 
situ assessment of  damage and the 
planning of  restoration measures.
3.10.7
Other hazards such 
as windstorms and 
pests and their 
relationship to 
wildfire risk
Other natural hazards that worsen the 
conditions for wildfire management 
often result in an increase in the levels 
of  fire risk.
Prolonged droughts (see Chapter 
3.9) and heatwaves (see Chapter 3.8) 
dry out fuels and help to create the 
conditions for uncontrollable wild-
fires (Gower et al., 2015). Examples 
of  these are the fires that occurred in 
2003 in Portugal and southern France, 
and in 2007 in Greece. Windstorms 
can result in the sudden accumulation 
of  large amounts of  fuel, which are 
often difficult to manage or extract. 
Furthermore, the difficult arrange-
ment of  fuels on the ground hinders 
the effective implementation of  fire 
prevention measures and hampers 
firefighting operations. Examples of 
these situations occurred in the areas 
affected by Storm Gudrum in Den-
mark and Sweden (2004), which re-
sulted in the world’s largest stockpile 
of  wood (de Rigo et al., 2016), and 
Storm Klaus (2012) in France.
In Europe, heavy attacks by insects 
and phytopathogens can have major 
impacts on forests, resulting in re-
duced forest health and, sometimes, 
widespread tree death (FOREST EU-
ROPE, 2015). Standing dead timber 
poses an increased risk of  wildfire. 
The loss of  economic value may in-
duce lack of  fuel management and in-
crease the fire risk. The accumulation 
of  dead and fallen woody fuel follow-
ing windstorms (see Chapter 3.7) also 
makes these forest areas more prone 
to attacks by insect pests and further 
increases their vulnerability to wildfire.
Other hazards, such 
as pest outbreaks or 
windstorms, may increase 
wildfire risk and hamper 
wildfire prevention 
measures.
However, wildfires can also influence 
other hazards. They are particular-
ly shaping the flood scenarios in the 
fragile Mediterranean-type ecosys-
tems, where the peak flood and the 
suspended material load of  water 
streams increase significantly in post-
fire conditions, inducing soil erosion, 
floods and landslides. 
3.10.8
Harmful effects of 
wildfires on human 
population and health
The effects of  wildfires include dam-
age to land cover, which encompasses 
the loss or degradation of  natural val-
ues and the decrease or failure of  pro-
vision of  ecosystem services in the af-
fected areas, which can be temporary 
or permanent. These include, among 
other things, soil protection, water 
purification, recreation, tourism, etc.
In addition, wildfires emit large vol-
umes of  gases that affect the human 
populations in the areas affected by 
them. Wildfire emissions contribute 
considerably to the total global at-
mospheric carbon emissions and are a 
concern from local to global scales. At 
the global scale, assessment of  emis-
sions is compiled in the Global Fire 
Emissions Database - GFED (Rand-
erson et al., 2015).
In addition to economic 
and environmental 
damage, wildfires pose a 
serious threat to human 
populations, producing 
negative effects on 
human health and 
increasing death tolls.
At the local scale, wildfire emissions 
can have harmful effects on the local 
population (Finlay et al., 2012; Bow-
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climate change and fire occurrence, 
supporting wildfire prevention in the 
context of  global change. A number 
of  researchers have highlighted the 
potential changes in fire climate re-
gimes in different parts of  the world, 
which may result in increased fire risk 
and exacerbation of  the effects of 
wildfires, especially in the Boreal and 
Mediterranean climatic regions (Bar-
bero et al., 2015). Climate studies in 
Sweden show that more fires, espe-
cially in south-east Sweden, with a fire 
season that is about two times longer 
than the current fire season, is expect-
ed, with attendant climate change sce-
narios (Sandahl, 2016). 
The effect of  climate change in the 
United States (Westerling et al., 2006) 
has already led to an increase in large-
fire activity in the western United 
States, with longer wildfire duration 
and longer wildfire seasons. Likewise, 
climate change is associated with an 
increased fire danger and consequent 
larger burnt areas in the EU Mediter-
ranean region by the end of  the cen-
tury (Amatulli et al., 2013; Khabarov, 
et al., 2014). The increase in fire activ-
ity and burnt areas will consequently 
lead to an increase in fire emissions 
in Europe and globally (Jolly et al., 
2015). The economic impact of  cli-
mate change, including the effects of 
wildfires, has recently been assessed 
in the context of  the Peseta II project 
of  the JRC (Ciscar et al., 2013).
3.10.9.2
Socio-spatial factors of 
wildfires: population, land 
cover and land use change, 
and landscape dynamics
Socio-spatial factors have a major role 
in the management of  wildfire risk. 
As noted in the literature, there is a 
proven relationship between ignitions 
and human populations (Bowman et 
al., 2011). Furthermore, the increase 
in the intensity of  wildfires results 
every year in a number of  human 
casualties and large economic losses 
due to the destruction of  human as-
sets (San-Miguel-Ayanz et al., 2013; 
Viegas, et al., 2009; EM-DAT, 2009). 
The expansion of  the so-called Wild-
land Urban Interface (WUI) leads to 
an increase in wildfire risk and to the 
much more difficult management of 
wildfires. Often, fire-fighting crews 
must protect human assets and disre-
gard the fighting of  wildfires, limiting 
their intervention to the protection of 
human lives and properties.
Wildfire risk is affected 
by contextual factors. 
The main factors are 
climate change and socio-
spatial factors such as 
population, land cover 
and land use change, and 
landscape dynamics.
The changes in land cover and land 
use patterns due to the movement 
of  population from rural areas to 
urban centres in many parts of  the 
world, and the consequent decline in 
fuel management in these areas, leads 
to an increase in fire risk and higher 
intensity of  wildfires (San-Miguel-
Ayanz et al., 2012).
Wildfires are a complex socio-spatial 
man and Johnston, 2005). The effects 
of  atmospheric pollution by wildfires 
include the aggravation of  respiratory 
problems in the population and can 
result in the deaths of  more suscep-
tible individuals. Serious problems 
to human health were recorded in 
many critical fires during the last dec-
ade; possibly the most noted events 
were those in Indonesia and Russia 
in 2010 and Indonesia in 2015. The 
Indonesian fire event in 1997 resulted 
in an estimated 45 000 km2 of  forest 
and land being burnt on the islands 
of  Sumatra and Kalimantan, releas-
ing between 0.81 and 2.57 Gt of  car-
bon to the atmosphere, equivalent to 
13–40 % of  the mean annual global 
carbon emissions from fossil fuels. 
As a result of  this fire, an estimated 
20 million people in Indonesia suf-
fered from respiratory problems, with 
19 800-48 100 premature mortalities 
(IFFN, 2000). Russia reported a death 
toll of  about 700 people daily in con-
nection with the smoke problems 
caused by peat fires in the Moscow 
region in 2010 (The Guardian, 2010). 
Less well known is the significant 
psychological effect that some peo-
ple can experience after close contact 
with wildfire (Eisenman et al., 2015).
3.10.9
Contextual factors af-
fecting wildfire risk
3.10.9.1
Climate change
Currently, an average of  400 million 
ha of  natural areas are burnt annu-
ally at the global level (FAO, 2015: 
245). Many organisations, including 
the IPCC (2014) contribute to the as-
sessment of  the relationship between 
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issue. However, both systemic com-
ponents – space and society – have 
usually been dealt with separately. 
The spatial patterns of  wildfires have 
been analysed at the regional scale, 
using the available data and employ-
ing methods of  comparative analysis 
for producing an overview of  fire 
occurrence in Europe (Chas-Amil et 
al., 2015; Montiel and Herrero, 2010; 
Salis et al., 2014). Interesting literature 
on the spatial distribution of  fire oc-
currence has also been developed at 
the municipal level (Fernandes, 2016; 
Martínez-Fernández et al., 2013). The 
social aspects, which are basically re-
lated to community-based fire man-
agement and community wildfire rela-
tions beyond wildland fire causes and 
wildland fire defence organisation, are 
less well known.
The temporal patterns and the evo-
lution of  the spatial patterns through 
history have also been less studied, 
owing to data limitations. The tem-
poral dimension of  wildland fires 
has been mainly explored in the 
short term, considering the differ-
ent periods of  the existing statistical 
series, although some studies have 
analysed fire history on the basis of 
lake charcoal deposits from the last 
12 000 years (Whitlock and Larsen, 
2012). The interactions between en-
vironment factors, the social context 
and the fire regime over the long term, 
as well as changing fire behaviour 
spatial patterns, resulting in the crea-
tion of  new territories at risk, are still 
largely unknown. Furthermore, it is 
essential to take into account the ter-
ritorial contextual factors (land cover 
and land use, meteorological factors, 
land tenure, cultural and organisation-
al aspects, public policies) that inter-
act and influence fire occurrence to 
better understand wildland fire causes 
(Beilin and Reid, 2015; Montiel and 
Galiana-Martín, 2016).
The interactive evolution of  spatial 
and human issues is defining differ-
ent land-type fire scenarios at various 
scales. The concept of  fire scenario 
(Montiel and Galiana-Martín, 2016) 
has provided an important conceptu-
al foundation by which to understand 
connections between landscape pat-
terns and dynamics and fire behav-
iour (propagation patterns). The use 
of  fire scenarios is thus useful to es-
tablish fire-design management strat-
egies at the landscape level (Costa et 
al., 2011; Moreira et al., 2011) that in-
crease social and ecological resilience 
and reduce territorial vulnerability to 
fire risk. Figure 3.49 shows a fire-re-
silient Mediterranean landscape in 
Sierra de Gata (Spain), in which di-
versified land management and fuel 
discontinuity prevent high-intensity 
wildfires.
3.10.10
Innovation for better
 understanding and 
wildfire management
Innovation in wildfire management 
comes from two main sources: (1) 
operational experience, in a lessons 
learning process, and (2) scientific re-
search. Such knowledge and innova-
tions are incorporated in the manage-
ment activities through, for example, 
the advancement in methods to quan-
tify and map fire risk components 
and the incorporation of  human fac-
tors in the management of  wildfires 
through education campaigns, rural 
Wildfire- resilient Mediterranean landscape in Sierra de Gata, Spain. 
Source: photo courtesy of C. Montiel
FIGURE 3.49
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tion can be further developed are as 
follows:
• Increased use of  fire spread mod-
els, coupled with portable, hand-
held devices to make decisions on 
site during firefighting (SCION, 
2009).
• Increased use of  digital technol-
ogies and social media to reach 
relevant stakeholders and lay com-
munities at times of  heightened 
fire risk; use of  these platforms 
to get early warnings of  wildfire 
outbreaks (two-way knowledge ex-
change).
• Increased synergy between differ-
ent agencies and departments with 
responsibility for disaster man-
agement. Economies of  scale and 
greater effectiveness in bringing 
relevant parties/actors together 
when it matters. This is important 
for countries such as the United 
Kingdom, where the risk of  storm 
and flood damage is currently 
much greater than the risk of  wild-
fires. Working together is likely to 
engender a better understanding 
of  the impending wildfire prob-
lems that climate change is already 
bringing about — a significant 
form of  preparedness.
• A better integration of  the four ‘R’s 
(risk reduction, readiness, response, 
recovery) with shared responsibili-
ties between land managers/own-
ers and the civil contingency com-
munity.
• A better understanding that pre-
vention is better than cure (e.g. 
Firewise (NFPA, 2016)), especially 
in times of  recession when gov-
ernment agencies are being cut 
back. Hence, land managers are 
being brought into the risk man-
agement process via wildfire fora, 
projects and other forms of  com-
munication. Government financial 
incentives for forest management 
(grants) are also manipulated to en-
sure that applicants understand the 
need to embrace wildfire risk-re-
duction policy and practice (GOV.
UK, n.d.).
• Increased rooting of  government 
policy in a risk-based framework 
(HM Tresaury, 2013), driven by 
climate change and other national 
risks (e.g. in a National Risk Regis-
ter (Cabinet Office, 2015)). Better 
understanding that poor handling 
of  a disaster can be politically 
damaging in a digital environment 
when blame can be ascribed with 
some confidence (Gasper and 
Reeves, 2011).
• Increased use of  the ecosystem 
framework (e.g. Millennium Eco-
system Assessment - MEA, Map-
ping and Assessment of  Ecosys-
tems and their Services - MAES) 
to contextualise ecosystems, their 
goods and services and their val-
ues (e.g. via Natural Capital Ac-
counting (BISE, n.d.)), and thus 
the potential loss from wildfire; e.g. 
the ecosystem approach has been 
used to evaluate potential loss from 
wildfire in a study in the United 
Kingdom (KWFW, 2014).
• Disaster Management degree (BSc, 
MSc) courses will help to embed 
risk analysis in the mainstream.
3.10.11
Research gap
Although innovation provides a better 
assessment of  fire risk components, 
and research demonstrates the appli-
cability of  research methods in pilot 
projects, there is still a lack of  proof-
of-concept at an operational level. 
programmes and a better conscious-
ness of  human society on the impacts 
of  wildfires. However, there remains 
a lack of  agreement with national and 
regional fire administrations on the 
implementation of  a common wild-
fire risk assessment at the European 
or global levels. 
Relevant progress has been made 
in the implementation of  common 
methodologies to assess fire danger 
at the European level in the context 
of  EFFIS. At the global level, there 
are initiatives to promote the pro-
duction of  information that forms 
the basis of  wildfire risk assessment 
(GWIS, FIREGLOBE, 2008), such 
as global fuel maps (Pettinari and 
Chuvieco, 2016), global fire ignition 
sources datasets, global fire vulnera-
bility (Chuvieco et al., 2014), as well 
as global burnt area maps (Chuvieco 
et al., 2016). In addition, global data 
on fire ignitions and burnt areas are 
provided by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration FIRMS ac-
tivity and fed into regional and global 
systems (e.g. AFIS, INPE, GWIS).
Innovation in wildfire 
management involves 
the adoption of new 
technologies for the 
assessment of wildfire 
risk and the incorporation 
of the human component 
in the implementation of 
prevention measures.
Some of  the areas in which innova-
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Few of  the research advances in pro-
jects are adopted or implemented by 
regional or national administrations. 
This is often due to the complexity in 
the use of  new tools and the inertia 
of  these administrations to change 
the use of  long-established methods, 
which are well known by staff.
Basic research on the social aspects 
of  wildland fire is very limited. The 
existing literature is mainly applied 
research, in particular case-studies of 
certain aspects of  the social dimen-
sions of  wildland fires (wildfire hu-
man causes and influencing factors; 
fire laws/policies/regulations; fire 
management; socioeconomic impacts 
of  wildfire risk; social awareness/vul-
nerability/resilience to wildfire risk, 
etc.). 
Although progress 
has been made in 
the assessment of 
fire risk components, 
there is still a need 
for research on, 
inter alia, fire risk 
and behaviour 
models as well as 
policy, social and 
economic aspects.
In general, these scientific publica-
tions are analytical descriptions used 
to assess a specific issue of  wildland 
fire factors or impacts at the local or 
regional level, instead of  the commu-
nity one which is closer to the social 
approach because this is the scale at 
which people organise and interact.
Research is needed in both technical 
and social spheres. It is easy to pre-
dict that developments in wildfire risk 
management will follow the increase 
in sophistication and use of  digital 
technologies. These largely support 
the readiness, response and recov-
ery phases in disaster management. 
However, it is less easy to be sure that 
reduction via a decrease in ignition 
events can take place without signifi-
cant changes in human behaviour for 
which social research will be valuable. 
The following are a few areas of  re-
search that could be prioritised (not in 
order of  importance):
• Refinement of  risk models (con-
tinual process), based on develop-
ments in fire science and better pa-
rameterisation, for example based 
on increased knowledge of  vegeta-
tion, its phenology and flammabil-
ity. This will be achieved through 
basic experimental research, moni-
toring and modelling.
• Modelling of  wildfire risk in the 
context of  predicted land-use 
change, which is affected by a range 
of  social, economic and environ-
mental (e.g. climate change) drivers. 
Foresight analysis is very important.
• Gaining a better understanding of 
wildfire behaviour to support fire 
prevention and fire suppression 
activities and to improve fire safe-
ty. The development of  more ad-
vanced fire suppression methods to 
cope with very high-intensity fires 
that are becoming more common.
• Economic analysis of  wildfire con-
sequences, including all elements 
of  risk management (reduction, 
readiness, response, recovery) at a 
regional or national scale in order 
to evaluate cost-effectiveness of  in-
vestment in each of  these elements. 
This must include the value of  loss 
of  the full range of  ecosystem 
goods and services.
• Land use/cover analysis (both cur-
rent and future projections) that 
would better characterise the im-
pacts of  landscape structure in fire 
propagation.
• Policy analysis to understand at 
national/international levels how 
wildfire policy can work synergis-
tically with existing agricultural, 
forestry, urban and habitats/biodi-
versity policies instead of  conflict-
ing with them. Use of  ecosystems 
frameworks to explore trade-offs 
and provide possible ways forward.
• Social research to understand the 
perceptions of  wildfire risk in the 
different land management sectors 
and the constraints to adopting a 
more realistic approach to it. In 
other words, why do we still experi-
ence so much negligent behaviour? 
Research to find ways to overcome 
such obstacles should be undertak-
en.
• More social research to understand 
why people commit intentional 
fires, and how to reduce these moti-
vations and to have a larger involve-
ment of  the population in the fire 
prevention and risk-reduction activ-
ities. A better understanding of  the 
interactions between physical and 
human factors affecting fire ignition 
is needed.
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well as to develop new methods for 
wildfire monitoring, management and 
policy decision-making. The synergies 
between this network and the GEO 
Global Initiative on establishing a 
GWIS may result in improved access 
to wildfire management information 
globally.
Regarding community-based coop-
eration, organised groups of  local 
stakeholders are emerging, especial-
ly in Mediterranean countries. These 
groups contribute to fire management 
as a result of  instrumental motivation, 
or self-interest (Aguilar and Montiel, 
2011).
3.10.13
Conclusions and 
key messages
There is a vast amount of  informa-
tion on wildfires at local, regional and 
global scales. However, problems re-
main at different scales in terms of 
harmonising or standardising prac-
tices for the assessment and manage-
ment of  wildfire risk.
Resilience theory is providing a suit-
able framework by which to explain 
abrupt changes in socioecological 
systems. The importance of  commu-
nity participation and building social 
capital through collective learning and 
governance mechanisms has been 
highlighted as a required basis for 
building disaster resilience (Aldunce et 
al., 2015; Aldunce et al., 2016; Montiel 
and Kraus, 2010; O’Brien et al., 2010). 
Another relevant contribution of  the 
resilience theory to fire risk mitigation 
is the capacity to anticipate, prepare 
and plan (Aldunce et al., 2015), which 
is one of  the theoretical foundations 
of  the concept of  fire scenarios. In 
fact, understanding the role of  fire 
on the landscape and the influence of 
landscape on fire regime is crucial for 
the resilience of  territories to wildfire 
risk.
Cognitive hierarchy theory is also a 
strong theoretical foundation of  so-
cial learning processes that may en-
able a reduction in ecological and 
social vulnerability to wildfire, par-
ticularly at the WUI (Galiana-Martín 
and Karlsson, 2012; O’Brien et al., 
2010). Nowadays, one of  the most 
important factors that affect wildfire 
impacts (and adds risk to humans) is 
the expansion of  the WUI. Consider-
ing that the developments in fire poli-
cy, in terms of  environmental politics, 
depend on the social construction of 
fire problems (Hajer, 2000), the social 
perception of  fire risk and fire culture 
are crucial components by which to 
understand and enhance support for 
specific management strategies (Cza-
ja and Cottrell, 2014). This is one of 
the bases of  social prevention pro-
grammes for reducing unwanted ig-
nitions, including the promotion of 
good practices of  fire use (Montiel 
and Kraus, 2010).
The following recommendations 
would help to enhance fire risk man-
agement from local to global scales in 
relation to three aspects, namely part-
nership, knowledge and innovation.  
Partnership
Engaging the wildfire community 
with other involved groups in oth-
er areas of  disaster management or 
emergency response in order to build 
on synergies and best practice meth-
odologies.
3.10.12
Partnerships and 
networks, 
international 
collaboration 
in wildfire 
management
International collaboration in wildfire 
management exists in different fora. 
There are networks that have collab-
orated to establish common wildfire 
management practices among coun-
tries. For instance, the Voluntary 
Guidelines: Principles and Strategic 
Actions of  the FAO provide a series 
of  recommended practices for wild-
fire management (FAO, 2006). These 
have been adopted by many countries, 
including most EU Member States.
There are bilateral agreements among 
many EU Member States for fire 
prevention and, in particular, for 
firefighting. In addition, at the Eu-
ropean level a general agreement for 
collaboration exist between countries 
to share firefighting resources during 
fire campaigns. This agreement is es-
tablished under the so-called Union 
Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) 
and is coordinated by the European 
Commission’s ERCC.
At the global level, one of  the most 
long-lasting initiatives aimed at build-
ing and retrieving information on 
wildfires is that of  the Global Obser-
vation of  Forest and Land Cover Dy-
namics (GOFC-GOLD) Fire Imple-
mentation Team. This brings together 
researchers and regional networks to 
generate and analyse information on 
wildfires at different spatial scales, as 
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Engage the lay public and land man-
agement sectors, as a unified and 
non-contradictory ‘voice’ is vital — 
confusion always leads to disinterest 
and failure of  communication.
The exchange of  research outputs, 
models, best practice and experience 
between countries should be encour-
aged through the continuation of  ex-
isting international forums and other 
mechanisms (e.g. Marie Curie and 
Erasmus programmes in the EU); 
this is especially important for coun-
tries with less experience of  wildfires 
to learn from those with more expe-
rience, particularly in the context of 
climate change.
Wildfire governance schemes are ur-
gently needed in order to obtain con-
sensus between the different stake-
holders to create collective willingness 
and favour the effectiveness of  wild-
fire management systems. It is impor-
tant to identify the institutions/ad-
ministrations that are relevant for the 
implementation of  actions related to 
wildfire risk assessment/mitigation.
Cooperation between the competent 
authorities and rural communities 
for wildfire preparedness and dam-
age mitigation should be enhanced 
through organisation assistance, 
equipment supply and training ses-
sions for locals. Good governance in 
wildland fire management requires 
the conscious regulation of  fire use 
practices and the establishment of  an 
action protocol to arrange coopera-
tion for pre-extinction measures and 
emergency responses between the dif-
ferent stakeholders.
The wildfire community should en-
gage with world-changing agencies 
such as the IPCC to ensure that its 
voice is heard, and that planning for 
the future takes wildfire risk fully into 
account. It may be that there are cur-
rently too many competing interna-
tional wildfire bodies, which need to 
find ways of  integrating together as 
individually they are too small. The 
IPCC is an example of  what can be 
achieved using a good platform.
Knowledge
Harmonisation or standardisation 
of  practices for the assessment and 
management of  wildfire risk across 
Europe or at global scale has mer-
it. However, it is more important to 
reach a common scientific under-
standing and to facilitate individual 
countries to deploy such knowledge/
wisdom in the best way for the par-
ticular needs of  the country.
It is necessary to identify if  harmo-
nisation is possible for all European 
countries, or if  this would be appro-
priate only for countries with similar 
climatic conditions. The same ap-
proach should be considered world-
wide.
When dealing with harmonisation/
standardisation, it is important to 
identify what needs to be harmonised. 
This is possible for example for the 
definition of  wildfire and wildfire risk, 
information systems, actions to take 
for wildfire management, capacitation 
of  resources, education and informa-
tion messages during fire campaigns.
Social education and prevention 
programmes, which aim to increase 
knowledge of  wildfires and to re-
duce unwanted ignitions, are essential 
where fire is a traditional land use and 
resource management tool.
Innovation
Technical research is important but, 
using current knowledge to the fullest 
effect, effort must be put into engage-
ment with politicians and senior de-
cision-makers in order to ensure that 
wildfire management is given strategic 
support and is resourced appropriate-
ly.
Integrated fire management is an in-
novative concept to reduce damage 
and maximise the benefits of  fire. It 
includes a combination of  preven-
tion and suppression strategies and 
techniques that integrate the use of 
technical fire and regulate traditional 
burning.
Fire scenarios are a new tool for inte-
grating fire management and land use 
planning to reduce the vulnerability of 
territories and societies to wildfires. 
The concept of  a fire scenario is use-
ful when confronted with the need to 
coexist with fire but this requires an 
understanding of  societal discourses 
and risk constructs at the landscape 
scale. This innovative approach to fire 
management provides arguments for 
adapting land use and forestry prac-
tices to the changing fire hazard.
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3.11 Biological risk: 
epidemics
Rishma	Maini,	Virginia	Murray,	Cathy	Roth,	Mike Catchpole, 
Kristie Ebi, Michael Hagenlocher, Camila Margarita Montesinos 
Guevara, Chloe Sellwood, Tiffany Yeung
3.11.1
Introduction 
An epidemic is the widespread, and 
often rapidly extending, occurrence 
of  an infectious disease in a com-
munity or population at a particular 
time (CCDM, 2008). A pandemic is 
the extension of  an epidemic to many 
populations worldwide or over a very 
wide area, crossing many internation-
al boundaries and affecting a large 
number of  people (Last et al., 2001). 
Both epidemics and pandemics can be 
hugely disruptive to lives, livelihoods, 
and the political and socioeconomic 
stability of  affected communities. As 
a result of  this capacity for disrup-
tion, they constitute a class of  disas-
ter, which like other types of  disaster, 
presents risks that can be ameliorated 
or reduced through risk management.
As a class of  disaster, epidemics and 
pandemics possess some unique char-
acteristics. Infectious disease patho-
gens continue to circulate, extend and 
evolve during an event and thus pres-
ent ongoing and changing challenges 
in regard to assessment, impact and 
persistence, further complicating risk 
management, control and recovery 
(Floret et al., 2006). For example, the 
emergence of  antimicrobial resistance 
may thwart efforts to effectively treat 
infectious disease, resulting in more 
costly health care as well as prolonged 
illness and mortality.
Unless detected and controlled at a 
very early stage (when this is possible), 
epidemics are prolonged, and pan-
demics more so. Robust and sensitive 
systems for detection and surveillance 
therefore form the backbone of  risk 
management strategies.
While many endemic or routine in-
fections have been controlled in de-
veloped countries by immunisation, 
antimicrobials and improved stand-
ards of  health and nutrition, they may 
still pose major hazards in developing 
countries with weaker health systems, 
fewer resources to devote to health 
and limited access to care. Such health 
systems are also poorly equipped to 
withstand epidemics of  emerging in-
fectious diseases, which may be spo-
radic and far more difficult to predict, 
and often involve diseases for which 
there is no cure (Jones et al., 2008). 
The existing routine surveillance sys-
tems may not be able to detect early 
signs of  outbreaks. As many of  the 
severe emerging diseases (such as 
Ebola, West Nile, Rift Valley fever) 
are zoonoses, the first signs of  such 
events may not manifest in humans 
but rather in wildlife or livestock, 
indicating the importance of  strong 
surveillance in the veterinary sectors, 
and the critical value of  strong linkag-
es between human and animal health 
surveillance in a One Health approach 
(CDC, 2016a).
Disease surveillance, 
preparedness and 
response mechanisms are 
essential to enable any 
health system to respond..
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Droughts, floods and other natural 
hazards such as earthquakes can all 
contribute to the initiation of  out-
breaks. Outbreaks of  plague can fol-
low earthquakes, as the rodents that 
carry plague-infected fleas are dis-
placed from their customary habitats 
and food sources, and come into clos-
er contact with human environments 
(Ivers and Ryan, 2006). Epidemics 
of  Rift Valley fever often commence 
when a period of  drought is followed 
by flooding or intense rainfall, so 
climate perturbations such as the El 
Niño-Southern Oscillation may her-
ald an increased risk of  outbreaks in 
at-risk regions, and indicate the initi-
ation of  preventive measures, such as 
immunisation of  livestock to prevent 
epizootics, and heightened surveil-
lance for early detection of  outbreaks 
in animals and in humans (Anyamba, 
et al., 2001). Disruption of  water and 
sanitation infrastructure from earth-
quakes, storms and floods can lead to 
outbreaks of  water- and food-borne 
pathogens such as cholera (Ivers and 
Ryan, 2006). The extractive industries, 
with their attendant ecosystem dis-
turbance, land-use and demographic 
changes, have been associated with 
precipitating outbreaks of  severe 
emerging diseases, including Mar-
burg haemorrhagic fever (Le Guen-
no, 1997). A recent study identified 
the top five drivers of  infectious dis-
ease threats in Europe as travel and 
tourism, global trade, climate, food 
and water quality, and natural envi-
ronment (Semenza et al., 2015). The 
implementation of  measures address-
ing these underlying drivers could 
therefore be a cost-effective strategy 
towards reducing the risk of  future 
disease threats.
The permanent prevention of  infec-
tion has proven possible but is rare; 
for example, smallpox was declared 
to have been eradicated globally in 
1979 (WHO, 1980), and the drive to 
eradicate polio continues to be an 
international priority (GPEI, 2013). 
Therefore, the focus is mainly on 
disaster risk reduction for epidemics 
and pandemics, which involves reduc-
ing risks in advance of  an epidemic 
through preparedness strategies, and 
the mitigation of  risks and hazards 
during the event. There are usually 
two general aspects to mitigating an 
infectious disease outbreak: the care 
of  patients (to alleviate disease and 
suffering) and the epidemiological 
investigation of  an outbreak to fa-
cilitate the response (Ferguson et al., 
2006). For both patient care and the 
epidemiological investigation and re-
sponse, the laboratory testing of  hu-
man (and/or animal/vector/environ-
mental) samples for evidence of  the 
pathogen is important to ensure that 
the correct intervention strategies are 
employed. The magnitude of  testing 
may be overwhelming for laboratories 
with specialised testing services (Ku-
mar and Henrickson, 2012), so plans 
to access such laboratories should be 
in place before an outbreak.
The response to an emerging infec-
tion disease outbreak may initially be 
largely dependent on the local public 
health workforce but the response 
may soon be directly reliant on the 
capacity of  other health departments 
and agencies. Again, cross-sectoral 
collaborative arrangements and plan-
ning for surge capacity play a fun-
damental role. Public health risk 
communication, which is effective in 
engaging the communities at risk and 
cognisant of  societal and cultural val-
ues, is key to ensuring implementation 
and compliance with recommended 
public health controls. Psychosocial 
as well as physical consequences may 
also occur in epidemic response and 
recovery and, therefore, plans must 
address the management of  relat-
ed psychological distress and mental 
illness (Moore et al., 2007).
The Sendai Framework (UNISDR, 
2015) states that:
“more dedicated action needs to be focused 
on tackling underlying disaster risk drivers, 
such as the consequences of  poverty and in-
equality, climate change and variability, un-
planned and rapid urbanization, poor land 
management and compounding factors such 
as demographic change, weak institutional 
arrangements, non-risk-informed policies, 
lack of  regulation and incentives for private 
disaster risk reduction investment, complex 
supply chains, limited availability of  tech-
nology, unsustainable uses of  natural re-
sources, declining ecosystems, pandemics and 
epidemics”
The framework goes on to advocate 
the promotion of  ‘transboundary co-
operation to enable policy and plan-
ning for the implementation of  eco-
system-based approaches with regard 
to shared resources, such as within 
river basins and along coastlines, to 
build resilience and reduce disaster 
risk, including epidemic and displace-
ment risk’ (UNISDR, 2015).
Of  note, the Sendai Framework states 
the global target need to ‘Substantially 
increase the availability of  and access 
to multihazard early warning systems 
and disaster risk information and as-
sessments to people by 2030’ (UNIS-
DR, 2015). The framework goes on to 
state that to achieve this it is impor-
tant ‘To enhance cooperation between 
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ity rate was estimated at 15 %, the rate 
increased significantly with age (Chan 
et al., 2003). Transmission was also 
amplified between health workers; 
nosocomial transmission accounted 
for 72 % of  cases in Toronto (Booth 
et al., 2003) and 55 % of  cases in Tai-
wan (CDC, 2003).
Before the SARS epidemic, coronavi-
ruses were believed to primarily cause 
minor upper respiratory tract illness 
in humans (Myint, 1995). With SARS, 
illness usually begins with a high fe-
ver associated with chills and rigors, 
headache and malaise, followed by 
respiratory impairment, which, on 
becoming severe, requires mechanical 
ventilation (Peiris et al., 2003).
During the early stage of  the epi-
demic, the non-specific presenting 
symptoms and the lack of  access to 
reliable diagnostic tests made it dif-
ficult for clinicians and public health 
authorities to accurately ascertain 
cases. Furthermore, the uncertainty 
around the population health impacts 
of  SARS generated considerable pub-
lic fear. The need to follow up many 
thousands of  contacts of  confirmed 
cases to check for the development 
of  illness placed an enormous burden 
on already overstretched public health 
services. Examples of  issues identi-
fied included:
• governments investing in high-
ly visible public health activities 
such as temperature testing at en-
try to buildings in order to provide 
a degree of  public reassurance, 
with a major investment made in 
entry-screening at airports, even 
though these measures were not 
evidence based (Bitar et al., 2009);
• the reintroduction of  enforced 
quarantine and isolation practic-
es to prevent transmission, raising 
ethical and legal questions around 
the balance between public health 
measures and individual rights, 
as well as questions about the ef-
fectiveness of  such measures and 
challenges in implementing them 
at scale (Huang, 2004);
• a lack of  availability of  hospital 
negative pressure isolation rooms 
in countries at the start of  the 
SARS epidemic, which are required 
to treat ill patients safely (Gamage 
et al., 2005).
Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) 
demonstrated the need 
for systems for early 
detection and global 
information-sharing.
In its wake, the health-care and na-
tional economic systems of  some 
countries were seriously disrupt-
health authorities and other relevant 
stakeholders to strengthen country 
capacity for disaster risk management 
for health, the implementation of 
the International Health Regulations 
(2005) and the building of  resilient 
health systems’ (UNISDR, 2015).
The scope of  this subchapter has 
been limited to viral and bacterial 
infectious diseases only. A series of 
well-documented disease epidemics 
are summarised to demonstrate the 
complexity of  DRM. The value of 
using the International Health Regu-
lations (IHR) and pandemic prepar-
edness approaches to disaster risk 
reduction on a global scale is demon-
strated, innovations in Early Warning 
Systems (EWSs) and surveillance are 
discussed, and the conclusions sum-
marise the key points and recommen-
dations.  
3.11.2
Diseases of 
contention
3.11.2.1
Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS)
The first cases of  SARS occurred in 
China in November 2002 (Christian 
et al., 2004), and the disease eventu-
ally spread to 37 countries, with 8 273 
confirmed cases (Chinese SARS Mo-
lecular Epidemiology Consortium, 
2004). The disease caused major out-
breaks in Asia and the Americas, with 
smaller outbreaks in Europe, illustrat-
ing how globalisation can contribute 
to the rapid amplification of  disease 
spread (Coleman and Frieman, 2014). 
While the overall estimated case fatal-
SARS
Source: PHE EDAM
FIGURE 3.50
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ed. The dramatic reconfiguration of 
health systems in response to the ep-
idemic, as well as the amplification of 
transmission in high-technology set-
tings, caused significant disruption to 
normal service delivery (Wenzel and 
Edmond, 2003). Trade and tourism 
were also significantly affected, with 
the global cost to economies estimat-
ed to be in the region of  EUR 38 bil-
lion (McKibbin and Lee, 2004). How-
ever, the basic strategy that eventually 
controlled SARS outbreaks world-
wide was effective surveillance and 
containment.
3.11.2.2
Ebola
Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) is a se-
vere haemorrhagic fever caused by 
viruses belonging to the genus Ebola-
virus in the family Filoviridae (Gath-
erer, 2014). Bats are thought to be 
the hosts of  Ebola viruses in nature, 
from which other wild animals such 
as chimpanzees and monkeys become 
infected (Reddy, 2015). Ebola is in-
troduced into the human population 
through close contact with infect-
ed animals. It then spreads through 
human-to-human transmission via 
direct contact with the blood, secre-
tions, organs or other bodily fluids of 
infected people (Feldmann and Geis-
bert, 2011).
Symptomatic patients experience a 
sudden onset of  fever, muscle pain 
and chills accompanied by vomit-
ing and diarrhoea, which in approxi-
mately one-fifth of  cases is followed 
by haemorrhagic complications. In 
severe cases, multiple organ failure 
may lead to death (Hartman et al., 
2010). Transmission can be interrupt-
ed through early diagnosis and the 
institution of  effective public health 
measures, such as patient isolation 
and care, contact tracing and safe bur-
ial practices (Bausch et al., 2007). 
Since 1976 when Ebola was first iden-
tified, more than 25 Ebola outbreaks 
have occurred in sub-Saharan Africa 
(Gostin et al., 2014). The recent West 
African Ebola epidemic (2013-16) in 
Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Sierra Leone was the most widespread 
outbreak of  EVD in history, resulting 
in 28 616 cases, of  which 11 310 are 
reported to have resulted in death 
(CDCb, 2016). Owing to the collapse 
in the ability to deliver other essential 
health care, a significant rise in mor-
tality due to other, normally treatable, 
disease was also observed.
On 8 August 2014, the WHO de-
clared the epidemic a ‘public health 
emergency of  international concern’ 
(PHEIC) (WHO, 2014a). Despite an 
understanding of  the control meas-
ures required to limit the spread of 
the outbreak, the initial response was 
slow, which allowed the epidemic to 
gain momentum. Reasons for the slow 
response included the wide geograph-
ical spread of  cases, the weak local 
health infrastructure and poor labo-
ratory capacity to diagnose infection, 
the lack of  expertise in containing the 
epidemic and treating those infected 
(Bell, 2016), and the delay of  political 
leaders in calling on international as-
sistance early on for fear of  creating 
panic and disrupting economic activi-
ty (Moon et al., 2015). Italy, the Unit-
ed Kingdom and Spain were the only 
European countries to have imported 
cases of  Ebola linked to the West Af-
rican outbreak (WHO, 2016a).
Lessons identified from the outbreak 
included:
• the need for stronger event-based 
surveillance systems in developing 
countries for early detection and 
response, to detect and stop infec-
tious disease threats;
• the importance of  engaging local 
communities in the response;
• the need for stronger international 
surge capacity and the mobilisation 
of  rapid assistance when countries 
are overwhelmed by an outbreak;
• strengthening infection prevention 
and control in health-care settings 
Ebola
Source: PHE EDAM
FIGURE 3.51
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eases with no or insufficient control 
measures, has been established. Fur-
thermore, the Coalition for Epidemic 
Preparedness Innovations has recent-
ly been established with an initial in-
vestment of  EUR 431 million from 
the governments of  Germany, Japan 
and Norway, and from the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation and the 
Wellcome Trust in the United King-
dom. This alliance aims to finance 
and coordinate the development of 
new vaccines to prevent and contain 
infectious disease epidemics. 
3.11.2.3
Zika
Zika is caused by a flavivirus, from the 
group of  viruses that cause dengue, 
yellow fever, WNV and Japanese en-
cephalitis. The main vectors of  Zika 
are Aedes aegypti mosquitos, which 
are common in dwellings and carry 
other viral infections. Zika virus was 
first recognised as a cause of  human 
disease in 1953, but only usually pro-
duced a mild and self-limiting illness 
without lasting consequence (Macna-
mara, 1954). However, in December 
2015, reports were emerging of  an 
epidemic of  microcephaly in Brazil 
(ECDC, 2015a).
given their potential to become 
‘amplification points’ for spread of 
EVD, placing health workers at sig-
nificant risk (Bell, 2016; Gostin et 
al., 2014).
The epidemic also highlighted the 
need to fast-track the development 
of  effective tests, vaccines and med-
icines. The final results of  a trial have 
just been published, confirming the 
protective efficacy of  an Ebola vac-
cine, which may prevent future Ebola 
outbreaks from having as devastating 
consequences (WHO, 2016b). A new 
WHO initiative, the blue print to ac-
celerate Research and Development 
(R and D) for severe emerging dis-
Distribution of Zika virus
Source: WHO
FIGURE 3.52
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Microcephaly is a severe neurodevel-
opmental disorder caused by a fail-
ure of  the brain to grow normally in 
the foetus, leading to an abnormally 
small head and impaired development 
(PAHO/WHO, 2015). The epidemic 
was confirmed to be caused by the 
Zika virus, which was new to Brazil 
(Campos et al., 2015). In addition to 
microcephaly, Zika causes a range 
of  neurological and other congenital 
abnormalities in the developing foe-
tus (WHO, 2016c), and severe neuro-
logical complications have also been 
observed in some adults and children, 
including Guillain-Barré Syndrome, 
which requires specialised intensive 
support (Oehler et al., 2014). Zika was 
declared a PHEIC under the Interna-
tional Health Regulations in February 
2016 (WHO, 2016d). 
Zika requires urgent 
prevention investment 
and control measures, 
which will take time to 
fully develop.
Zika is now spreading in the Ameri-
cas to several other countries in South 
America, Central America and North 
America, and imported cases have 
been recorded in Europe (ECDC, 
2015a, 2015b, 2016; Hennessey et al., 
2016). Although in November 2016, 
it no longer had the status of  a PHE-
IC, questions remain unanswered on 
the best means of  controlling the 
virus and its impacts. The disease is 
spread by mosquitos, which are very 
difficult to control using convention-
al vector control methods (Yakob 
and Walker, 2016). This has required 
a major investment into accelerating 
novel vector control strategies, which 
will require years of  intensive testing, 
evaluation and regulatory oversight 
(Daudens-Vaysse et al., 2016). Work 
is under way to speed up the devel-
opment of  vaccines, which will have 
to be safe for pregnant women and 
women of  child-bearing age, effective 
with one dose, cheap and scalable to 
large volumes of  production (Mau-
rice, 2016).
The social consequences of  the se-
vere complications of  Zika are formi-
dable. The congenital abnormalities 
are a cause of  fear and anxiety among 
women who are, or may become, 
pregnant. In some cultures, women 
who have children with abnormali-
ties are isolated or stigmatised in their 
communities (WHO, 2016e). Family 
planning services may be weak, diffi-
cult to access or not culturally accept-
able in some areas, and many coun-
tries do not allow abortion even for 
medical reasons, so the impact on af-
fected women and their families, and 
the need for longer-term social pro-
vision and disability services, must be 
addressed (WHO, 2016f).
3.11.2.4
Human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV)
Human immunodeficiency virus HIV 
is a type of  retrovirus that is trans-
mitted by the exchange of  body flu-
ids (breast milk, blood, semen and 
vaginal secretions) from infected in-
dividuals. The virus attacks and de-
stroys infection-fighting CD4 cells 
of  the immune system and weakens 
the host’s defences, leading to Ac-
quired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS). Even without treatment, 
there is often a long time lag (on aver-
age 10 years) between the acquisition 
of  infection and the onset of  AIDS 
(Poorolajal et al., 2016). Immunode-
ficiency increases the susceptibility of 
individuals to a variety of  infections, 
many of  which are not dangerous to 
people with strong immune systems, 
necessitating early diagnosis and ap-
propriate treatment (WHO, 2016g). 
Human immunodeficiency 
virus/acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome 
(HIV/AIDS) provides an 
example of the problems 
in managing a pandemic 
when early detection 
is poor.
HIV was first identified in 1983 and 
was definitively linked to AIDS pa-
tients in 1984 (Blattner et al., 1988). 
A reluctance to address the common 
transmission factors directly through 
effective social engagement may have 
impeded early efforts to limit the ex-
tension of  the epidemic, which is now 
a pandemic. To date, approximately 75 
million people have been infected with 
HIV and it is considered that 36 mil-
lion people have died from HIV-relat-
ed causes (WHO, 2016h). Despite the 
predominance of  HIV/AIDS cases 
in sub-Saharan Africa, recent reports 
state that eight out of  12 countries in 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia have 
experienced increases in new cases of 
HIV infections (UNAIDS, 2016).
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an individual’s HIV status, possess-
ing skills for implementing safe sex, 
perceiving risk accurately and having 
peer support to build safer behaviours 
(Coates et al., 1988).
The economic impact of  HIV is also 
significant. Although no definitive fig-
ures for Europe have been found, it 
is estimated that, on average, the ep-
idemic causes a reduction in GDP of 
2-4 percentage points across affected 
African countries (UNDESA, 2001).
Annual HIV/AIDS mortality has 
reduced from 2.3 million in 2005 to 
1.5 million in 2013 as a result of  the 
introduction of  highly active antiret-
roviral therapy (Granich et al., 2015). 
This effective treatment increases sur-
vival by up to 25 years following in-
fection (Poorolajal et al., 2016). Glob-
al treatment coverage reached 46 % at 
the end of  2015. However, in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, only 21 % 
of  those living with HIV are receiving 
treatment, owing to a lack of  resourc-
es and political will (UNAIDS, 2016).
Further work has been proposed by 
the United Nations General Assem-
bly High-Level Meeting on Ending 
AIDS to terminate the AIDS epidem-
ic by 2030. Intensified efforts are re-
quired to reach this target, including 
the strengthening of  HIV therapy 
with pre-exposure prophylaxis, ensur-
ing that people with HIV know their 
status, filling the treatment gap and 
reaching and protecting vulnerable 
groups such as women and children 
through an improved surveillance sys-
tem (WHO, 2016i). Increased efforts 
should also be directed at strengthen-
ing human rights and combatting stig-
ma and discrimination against people 
with HIV infection.
3.11.3
The International 
Health Regulations 
and pandemic 
preparedness
Currently, there are two international 
mechanisms that have been created 
by the WHO to respond rapidly to 
international health emergencies: the 
Global Outbreak and Response Net-
work (GOARN) and the International 
Health Regulations IHR (2005).
The Global Outbreak and Response 
Network GOARN has its secretariat 
in the WHO and is a worldwide part-
nership of  agencies, institutions and 
networks, with expertise to support 
the response to epidemics wherever 
they may occur. Since 2000, it has co-
Even with extensive education pro-
grammes, the social, economic, po-
litical and environmental structural 
factors that increase susceptibility to 
HIV infection and undermine preven-
tion and treatment efforts continue to 
pose challenges (Seeley et al., 2012).
HIV infection risks include men who 
have sex with men, unprotected sex 
outside a stable relationship and in-
jecting drug use. Safe infection control 
practices are crucial to prevent trans-
mission in health-care settings. Fear 
of  stigmatisation and discrimination 
can prohibit access to health servic-
es (Mahajan et al., 2008). Women are 
also particularly vulnerable in cultures 
where they have little power over their 
sexual behaviour (Tsasis and Niru-
pama, 2008). Conditions correlated 
with safe behaviours include knowing 
HIV virus
Source: PHE EDAM
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ordinated over 130 international pub-
lic health operations (WHO, 2015).
The International Health Regula-
tions (2005) is an international legal 
instrument which is key to the Sen-
dai Framework for DRR and its im-
plementation and provide a compre-
hensive framework of  definitions, 
principles and responsibilities that are 
‘designed to prevent the international 
spread of  disease’ (WHO, 2005). The 
IHR set out State Party obligations to 
develop certain minimum core public 
health capacities in surveillance and 
response at the local and national lev-
els. Within the European Union, the 
European Centre for Disease Preven-
tion and Control (ECDC) is respon-
sible for identifying, assessing and 
communicating current and emerging 
threats to human health posed by in-
fectious diseases. WHO Europe and 
the ECDC work together to develop 
a single European reporting and re-
sponse system, and the ECDC assists 
EU Member States in certain aspects 
of  IHR implementation, via Decision 
1082/2013/EU.
The IHR also specify procedures 
for the determination by the Direc-
tor-General of  a PHEIC and the is-
suance of  corresponding temporary 
recommendations (WHO, 2005). In 
the case that a potential PHEIC is no-
tified, the IHR sets out the procedure 
for the establishment of  an Emer-
gency Committee of  relevant experts 
selected by the Director General that 
will provide views on whether the 
event constitutes a PHEIC (and when 
it ceases to be) and on recommenda-
tions to be given on health measures 
to prevent or reduce the internation-
al spread of  disease and avoid un-
necessary interference with interna-
tional traffic (WHO, 2005). During 
a PHEIC or any other public health 
event, countries may require and re-
quest assistance with the management 
of  the epidemic. However, the overall 
capacity to control and prevent the 
occurrence of  epidemics or a pan-
demic is only as good as the weakest 
link in the chain and, similarly, the ef-
fectiveness of  an international alert 
system will only be as good as its im-
plementation.
The 2009 H1N1 flu virus pandem-
ic marked the first use of  the IHR 
2005 to address a global public health 
emergency (Katz and Fischer, 2010). 
Although this pandemic saw signifi-
cantly fewer fatalities than the 1918 
‘Spanish flu’ pandemic (Morens and 
Fauci, 2007), it still resulted in signif-
icant pressures on responding organ-
isations (particularly health systems), 
coordinating governments and the 
public (Girard et al., 2009).
Pandemic influenza differs from the 
more routine epidemics of  seasonal 
influenza that populations face on a 
regular basis in a number of  ways:
• a pandemic is, by definition, a glob-
al epidemic, affecting all countries 
across the world at the same time 
(Cox et al., 2003);
• a pandemic can occur at any time of 
the year, unlike the more predicta-
ble seasonal epidemics (Lipsitch et 
al., 2009);
• most of  the population will be 
susceptible to the pandemic influ-
enza virus owing to the novelty of 
the virus compared with previous 
circulating strains, rather than the 
typical at-risk groups of  those at 
extremes of  age or with known 
clinical risk factors (Cox et al., 
2003);
• a pandemic could occur in multi-
ple waves (Ngyuen-Van-Tam and 
Penttinen, 2016).
The International 
Health Regulations 
specify the core 
capacity requirements 
of countries to prevent 
the international spread 
of disease, one of 
which is preparedness. 
The challenges with 
preparedness planning 
for a pandemic are 
manifold and reflect the 
uncertainties in how such 
an event could manifest, 
as well as the potential 
impact.
Pandemic preparedness varies across 
states and is influenced by many un-
derlying factors. These include the 
resources available to plan for and 
respond to something as unknowa-
ble as a pandemic, where limited re-
sources are understandably targeted 
towards known immediate challeng-
es such as childhood immunisations, 
HIV/AIDS or clean water (Nicoll et 
al., 2016; Oshitaniet al., 2008). Even 
if  a country is developing robust pan-
demic preparedness arrangements, ad 
hoc or unexpected events can cause 
activity to be derailed, postponed or 
abandoned, such as an outbreak of 
another disease or a major natural 
disaster (Campigotto and Mubareka, 
2015; CCDM, 2008). 
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• testing and exercising plans, and 
ensuring that staff  are appropriate-
ly trained;
• using routine surveillance to ensure 
early warning of  pandemic arrival 
in the country;
• ensuring that communication 
routes are effective for a range of 
audiences (including the public, 
health-care workers and politi-
cians);
• providing access to effective and 
appropriate clinical counter meas-
ures;
• providing access to appropriate 
personal protective equipment for 
health-care workers;
• ensuring that essential services 
and business have considered their 
business continuity arrangements;
• planning for special groups and 
settings (such as the justice setting, 
migrants and persons in transit, 
and hard-to-reach populations);
• planning to cooperate with interna-
tional partners, and how to manage 
any border issues;
• planning for recovery.
Responding to a severe influenza 
pandemic is potentially one of  the 
biggest challenges for the health sec-
tor, as well as wider society. Even if  a 
severe pandemic never occurs, all the 
planning and discussion around some 
of  the potential issues can help to in-
form responses to other incidents. 
3.11.4
Innovative 
approaches for 
early warning and 
surveillance
As advances in technology and com-
munications have increased the op-
portunities for international travel 
and trade, both of  which are recog-
nised drivers of  the emergence and 
re-emergence of  human pathogens 
(Suk et al., 2008), so have they in-
creased the opportunities for surveil-
lance to enable the rapid detection 
and assessment of  threats, and the 
sharing of  intelligence across inter-
national borders. Key advances that 
have improved surveillance capacities 
include:
• increases in computing power and 
storage capacity, enabling the rapid 
analysis of  large disease incidence 
datasets;
• developments in electronic com-
munications systems and infor-
mation standards enabling ma-
chine-to-machine data transfer 
and rapid sharing of  information, 
nationally and internationally 
(Guglielmetti et al., 2005);
• internet-based search and retrieval 
applications that scan for media 
and other informal reports that 
might indicate the emergence of  an 
infectious disease epidemic (Keller 
et al., 2009; Anema et al., 2016);
• Geographic Information Systems 
(GISs) that enable the analysis and 
display of  information that can as-
sist in identifying clusters or assess-
ing environmental determinants of 
exposure (Freifeld et al., 2008).
Infectious disease modelling that in-
tegrates data on environmental varia-
bles with health and disease data may 
also help to anticipate future disease 
threats, thereby providing support 
tools for decision-makers (Suk et al., 
2014; Semenza et al., 2013). The emer-
gence of  the field of  digital epidemiol-
ogy, which is the science of  conduct-
ing epidemiological studies using data 
Pandemic preparedness and response 
goes much wider than health-care sys-
tems. While the link with social care 
is easily recognised, maintaining the 
business continuity of  other essential 
services (such as emergency services, 
schools, fuel, power, education, pris-
ons, etc.) is necessary to mitigate any 
further unintended or unanticipated 
impacts on the health response. On 
account of  the need for cross-sectoral 
involvement, and the potential broad 
disruption that a severe pandemic 
might generate, pandemic planning 
may be considered a model for large-
scale disaster planning.
While all sectors of  society are in-
volved in pandemic preparedness and 
response, the national government is 
the natural leader for overall coordi-
nation and communication efforts. 
Public perceptions of  the state can 
therefore influence the success of  the 
response; during the 2009 H1N1 pan-
demic, health authorities were viewed 
as trustworthy in the United King-
dom, while in Spain, there was public 
speculation that the vaccine was driv-
en by the economic interests of  the 
pharmaceutical industry, which led 
to poor vaccine uptake (Henrich and 
Holmes, 2011; Prieto et al., 2012).
As in all disaster preparedness sce-
narios, there are a number of  key es-
sential elements that underpin robust 
pandemic planning (CCDM, 2008; 
Fineberg, 2014; WHO, 2009):
• having national, subnational and 
local strategic, tactical and opera-
tional plans;
• working across multi-agency part-
nerships, including the private and 
voluntary sector organisations;
• planning for a risk-based and flexi-
ble response;
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from digital tools and data sources 
from the internet such as social media, 
is already having an immediate impact 
on the operational activities of  public 
health agencies worldwide (Salathe et 
al., 2012). There are, however, consid-
erable challenges, such as filtering large 
volumes of  unstructured data, and 
ethical issues around data-sharing and 
use (Brownstein et al., 2008).
Informal sources for 
event-based surveillance 
can provide very early 
signals of significant 
health events, sometimes 
before they are detected 
through official indicator-
based channels.
An important innovation in the 2005 
revision of  the IHR was to change 
the focus of  the regulations from one 
limited to specific diseases to one ap-
plicable to health risks, irrespective of 
their origin or source (WHO, 2005). 
This has a number of  key benefits in 
terms of  the early detection of  epi-
demic threats, including not only the 
broadening of  the scope of  infec-
tions (and other potential causes of 
PHEICs) covered, but also removing 
a dependency on awaiting definitive 
(laboratory) confirmation of  the aeti-
ology of  a detected case or incident 
of  potential international concern 
before reporting. As a consequence, 
monitoring of  the evolution of  dis-
eases and factors affecting their emer-
gence and transmission can occur at 
an earlier stage than in the past.
 3.11.5
Conclusions and 
key messages
Epidemics and pandemics are types 
of  disasters that are capable of  over-
whelming health systems, disrupting 
communities and challenging political 
leadership, and that often have devas-
tating societal, economic and psycho-
logical impacts. Infectious diseases 
can behave unpredictably and have 
a capacity to evolve and adapt to ex-
ploit population susceptibilities, thus 
posing a perpetual challenge in the 
context of  DRR and DRM.
The recommendations below have 
been structured according to the pil-
lars of  the DRMKC, namely partner-
ship, knowledge and innovation. The 
DRKMC has been developed in order 
to support the translation of  complex 
scientific data and analyses into usable 
information, providing science-based 
advice for DRM policies, as well as 
timely and reliable scientific-based 
analyses for emergency preparedness 
and coordinated response activities. 
Partnership
Multidisciplinary working is essen-
tial in order to reduce the impacts 
of  epidemics and pandemics. Infor-
mation-sharing between sectors (e.g. 
animal health, veterinary, transport, 
environmental health, food, water 
and sanitation) is key to preventing 
the spread of  infection and assessing 
evolving risk through surveillance, 
particularly as many emerging infec-
tions are zoonoses and may first man-
ifest in livestock. As infectious dis-
eases do not respect borders, strong 
collaboration and coordination be-
tween national and international 
structures is fundamental to limiting 
morbidity, mortality and societal dis-
ruption. Comprehensive prepared-
ness planning involving multi-agency 
partnerships can also make the tran-
sition from disaster to recovery more 
effective.
Knowledge
Control measures should be evi-
denced-based when possible, and 
preparedness plans should be clear, 
flexible and regularly tested in order 
to provide a timely, appropriate and 
effective response. Countries should 
also be supported to comply with 
the International Health Regulations 
which set out the core competen-
cies that countries should have with 
respect to their national surveillance 
and response, and their obligation 
to report events that constitute a 
PHEIC.
Innovation
Syndromic surveillance and the use of 
innovative methods to collect event-
based data, for example through the 
internet, may assist in the early detec-
tion of  disease outbreaks. In the ab-
sence of  existing effective treatment 
or preventive measures, investment is 
required into research to develop new 
preventive and/or therapeutic strate-
gies; two recent examples of  this are 
the WHO blue print for accelerating 
Research and Development and the 
evaluation of  an effective vaccine 
against Ebola, and the formation of 
the Coalition for Epidemic Prepared-
ness Innovations.
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A set of  recommendations relating to the hazards has been identified and is 
based on the three pillars of  the DRMKC: 
Partnership
Recommendation 1: multidisciplinary working and information-sharing is es-
sential to reduce the impacts of  these hazards. Collaboration and partnerships 
are necessary both between institutions and disciplines, and need to occur at 
the local, national and international levels. For example, with respect to institu-
tions and disciplines, improvements in the forecasts of  storms will in part be 
driven by the interaction between fundamental atmosphere and ocean science 
with operational forecasting, so continued collaboration between forecasting 
centres and universities and research centres is of  key importance. Between 
the local and national levels, a systematic approach across all sectors involving 
state, private, voluntary and community actors is required to understand the 
wider societal impacts of  temperature extremes. In relation to international 
alerting and response, countries are now legally bound by the International 
Health Regulations to report on potential transboundary risks of  hazards such 
as infectious diseases, allowing the determination (if  required) of  a PHEIC. 
This has led to the overarching implementation across government and all 
sectors of  the Sendai framework.
Knowledge
Recommendation 2: it is recommended that an enhanced understanding of 
the origin, behaviour and evolution of  these hazards to facilitate local, national 
and regional risk assessment is needed. This is consistent with priority one of 
the Sendai framework, which states: 
Policies and practices for disaster risk management should be based on an 
understanding of  disaster risk in all its dimensions of  vulnerability, capacity, ex-
posure of  persons and assets, hazard characteristics and the environment. Such 
knowledge can be leveraged for the purpose of  pre-disaster risk assessment, 
for prevention and mitigation and for the development and implementation of 
appropriate preparedness and effective response to disasters.
For instance, climate change is predicted to exacerbate the frequency and se-
verity of  droughts; therefore, observed and projected trends in drought hazard 
need to be understood and considered in management plans.
Recommendation 3: the generation of  knowledge and evidence to address 
research gaps around risk will enable a shift towards a more pro-active ap-
proach as opposed to the prevailing reactive approach. The influence of  dif-
ferent socioeconomic and cultural contexts on risk and response should also 
be studied. With respect to wildfires, although there is a vast knowledge of 
wildfire risk, information varies according to the scale at which risk is assessed 
Recommendations
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and differs from local to regional or global scales. There is also a need to use 
standardised event documentation to enhance risk assessment where feasible.
Recommendation 4: EWSs often entail the collection, integration and analy-
sis of  different types of  data, and so it is recommended to improve the interop-
erability of  systems and exchange of  data. Challenges to drought monitoring 
are the continuous availability of  indicators covering the various hydro-meteor-
ological components and their combined analysis into usable information for 
decision-making. In the context of  storms, a greater understanding of  how to 
interpret, use and communicate probabilistic forecasts is required.
Recommendation 5: preparedness plans should be clear, flexible and regular-
ly tested in order to provide a timely, appropriate and effective response. Com-
prehensive preparedness planning involving multi-agency partnerships can 
also make the transition from disaster to recovery more effective. Managing 
temperature extremes can be approached from a number of  perspectives, in-
cluding using forecasting technology, the development of  heat and cold plans, 
and urban design and town planning. The key essential elements that underpin 
robust epidemic and pandemic planning provide a useful example.
Recommendation 6: of  critical importance is building knowledge on how to 
strengthen community resilience to hazards. For example, enhancing drought 
resilience in regions with high population vulnerability and low adaptive capac-
ity should be reflected in relief  aid programming, and knowledge of  epidemics 
and pandemics should be used where possible to facilitate support and to im-
plement population immunisation with relevant strains of  vaccines. 
Innovation
Recommendation 7: investment in research is needed in order for innova-
tion to continue. For all the discussed hazards, new technologies are emerging 
that better assess their risk. Disasters can also act as a catalyst for innovation. 
The West African Ebola outbreak highlighted the need to fast-track the de-
velopment of  effective tests, vaccines and medicines. The final results of  the 
targeted trial for the population at risk have just been published and confirm 
the protective efficacy of  an Ebola vaccine, which may prevent future Ebola 
outbreaks from having such devastating consequences.
Recommendation 8: the internet revolution has significantly contributed to 
innovation; for example, syndromic surveillance to collect event-based data 
through social media, for instance, may assist in the early detection of  disease 
outbreaks. The ability to draw on multiple sources of  information from data 
networks, as encapsulated by the concept of  ‘the internet of  things’, also of-
fers considerable potential for managing disaster risk related to temperature 
extremes
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The risk of  technological accidents from man-made and natural hazards is 
increasing as a result of  industrialisation, population growth that leads to more 
urbanisation and community encroachment on natural-hazard areas, and cli-
mate change. The last few years have seen major technological accidents, with 
significant social, environmental and economic impacts that have had reper-
cussions around the globe. Examples include the explosions at chemicals ware-
houses at Tianjin Port in 2015, the Fukushima nuclear disaster caused by the 
2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, and the Deep Water Horizon 
oil spill in 2010.
There is no overarching framework for the reduction of  technological risks, 
and disaster risk reduction initiatives have not commonly addressed this type 
of  risk. With the Sendai Framework for Action, the importance of  technolog-
ical hazards has been recognised and an all-hazards approach to disaster risk 
reduction is promoted. This includes dangerous situations arising from man-
made activities caused by human and organisational error, mechanical failure 
and natural hazards — so-called Natech risk. Prevention and preparedness for 
these risks, and for environmental emergencies in general, also has implications 
for sustainable development.
There are many hazardous industrial activities that provide society with im-
portant goods and services (e.g. chemical processing, oil and gas transport and 
some forms of  electricity production). For the purpose of  this report, three 
examples of  major technological hazards were selected and the state of  play in 
the management of  the associated risks is discussed: (1) chemical accident risks 
due to the relatively frequent occurrence of  accidents, (2) nuclear risks due to 
the potential for major cross-border consequences, and (3) Natech risks as an 
example of  a multihazard cascading risk.   
Introduction
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3.12 Technological risk:
chemical releases
Maureen	Heraty	Wood, Lee Allford, Zsuzsanna Gyenes, Mark 
Hailwood
3.12.1
Introduction
In 1921, an explosion of  4 500 tonnes 
of  ammonium nitrate sulphate fertil-
iser at a BASF site in Oppau, Germa-
ny, killed more than 500 people and 
caused considerable damage to the 
site and surrounding community. At 
the time, Carl Bosch, BASF’s Nobel 
Prize-winning engineer said, ‘The dis-
aster was caused neither by careless-
ness nor human failure. Unknown 
natural factors that we are still unable 
to explain today have made a mock-
ery of  all our efforts. The very sub-
stance intended to provide food and 
life to millions of  our countrymen 
and which we have produced and sup-
plied for years has suddenly become 
a cruel enemy for reasons we are as 
yet unable to fathom.’ This statement 
was no doubt true in 1921, when 
chemical manufacturing was still a 
new and growing industry. 100 years 
later, however, thanks to the work of 
generations of  dedicated scientists in 
industry and academia, ‘unknown nat-
ural factors’ are rarely an underlying 
cause or chemical accidents today.
Accident reports, investigation results 
and media reports of  recent times 
give overwhelming evidence that 
chemical accidents today are mainly 
caused by a failure to apply what is 
already known, the ‘known knowns’. 
Improvements in our understanding 
of  chemical accident risks and chem-
ical accident control technologies and 
systems have not necessarily led di-
rectly to advances in a significant re-
duction in chemical accident disasters. 
Indeed, according to a famous study 
by H. W. Heinrich (1931), 98 % of  all 
industrial accidents are preventable. 
However, technological disasters are 
by their nature ‘(hu)manmade’ and 
it can be argued that a reduction in 
chemical disaster risk is particularly 
affected by the dependence on hu-
mans to manage and use the technolo-
gy appropriately. Turner and Pidgeon 
(1997) argue that disasters arise from 
an absence of  knowledge at some 
point. They occur because we do not 
understand enough about those forc-
es (i.e. in industrial processes) that we 
are trying to harness, and, as a result, 
energy is released at the wrong time 
or in the wrong place. They are also 
clear that this is not just an engineer-
ing issue and that many disasters arise 
from social or administrative causes 
or the combination of  technical and 
administrative causes.
Improvements in our 
understanding of 
chemical accident risks 
and chemical accident 
control technologies 
and systems have not 
necessarily led directly to 
advances in a significant 
reduction in chemical 
accident disasters.
The science of  reducing chemical 
accident risks is now focused on the 
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underlying causes of  human failure 
to control the risks. Characterising 
causality in this way adds new dimen-
sions to the study of  chemical acci-
dent risks. In attributing causality to 
control, there is a recognition that 
further progress in reducing chemical 
accident risks requires strong involve-
ment of  the social sciences. Certainly, 
there is considerable room to examine 
new engineering solutions, such as the 
use of  artificial intelligence and adapt-
ing existing control technologies to 
new processes. However, these types 
of  solution are industry and even pro-
cess specific and do not apply to many 
sectors in which accidents frequently 
occur. Indeed, the oil and gas industry 
is one of  the world’s oldest industries 
and has been the subject of  massive 
technological investment over many 
decades; however, globally it is by far 
the leader in terms of  the frequency 
of  severe chemical accidents.
The term ‘hazardous industries’ com-
prises numerous substances, process-
es and equipment, with considerable 
variation within each category in re-
gard to properties, function and be-
haviour under different conditions. 
Petroleum refineries, bulk chemical 
production (e.g. chlorine and ammo-
nia), the manufacture of  specialty 
chemicals (e.g. paints, dyes, plastics 
and resins) and pharmaceuticals are 
examples of  industries that comprise 
a wide range of  processes, each with 
their own unique risk profile and as-
sociated risk management implica-
tions. While there is less variety, there 
is still considerable danger in process-
es involving hazardous substances in 
the ‘non-chemical’ industries, such as 
water and waste treatment, electro-
plating and food production. In addi-
tion, distribution activities, including 
transport by rail, road and pipeline, 
as well as explorative and extractive 
activities both on- and offshore, also 
are important sources of  chemical 
accident risk. The evaluation of  the 
potential for chemical accidents trig-
gered by natural hazards (so-called 
Natech accidents, see Chapter 3.14) 
or other external events, as well as in-
cidents caused by intentional acts, in-
volves additional factors (e.g. natural 
hazard forecasting, earthquake pro-
tection, site security, etc.). These types 
of  incident risks are not specifically 
addressed in this paper, but it is as-
sumed that standard risk management 
practices, as here, also help to prevent 
and mitigate such events. 
In societies with mature risk regu-
lation, such production and use of 
hazardous substances is permitted 
provided that the risks remain at a 
level deemed acceptable by the lo-
cal community and society in gener-
al. This paper presents evidence that 
industrialised countries are still far 
from achieving an acceptable level 
of  chemical accident risk. It then de-
scribes a number of  underlying causes 
common to all industries and societies 
that are impeding progress in chemi-
cal accident risk reduction.   
3.12.2
Chemical accidents 
with serious impacts 
continue to occur 
with disturbing 
regularity
Chemical accidents are still a relatively 
frequent occurrence in all industrial 
countries and raise important ques-
tions about the adequacy of  disaster 
risk-reduction efforts. Media mon-
itoring over the last several years 
shows consistently that at least 25-30 
chemical accidents with worker or 
community impacts are reported each 
month around the world in industri-
alised countries. Preliminary results 
of  a study by Wood et al. (2016) of 
accident reports covering all major 
chemical hazards in fixed facilities and 
transport over the last 5 years (2012-
16) identify 29 national and regional 
chemical accident disasters and 21 
chemical accidents with evident high 
local impact.  
Chemical accidents are 
still a relatively frequent 
occurrence in all industrial 
countries and raise 
important questions 
about the adequacy of 
disaster risk-reduction 
efforts.
Disasters were classified on the ba-
sis of  reported impacts on human 
health, the local community or the 
environment or on the basis of  sig-
nificant attention at a national level 
in processing and storage facilities 
and distribution networks (transport 
and pipelines). ‘Local shocks’ were 
are accidents identified on the basis 
of  important local impacts as report-
ed in the newspapers, corresponding 
to at least gravity level 3 on the Eu-
ropean Gravity Scale for Industrial 
Accidents (Committee of  Compe-
tent Authorities for Implementation 
of  the Seveso Directive, 1994). In 
total, these accidents accounted for 
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928 deaths, and (where reported) 22 
973 injuries. In addition, significant 
environmental impacts were record-
ed, with one pipeline disaster reach-
ing USD 257 million (EUR 236 mil-
lion) in restoration costs (LATimes, 
2017). More than 7 000 people were 
evacuated for several months ow-
ing to a slow leak of  natural gas that 
was finally sealed off  in February 
2016 (October 2015-February 2016, 
Aliso Canyon, CA, USA). Insur-
ance companies recorded nine acci-
dents resulting in >USD 100 million 
(EUR 92 million) in damages, includ-
ing two accidents (Hazardous goods 
warehouse, Tianjin, China, 12 August 
2015 and petroleum refinery fire, 15 
June 2014, Achinsk, Russia) costing 
>USD 1 billion (EUR 0.92 billion). 
Many other impacts, including job 
losses, environmental impacts, emer-
gency response costs, damage to near-
by buildings and market and produc-
tion losses were sparsely reported, but 
businesses in West Virginia were re-
ported to have lost USD 61 000 000 
(EUR 56 000  000) in 4 days.
Belke (1998) states:
 ‘From the perspective of  the individual fa-
cility manager, catastrophic events are so rare 
that they may appear to be essentially im-
possible, and the circumstances and causes of 
an accident at a distant facility in a different 
industry sector may seem irrelevant. Howev-
er, from our nationwide perspective at [U.S.] 
EPA and OSHA, while chemical accidents 
are not routine, they are a monthly or even 
weekly occurrence, and there is much to learn 
from the story behind each accident.’ 
The frequency of  severe chemical 
accidents is at odds with society’s 
expectations. Societies are becom-
ing increasingly risk averse and fail-
ure is less readily tolerated. There 
are indications that the frequency of 
serious chemical accidents is higher 
than expected in many industrialised 
countries. In 2015 the number of 
deaths from major accidents on the 
≈10 000 EU Seveso sites was estimat-
ed to be at least 15 (see Figure 3.54). 
This statistic, if  confirmed, means 
that the frequency of  one fatality on 
a major hazard site in the European 
Union was around 1.5 × 10ˉ³, that is, 
above acceptable limits for individu-
al risk in EU Member States that use 
quantitative criteria. (e.g. the criteria 
established for individual risk (prob-
ability of  1 fatality) is < 1 × 10ˉ⁶ in 
both the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, although lower probabili-
ties may be accepted in some circum-
stances, for example, depending on 
economic costs and benefits (Ham et 
al., 2006)). In 2013, the President of 
the United States issued an Executive 
Order to improve chemical facility 
safety and security following various 
high-profile chemical accidents. In 
recent years, chemical accident fre-
quency and severity in other major 
industrialised countries, such as China 
and Brazil, has been approaching, or 
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has approached, levels that would be 
generally considered unacceptable in 
an industrialised economy.
Globalisation and 
the export of technology 
have increased chemical 
accident risk 
outside the EU.
Similar trends are noted in develop-
ing countries (see Figure 3.55). The 
terms ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
are used in this paper to differenti-
ate countries with modern physical 
and institutional infrastructures from 
those that are still in the process of 
establishing such infrastructures. ‘In-
dustrialised countries’ refers to both 
developed countries and newly indus-
trialised countries, in which the manu-
facturing sector has a significant eco-
nomic presence. China enacted the 
Emergency Event Response Law of 
2007 as a result of  an important les-
son learned from two major chemical 
accidents in China: the 2003 gas well 
blowout in Chongqing that caused 
243 deaths mainly from hydrogen sul-
phide inhalation, and the 2005 release 
of  toxic substances into the Songhua 
River (Zhao et al., 2014). New leg-
islation in Brazil covering chemical 
risks stems from broad-based con-
cerns about problems connected with 
chemical safety that have grown in 
intensity and extent in the last two 
decades. Many developing 2014coun-
tries have experienced rapid growth 
in hazardous operations in particular 
segments of  the oil and gas, chemi-
cal and petrochemical industries and 
mining, driven by a combination of 
factors, including increased demand 
in emerging economies, access to raw 
materials and the need to lower pro-
duction costs, facilitated by a decline 
in trade barriers and government in-
centives to attract foreign investors 
(de Freitas et al., 2001).
Chemical accident disasters reported from 2012-16 (N=29), occurring in industries producing, handling or stor-
ing dangerous substances, including oil and gas, petrochemical and chemical industries, as well as ‘non-chemi-
cals’ business, such as power generation, food manufacturing and water treatment.
The frequency of chemical disasters occurring in developing countries in the period 2012-16 was more or less 
equivalent to that of developed countries, but fatality rates were much higher. It is speculated that risks to 
humans are less well-managed in developing countries. 
Non-human impacts (environment, economic loss, property damage) were often quite severe in both developed 
and developing regions.
Source: Wood et al. (2016)
FIGURE 3.55
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3.12.3
Chemical risk 
management in 
modern times: 
the theory is 
well-established 
but implementation 
lags behind
 
There is currently considerable agree-
ment on the fundamental principles 
of  process safety management which, 
if  understood and properly applied, 
would prevent a large majority of 
chemical accidents that still occur 
today. These essential principles are 
then applied in the context of  an ISO 
31000:2009 risk management process 
(see Figure 3.56). From an operational 
perspective, successful risk manage-
ment comes from applying layers of 
protection throughout the process 
life cycle (design to decommission-
ing), starting with the reduction of  the 
hazard itself, and working outwards to 
accident prevention, mitigation and 
response. Above all, it is the organi-
sations and individuals that manage 
all of  these elements. For this reason, 
hazardous sites are expected to have a 
safety management system in place, a 
derivative of  the well-known ‘manage-
ment system’ concept, to manage the 
interface of  humans with hazardous 
processes in order to minimise pro-
cess hazard risks. 
The hazardous industries understand 
in principle how to manage chemical 
accident risks. Why, then, do these 
industries continue to repeat failures 
of  the past and have accidents and, 
sometimes, disasters? A study of  ac-
cidents of  the past few decades and 
the work of  numerous experts on 
man-made disasters, including chem-
ical accidents, as well as nuclear, space 
and aviation disasters, suggest that the 
causes are systemic. Sweeping chang-
es in business philosophy and the 
explosion of  opportunity created by 
new technology, such as the increas-
ing reliance on the computerisation of 
business processes, have brought ben-
Relationship between the risk management principles, framework and processes (ISO 31000:2009 Risk man-
agement – Principles and guidelines)
Source: International Organization for Standardization (n.d.)
FIGURE 3.56
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efits as well as a share of  risks. These 
risks are particularly notable for man-
made risks where small changes to 
complex systems can unwittingly re-
move barriers to initiation or propa-
gation of  a potential hazard event.
It is a fact that technological disasters, 
past and present, not just chemical 
disasters, have relevant and timeless 
lessons for risk managers in all in-
dustries, many of  which have been 
recently documented by Gil and Ath-
erton (2008, 2010)). A number of 
high-profile technological disasters 
occurring since 2000 have challenged 
some experienced risk management 
experts to identify the patterns un-
derlying the repeated failures behind 
the latest round of  technological ac-
cidents, building on the work of  Per-
row (1984) and Rasmussen (1975), 
among others, on managing risk in 
complex systems, by means of  new 
approaches. Hollnagel et al. (2008) 
have introduced the concept of  ‘resil-
ience engineering’ for technologically 
complex industries. They look at risk 
management from the organisational 
perspective of  the large multination-
al and government operators that are 
the owners and operators of  these 
technologies. In resilient systems, in-
dividuals and organisations habitually 
adjust their performance to match the 
variability of  risk over time, ‘prior to 
or following changes and disturbances 
so that it can continue its functioning 
after a disruption or a major mishap, 
and in the presence of  continuous 
stresses.’ Klinke and Renn (2006) sug-
gest that ‘risks must be considered 
as heterogeneous phenomena that 
preclude standardised evaluation and 
handling’ in their paper describing 
governments’ potential role in man-
aging systemic risks. Le Coze (2013) 
proposes that new analytical models 
for safety assessment take into ac-
count the dynamic and systemic as-
pects of  safety.
Chemical accidents 
nowadays are often 
derived from the failure of 
industry, government and 
society to understand the 
profound effect that their 
choices have on risk.
Kletz (1993) commented on the pat-
tern of  corporate memory loss in 
United Kingdom companies as far 
back as 1993. More recently, Baybutt’s 
2016 review of  accidents investigat-
ed by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board 
since 1998 concluded ‘Remarkably, 
all of  the reviewed incidents involved 
some type of  deficiency or omission 
in adhering to established process 
safety practices. In many cases there 
were multiple deficiencies and omis-
sions.’ Wood et al. (2016) also found 
that where probable causes of  acci-
dents have been ascertained, they are 
most often associated with predicta-
ble circumstances in which control 
measures were insufficient as a result 
of  poor risk management or, in some 
cases, a lack of  adequate awareness of 
the risks. This finding is further sub-
stantiated in various ‘lessons learned’ 
publications, such as the MAHB Les-
sons Learned Bulletin, where analyses 
of  recent and older accidents are side-
by-side, identifying often remarkably 
similar findings about what went 
wrong (European Commission Joint 
Research Centre, 2012-2016).
The research of  Taylor et al. (2016) 
collated and synthesised circumstanc-
es and causality associated with 12 
significant technological accidents, 
of  which five were chemical acci-
dents, and identified numerous or-
ganisational failures associated with 
leadership, oversight and scrutiny, 
and communication that were com-
mon precursors to the events studied. 
Their study identified a number of 
factors, including the general decline 
of  safety departments, oversimplifi-
cation to upper management through 
aggregation of  indicators and other 
inputs, poor understanding of  oper-
ational ‘reality’, lack of  processes and 
systems that ensure that process safe-
ty risks are properly assessed, and the 
influence of  commercial interests, as 
among the key forces that shaped the 
events leading to the accidents. Ar-
stad and Aven (2017) point out that 
‘it is dangerous to assume that system 
boundaries can be limited to the sharp 
end of  the business … wide and open 
system boundaries recognise the im-
portance of  many more risk sources 
and safety.’ They also remark on the 
tendency to oversimplify risks (‘com-
plexity is incompressible’) associated 
with complex technologies. With pe-
troleum-based industries as a primary 
candidate, Carnes (2011) outlines a 
High Reliability Governance mod-
el based on multiple engagements 
between government and industry 
actors, which continually reinforces 
common performance expectations 
and a high-level safety culture.
A large number of  scientific stud-
ies of  technological disasters focus 
on big, well-resourced organisations. 
However, it is a fact that many serious 
accidents around the world originate 
in small and medium-sized enterprises 
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(SMEs) that are operating fairly sim-
ple processes (e.g. warehouses, fuel 
distribution) (European Commission 
Joint Research Centre, 2012-2016; 
Gil and Atherton, 2010; Howard, 
2013; State Administration of  Work 
Safety (China), 2016; U.S. Chemical 
Safety Board, 2016b). While they are 
not all ‘disasters’, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)’s 
2004 report on reducing disaster 
risks correctly cites that accidents 
with local impacts are an important 
part of  understanding the scale and 
dimensions of  particular threats. In 
addition, there is some evidence that 
government and society unwittingly, 
for sometimes for very good reasons, 
accept more risk in relation to SMEs. 
These companies often present sig-
nificant challenges for regulators be-
cause they lack adequate expertise or 
even sufficient hazard awareness to 
manage their risks within acceptable 
limits. Typical cases of  this type are 
the small fireworks manufacturers 
whose premises have been the sites of 
several accidents with multiple fatali-
ties in the past 5 years within the EU 
(eMARS, 2012; Wood et al., 2016). 
Moreover, recent tragedies, such as 
the disasters of  Tianjin, China (2015) 
(State Administration of  Work Safety 
(China), 2016) and West, Texas (2013) 
(U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2016b) 
indicate that, in these cases, even 
though the presence of  a significant 
hazard was known, the government 
failed at many levels to ensure that 
adequate prevention, mitigation and 
preparedness measures were in place.
Twelve underlying causes 
are cited as challenges 
to controlling chemical 
accident disaster risk in 
current times.
The authors of  this paper have iden-
tified 12 types of  underlying causes of 
chemical accidents based on their own 
studies of  accidents and research of 
other experts. They are based in part 
on causal typologies developed by the 
various experts in man-made risks al-
ready cited in this paper. They also re-
flect the authors’ extensive experience 
in studying and investigating the caus-
es of  chemical accidents, bringing in 
the small business and governmental 
Distant leadership and optimisation strategies: a recipe for 
organisational failure. 
The accident at a multination-
al liquefied natural gas plant in 
South Gippsford, Australia, in 1998, 
known as the ‘Longford accident’, 
is attributed in part to a series of 
company misjudgements, including 
relocation of expertise to another 
site, poor intercompany communi-
cation and the insufficient prioriti-
sation of safety over profits . Two 
people were killed and eight were 
injured. The state of Victoria was 
left without its primary gas supply, 
crippling industry, in particular com-
mercial industry, with an estimated 
economic loss of at around AUD 1.3 
billion (Hopkins, 2014). Similarly, 
the lack of adequate oversight of 
operations at a fuel storage termi-
nal, coupled with poor intercompa-
ny communication exchange, was 
considered a leading cause of the 
devastating Buncefield explosion 
and fire at the Buncefield fuel ter-
minal, Hemel Hempstead, Unit-
ed Kingdom, in 2005 (U.K Health 
and Safety Executive, Environment 
Agency and the Scottish Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 2005). 
The primary causes were the fail-
ure of two-level instruments on the 
tank that overflowed. The alarm and 
overfill protection functions did not 
operate as a result. The analysis of 
the event indicates that it was the 
result of a sequence of manage-
ment failures in addressing known 
risks and performance uncertainties 
over a period of months and even 
years prior to the incident (Howard, 
2013).
BOX 3.3
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happen every week. Moreover, as 
noted by Quarantelli (1997), there is 
also a misleading tendency to equate 
disastrous occasions only with casu-
alties and property damage. Hence, 
there is far less visibility for chemical 
accidents that cause significant social 
disruption, such as evacuation, loss of 
drinking water, severe environmental 
damage, job loss and elevated and of-
ten uncertain exposure to health risks.
2. Failure to manage risk across 
boundaries. The organisations and 
individuals in charge of  chemical ac-
cident risks usually define challenges 
in terms of  their own expertise and 
jurisdictions. There are numerous in-
cidents in the EU eMARS database 
indicating a failure to communicate 
information to those who need it, 
both internally to organisations and 
externally to other industrial sectors, 
professional disciplines and interna-
tional boundaries (eMARS, 2012; Eu-
ropean Commission Joint Research 
Centre, 2012-2016). Chemicals risk 
management in industry has tradi-
tionally been assigned to chemical 
and mechanical engineers who have 
little training in human and organi-
sational factors. Government assigns 
monitoring and enforcement on the 
basis of  who is affected, that is, on-
site workers (labour authorities), off-
site communities (civil protection 
authorities) or the environment (en-
vironmental authorities). The large 
multinational industries, such as oil 
and gas, and chemical manufacturing 
companies, exchange little informa-
tion on chemicals risk management 
with other (and often less-resourced) 
industrial sectors, such as pyrotech-
nics production, pharmaceuticals 
and various non-chemical businesses. 
Similarly, government oversight and 
enforcement tends to follow jurisdic-
tional boundaries in the geograph-
ic sense. This limitation can lead to 
dimensions that are sometimes not 
well covered in research.
Causes are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, since the presence of  one 
underlying cause can make a site sus-
ceptible to other dangerous mentali-
ties and conditions. The 12 underlying 
causes are as follows:
1. Lack of  visibility. A paucity of 
chemical accident data and incon-
sistent media attention has exacer-
bated the lack of  interest in reduc-
ing chemical accident risks in recent 
decades. The limited public databases 
on chemical accidents leave society 
without any performance measures. 
With the exception of  high-cost ac-
cidents reported by insurance compa-
nies, there are no published statistics 
on accident frequency. International 
media picks up only high-profile dis-
asters, which form only a small frac-
tion of  the chemical accidents that 
When industry and government both fail to learn lessons 
from past accidents.
Even major disasters are ignored 
and forgotten. A case in point is the 
massive explosion involving ammo-
nium nitrate fertilisers that occurred 
in West, Texas, USA in 2013, which 
killed 15 people and destroyed 
140 nearby homes. This incident 
was preceded by some well-known 
disastrous explosions involving 
ammonium nitrate fertilisers, in 
particular, Oppau, Germany, 1921 
(>500 deaths); Texas City (Texas), 
USA, 1947 (581 deaths, > 3 000 in-
juries); and Toulouse, France, 2001 
(29 deaths, > 2 500 injuries). 
It appears that lessons from prior 
accidents about handling ammoni-
um nitrate fertilisers had not been 
taken into account in either indus-
try practices or fire protection laws 
(BP Refineries Independent Safety 
Review Panel, 2007). Furthermore, 
the potential off-site consequences 
of an ammonium nitrate explosion 
were ignored by the prevailing en-
vironmental regulation that had ju-
risdiction only over substances with 
toxic release potential. Emergency 
and land-use planning measures 
prior to the accident did not have 
any special provisions for a school, 
nursing home or residences in close 
proximity (U.S. Chemical Safety 
Board, 2016b).
BOX 3.4
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a lack of  regional coordination on 
chemical accident risk management 
and may present serious transbound-
ary accident risks. The failure to see 
beyond one’s own boundaries fosters 
a piecemeal approach to risk manage-
ment and results in lost opportunities 
in sharing lessons learned and devel-
oping common strategies.
3. Failure to learn lessons from past 
accidents and near misses. There is 
substantial evidence that neither gov-
ernments nor public authorities have 
learned sufficiently from past acci-
dents. Taylor et al. (2015) note that 
that failure to learn was recurrent in 
organisations involved in some of  the 
significant man-made disasters of  the 
last 30 years in Europe and elsewhere. 
According to the study, barriers to 
learning were related to culture, the 
poor communication of  findings and 
‘lost’ corporate memory, a failure to 
investigate prior events, a narrow view 
of  what was useful to learn and what 
constituted an opportunity to learn, 
and the silo effect, such that informa-
tion on events does not cross inter-
nal organisational boundaries. An ef-
fective risk management programme 
incorporates the systematic study of 
past accidents occurring both on-site 
and elsewhere. Learning from one’s 
own accidents (in one’s organisation 
or jurisdiction) is important to diag-
nose specific weaknesses and trends. 
Learning from relevant accidents that 
Accidents that resulted from a combination of complexity 
and complacency
Macondo Oil Drilling Platform (Gulf 
of Mexico, 2010) The Macondo dis-
aster of 20 April 2010, in the Gulf 
of Mexico, stemmed from the loss 
of control of an oil well, resulting in 
a blowout and the uncontrolled re-
lease of oil and gas (hydrocarbons) 
from the well. The accident result-
ed in the deaths of 11 workers and 
caused a massive, ongoing oil spill 
into the Gulf of Mexico ( U.S. Chem-
ical Safety Board, 2016a).
BP Texas City (USA, 2005). On 23 
March 2005, a series of explosions 
occurred at the BP Texas City refin-
ery during the restarting of a hy-
drocarbon isomerisation unit. Fif-
teen workers were killed and 180 
others were injured (BP Refineries 
Independent Safety Review Panel, 
2007).
Experts have noted that these two 
accidents were caused by severe 
organisational failures, which had 
remarkably similar causality, in-
cluding (1) multiple system oper-
ator malfunctions during a critical 
period in operations, (2) required 
or accepted operations guidelines 
not being followed (‘casual com-
pliance’), (3) neglected mainte-
nance, (4) instrumentation that 
either did not work properly or the 
data interpretation of which gave 
false positives, (5) inappropriate 
assessment and management of 
operations risks, (6) multiple oper-
ations conducted at critical times 
with unanticipated interactions, 
(7) inadequate communication be-
tween members of the operations 
groups, (8) a lack of awareness of 
risks, (9) diversion of attention at 
critical times, (10) a culture with in-
centives that provided increases in 
productivity without commensurate 
increases in protection, (11) inap-
propriate cost and corner cutting, 
(12) lack of appropriate selection 
and training of personnel, and (13) 
improper management of change 
(Carnes, 2011). 
BOX 3.5
occur on other sites and in other lo-
cations is essential to map all possible 
pathways that could lead to an acci-
dent. Even when problems are rec-
ognised, the failure to learn leads to 
inappropriate solutions. In industry 
there is a tendency to respond with 
increasing complexity, in the form of 
new, but not necessarily better, tech-
nology. Similarly, governments will 
respond with new or stricter, but not 
necessarily better, regulation.
4. Social drivers, including eco-
nomic trends. Avoiding situations in 
which judgement is clouded by oth-
er considerations is a long-standing 
challenge of  risk management, as ev-
idenced by the accidents at BP Texas 
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City (BP Refineries Independent Safe-
ty Review Panel, 2007) and the explo-
sion and fire at the Macondo offshore 
drilling platform (U.S. Chemical Safe-
ty Board, 2016a). Both good and bad 
intentions can interfere with good risk 
decisions. For example, employees 
will tolerate bad conditions because 
they need jobs. Similarly, well-inten-
tioned operators may delay mainte-
nance and repairs on ageing sites to 
keep costs down and prevent the site 
from closing. Risk management ef-
forts of  some organisations and in-
dividuals can also by limited by sys-
temic constraints, including a lack of 
political will and corruption, affecting 
both developed and developing coun-
tries. Economic and civil instability 
and a combination of  long-standing 
cultural and structural deficiencies 
are a particular concern in develop-
ing countries. Economic pressure is 
a particular social driver that can put 
gains in chemical process safety at 
risk, particularly in the modern world 
when business circumstances change 
at a rapid pace. Instability in man-
agement and in business continuity 
has a knock-on effect on all aspects 
of  risk management. In some situa-
tions, poor profit margins impose dif-
ficult decisions on various operations 
in terms of  defining safety priorities 
when resources are stretched. How-
ever, there are also various trends in 
profitable companies, such as optimi-
sation (operational efficiency) and the 
drive towards increasing shareholder 
value, that can undermine risk man-
agement when they are applied with-
out due consideration of  the impacts 
on risks.
5. Increasing complexity. Nowa-
days, change occurs more and more 
rapidly in all aspects of  daily life. 
While individually the risks of  tech-
nologies and associated hazards are 
generally known, the impacts of  mul-
tiple and rapid changes in the way 
humans behave around them are dif-
ficult to assess and can to some ex-
tent constitute ‘unknown unknowns’. 
As noted by Arstad and Aven (2017) 
for the Columbia Space Shuttle dis-
aster, ‘Always under pressure to ac-
commodate tight launch schedules 
and budget cuts … certain problems 
became seen as maintenance issues 
rather than flight safety risks.’ This 
situation is echoed in a number of  the 
highly visible chemical accident dis-
asters over the last few decades (e.g. 
BP Texas City (BP Refineries Inde-
pendent Safety Review Panel, 2007), 
Buncefield (Howard, 2013), Macondo 
(U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2016a)). 
Risks are not perceived as risk but 
rather as problems to work around. 
The prevailing trends are quickly re-
placed by new trends and existing 
technologies are quickly replaced by 
new technologies. Sites change own-
ership with considerable frequency 
(Kamakura, 2006), which is often ac-
companied by significant changes in 
management policies, work patterns, 
safety culture or other structures that 
guide norms of  behaviour, and also 
contributes to an increasing decline 
in the corporate memory of  accident 
risks (OECD, 2016). In reality, change 
occurs faster than the knowledge to 
understand how the change is affect-
ing different aspects of  our lives, in-
cluding habits of  living and working, 
What can happen when governments are complacent.
The disastrous fire and explosion in 
the port of Tianjin, China, in 2015, 
is mainly attributed to lax safety 
procedures and a deliberate lack of 
government oversight. The owners 
of the storage and distribution com-
pany at the source of the accident 
somehow managed to persuade 
numerous authorities to look the 
other way with regard to permit-
ting inspections and hazard control 
measures. The site began opera-
tions in 2014, handling and storing 
a variety of dangerous substances, 
many in volumes much higher than 
would be considered safe. Accord-
ing to the official investigation re-
port, there was neither evidence 
that recognised safety standards 
were applied nor evidence that 
workers had been trained in han-
dling hazardous goods. In addition 
to causing 165 deaths and injuries 
to nearly 800 people, 30 000 peo-
ple in the surrounding community 
were evacuated (State Administra-
tion of Work Safety (China), 2016).
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but also political, commercial and 
economic dimensions. As noted by 
Ruifeng et al. (2012), process con-
trols and safeguarding equipment are 
more complex, thereby increasing 
newer risk that is often unforeseen. 
Both Mannan (2005) and Quarantelli 
(1997) also indicate that a correlation 
exists between the scale and com-
plexity of  process plants and major 
incidents. However, these and other 
modern trends are having significant 
consequences on safety and security, 
the long-term impacts of  which are 
still not fully understood. Deeper un-
derstanding requires a multidiscipli-
nary approach, despite the fact that 
the job market is exhibiting a tenden-
cy for increasing specialisation.
6. Automation and information 
technology dependencies. Twen-
ty years ago, Quarantelli (1997) pre-
dicted that technological advances 
would reduce some hazards but make 
some old threats more dangerous, 
and cited computer technology as a 
kind of  technology that represented 
a distinctly new danger. Indeed, the 
automation of  activities traditionally 
performed by humans is a frequent 
adaptation of  computer technology 
but it could in many circumstances 
create new risks in operations using 
dangerous chemicals. As pointed out 
by Lagadec and Topper (2012), socie-
ty itself  is still not clear about the full 
range of  impacts of  this innovation 
or other such 21st phenomena as the 
internet, the media explosion, social 
networking and smartphones. More-
over, as Taylor et al. (2016) suggest, 
an emphasis on interconnectivity and 
interdependence has become increas-
ingly important, but when a failure 
occurs in one of  the interconnected 
systems it can lead to major disrup-
tion. A further concern has emerged 
with the vulnerability of  information 
technology systems to hacking or, 
even more simply, unforeseen poten-
tial for errors in the design and oper-
ation of  automated systems that are 
increasingly interdependent across 
sites and accessed and operated by 
multiple users.
7. Failure of  risk management and 
risk assessment. The EU eMARS 
(2012) and the U.S. Chemical Safety 
Board (2016a, b), for example, have 
produced many reports of  recent past 
accidents for which the likelihood of 
the event occurring or the severity of 
its impacts could have been reduced 
with the application of  actions with-
in the hierarchy of  risk management 
controls. Many of  these reports also 
indicate a failure in the risk assess-
ment process (e.g. that a risk assess-
ment was not conducted, certain fac-
tors were discounted, lessons learned 
from previous events was ignored or 
that the risk associated with a change 
in operations was not considered). In-
deed, many accidents also have been 
known to occur because of  lack of 
follow-up after the monitoring and 
review of  the functionality of  the 
safety management system, such that 
the risk assessment was not updated 
after deficiencies in the risk assess-
ment were discovered. Both organ-
isations and individuals can fail to 
apply risk management principles, 
even when well established and part 
of  training requirements. There is 
also often a lack of  attention paid to 
inherent safety in which processes are 
designed without considering oppor-
tunities for risk reduction (chemical 
substitution, limiting volumes, expo-
sure, etc.). This failure is sometimes 
attributed to various business and 
organisational trends cited in this pa-
per, such as business climate and eco-
nomic trends, organisational change 
and staff  reductions, complexity and, 
sometimes, a loss of  focus (compla-
cency or ‘organizational drift’ (Taylor 
et al., 2015)); however, in other indus-
tries, particularly non-chemicals busi-
nesses and small companies, other 
factors, such as lack of  awareness and 
education, are stronger influences.
8. Corporate disconnect from risk 
management. The globalisation of 
hazardous industries has increased 
both the physical and mental distance 
between headquarters and the sites 
they manage. Headquarters staff  lose 
a tacit understanding of  how sites ex-
perience chemical accident risks. For 
example, multinational sites can pose 
particular complexity when the cul-
ture and policy of  the management is 
vastly different from that to which the 
site has been accustomed, especially if 
it is in a different country (European 
Commission Joint Research Centre, 
2014). Corporate leaders also tend to 
oversimplify production safety risks 
(or risks are oversimplified for them) 
(Arstad and Aven, 2017; Taylor et al., 
2015). It is assumed that new commu-
nication and automation technologies 
have universally positive trickledown 
benefits for all operations. For chem-
ical accident hazards, the opposite is 
often the case. In particular, the trend 
towards short-term resource optimi-
sation continues to have disturbing 
implications for chemical risk man-
agement. The tendency to outsource 
expertise and maintenance operations 
has already received considerable at-
tention. There is also a preference in 
some companies to distribute limited 
expertise across many sites, so that 
access to critical safety expertise is 
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proportionately less available to sites. 
This phenomenon has been consid-
ered a significant factor in the Long-
ford accident (Hopkins, 2014) as well 
as the catastrophic fire that occurred 
at the Buncefield storage site in 2005 
(Howard, 2013). 
9. Insufficient risk communica-
tion and awareness. Hazardous in-
dustries are introduced in locations 
with little attempt to communication 
and build awareness of  the risks, to 
foster meaningful preparedness and 
planning, or to ensure that training 
and expertise are adequate for the re-
sponsibilities associated with the risk. 
This situation is particularly acute in 
developing countries where the de-
sire for economic growth outweighs 
other decision factors. In many cases, 
risks are not so much accepted as ig-
nored, encouraged by a historical lack 
of  transparency in the political classes 
or society as a whole. When consid-
ered in context, the risk of  fatal ma-
jor accidents is also relatively small 
compared with the risks of  poverty, 
disease and road traffic accidents and, 
therefore, may not receive the atten-
tion it deserves as a risk that is readily 
mitigated. The Enschede (the Neth-
erlands) fireworks accident of  2000 
(The Oosting Commission, 2001) and 
the accident in West, Texas (USA) 
(U.S. Chemical Safety Board, 2016b) 
are notable examples of  how a lack of 
appropriate risk communication and 
awareness can contribute significantly 
to disasters.
10. Resource and infrastructure de-
ficiencies. Many sites are compelled 
by a combination of  circumstances 
and poor decisions to operate with 
less than adequate resources and infra-
structure. In particular in developed 
countries, the physical infrastructures 
that underpin both public and private 
services are reaching the end of  their 
normal lifespan (Quarantelli, 1997). A 
lack of  resources generally leads to in-
sufficient competence to manage risks 
(e.g. no chemical or mechanical engi-
neer on site) or to improve degraded 
equipment or to apply safety manage-
ment systems with rigor. Physical in-
frastructure can also be degraded by 
age or neglect, the latter of  which was 
a key factor contributing to the cata-
strophic explosion and fire at the pe-
troleum oil refinery at BP Texas City 
in 2005 (BP Refineries Independent 
Safety Review Panel, 2007). In many 
developing countries, it is common to 
start operations under less than ideal 
circumstances. The existing physical 
infrastructure may be degraded from 
years of  neglect. There may be gaps 
in the education and risk awareness of 
local worker populations, as well as a 
limited availability of  university-ed-
ucated staff. Industries in developed 
countries also may suffer competency 
deficiencies due to declines in engi-
neering students seeking career paths 
in traditional chemical process indus-
tries. Moreover, higher education in 
relevant engineering disciplines still 
excludes knowledge of  chemical ac-
cident phenomena or basic principles 
of  risk management.
11. Deficiencies of  the legal infra-
structure. In much of  government 
and industry globally, management of 
chemical accident risks is focused on 
emergency preparedness, and strat-
egies aimed at prevention and miti-
gation are not prioritised. Society as 
a whole exhibits a high risk tolerance 
owing to historically poor living and 
working conditions that consequent-
ly predisposes workers to accept and 
ignore workplace hazards. In many 
developing countries, there may be 
no legal framework to require and en-
force minimum standards for process 
safety performance on chemical haz-
ard sites. When a proper legal frame-
work exists, regulators and operators 
lack the competence and resources to 
understand or enforce it. These cir-
cumstances have implications for de-
veloped countries in that companies 
may have sites in developing countries 
and their citizens may be customers 
of  their products. However, even in 
developed countries, there is also a 
recognised pattern that governments 
do not often proactively engage in 
managing chemical accident risks un-
til after a serious accident, or a num-
ber of  serious accidents, occur. No-
tably, attention to chemical process 
safety in Australia gained widespread 
attention only after the Longford ac-
cident in 1998 (Hopkins, 2014), and 
in New Zealand following the mining 
accident in 2010 (Royal Commission 
on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 
2012).
12. Complacency in government 
and industry. The longevity of 
chemical accident prevention and 
preparedness regimes in developed 
countries also leads many politicians 
and industry leaders to reduce their 
attention to chemical accident risks, 
threatening to undermine decades of 
risk-reduction progress. Sometimes 
called ‘organizational drift’ (Taylor et 
al., 2015), this phenomenon may oc-
cur in once-strong organisations and 
societies that allow their standards 
to erode over time without noticing 
their own decline. The perception 
that chemical accidents are no longer 
a threat eventually results in dramatic 
decreases in resources for enforce-
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ment and risk management. Notably, 
there has been a dramatic lack of  fo-
cus in modern times on process safety 
as an inherent operating requirement 
(not just because the legislation re-
quires it). Government complacency 
can be manifested by lax application 
of  permitting laws, reduced frequency 
of  inspections and insufficient atten-
tion to land use and emergency plan-
ning. Complacency in industry is of-
ten evidenced by greater tolerance of 
deviations from accepted norms, such 
as process parameters, safety proce-
dures and maintenance requirements. 
In developing countries, the problem 
is arguably worse. The vast majority 
of  owners and operators of  hazard-
ous sites, even in large state-owned 
or multinational subsidiaries, are used 
to minimal management of  chemical 
hazards on their sites.
3.12.4
Implications for 
future scientific study
The main topics that emerge as areas 
for further study and experimentation 
are listed and described below. Many 
are already the subject of  projects in 
research institutes and collaborations 
within the international community. 
Experts in all areas 
should work together on 
initiatives that promote 
good risk governance, 
creating a new paradigm 
for all society.
However, it is widely recognised that 
these problems, having proved so re-
sistant to solutions, will require con-
siderable reflection and patience to 
identify approaches that produce tan-
gible improvements.
Experts in all areas should work to-
gether on initiatives that promote 
good risk governance, creating a new 
paradigm for all society through the 
following:
• Motivating corporate and govern-
ment leadership. New models for 
the governance of  hazardous in-
dustries should be explored and 
tested. These models should apply 
to corporate leadership and gov-
ernment alike, applying manage-
ment philosophies supported by 
rigorous enforcement proportion-
ate to the level and complexity of 
the risk. New strategies should be 
based on a mutual expectation be-
tween government and industry 
of  overall corporate responsibility 
for maintaining risk resilience that 
goes far beyond the current com-
pliance-based paradigm. Enforce-
ment will need new (more evolved) 
strategies (e.g. nudge, push, force) 
to drive industrial practice. Con-
cepts such as recovering the profits 
of  illegal/unsafe activity to remove 
the economic advantage may also 
be a step forwards. Fears that the 
process industries could potentially 
have parallels to the banking crises 
(2008 onwards) in terms of  poorly 
understood risks have triggered the 
development of  the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) publication 
Corporate Governance for Pro-
cess Safety — Guidance for Senior 
Leaders in High Hazard Industries, 
an important new tool for industry 
and government addressing this 
topic (OECD, 2012).
• Systematic accident reporting, data 
collection and exchange. There 
needs to be a concentrated effort 
to build national and international 
chemical accident registers and to 
promote accident exchange be-
tween industries and countries. The 
availability of  reliable chemical ac-
cident statistics will allow academ-
ics, politicians and the media to 
understand the magnitude and na-
ture of  chemical accident risks and 
identify appropriate risk-reduction 
measures.
• Promoting positive safety culture 
both industry-wide and in society. 
The chemical processing industries 
should focus serious attention on 
developing a positive safety cul-
ture industry-wide, such that it is 
resilient in the face of  change, par-
ticularly in the economy and site 
management. Psychologists should 
work with industry and govern-
ments to foster risk awareness and 
sensitivity among citizens. An in-
formed safety-sensitive society can 
help to support a broader mandate 
to insist that companies exercise 
greater corporate responsibility for 
reducing the risks associated with 
their operations.
• Heightened commitment to the 
Plan–Do–Act cycle in chemical 
process safety management. After 
an accident has occurred, a com-
mon finding is that a potential risk 
factor had been identified and ig-
nored. In keeping with improved 
safety culture, guidance and train-
ing on safety management policy 
and performance indicators need 
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to put more emphasis on incor-
porating lessons learned from past 
events and audit findings on defi-
ciencies in risk management into 
process hazard assessments and 
the safety management system as 
quickly as possible.
• Risk management in SMEs in the 
chemical business. There are sub-
categories of  SMEs in the chem-
ical business, each of  which has 
elevated risk for different reasons. 
The most challenging intellectually 
are the SMEs that know their risks 
and take care to manage them but 
still have accidents. More research 
is needed on why accidents occur 
in SMEs, including geographic and 
economic differences that may in-
fluence these risks, and on strate-
gies to reduce them.
• Risk management in non-chemi-
cal businesses. Similarly to SMEs, 
studies to develop strategies and 
guidance to support risk manage-
ment in many of  these industries 
are still needed. There are a number 
of  examples of  this work, such as 
the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Supplemental Risk Man-
agement Program Guidance for 
Ammonia Refrigeration Facilities. 
More analysis and dissemination of 
lessons learned from accidents in 
such locations is also needed.
• Business-sector risk-reduction in-
itiatives on a global scale. Oil and 
gas, extractive industries, industrial 
parks and large-scale chemical pro-
duction should be the focus of  a 
global collaborative effort between 
industry, government and aid or-
ganisations to reduce chemical ac-
cidents in these industries.
• Risk assessment models that ad-
dress new technologies and com-
plexity. Some researchers (e.g. Tay-
lor et al., 2015; Travers, 2016) are 
already proposing models by which 
to assess risks associated with com-
plexity. These models need to be 
tested and developed further. In 
addition, research is required to 
characterise and quantify various 
emerging risks, including those as-
sociated with the increasing use of 
automation and the outsourcing of 
critical safety functions, ownership 
change, how culture and compe-
tence profiles in different countries 
can affect chemical accident risk 
and other emerging concerns men-
tioned in this paper.
More work is needed on 
how business practices 
must change to mitigate 
the most common 
violations of safety 
management principles.
 
More work is needed on how business 
practices must change to mitigate the 
most common violations of  safety 
management principles, in particular 
in relation to:
• Mechanical integrity. All too often, 
maintenance and repairs of  equip-
ment and infrastructure are consid-
ered dispensable when inconven-
ient for profit or production goals. 
The underlying causes should 
be studied and new approaches 
adopted that provide stronger mo-
tivation, including risk assessment 
requirements and government-op-
erator interfaces (e.g. permits, 
inspections), for reinforcing me-
chanical integrity as an operating 
requirement.
• Management of  change. This safe-
ty principle is particularly challeng-
ing because time pressures and a 
human preference for expediency 
undermine its consistent imple-
mentation. Finding methods that 
help companies and individuals to 
recognise change when a change 
can elevate risk is an important part 
of  resilience engineering and a sig-
nificant aspect of  the ‘resonance’ 
factor described by Leonhardt et 
al. (2009). Resonance is a quality 
that explains how disproportion-
ately large consequences can arise 
from seemingly small variations in 
performance and conditions.
• Learning lessons from accidents and 
failures. Industries and sites need 
to learn from, and remember, past 
accidents. Corporate memory loss, 
across-industry, is not an appropri-
ate excuse. A greater investment is 
needed in projects to develop strat-
egies to learn and remember, with 
a particular emphasis on collabo-
rations between industry, govern-
ment and academia. According to 
Patterson (2009), both industry and 
government struggle with barriers 
that tend to undermine systematic 
extraction and communication and 
lessons learned and there needs to 
be a renewed effort to overcome 
these barriers. As noted by Hail-
wood (2016), companies operating 
major hazard facilities should es-
tablish systems that not only ensure 
reporting and learning from their 
own accidents and near misses, but 
also make use of  databases and re-
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ports from the accidents of  others. 
Each country should also make re-
sources available to investigate acci-
dent causes and lessons learned, as 
well as to collect and document this 
knowledge and make it accessible to 
third parties.
Renewed effort is needed 
to ensure that there is 
adequate competence 
in our industries and 
our governments for 
addressing chemical 
accident risks now and 
over the long term.
 
Renewed effort is needed to ensure 
that there is adequate competence in 
our industries and our governments 
for addressing chemical accident risks 
now and over the long term, enabled 
by:
• Greater access to risk management 
knowledge and tools. Risk man-
agement is always specific to a site. 
Few sites have exactly the same 
risks, even if  they produce the same 
products, since the physical charac-
teristics of  the location, structures 
and equipment are important ele-
ments of  the risk. Considerable fu-
ture mechanisms are needed to en-
sure good management practice for 
all kinds of  operations and to make 
equipment available in an easy to 
read format, taking account of  the 
many different languages in which 
they might be needed.
• Access to risk assessment compe-
tence. Both operators of  hazardous 
sites and regulators need to know 
the type and severity of  accidents 
that could occur and have a real-
istic understanding of  the control 
measures needed to ensure that the 
risk of  such accidents is minimised. 
Cheap and easy access to interac-
tive consequence assessment, risk 
mapping and quantitative assess-
ment tools is urgently needed in all 
areas of  the world.
• Strategies to combat a labour mar-
ket deficient in appropriate exper-
tise. Industry and academia need to 
continue to push for standardised 
process safety curriculums associ-
ated with chemical engineering and 
chemistry in particular, as well as 
with environmental management 
and other related disciplines to 
some extent. Multinational com-
panies operating in developing 
countries need to be aware that 
competence and experience in risk 
management may be far less avail-
able than in Europe or the United 
States, and process operations need 
to be adjusted accordingly (Zhao et 
al., 2014). In all parts of  the world, 
industry and the professional engi-
neering community should do far 
more to support occupational and 
process safety education and train-
ing to produce more qualified pro-
fessionals capable of  identifying 
and managing risks in design and 
daily operations.
European Union industry 
and government must 
share responsibility 
for reducing chemical 
accident risks in 
developing countries.
European Union industry and gov-
ernment must share responsibility for 
reducing chemical accident risks in de-
veloping countries, and special empha-
sis should be placed on the following:
• Building basic awareness of  chem-
ical risks and how to manage them 
to developing countries. Basic train-
ing in chemical risks and safe chem-
icals management is badly needed. 
The remarkable efforts of  numer-
ous international organisations 
such as UNEP, UNECE (United 
Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe), UNEP-OCHA and 
the WHO, among others, are un-
derfunded and far too fragmented 
to have significant impacts, despite 
smart management and promis-
ing results from recent initiatives. 
Meaningful progress is possible 
only with substantial commitments 
involving UNDP, United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research, 
the World Bank and the European 
Commission as well as Region-
al Economic Commissions in the 
context of  a coordinated and com-
prehensive long-term strategy.
• Resilience and risk awareness build-
ing. There has been considerable 
success with stakeholder involve-
ment approaches such as UNEP 
APELL to manage risks at a local 
level within a systemic national and 
international regional strategy. A 
number of  tools, including those 
produced by the OECD (2003) 
and UNEP (2010), already exist 
to guide developing countries on 
how to build a comprehensive and 
effective chemical accident risk 
prevention and preparedness pro-
gramme. The clear next step is to 
identify and deploy mechanisms by 
which to provide significant and 
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sustained support to countries that 
are ready to take steps towards es-
tablishing such programmes.
• Fostering regional and internation-
al networks and collaborations on 
chemical accident risk manage-
ment. A critical mass of  policy and 
technical initiatives at both regional 
and international level, creating a 
constant pressure and giving de-
veloping countries easy access to 
expertise and technical support, is 
a way to establish a new norm. A 
number of  international organi-
sations (e.g. UNECE, 2014)) have 
reported increasing success with 
such approaches but they are barely 
implemented for chemical accident 
prevention programmes in regions 
such as Asia and Africa.
• Improving performance measures 
for interventions. Fund admin-
istrators generally lack objective 
measures by which to evaluate suit-
able candidates for chemical acci-
dent prevention programmes that 
may target the specific needs of 
and provide continued support to 
achieve meaningful results. Further 
refinement and testing of  capaci-
ty-building performance indicators, 
and methods for qualitative assess-
ment (e.g. level of  political will, key 
drivers of  change) such as those 
currently in development by the 
JRC (Baranzini et al., in progress), 
can lead to better targeting of  such 
initiatives. These could also be use-
ful for developed countries.
3.12.5 
Conclusions and 
key messages
Recent accident trends provide ev-
idence that the world is nowhere 
near reducing the risk of  industrial 
accidents to acceptable levels. While 
developed countries have shown 
marked improvements, particular-
ly in reducing the average number 
of  fatalities associated with chemical 
accidents, the overall rate of  major 
accidents with other serious impacts 
remains high. Throughout the world, 
accidents continue to stem from vio-
lations of  well-known safety manage-
ment principles. Such failures can only 
sometimes be explained by complex-
ity and a misfortunate combinations 
of  events; very often they may be due, 
entirely or in part, to incompetence, 
a lack of  awareness or outright negli-
gence. Many experts are exasperated 
that management practices and atti-
tudes are so vulnerable to other influ-
ences and resist improvement.
In conclusion, accepted norms of  in-
dustry, government and society are 
undermining good risk management. 
This finding has a number of  impor-
tant implications for the direction of 
future research, policy development 
and the role of  government and in-
dustry in reducing accident risks.
 
Partnership
The findings confirm overwhelmingly 
that the traditional approach in which 
stakeholders stick to their traditional 
rules is not going to fix the problems 
in question. It is no longer possible 
that industry works alone to define 
and implement good risk manage-
ment practice. Policymakers can no 
longer simply set performance stand-
ards and then step aside. Observa-
tions from academics, particularly in 
the social sciences, need to find their 
way into both industry and govern-
ment approaches to chemical accident 
risk.
Knowledge
The control of  chemical accident 
risk is very often undermined by the 
cultural norms and expectations as-
sociated with how government and 
business are expected to act, and a 
lack of  knowledge and awareness 
about chemical accident risks in soci-
ety in general. Combatting these forc-
es requires new thinking about how 
our businesses and governments are 
working with these risks. As such, the 
essence of  the change is that all soci-
ety must recognise part ownership of 
chemical accident risk, and ownership 
implies both a certain responsibility 
for, and power to prevent, such risk. 
This finding in turn requires that the 
new approach to controlling chemi-
cal accident risks is to change culture 
with education and awareness.
Innovation
The recommendations in this paper 
suggest a paradigm change in the way 
the EU and the developed world in 
general approach chemical accident 
risk. Solutions must encompass a 
broader vision of  risk ownership and 
boundaries of  influence, recognising 
that the role of  industry does not 
end beyond the fence line, that off-
site forces can influence onsite risks 
and that society’s responsibility may 
need to extend beyond traditional ge-
ographic boundaries. If  the system 
is the problem, the solutions lie in 
changing the system.
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3.13 Technological risk:  
nuclear accidents
Emmanuel	Raimond, Gryffroy Dries, Andrej Prošek
3.13.1
Introduction
Nuclear accidents, if  their conse-
quences are not mitigated, have the 
potential to initiate a disaster both in 
the vicinity of  and even far away from 
the damaged nuclear facility. Safety 
principles, safety objectives and safe-
ty rules are internationally promoted 
and harmonised to reduce such risks 
as far as possible, but there is always 
a residual risk, as demonstrated by the 
recent Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
This subchapter presents some of  the 
fundamental principles applied in nu-
clear safety. These fundamentals are 
introduced with the idea that they can 
be transposed to other technological 
or natural risks. It then summaris-
es some important lessons from the 
three accidents that influenced the 
nuclear industry significantly: Three 
Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986) 
and Fukushima Dai-ichi (2011).
The subchapter then explains risk 
assessment methodologies and de-
scribes the current efforts for risk 
reduction, from plant design to emer-
gency plans.
Nuclear accidents have 
the potential to initiate 
a disaster both in the 
vicinity of and even far 
away from the damaged 
nuclear facility.
 
In conclusion, this subchapter pro-
poses some perspectives on research 
that can support risk assessment or 
help in accident management in this 
area. Understanding the interactions 
between nuclear facilities and their 
environment appears to be a crucial 
and transversal issue.
3.13.2
Nuclear safety 
framework
 
In European Member States, Council 
Directive 2014/87/Euratom of  8 July 
2014 (EU, 2014) provides a general 
framework to be applied in relation 
to nuclear safety. This framework is 
consistent with the Safety Fundamen-
tals established by the Internation-
al Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
(IAEA, 2006), and the main recom-
mendations provided by the Western 
European Nuclear Regulators Associ-
ation (directive for reactors in opera-
tion (WENRA, 2014) and new reac-
tors (RHWG, 2013)).
Some important issues are summa-
rised below.
The IAEA (2006) has defined one 
fundamental safety objective, namely 
to protect people and the environ-
ment from harmful effects of  ion-
ising radiation, and 10 fundamental 
safety principles:
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justified and optimised.
Those safety fundamentals are then 
expressed in more technical require-
ments or concepts in each country or 
at European level (EU, 2014) or in the 
IAEA Safety Standards.
Some important concepts are sum-
marised below. They can obviously be 
transposed to other risks induced by 
human activities.
Safety principles, safety 
objectives and safety 
rules are internationally 
promoted and harmonised 
to reduce nuclear risks as 
far as possible.
The safety culture shall be encour-
aged by the management, at all levels 
in the licensee organisations: this shall 
include ensuring that their actions dis-
courage complacency and encourage 
an open reporting culture as well as a 
questioning and learning attitude with 
a readiness to challenge acts or condi-
tions adverse to safety (see WENRA, 
2014, for example).
The defence-in-depth approach (IN-
SAG, 1996; IAEA, 2016) is considered 
a key concept by which to reach an 
appropriate level of  protection from 
nuclear risk. For example, Council di-
rective 2014/87/Euratom (EU, 2014) 
includes the following statements:
[…] safety activities are subject to, as far as 
reasonably practicable, independent layers of 
provisions, so that in the event that a failure 
were to occur, it would be detected, compen-
sated or corrected by appropriate measures. 
The effectiveness of  each of  the different lay-
ers is an essential element of  defence-in-depth 
to prevent accidents and mitigate the conse-
quences should they occur. Defence-in-depth 
is generally structured in five levels. Should 
one level fail, the subsequent level comes into 
play. The objective of  the first level of  pro-
tection is the prevention of  abnormal oper-
ation and system failures. If  the first level 
fails, abnormal operation is controlled or 
failures are detected by the second level of 
protection. Should the second level fail, the 
third level ensures that safety functions are 
further performed by activating specific safety 
systems and other safety features. Should the 
third level fail, the fourth level limits accident 
progression through accident management, 
so as to prevent or mitigate severe accident 
conditions with external releases of  radio-
active materials. The last objective (the fifth 
level of  protection) is the mitigation of  the 
radiological consequences of  significant ex-
ternal releases through the off-site emergency 
response.
The design of  nuclear power plants 
(NPPs) is based on a deterministic 
approach: initiating events (deviations 
from normal operation, incidents, ac-
cidents, hazards) are postulated and 
used to design all systems, structures 
and components (SSCs) with design 
rules that should ensure significant 
safety margins. Such an approach 
must be completed by a probabilis-
tic approach that allows considering 
more exhaustively the combinations 
of  events (initiating events, system 
and human failures) that could lead to 
an accident. This is explained below.
The European regulators consider 
that a continuous improvement of 
the safety of  NPPs is a good practice 
that should be promoted: this means 
1. The primary responsibility for 
safety must rest with the person 
or organisation responsible for 
the facilities and activities that 
give rise to radiation risks.
2. An effective legal and govern-
mental framework for safety, in-
cluding an independent regulato-
ry body, must be established and 
sustained.
3. Effective leadership and man-
agement for safety must be es-
tablished and sustained in or-
ganisations concerned with, and 
facilities and activities that give 
rise to, radiation risks.
4. Facilities and activities that give 
rise to radiation risks must yield 
an overall benefit.
5. Protection must be optimised to 
provide the highest level of  safety 
that can reasonably be achieved.
6. Measures for controlling radi-
ation risks must ensure that no 
individual bears an unacceptable 
risk of  harm.
7. People and the environment, 
present and future, must be pro-
tected against radiation risks.
8. All practical efforts must be made 
to prevent and mitigate nuclear or 
radiation accidents.
9. Arrangements must be made for 
emergency preparedness for and 
response to nuclear or radiation 
incidents.
10. Actions to reduce existing or un-
regulated radiation risks must be 
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that NPPs are submitted to periodic 
safety reviews, possibly associated to 
safety objectives enhancement. Such 
periodic safety reviews shall concern 
all safety issues, including plant age-
ing, the modifications of  the NPP en-
vironment (e.g. climatic changes) and 
any upgrading or modernisation of 
the plant. The result of  such a process 
should be such that NPPs become 
progressively safer.
There are a number of  organisations 
at the international level that share 
experience and good practices, in-
cluding:
• the IAEA
• the OECD Nuclear Energy Agen-
cy (NEA)
• the European Nuclear Safety Regu-
lators Group (ENSREG)
• the Western European Nuclear 
Regulators Association (WENRA)
• the European Nuclear Installations 
Safety Standards Initiative (ENISS)
• the World Association of  Nuclear 
Operators (WANO)
• the European Technical Safety Or-
ganisation Network (ETSON)
• the Association of  the Heads of 
the European Radiological protec-
tion Competent Authorities (HER-
CA).
The European Commission also pro-
motes a high level of  nuclear safety 
through its tasks in the preparation 
of  Euratom directives. The European 
Commission JRC coordinates or par-
ticipates in several nuclear safety sci-
entific research and technical support 
projects. The Euratom Framework 
Programs (now Horizon 2020) also 
provide financial support to Europe-
an nuclear research and training pro-
jects, including risk assessments and 
nuclear safety projects. For example, 
the ASAMPSA_E (Advanced Safety 
Assessment methodologies: extend-
ed PSA) project, on risk assessment 
practices, which is mentioned in this 
subchapter, and the European Severe 
Accident Research Network of  Excel-
lence (SARNET) have been support-
ed by European Commission funding. 
Some projects deal with emergency 
management (EURANOS, NERIS-
TP). Through the EU Instrument for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation, Europe-
an and international safety standards 
are also promoted in third countries.
3.13.3
Lessons from past 
events
Lessons learned from Three Mile Is-
land (1979), Chernobyl (1986) and 
Fukushima Dai-ichi (2011) accidents 
influenced the nuclear industry sig-
nificantly. They led European Un-
ion to set out a common European 
maximum permitted levels of  con-
tamination in foodstuffs following a 
nuclear accident and develop an early 
warning system ECURIE, while many 
EU Member States have installed the 
networks of  radiation measurement 
stations that  have been integrated in 
an EU-wide monitoring system EUR-
DEP.
3.13.3.1
Three Mile Island, 1979
The Three Mile Island accident oc-
curred on 28 March 1979 in Pennsylva-
nia, USA. Although some risk studies 
had emerged before 1979 (US NRC, 
2016), this accident demonstrated the 
importance of  having an awareness of 
the potential for core melt accidents 
among NPP designers and operators. 
The accident was caused by an inci-
dent on the reactor steam generator 
feedwater system, which led to the 
automatic reactor tripping. Consid-
ering all existing safety systems, this 
event should not have been the cause 
of  an accident, but some maintenance 
errors (e.g. wrong valve positions), ad-
ditional equipment failure (one prima-
ry circuit safety valve did not respond 
to a closure signal from the control 
room), and a misunderstanding of 
the reactor status by the operators in 
the control room led to the melting 
of  the reactor core. This led to signif-
icant radioactivity release in the reac-
tor containment vessel. The accident 
progression was stopped when the 
operators restarted the injection of 
water into the reactor vessel.
The offsite radiological consequences 
were very limited thanks to the design 
features of  the reactor containment 
vessel. Nevertheless, the accident 
caused extreme anxiety in the popula-
tion, despite the fact that the recom-
mendation of  evacuation by the nu-
clear authorities was later cancelled by 
the governor of  Pennsylvania.
Many lessons have been learned from 
this accident (IRSN, 2013) relating to, 
for example, the following:
• NPP operator procedures (a com-
bination of  symptom-based and 
event-based procedures is now 
preferred);
• NPP operator training (accident 
computer simulation training, acci-
dent drills, etc.);
• NPP control room design (reliabil-
ity of  information displayed, alarm 
processing, etc.);
• additional emergency operating 
procedures are needed for situa-
tions that are not anticipated in the 
360
were highly unstable at certain power 
ranges, the emergency shutdown sys-
tem had too long a response time and 
there was no containment around the 
reactor. In addition, the lack of  suf-
ficient preparation for the conditions 
required for the planned test, and the 
lack of  time in which to complete it, 
meant that operators did not follow 
all the operating rules. They also vio-
lated these rules by suppressing some 
important safety systems.
The explosion sent radioactive mate-
rials contained in the nuclear reactor 
core into the atmosphere, to altitudes 
of  more than 1 200 metres. The radi-
oactive plume then propagated in the 
European atmosphere, then world-
wide, and caused the contamination 
of  territories at different level. The 
areas of  Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, 
which received depositions of  caesi-
um-137 exceeding 37 000 becquerels 
per square metre after the accident, 
cover a surface area of  approximately 
150 000 km2 with more than 5 mil-
lion inhabitants. The accident had 
huge impacts on the environment 
(contamination of  ground, rivers, 
forest, agriculture products, etc.), the 
ecosystem (transfer of  contamination 
through the food chain or agricultural 
cycles), human health (especially for 
the ‘liquidators’ who worked to lim-
it the consequences of  the accident 
and for inhabitants of  contaminated 
areas) and the economy and society in 
general. Many research programmes 
have been devoted to the study of  the 
impacts of  this accident.
A number of  lessons have been 
learned from this accident (IRSN, 
2011), including:
• a new perception and understand-
ing of  the consequences of  such an 
accident;
• the importance of  emergency pre-
paredness to face such events (na-
tional emergency response organ-
isations have been reinforced in 
most countries);
• the importance of  transparency and 
providing information to the pub-
lic: an EWS, ECURIE (European 
Community Urgent Radiological 
Information Exchange), has been 
elaborated that allows each country 
to immediately inform all EU Mem-
ber States in the event of  an acci-
dent in one of  its nuclear facilities; a 
dedicated European Directive (EU, 
1989) defines common require-
ments on informing the general 
public in the event of  a radiologi-
cal emergency and some countries 
have significantly reinforced the le-
gal basis for such transparency (e.g. 
France; see French Nuclear Safety 
Authority, 2006); an International 
Nuclear Event Scale has been de-
fined to ensure clear understanding 
of  the severity of  various events;
• the need for common European 
maximum permitted levels of  con-
tamination in foodstuffs following 
a nuclear accident, which have been 
set out in a related Council Regula-
tion issued in 1987 (Euratom, 1987);
• for the overall radiological sur-
veillance of  the environment, EU 
Member States have installed radi-
ation measurement stations; these 
national networks have been inte-
grated in an EU-wide monitoring 
system EURDEP (European Radi-
ological Data Exchange Platform; a 
standard data-format and network 
for exchanging radiological moni-
toring) which is managed by the Eu-
ropean Commission;
• in terms of  plant design and opera-
tion, the accident has promoted the 
initial design (loss of  the main elec-
trical supply, loss of  ultimate heat 
sink, filtered containment venting 
procedure, etc.);
• the reactor containment vessel is 
of  prime importance and shall be 
reinforced where possible;
• precursors of  accidents (incidents 
with no serious consequences) 
shall be analysed systematically to 
identify possible weaknesses; this 
may lead to modifications in NPP 
design or operation;
• emergency preparedness is of 
prime importance, with local and 
national emergency response teams 
able to support control room oper-
ators and to coordinate protective 
actions for the population;
• research to understand accident 
progression in the case of  a severe 
accident is needed, and appropriate 
mitigation strategies shall be devel-
oped;
• probabilistic safety assessments 
(PSAs, see below) shall be devel-
oped to identify accidents associ-
ated with multiple failures or com-
mon cause failures, for which safety 
improvements may be needed.
3.13.3.2
Chernobyl, 1986
On 26 April 1986 at 01:24, the 
RBMK (Reaktor Bolshoy Moshch-
nosti Kanalnyy, i.e. high power 
channel-type reactor that is a class 
of  graphite-moderated nuclear pow-
er reactor designed and built by the 
Soviet Union) type reactor 4 at the 
Chernobyl NPP, which had been in 
service since 1983, exploded in an 
accident during a technical test. The 
initial design of  the RBMK reactors 
had some significant weaknesses from 
a safety standpoint. In particular, they 
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safety culture (under an interroga-
tive and prudent approach, the test 
at the origin of  the accident would 
not have been carried out) and the 
importance of  the appropriate ap-
plication of  the defence-in-depth 
concept (despite human error, other 
lines of  defence should have pre-
vented such a disaster).
For new reactors, European regulators 
consider that such accidents with large 
radioactive release shall be ‘practically 
eliminated’ and they require an appro-
priate demonstration of  the various 
safety features (RHWG, 2013). This 
requirement has a considerable impact 
on reactor design features.
3.13.3.3
Fukushima Dai-ichi, 2011
The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
was initiated by the Great East Ja-
pan earthquake that occurred on 11 
March 2011 with a magnitude of  9. It 
caused a tsunami that struck the Jap-
anese coasts, with waves exceeding 10 
metres. The devastation in Japan was 
considerable: more than 15 000 peo-
ple were killed, 6 000 were injured and 
2 500 reported missing, and the de-
struction of  buildings and infrastruc-
ture was considerable.
Lessons learned from 
Three Mile Island (1979), 
Chernobyl (1986) 
and Fukushima Dai-
ichi (2011) accidents 
influenced the nuclear 
industry significantly.
The earthquake did not threaten the 
Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP’s safety 
functions, but the resulting tsunami 
submerged the NPP’s platform and 
led to the loss of  the ultimate heat 
sink and most internal electrical sup-
plies. Four out of  six reactors stayed 
in long-term station black-out con-
ditions. The site staff, despite their 
best efforts and considerable courage, 
could not prevent core melt at units 
1, 2, and 3 and the resulting hydrogen 
explosions and large radioactive re-
lease in the environment. This caused 
a nuclear catastrophe in addition to 
the earthquake and tsunami impacts. 
Although the winds were mostly di-
rected towards the sea during the 
accident, the ground contamination 
by the radioactive plume led to the 
evacuation of  80 000 inhabitants (a 
number that rose after a ‘voluntary’ 
evacuation starting on 25 March) and 
had huge impacts for agriculture, eco-
systems, the economy and society in 
general in the region of  Fukushima. 
The contamination of  the ocean by 
liquid releases also had impacts on 
the fishing industry. The IAEA report 
(2015) provides a description of  the 
accident, its consequences and all re-
mediation efforts.
The accident led European countries 
and many others to develop a stress 
test programme to assess the capacity 
of  NPPs to withstand extreme condi-
tions (ENSREG, 2012). The robust-
ness of  NPPs has been assessed in 
terms of  three major topics:
• protection against extreme external 
hazards (earthquake, flooding, etc.);
• NPP controls in the event of  a loss 
of  ultimate heat sink or electrical 
supply;
• severe accident management proto-
cols.
Most NPP operators have decided 
to implement additional provisions 
on their utilities to further increase 
their robustness and the protection of 
population. The European regulators 
and the IAEA have also promoted the 
concept of  ‘design extension condi-
tions’ (IAEA, 2016; WENRA, 2014). 
The idea is to extend the basic design 
of  NPPs to account for more adverse 
conditions for which a reactor can 
still be maintained in a safe state, or 
for which a severe accident (with core 
damage or spent fuel damage) can be 
controlled to recover a stable state 
without any significant radioactive re-
lease into the environment.
After the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, 
most countries decided that NPP re-
inforcements must be able to face ex-
treme conditions. Such reinforcements 
should enable the following:
• site protection against hazards (ex-
treme flooding, winds, etc.);
• implementation of  additional pro-
tected (bunkered) safety systems or 
the reinforcement of  some existing 
structures, systems and compo-
nents;
• implementation of  additional fixed 
or mobile equipment to allow plant 
stabilisation in extreme situations;
• implementation of  new infrastruc-
ture and equipment for emergency 
response management (reinforced 
emergency building, reinforced 
mobile equipment storage, addi-
tional communication and trans-
port means, improved protection 
against radioactivity);
• more staff  responsible for emer-
gency actions;
• improvement of  severe accident 
management strategies and, for 
some NPPs, the implementation of 
new equipment.
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NPPs, and many countries, such as 
France, include a re-assessment of 
external hazards at each 10-year peri-
odic safety review. If  the safety mar-
gins appear to be reduced in light of 
the most recent knowledge (e.g. on 
earthquake, flooding risks or more 
general climatic changes), then NPP 
reinforcements can be decided. To il-
lustrate this topic, a survey has been 
carried out by the ASAMPSA_E pro-
ject (ASAMPSA_E, 2013) on more 
than 80 high-amplitude external haz-
ards that have been experienced by 
NPPs or other facilities and high-am-
plitude external hazards described in 
the IAEA Incident Reporting System 
(IRS) database. Table 3.7 provides 
some external hazards that could be 
experienced by nuclear facilities iden-
tified by ASAMPSA_E.
Meteorological events are the most 
frequent, followed by biological in-
festation events. ‘Low air tempera-
ture’ seems to be the most recurrent 
hazard, followed closely by ‘Light-
ning’ hazards. Infestation with marine 
organisms has been observed more 
often than infestation with vegetable 
materials (such infestation may threat 
the ultimate heat sink of  NPPs).
The Fukushima Dai-ichi accident 
showed the importance of  the combi-
nations of  hazards. This fact was also 
identified in France during an event at 
Le Blayais NPP in 1999 (a combina-
tion of  a storm, high tide and waves 
led to the partial submersion of  the 
NPP platform). This event led to the 
significant reinforcement of  certain 
French NPPs against flooding, but 
perhaps not to an international aware-
ness of  the importance of  combina-
tions of  hazards in risk assessments.
All the above show the importance of 
enhanced investigations of  all cred-
ible external hazards, including all 
their possible correlations and combi-
nations. This has led to the analysis of 
the impact of  ‘rare events’, which is a 
challenging activity for the engineer-
ing sector.
3.13.4
Safety assessment 
methodologies
The design of  NPPs follows a set of 
rules and practices that should ensure 
a high level of  safety. Standards have 
been developed, then improved, in a 
number of  areas, from high-level con-
siderations ( IAEA, 2016; WENRA, 
2014; RHWG, 2013) to more tech-
nical ones (e.g. rules for mechanical 
design).
An important step in demonstrat-
ing the safety of  a NPP design is to 
identify a set of  accident conditions 
that are applied to design all safety-re-
lated SSCs of  the NPP. These acci-
dent conditions result from initiating 
events (equipment failure, human 
errors, internal or external hazards) 
leading to NPP transients, which are 
then analysed using specific conserv-
ative assumptions to ensure safety 
margins. The examination of  this set 
of  accident conditions using con-
servative assumptions is the so-called 
deterministic safety assessment. The 
methods that are applied must be suf-
ficiently simple for the feasibility of 
the design and its safety demonstra-
tion, and sufficiently robust to ensure 
that the NPP and its organisation can 
be resilient to any event during plant 
operation.
In relation to emergency preparedness 
and response, existing and reinforced 
requirements have been integrated 
into the revision of  the European 
Basic Safety Standards directive (EU, 
2013); the directive gives an increased 
focus on the need for international 
cooperation. The emergency manage-
ment plans have been improved or 
are in revision in many countries (see 
HERCA-WENRA scheme for severe 
accidents, change in pre-planning ra-
dii for evacuation, sheltering and io-
dine distribution). Research in this 
area was promoted via the PREPARE 
and the recently started CONCERT 
project.
This has led to post-Fukushima action 
plans on a national level as well as to 
enhancements of  the safety standards 
at international (IAEA, WENRA, 
etc.) or national levels.
Although NPP modifications have 
been decided, the Fukushima Dai-ichi 
accident has led to an increased inter-
est in the study of  natural and man-
made hazards that could threaten a 
nuclear site and in the development 
of  an on-site and off-site emergency 
response organisation that is capable 
of  facing any complex situation.
3.13.3.4
High-amplitude external 
hazards at nuclear power 
plant sites
Nuclear power plants should be de-
signed to withstand any high-am-
plitude external hazards that could 
threaten safety functions. Neverthe-
less, a number of  high-amplitude 
events have caused problems at some 
nuclear sites. This is an important 
challenge for the safe operation of 
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To improve the safety demonstration, 
and as a complementary approach to 
the deterministic approach, proba-
bilistic safety assessments (PSAs) are 
developed. A definition of  the three 
levels of  PSA can be found in IAEA 
Safety Standards SSG-3 (IAEA, 
2010a) and SSG-4 (IAEA, 2010b):
‘PSA provides a methodological approach to 
identifying accident sequences that can follow 
from a broad range of  initiating events and 
it includes a systematic and realistic deter-
mination of  accident frequencies and conse-
quences. In international practice, three lev-
els of  PSA are generally recognised:
1. In Level 1 PSA, the design and oper-
ation of  the plant are analysed in or-
der to identify the sequences of  events 
that can lead to core damage and the 
core damage frequency is estimated. 
Level 1 PSA provides insights into the 
strengths and weaknesses of  the safety 
related systems and procedures in place 
or envisaged as preventing core damage.
2. In Level 2 PSA, the chronological pro-
gression of  core damage sequences iden-
tified in Level 1 PSA are evaluated, 
including a quantitative assessment of 
phenomena arising from severe damage 
to reactor fuel. Level 2 PSA identifies 
External hazards that could be experienced by nuclear facilities 
TABLE 3.7
Earthquakes 
Tsunamis 
Ground subsidence  
Flooding 
High tides 
Storm surges 
Wind waves 
High river 
levels/flow 
Spring runoff (from 
mountains) 
High winds 
Hurricanes 
Tornados 
Projectiles driven by 
high winds 
Salt storms 
Blackout 
Electrical disturbance 
transmitted by the external 
power grid 
Malware computer programs 
or computer viruses 
Electromagnetic interference 
Disturbance by high-
frequency radio signals 
Oil spills 
Transport accidents 
Aircraft crashes 
External fire due to human 
activity 
External explosion 
Corrosive liquids or gases 
Toxic liquids or gases 
Radioactive releases 
Pandemics/severe epidemics 
Biofouling 
Jellyfish infestation 
Small fish infestation 
Mollusc infestation 
Shell infestation 
Vegetable material in 
the heat sink 
Reeds intrusion 
Algae 
Rat infestation 
Low water 
temperature 
Frazil 
Ice in cooling water 
Frost 
Lightning 
Solar flares, solar 
storms, geomagnetic 
storms 
Sand deposits 
Silting 
Small rocks 
Sediments 
Low air 
temperature 
High air 
temperature 
Low river levels 
Extreme rain 
Heavy snowfalls 
Wet snow 
Atmosphere moisture 
Hail 
Freezing rain 
Forest fire 
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Although this approach is quite ad-
vanced for NPPs, PSA experts recog-
nise in general that these studies still 
have some weaknesses and continual 
improvements are performed. One 
weakness is often the completeness 
of  initiating events and hazards con-
sidered, which varies from one PSA 
to another.
Standards have been 
developed to design 
NPPs that should ensure 
a high level of safety. 
An important step in 
demonstrating the 
safety of a NPP design
 is to identify a set of 
accident conditions. 
To improve the 
safety demonstration 
probabilistic safety 
assessments are 
developed.
The ASAMPSA_E project was initiat-
ed in 2013 to help increase the scope 
of  existing PSAs. For this project:
‘An extended PSA (probabilistic safety as-
sessment) applies to a site of  one or several 
Nuclear Power Plant(s) (NPP(s)) and its 
environment. It intends to calculate the risk 
induced by the main sources of  radioactivity 
(reactor core and spent fuel storages, other 
sources) on the site, taking into account all 
operating states for each main source and all 
possible relevant accident initiating events 
(both internal and external) affecting one 
NPP or the whole site.’ 
Some general lessons can be identi-
fied (Raimond, 2016):
• an extended PSA is still an objec-
tive for most PSA teams working 
on NPPs: no NPP site currently 
has a PSA that covers:
-full-power and all reactor shut 
down-state initial states
-all sources of  radioactivity
-all relevant types of  initiating 
events (internal and external)
-multi-unit accident management
• there is a need to enlarge the analy-
sis scope in terms of  the NPP, the 
neighbouring reactors or other in-
dustries, the environment at a me-
dium scale;
• the risk metrics to be used are still 
a topic for discussion, especially if 
the objective is to calculate some 
‘global risk’;
• PSA experts have to decide, for 
each NPP, which initiating events 
should be included in the PSA. 
Criteria are applied to identify risk 
significant events but, for some in-
itiating events (e.g. high-amplitude 
earthquakes or combined extreme 
weather conditions), high uncer-
tainties exist in both their frequen-
cy and amplitude; in such cases, the 
PSA approach is questionable;
• the geosciences fail sometimes to 
calculate both frequencies and fea-
tures of  some rare (extreme) natu-
ral events for PSA with reasonable 
uncertainty bounds; this is, in fact, 
a societal concern and progress in 
these areas should be expected;
• the study of  the impact beyond de-
sign hazards may require additional 
methodologies (e.g. impact of  be-
yond design lightning strike);
• PSAs have been applied to sin-
gle NPPs; PSAs for multiple NPP 
sites have rarely been undertaken; 
the feasibility and interest of  such 
ways in which associated releases of  ra-
dioactive material from fuel can result 
in releases to the environment. It also 
estimates the frequency, magnitude, 
and other relevant characteristics of  the 
release of  radioactive material to the 
environment. This analysis provides ad-
ditional insights into the relative impor-
tance of  accident prevention, mitigation 
measures, and the physical barriers to 
the release of  radioactive material to the 
environment (e.g. a containment build-
ing).
3. In Level 3 PSA, public health and 
other societal consequences are estimat-
ed, such as the contamination of  land 
or food from the accident sequences that 
lead to a release of  radioactive material 
to the environment.
PSAs are also classified according to the 
range of  initiating events (internal and/or 
external to the plant) and plant operating 
modes that are to be considered.’ 
The PSA methodology is based on 
event tree methodologies, which are 
conceptually simple but highly com-
plex in detailed applications. This is 
due to the number of  SSCs in a NPP, 
the variety of  initiating events, the 
possible equipment and human fail-
ures, the interdependencies between 
events, the uncertainties in data (haz-
ards modelling, equipment failure 
probability, human failure probabili-
ty, physical phenomena progression, 
SSCs behaviour in unplanned circum-
stances, etc.). A PSA modelling exists 
for almost all NPPs. Their quality is 
progressively improving, thanks to 
periodic updates and experience shar-
ing. For example, the OECD-NEA 
working group risk (WG-Risk) col-
lects and shares international experi-
ence in this area.
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studies are ongoing issues;
• the application of  PSAs (or ex-
tended PSAs) in decision-making 
processes is still a topic for harmo-
nisation: for example, the recent in-
terest in rare extreme events func-
tions as a reminder of  the need to 
take into account uncertainties in 
decision-making processes.
3.13.5
Risk reduction, a 
multiform activity
As explained above, European nucle-
ar stakeholders apply the concept of 
continual safety improvement. This is 
done with a risk-reduction perspec-
tive. PSA has a role in this process, 
but many other considerations are 
taken into account. Risk reduction is 
in fact a multiform activity that can-
not be reduced to a simple list. Some 
examples are proposed below but 
they cover only a limited number of 
risk-reduction possibilities, which are 
in fact possible at each level of  the de-
fence-in-depth approach.
For new reactors, the protection of 
the population in the event of  a se-
vere accident is paramount, as indicat-
ed by WENRA (2014):
‘ reducing potential radioactive releases to the 
environment from accidents with core melt, in 
short and long term, by following the qualita-
tive criteria below:
• accidents with core melt that would lead 
to early or large releases of  radioactive 
material should be practically eliminated;
• in the event that accidents with core melt 
do occur, design provisions should have 
been be made so that only limited pro-
tective measures in area and time are 
needed for the public (e.g. no permanent 
relocation, no need for emergency evacua-
tion outside the immediate vicinity of  the 
plant, limited sheltering, no long term re-
strictions in food consumption) and suffi-
cient time must be available to implement 
these measures.’ 
Several safety authorities request that 
utilities upgrade existing reactors to 
meet, as far as possible, the objectives 
for new reactors. In particular, it shall 
be postulated that severe accident 
may happen and that, in such cases, 
accident mitigation strategies shall be 
implemented. This obviously contrib-
utes to some degree of  risk reduction, 
at least if  the other existing safety fea-
tures are not degraded as a result of 
ageing.
Risk reduction is a 
multiform activity that 
cannot be reduced to a 
simple list. There are a 
number of risk-reduction 
possibilities, which are in 
fact possible at each level 
of the defence-in-depth 
approach.
 
Research activities are very important 
to ensure the continued interrogation 
of  existing practices, to develop new 
knowledge and to promote the ap-
plication of  new knowledge in safe-
ty improvements. Some examples are 
described here but, in fact, there are 
numerous topics of  interest (e.g. see 
NUGENIA, 2013):
• the reassessment of  hazards is an 
important issue during periodic 
safety review; as explained above, 
for natural hazards, there are top-
ics where geosciences provide 
highly uncertain information due 
to remaining uncertainties for rare 
events but, nevertheless, even if 
the quantification of  hazard fea-
tures is difficult, reinforcement of 
NPPs can be decided based on the 
most recent knowledge;
• the analysis of  NPPs’ responses in 
the event of  an accident using sim-
ulation tools capable of  providing 
best-estimate information for the 
design verification of  SSCs or the 
development of  operating proce-
dures;
• the analysis of  SSCs’ response 
(fragility analysis) in the event of 
hazards (earthquake, flooding, fire, 
lightning, etc.);
• techniques for in-service inspec-
tion to check the capability and 
conformity to safety standards of 
all key safety equipment (e.g. pipe 
welding control, risk informed in-
spection, plant walkdowns);
• research on severe accident pro-
gression;
• research on accident precursors;
• research on human factors and 
organisations: how to evaluate the 
efficiency of  organisations to en-
sure the efficiency of  all human 
activities (during NPP design, con-
struction, normal operation, mod-
ernisation, control, accident man-
agement, etc.).
The emergency response is also a 
crucial factor during accident man-
agement. This concerns the site in 
question (to help manage a complex 
situation at a local and national level, 
to ensure the dissemination of  trans-
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3.13.6 
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership
To conclude, we wish to highlight the 
importance of  the multiform activi-
ties conducted to prevent any accident 
or to limit its consequences should 
one occur. The fundamental safety 
principles and the defence-in-depth 
approach underlie these multiform 
activities, which intend to enhance the 
nuclear safety requirements, the de-
sign features of  nuclear facilities, the 
quality of  construction, all human ac-
tivities during normal operation and, 
in response to accidental situations, 
the continuous safety improvement 
and the control by appropriate bodies.
Knowledge
The efficiency of  the emergency re-
sponse plans at local, national or in-
ternational levels and of  the related 
international cooperation remains 
a challenge for the nuclear industry, 
and good practices can be shared with 
other activities. In parallel, research 
on the resilience of  human organisa-
tions when facing complex situations 
can be promoted in the nuclear indus-
try and in many other areas.
Innovation
The nuclear industry has still to face 
many challenges to maintain and im-
prove the safety of  operating and new 
reactors. Among these challenges are 
the human and organisational factors 
(training and education, generation 
renewal, changes in competences, 
evolution of  requirements and reg-
ulation, modernisation programmes, 
the organisation’s efficiency, etc.), the 
ageing of  the nuclear facilities and the 
financial context.
If  some challenges are very specific 
to nuclear activities, others are ful-
ly cross-connected to other human 
activities. For example, the study of 
high-amplitude natural hazards has 
become increasingly important since 
the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, and 
efforts are being made to reinforce 
nuclear facilities if  needed. Under-
standing and predicting these natu-
ral hazards is a societal concern and 
progress in geosciences is expected. 
To support safety studies for nuclear 
facilities, seismic faults identification 
and modelling, the quantification of 
correlated natural hazards (typically 
during extreme weather conditions) 
or the regional analysis of  the conse-
quences of  such natural hazards are 
topics of  interest for which knowl-
edge should be improved.
parent information), the public au-
thorities (to decide protective actions 
for the populations, to disseminate 
information transparently to the pub-
lic) and international exchanges (the 
consequences of  a nuclear accident 
are transnational; rescue solutions can 
often be found at the international 
level, and immediate and transparent 
communication is expected from any 
country facing a nuclear accident). As 
mentioned above, many research ac-
tivities support progress in emergency 
response capabilities, for example on 
source term prediction, simulations 
of  radioactivity transfer in environ-
ment, rules for the protection of  pop-
ulations, rules for agriculture manage-
ment and communication during and 
after the accident (see EURANOS, 
NERIS-TP and PREPARE projects).
In addition, it is also recognised that 
the organisation of  the control of  nu-
clear activities by official bodies (in 
general nuclear safety authorities and 
technical safety organisations) and the 
relationship between the industry and 
these official bodies are of  primary 
importance in risk reduction. Rela-
tionships with NGOs also have to be 
considered carefully.
We can mention, as an example, some 
values generally shared by the safety 
authorities or the Technical Safety 
Organisations, namely competence, 
independence, rigor, transparency im-
partiality, proactivity or initiative. The 
efficiency of  the control of  nuclear 
activities is another topic for exchang-
es at the international level.
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3.14 Technological risk:
Natech
Elisabeth	Krausmann, Ana Maria Cruz, Roland Fendler, 
Ernesto Salzano
3.14.1
Introduction
The past few years have seen a num-
ber of  natural disasters accompanied 
by major damage to industrial facilities 
and other infrastructures. In March 
2011, a tsunami struck a Japanese 
NPP, causing a nuclear meltdown, 
and raging fires and explosions at oil 
refineries in the wake of  the massive 
earthquake that triggered the tsunami 
also made the global headlines. Other 
recent examples of  major disasters in-
clude Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which 
caused multiple hydrocarbon spills 
and releases of  raw sewage, the dam-
age to industrial parks during the Thai 
floods in 2011, or Hurricanes Katri-
na and Rita in 2005, which wreaked 
havoc on the offshore oil and gas in-
frastructure in the Gulf  of  Mexico 
(Krausmann and Cruz, 2013; Cruz 
and Krausmann, 2008, 2009).
These events clearly demonstrated the 
potential for natural hazards to trig-
ger fires, explosions and toxic or ra-
dioactive releases at hazardous instal-
lations and other infrastructures that 
process, store or transport danger-
ous substances. These technological 
‘secondary effects’ caused by natural 
hazards are known as ‘Natech’ (Nat-
ural-hazard-triggered technological) 
accidents (Krausmann et al., 2017a). 
They are a recurring but often over-
looked feature of  many natural-dis-
aster situations and have repeatedly 
had significant and long-term social, 
environmental and economic impacts, 
including supply-chain disruptions 
(Figure 3.57). It is important to note 
that natural-hazard impacts on com-
mercial districts or residential areas 
where lower quantities of  hazardous 
materials are present are also a safety 
concern.
Natural hazards can cause multiple 
and simultaneous releases of  haz-
ardous materials over extended are-
as, damage or destroy safety barriers 
and systems, and down lifelines often 
needed for accident prevention and 
mitigation. These are also the ingre-
dients for cascading disasters. For 
this reason, successfully controlling a 
Natech accident has often turned out 
to be a major challenge, if  not impos-
sible, where no prior preparedness 
planning had taken place.
Natech accidents 
can have serious 
consequences, including 
cascading events. While 
their risk is increasing, 
they are not adequately 
addressed in DRM.
Unfortunately, disaster risk-reduc-
tion frameworks do not fully address 
technological hazards in general or 
Natech hazards in particular. In ad-
dition, chemical accident prevention 
and preparedness programmes often 
overlook the specific aspects of  Na-
tech risk, which has caused a lack of 
dedicated risk-assessment methodol-
ogies and guidance for industry and 
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authorities on how to manage these 
risks both onsite and offsite. 
This is aggravated by the expected 
increase of  future Natech risk due to 
worldwide industrialisation, climate 
change, population growth and com-
munity encroachment in areas subject 
to natural hazards (Krausmann and 
Baranzini, 2012).
This subchapter gives an overview of 
the state of  play in Natech risk reduc-
tion in the EU and globally; it high-
lights existing gaps in Natech risk re-
duction and makes recommendations 
on how to close these gaps. 
While natural-hazard triggered nu-
clear accidents also qualify as Nat-
ech events (see Chapter 3.13), this 
subchapter focuses on Natech risk in 
terms of  non-nuclear hazardous in-
dustrial activities.
3.14.2
Forensic analysis of 
Natech accidents and 
lessons learned
Post-accident analysis is a valuable 
tool to recreate the dynamics of  acci-
dents and to draw conclusions on the 
most prominent damage mechanisms 
and hazardous materials release paths, 
particularly vulnerable storage and 
process equipment types, as well as on 
the hazardous materials most com-
monly involved in these types of  ac-
cidents. For this reason, efforts have 
been made to systematically collect 
and analyse information on the caus-
es and dynamics of  Natech accidents 
to support scenario development and 
the design of  better protection op-
tions. In order to facilitate this pro-
cess and to overcome the deficiencies 
of  conventional industrial accident 
databases with respect to Natech acci-
dents, the European Commission has 
set up the eNATECH database for the 
systematic collection and analysis of 
Natech accident data and near miss-
es. The database exhibits the more 
sophisticated accident representation 
required to capture the characteristics 
of  Natech events and is publicly ac-
cessible (eNATECH, 2015).
Lessons can be learned in all phases 
of  risk and accident management, 
from prevention and preparedness 
to response and recovery. Analyses 
of  single accidents produce immedi-
ate lessons specific to the event, while 
analyses of  a set of  similar accidents 
from a broader data pool yields les-
sons learned that are more widely 
applicable. The latter type of  study 
facilitates, for example, the identifica-
tion of  commonly occurring causes 
of  accidents involving specific sub-
stances or industries, which may not 
be easily recognisable within a single 
occurrence. This analysis also lends 
itself  to identifying technical and or-
ganisational risk-reduction measures 
that require improvement or that are 
missing.
3.14.2.1
General lessons learned
The analysis of  Natech accidents 
across different types of  natural 
hazards showed that there are cer-
tain commonalities regardless of  the 
Hydrocarbon releases at a refinery during floods in Coffeyville, USA, 
in 2007.
Source: photograph courtesy of the Kansas Wing of the Civil Air Patrol
FIGURE 3.57
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als releases possibly occurring from 
several sources at the same time, an 
increased ignition probability, cou-
pled with simultaneous damage to 
safety barriers and systems including 
the frequent loss of  lifelines needed 
for process control or firefighting, 
the likelihood of  cascading disasters 
is also higher for Natech events than 
for conventional industrial accidents.
3.14.2.2
Lessons learned from
Natech accidents due to 
earthquakes, floods and 
lightning
Most Natech accident analyses have 
focused on accidents triggered by 
earthquakes, floods or lightning. Pri-
ority was given to these hazards be-
cause of  the generally greater severity 
of  Natech events caused by earth-
quakes (Antonioni et al., 2009), and 
the high frequency of  accidents ini-
tiated by floods and lightning in EU 
Member States and OECD Member 
Countries (Krausmann and Baranzini, 
2012). Systematic analyses of  the dy-
namics and consequences of  Natech 
accidents caused by other natural haz-
ards are scarce, although other natural 
hazards, such as tsunamis, extreme 
temperature, high winds or landslides 
have also caused Natech accidents.
Hydrocarbon storage 
tanks are found to be 
particularly vulnerable 
to natural-hazard 
impact, which increases 
the cascading risk. 
Safety barriers are 
usually also affected by 
natural hazards and are 
unavailable for accident 
mitigation.
The main damage and failure mech-
anisms of  industrial structures and 
hazardous equipment during earth-
quakes are direct shaking impact, 
ground deformation and liquefac-
tion (Figure 3.58). The impact ranges 
from structural damage without the 
release of  hazardous materials, such 
as shell buckling, sloshing damage 
or anchor-bolt stretching, to damage 
with loss of  containment, caused, for 
instance, by the failure of  flanges or 
pipe connections, shell and roof  fail-
ures or tank overturning and collapse 
(Krausmann et al., 2011). The analyses 
also showed that during earthquakes 
it is common that several loss-of-con-
tainment events occur simultaneously. 
This increases the likelihood of  cas-
cading accidents. The analyses also 
highlighted the vulnerability of  safe-
natural-hazard trigger. Studies have 
indicated, for instance, that storage 
tanks at atmospheric pressure, and in 
particular those with floating roofs, 
appear to be particularly vulnerable 
to earthquake, flood and lightning im-
pacts compared with other types of 
industrial equipment (Krausmann et 
al., 2011). While no systematic stud-
ies for other types of  natural hazards 
are available, individual case histories 
seem to support this conclusion in the 
case of  storms or heavy rain (Bailey 
and Levitan, 2008; Godoy, 2007).
From an industrial safety perspec-
tive, the high susceptibility of  stor-
age tanks to natural-hazard impacts is 
problematic, as these plant units often 
contain large quantities of  crude oil, 
gasoline or other types of  flammable 
liquid hydrocarbons. It is therefore 
unsurprising that many Natech acci-
dents involve hydrocarbon releases 
that have ignited and escalated into 
major fires or explosions (Table 3.8).
In addition, with hazardous materi-
Substances mainly involved in flood-triggered Natech accidents accord-
ing to an analysis by Cozzani et al. (2010)
TABLE 3.8
Hazardous substance category No. of accidents 
Oil, diesel fuel, gasoline; liquid hydrocarbons 158 
Propane, butane, LPG 12 
Fertilisers 11 
Acid products 7 
Cyanides 5 
Oxides 5 
Ammonia 5 
Chlorine 3 
Explosives 3 
Calcium carbide 3 
Soap and detergents 1 
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ty barriers (e.g. catch basins around 
tanks or sprinkler systems) to seismic 
loading.
In the case of  floods, the main dam-
age and failure mechanisms are the 
displacement of  equipment due to 
buoyancy and water drag, as well as 
the impact of  floating objects. This 
can break connections between pipe-
work and equipment, cause pipelines 
to rupture or lead to tank collapse or 
implosion (Krausmann et al., 2011). 
Once a hazardous material has been 
released, the presence of  the floodwa-
ters aggravates the accident by acting 
as a vector for spreading the released 
toxic or flammable materials over 
wide areas. This can also increase the 
likelihood of  domino accidents while 
simultaneously creating further risks 
in the areas surrounding the damaged 
facility (Figure 3.57). The analysis of 
flood-triggered accidents also showed 
that released substances can react vi-
olently with the floodwaters, thereby 
creating secondary toxic or flamma-
ble gases from often less dangerous 
precursor chemicals (Cozzani et al., 
2010).
The analysis of  lightning-triggered 
Natech accidents highlighted two dif-
ferent types of  impact mechanisms: 
(1) direct impacts, causing structural 
damage to equipment, or the ignition 
of  flammable vapours by the lightning 
strike (e.g. at the rim seal of  atmos-
pheric storage tanks); and (2) indirect 
impacts, which can trigger loss of 
containment, e.g. via process upsets 
due to power outage and power dips 
and impacts on electrical control and 
safety systems (Renni et al., 2010).
For a detailed discussion of  lessons 
learned from Natech accidents due to 
a wide variety of  natural hazards, the 
reader is referred to Krausmann and 
Salzano (2017).
3.14.3
Status of Natech risk 
management in 
European Union 
Member States and 
in OECD
Member Countries
3.14.3.1 
European Union
In the EU, major (chemical) accident 
risks are regulated by the provisions 
of  the so-called Seveso Directive on 
the control of  major-accident haz-
ards and its amendments (European 
Union, 2012; see also Chapter 3.12). 
Following a series of  Natech and oth-
er major chemical accidents (e.g. the 
spill of  cyanide-laced tailings from 
a dam breach due to heavy rainfall 
and rapid snowmelt, or the release of 
chlorine from a flooded chemical fa-
cility), it was decided that an amend-
ment of  the Seveso Directive was 
needed to close remaining gaps. The 
latest amendment now explicitly ad-
dresses Natech risks and requires that 
environmental hazards, such as floods 
and earthquakes, be routinely identi-
fied and evaluated in an industrial es-
Collapse of a dryer and severing of connected pipes at a fertiliser factory 
hit by the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China. 
Source: photograph courtesy of E. Krausmann
FIGURE 3.58
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tion measures in place. The ultimate 
objective of  these codes and stand-
ards is the preservation of  life safety 
and, hence, the prevention of  build-
ing collapse. While in itself  an im-
portant goal, the preservation of  a 
building’s structural integrity is not 
necessarily sufficient to prevent the 
release of  hazardous materials under 
natural-event loading.
The survey identified a number of 
key areas for future work for industry, 
regulators, and science and engineer-
ing. The majority of  survey respond-
ents called for the development of 
guidance on Natech risk assessment 
for industry with the highest priority, 
followed by the preparation of  Nat-
ech risk maps to inform land-use and 
emergency planning by identifying a 
region’s Natech hotspots.
3.14.3.2
The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD)
Parallel to the survey on the status of 
Natech risk management in the EU, 
OECD Member Countries were polled 
on the same subject. The OECD re-
sults showed a similar trend as in the 
EU and highlighted the same gaps 
(Krausmann and Baranzini, 2012). The 
majority of  OECD survey respond-
ents expressed their belief  that there 
is a clear need to improve current reg-
ulations and fill existing gaps to fully 
address Natech risk reduction. Similar 
to the EU survey, they called for the 
development of  natural-hazard and 
Natech risk maps, methodologies for 
and guidance on Natech risk assess-
ment for industry and communities, 
as well as the training of  authorities on 
Natech risk reduction.
Natech accidents 
continue to happen, which 
raises doubts about the 
effectiveness of existing 
safety legislation, as well 
as about the adequacy 
of design codes and 
standards for natural-
hazard impact at 
hazardous installations.
One of  the main international guide-
lines considering Natech risks are the 
OECD Guiding Principles for Chem-
ical Accident Prevention, Prepared-
ness and Response (OECD, 2003), the 
application of  which is the subject of 
an OECD Council Recommendation. 
Given that the 2003 revision of  the 
Guiding Principles considered only 
some aspects of  Natech risk manage-
ment, the OECD Working Group on 
Chemical Accidents decided to ad-
dress the issue more comprehensively 
by including a Natech project into its 
2009-12 work programme to identi-
fy existing gaps and develop targeted 
recommendations for Natech risk re-
duction.
As a final outcome of  the OECD 
Natech project, a Natech Addendum 
to the Guiding Principles was issued 
(OECD, 2015). This addendum in-
cludes numerous recommendations 
for government and industry that ad-
dress the inclusion of  Natech risks in 
the drafting of  regulations, rules and 
standards, their enforcement and im-
plementation, and other activities in 
support of  effective Natech risk man-
tablishment’s safety report (European 
Union, 2012). Awareness of  Natech 
risks in Europe has been growing ever 
since.
A recent survey among Seveso reg-
ulatory bodies aimed to assess the 
status of  Natech risk management 
in the EU (Krausmann and Baran-
zini, 2012). The results of  the survey 
showed an increasing awareness of 
the potentially disastrous impacts of 
natural hazards on chemical facilities. 
However, the survey also highlight-
ed a number of  gaps in Natech risk 
reduction, as well as related research 
and policy challenges.
Over half  of  the survey respondents 
indicated that their countries had ex-
perienced one or more Natech acci-
dents in the period 1990-2009. The 
main accident triggers were lightning, 
low temperatures and floods. Consid-
ering the recurrence of  Natech acci-
dents, the survey results suggest that 
the legal frameworks for chemical-ac-
cident prevention have not always 
been effective. The survey participants 
expressed their belief  that industries 
in many EU Member States may not 
consider Natech risks appropriately in 
their facility risk assessment, with po-
tentially low preparedness levels as a 
result. The survey also revealed strong 
differences between the actual Natech 
accident triggers and the natural haz-
ards perceived to be of  concern, high-
lighting an incongruity between actual 
causes and risk perception.
The recurrence of  Natech accidents 
has also raised doubts about the ad-
equacy of  design codes and stand-
ards for hazardous installations with 
respect to natural-hazard impact, as 
well as about the associated protec-
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agement. With pipelines being at risk 
owing to natural hazards, the Natech 
Addendum also advocates the con-
sideration of  Natech risks in pipeline 
safety.
As a follow-up to the first Natech 
project, the OECD included a second 
Natech project in its 2017-20 work 
programme, which focuses on the 
implementation of  recommendations 
from the first project and on improv-
ing international cooperation in Nat-
ech risk management.
3.14.4
Natech risk 
assessment
Risk analysis is an important tool by 
which to estimate the risk level of  a 
hazardous activity. Quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) in particular al-
lows the identification of  system 
weaknesses, the prioritisation of  safe-
ty measures in terms of  their impor-
tance for risk reduction, or the esti-
mation of  a facility’s overall risk level, 
summarised in a risk figure. This risk 
figure can then be compared with pre-
scribed risk acceptance target levels, 
where existing, to show that risks are 
adequately controlled in fulfilment of 
regulatory requirements (see Chapter 
2.1).
3.14.4.1
General methodology
The identification of  potentially Na-
tech-prone areas and the determina-
tion of  the associated risks are the 
first steps towards managing Natech 
risks. As Krausmann and Baranzini 
(2012) note, hardly any Natech risk 
maps exist in EU Member States and 
OECD Member Countries, and the 
development of  a Natech risk analysis 
and mapping capability is considered 
a high-priority need by authorities to 
effectively reduce Natech risks.
There is a lack of 
consolidated Natech risk 
assessment tools, and 
extensions to traditional 
risk analysis need to be 
made to take into account 
the characteristics of 
Natech events.
Regardless of  the risk-analysis ap-
proach chosen, extensions to both 
qualitative and quantitative risk anal-
ysis need to be made to take into ac-
count the characteristics of  Natech 
events. Hence, specific damage mod-
els to assess the severity and proba-
bility of  equipment damage due to a 
natural event, and a procedure to ac-
count for the possibility of  simultane-
ous hazardous materials releases from 
more than one process or storage unit 
are needed. Simple damage models 
are available for a limited number of 
equipment categories (storage tanks, 
some types of  process equipment) 
and in particular for earthquake im-
pact. The inclusion of  these dam-
age models in QRA case studies has 
demonstrated the importance of  con-
sidering earthquake-triggered acci-
dent scenarios for ensuring the safety 
of  the facility itself  and the surround-
ing population and environment 
(Antonioni et al., 2007; Campedel et 
al., 2008). Therefore, natural hazards 
can be important risk contributors at 
hazardous facilities and must be ade-
quately considered in the risk-analysis 
process.
An in-depth discussion of  the individ-
ual steps in Natech risk assessment, 
including the treatment of  cascading 
events, can be found in Krausmann 
(2017).
3.14.4.2
Methods and tools for 
Natech risk assessment
The surveys discussed in Chapter 
3.14.3 highlighted a lack of  method-
ologies and tools for Natech risk anal-
ysis and mapping, which has so far 
hampered the appropriate inclusion 
of  this type of  risk into industrial risk 
assessment. Following calls by gov-
ernment to close this gap, the Euro-
pean Commission (JRC) developed 
the RAPID-N framework for rapid 
Natech risk assessment and mapping, 
which can be used to quickly identi-
fy Natech risk hotspots (Girgin and 
Krausmann, 2017, 2013). RAPID-N 
is a unique, semi-quantitative tool that 
allows the rapid analysis of  Natech 
risks at local (single installation) or 
regional (multiple installations) level. 
This web-based tool is freely available 
via prior user registration and author-
isation (RAPID-N, 2017). Figure 3.59 
shows an example output of  RAP-
ID-N.
RAPID-N supports different natu-
ral hazards and industrial equipment 
types by design. It estimates and maps 
Natech risk in a web-based environ-
ment and can support land use and 
emergency planning, as well as Nat-
ech damage and consequence analysis 
immediately after a natural event. The 
latter in particular is fundamental for 
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function that will allow Natech risk 
analysis for facilities in the RAPID-N 
database immediately following the 
occurrence of  a major natural event. 
Through this function, competent 
authorities, first responders and oth-
er interested parties can be quickly 
alerted to potential Natech accidents 
to ensure that fast protective action is 
taken if  required.
While RAPID-N currently follows a 
semi-quantitative approach for ana-
lysing and mapping Natech risks 
to ensure a quick assessment with 
a minimum of  data, the University 
of  Bologna has developed a Natech 
module for its software package ARI-
PAR-GIS to characterise the Natech 
risks of  single facilities in a quantita-
tive way (Antonioni et al., 2017). This 
approach is more detailed than that 
of  RAPID-N; however, it requires 
a significant number of  data for the 
assessment process. The output of 
ARIPAR-GIS is individual risk and 
societal risk from Natech accidents 
caused by earthquakes and floods.
3.14.5
Natech risk reduction
Past near misses have shown that Na-
tech risk reduction generally pays off, 
and facilities that have benefited from 
natural-hazard specific design and the 
implementation of  Natech risk-re-
duction measures have fared better 
during natural events (e.g. Cruz and 
Steinberg, 2005). Where these meas-
ures were inadequate or totally lack-
ing, damage was more severe or even 
catastrophic.
Problem areas that stand out in most 
Natech accidents are related to in-
sufficient prevention and prepared-
ness, often caused by the grossly in-
adequate design bases of  hazardous 
installations in natural-hazard prone 
areas due to a failure to acknowledge 
the specific requirements of  pro-
cess equipment under natural-hazard 
loads, the absence or weak enforce-
ment of  safety regulations, and a lack 
of  guidance on how to address the 
problem of  Natech risks in the indus-
try. In addition, there is the miscon-
ception that engineering and organi-
sational protection measures in place 
to prevent and mitigate conventional 
industrial accidents would also pro-
tect against Natech events. In fact, 
the very natural event that damages 
or destroys industrial buildings and 
equipment can also render inoperable 
engineered safety barriers (e.g. con-
tainment dikes, deluge systems) and 
lifelines (power, water for firefighting 
or cooling, communication) needed 
first responders who require an as-
sessment of  the dangers of  secondary 
hazards from industrial plants follow-
ing a natural disaster before dispatch-
ing rescue teams. It could also provide 
a means by which authorities may 
warn the population in the vicinity of 
an installation of  imminent problems.
The current version of  RAPID-N 
supports earthquake Natech risk anal-
ysis and mapping for fixed chemical 
installations, such as refineries or stor-
age tank farms, and onshore pipeline 
networks. In the next release of  the 
tool, floods will be included as addi-
tional Natech accident triggers. Ad-
ditional short-term upgrades that are 
under way are (1) the inclusion of  in-
dividual and societal risk calculations 
in addition to impact zones to move 
towards a more quantitative treatment 
of  the problem, and (2) the imple-
mentation of  an automated analysis 
RAPID-N example output for the release and ignition of a flammable sub-
stance caused by a hypothetical Istanbul earthquake scenario. The circle 
endpoints indicate the point up to which second-degree burns would be 
received for different release scenarios.
Source: courtesy of European Commission (JRC)
FIGURE 3.59
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to prevent an accident, mitigate its 
consequences and keep it from es-
calating. There is, therefore, a need 
for Natech-specific additional safety 
measures to accommodate the char-
acteristics of  Natech accidents, which 
require targeted prevention, prepar-
edness and response.
3.14.5.1
Structural prevention and 
mitigation measures
In general, structural risk-reduction 
measures for technological risks use 
engineering solutions, such as safe-
ty valves or containment dikes, for 
accident prevention and mitigation. 
In this context, prevention refers to 
passive and active actions or measures 
put in place to reduce the likelihood 
of  damage and the occurrence of  a 
hazardous materials release, while 
mitigation refers to actions or meas-
ures implemented to lower the impact 
of  hazardous materials releases if 
they cannot be prevented.
Experience from past Natech ac-
cidents and the associated lessons 
learned have led to the development 
of  recommendations for reducing Na-
tech risks for accident scenarios from 
a wide variety of  natural hazards. For 
example, in earthquake-prone areas, 
flexible tank-pipe connections should 
be used given that the breaking of 
rigid connections has often led to re-
leases (Figure 3.60). Anchoring or re-
straining equipment could effectively 
avoid displacement and keep equip-
ment containing hazardous materials 
intact. The vulnerability of  safety bar-
riers (e.g. catch basins around tanks 
or sprinkler systems) is particularly 
apparent during earthquakes. Criti-
cal active and passive safety barriers 
should, therefore, also be designed to 
withstand the forces of  the expected 
earthquake.
Natech risk reduction 
requires targeted 
prevention, preparedness 
and response, including 
Natech-specific 
safety measures, the 
implementation of which 
was found to pay off.
The risk of  flood-triggered Natech 
accidents can be minimised, for ex-
ample, if  hazardous equipment is 
anchored or otherwise restrained to 
prevent floating and displacement 
by floodwaters. Indirect flood im-
pacts via short-circuiting of  electrical 
equipment that affects safety-critical 
systems can be reduced by protecting 
systems from wave loading and water 
intrusion. This can be achieved by wa-
terproofing and appropriate design. 
The lifting of  flammable waste oil in 
plant drainage systems due to flooding 
can be prevented by segregating the 
drainage systems for waste flammable 
substances and surface run-off  water.
With respect to reducing the Natech 
risk from lightning strikes, the rim seal 
of  atmospheric floating-roof  tanks is 
the most likely point of  ignition, and 
the seal should therefore be regular-
ly checked and maintained. Further-
more, partial or total onsite power 
outage and power dips can lead to 
process upsets and thereby indirectly 
to hazardous materials releases. In-
ternal backup systems should provide 
Flexible steel pipe on a large oil tank in an earthquake-prone area.
Source: photograph courtesy of A.M. Cruz
FIGURE 3.60
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isational control is needed to support 
protection goals.
An in-depth discussion of  organisa-
tional Natech risk-reduction measures 
and approaches is provided in Kraus-
mann et al. (2017b). The following 
sections provide examples of  such 
measures.
3.14.5.3
Natech risk governance
From a Natech point of  view, risk 
governance is becoming exceedingly 
important in light of  increasing in-
dustrialisation coupled with emerg-
ing hazards, such as climate change. 
Since natural hazards can impact 
large areas at the same time, an in-
tegrated risk-governance approach 
involving all stakeholders is needed 
that addresses the safety of  individ-
ual industrial installations as well as 
the potential interactions with neigh-
bouring installations, lifelines and 
nearby communities. The Great East 
Japan earthquake and the Thai floods 
in 2011, for example, highlighted the 
need to better understand infrastruc-
ture-failure interdependencies and the 
governance of  the associated risks.
3.14.5.4
Emergency planning
Natech accidents caused by major 
natural events pose a tremendous 
challenge for emergency response 
owing to:
• possible multiple and simultane-
ous hazardous materials releases 
over extended areas, a scenario for 
which emergency responders are 
usually not trained and equipped;
• competition for scarce emergency 
response resources for providing 
aid in natural disaster areas and for 
combatting the Natech accident;
• hampering of  search and rescue 
operations as a result of  toxic re-
leases, fires and explosions;
• inapplicability of  standard civ-
il-protection measures such as 
evacuation or shelter;
• reliance of  industry on external 
lifelines and emergency-response 
resources for managing a Natech 
accident rather than preparing a 
‘standalone’ emergency plan.
In order to increase preparedness for 
Natech accidents, emergency plans 
for hazardous industry should con-
sider natural-hazard risks. Plant-in-
ternal emergency plans for mitigating 
hazardous materials releases should 
assume that safety barriers are ab-
sent or non-functional and off-site 
response resources are not available, 
requiring backup lifelines to control 
the Natech accident. Off-site emer-
gency plans need to take into account 
the eventuality of  toxic releases, fires 
and explosions impacting the popu-
lation and the rescue operations and 
the need for evacuation in a situation 
where transport routes might be com-
emergency power to those processes 
from which dangerous conditions can 
result during power loss (Krausmann 
et al., 2011).
Many more structural Natech preven-
tion and mitigation measures for dif-
ferent natural hazards and equipment 
types are discussed in detail in Cruz et 
al. (2017).
3.14.5.2
Organisational prevention 
and mitigation measures
In contrast to structural measures, 
which use engineered physical solu-
tions for prevention and mitigation, 
organisational measures are admin-
istrative programmes and controls 
put in place to reduce risks. Organi-
sational protection measures include 
staff  training, the implementation 
of  safety practices and procedures, 
including the monitoring of  safety 
performance, educational and aware-
ness-raising campaigns and the estab-
lishment of  safety policies and laws. 
Since technical protection measures 
can never entirely eliminate hazards 
from a hazardous installation, organ-
Effectiveness of Natech-specific early warning based on the warning 
time to warn and action time tact. 
Source: Salzano et al. (2009)
TABLE 3.9
twarn/tact Characteristics Effectiveness 
<< 1 
Short warning time or slow 
preventive action 
Low: little time to implement preventive action 
≈ 1 
Warning time similar to time 
needed for preventive action 
Medium: some preventive action possible prior to 
natural-event impact 
>> 1 
Long warning time or fast 
preventive action 
High: sufficient time for preventive action even if 
time-consuming 
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promised. An assessment of  the vul-
nerability of  the emergency response 
resources is also called for in the con-
text of  Natech risk reduction.
Emergency plans at both plant and 
community level should be period-
ically reviewed and tested to ensure 
that they remain up to date. This is 
of  particular importance in times of 
climate change, which might require 
updates to the assumptions on which 
the emergency plan is based.
3.14.5.5 
Early warning
Early warning is usually not availa-
ble or practicable for reducing Nat-
ech risks, as warning times for some 
natural hazards are too short for pre-
ventive action at hazardous facilities. 
Salzano et al. (2009) contend that the 
effectiveness of  Natech early warning 
systems is defined by the ratio of  the 
available warning time and the time 
needed to implement preventive ac-
tion (Table 3.9).
For earthquakes, for example, warn-
ing times range from fractions of 
seconds to only a few seconds, which 
makes early warning for earthquake 
Natech accidents rather impractical. 
In this case, the earthquake-resist-
ant design of  hazardous installations 
should be prioritised.
The situation is different for river 
floods, for which warning times can 
range from hours to days, leaving am-
ple time and opportunity to mitigate 
the Natech risk, for example by im-
plementing plant shut-down, depres-
surising equipment or transferring 
hazardous substances from predicted 
on-site inundation zones to safer lo-
cations. If  tsunamis are generated in 
the far field, the warning lead time 
should permit the actuation of  pre-
vention actions, as for floods.
Interestingly, Bouquegneau (2007) 
also suggests that early protective ac-
tions, such as disconnecting sensitive 
equipment or stopping hazardous 
processes, are possible for lightning 
hazards by using information from 
meteorological lightning location sys-
tems.
3.14.6
Conclusions and 
key messages
Past Natech accidents have clearly 
shown the vulnerability of  hazardous 
industrial activities to natural-hazard 
impact, with often major consequenc-
es on health, the natural environment, 
and the local, regional or global econ-
omy owing to asset damage and the 
associated business downtime. Some 
of  these accidents have also dramat-
ically demonstrated the increased risk 
of  cascading effects and the challeng-
es faced by emergency responders.
The good news is that awareness of 
Natech risks is increasing worldwide 
and first attempts to systematically 
assess and control this risk are being 
made. Nevertheless, a number of  re-
search and policy gaps related to Nat-
ech risk reduction remain that require 
addressing in a concerted effort of 
regulators, industry and the research 
community.
Partnership
In many countries, there is legislation 
that regulates hazardous industrial 
activities, and in some cases Natech 
risks are explicitly addressed. It is 
important that these regulations be 
enforced. Where missing, dedicated 
legislation for reducing Natech risks 
should be developed and implement-
ed. At the same time, risk communi-
cation between industry and all levels 
of  government should be improved 
to ensure that communication related 
to Natech risks flows freely and effec-
tively to realistically estimate the risk. 
Public–private partnerships could fa-
cilitate the linking of  science, practice 
and policy in support of  Natech risk 
reduction.
Knowledge
Further awareness-raising efforts are 
needed to help stakeholders recognise 
the vulnerability of  hazardous instal-
lations during natural-hazard impact. 
In this context, climate change must 
be a factor in the assessment, as it 
might change natural-hazard severi-
ties and frequencies and thus render 
the design basis of  installations and 
equipment inadequate. In addition, 
plant workers, civil protection author-
ities and those in charge of  chemi-
cal-accident prevention need to re-
ceive targeted training to be able to 
handle the challenges that are associ-
ated with Natech accidents. 
Innovation
Risk assessment is an important tool 
by which to identify safety gaps and 
prioritise safety-relevant interven-
tions at a facility. There are no con-
solidated methodologies for Natech 
risk assessment, and research should 
focus on the development of  Natech 
risk assessment methodologies and 
tools for different natural hazards, as 
well as related guidance at the indus-
try and community levels. Data on 
CHAPTER 3 UNDERSTANDING DISASTER RISK: HAZARD RELATED RISK ISSUES - SECTION IV
377
accidents and near misses crucial for 
learning lessons and scenario building 
are often closely guarded by industry 
for fear of  negative repercussions 
on their activity. Authorities should 
promote and facilitate the sharing of 
Natech accident data by companies to 
support future risk reduction. 
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The last few years have seen a number of  natural disasters that have been ac-
companied by major damage to industrial facilities. These events have demon-
strated the potential for natural hazards, such as earthquakes, floods, storms, 
etc., to trigger fires, explosions and toxic or radioactive releases at hazardous 
installations that use or store hazardous substances. These so-called Natech 
accidents are a recurring but often overlooked feature of  many natural-disas-
ter situations. In addition, chemical and nuclear activities are an increasingly 
important source or risk of  such accidents owing to increased industrialisation 
and urbanisation.
Unfortunately, disaster risk-reduction frameworks have not commonly ad-
dressed technological risks. The Sendai Framework for Action recognises the 
importance of  technological hazards and promotes an all-hazards approach to 
disaster risk reduction. This includes hazardous situations arising from man-
made activities due to human error, mechanical failure and natural hazards.
Chemical risk
Chemical accidents continue to occur relatively frequently in industrialised and 
developing countries alike, which raises questions about the adequacy of  cur-
rent risk-reduction efforts. The causes underlying chemical accidents are large-
ly assumed to be systemic. Most chemical accidents today are caused by viola-
tions of  well-known principles for chemicals risk management, which have led 
to insufficient control measures.
From the forensic analysis of  chemical accident reports, a number of  underly-
ing causes have emerged, one or several of  which can affect a chemical installa-
tion to create conditions conducive to disaster. These causes include:
• A lack of  visibility due to a lack of  published statistics on accident frequency 
and a reporting bias towards high-consequence accidents, which are a mere 
fraction of  the many smaller chemical accidents that occur each week.
• The challenge to manage across boundaries, when chemical and mechani-
cal engineers commonly assigned to chemicals risk management have little 
training in human or organisational factors.
• A failure to learn lessons from past accidents and near misses.
• Economic pressure and a trend towards optimisation, which can undermine 
risk management when decisions are made without due consideration of 
their impacts on safety risks.
• Failure to apply risk-management knowledge by both individuals and organ-
isations due to a lack of  awareness and education, or inattention to inherent 
safety.
• Insufficient risk communication and disconnection from risk management 
due to the globalisation of  hazardous industries, which places a distance 
between corporate leaders and the sites they manage.
Recommendations
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• Outsourcing of  critical expertise or distribution of  limited expertise over 
many sites, making it less accessible when needed.
• Governments do commonly not proactively engage in managing chemi-
cal-accident risks until after a serious accident, and accident management is 
focused on emergency preparedness and response rather than prevention.
• Complacency in government and industry due to the incorrect perception 
that chemical accidents are no longer a threat, thereby causing a decrease in 
resources for enforcement and risk management.
• Based on the identified accident causes, a number of  areas for further study 
and experimentation to reduce chemical accident risks should be explored, 
and it is recommended that the following occur:
• Motivation of  corporate and government leadership by exploring new mod-
els for risk governance, and promotion of  a positive safety culture by foster-
ing risk awareness. Enforcement will need a new strategy to drive industrial 
safety practice.
• Promotion of  systematic accident reporting, data collection and exchange to 
raise awareness of  the potential consequences of  chemical accidents. These 
data should be used to learn lessons from accidents and near misses.
• Development of  strategies to combat labour market deficiencies related to 
process-safety expertise.
• Creation of  cheap and easy access to risk-management knowledge and tools, 
including to risk-assessment competence urgently needed in all areas of  the 
world.
• Building of  awareness of  chemical risks and how to manage them in devel-
oping countries.
• Fostering of  regional and international networks and collaboration on 
chemical accident risk management to create pressure and give developing 
countries easy access to expertise and technical support.
Nuclear risk
Accidents at nuclear facilities, regardless of  the accident trigger, have the po-
tential to cause a disaster. In the EU, a nuclear safety framework aims to ensure 
that people and the environment are protected from the harmful effects of 
ionising radiation. The basis of  this framework is the defence-in-depth ap-
proach, a key concept by which to reach an appropriate level of  protection 
from nuclear risks, and an adequate safety culture.
After several major nuclear accidents, safety assessment methodologies have 
been continuously improved, and the design of  a NPP follows a set of  rules 
and practices that ensure a high safety level. At the design stage, a set of  ac-
cident conditions is identified that can result from different initiating events, 
and this set is examined using a conservative, deterministic safety assessment. 
This is complemented by a PSA, which provides a methodological approach 
to identifying accident sequences that can follow from a wide range of  initiat-
ing events, as well as to determining accident frequencies and consequences. 
The challenge is to make certain that the list of  considered initiating events is 
complete.
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Many different protective activities form the basis of  ensuring the safety of 
nuclear facilities, both during normal operation and in the case of  accidents. 
However, the nuclear industry still faces a number of  challenges that need to 
be addressed. The following are therefore recommended:
• Further assess the impacts on the safety of  nuclear activities of  human and 
organisational factors (e.g. training, management of  change, evolution of 
regulations and associated requirements), of  ageing effects on nuclear facil-
ities and of  financial concerns.
• Improve knowledge of  the identification and modelling of  natural hazards 
to support safety studies for nuclear facilities.
• Share good practice on emergency responses at local, national and interna-
tional levels between nuclear and non-nuclear industrial activities to increase 
the efficiency of  emergency-response plans.
• Promote research on the resilience of  human organisations in the face of 
complex situations in nuclear industries and other areas with similar require-
ments. 
Natech risk
Natech accidents are a technological ‘secondary effect’ of  natural hazards and 
have caused many major and long-term social, environmental and economic 
impacts. National and international initiatives have been launched to examine 
the specific aspects of  Natech risk and to support its reduction.
The forensic analysis of  Natech accident records has allowed the preparation 
of  lessons learned across different triggering natural hazards that support the 
reduction of  Natech risks. This includes the setting up of  a dedicated Natech 
accident database to foster the easy and free sharing of  accident data. Accident 
analyses also show that there is an increased risk of  cascading effects during 
Natech accidents. In general, Natech risk reduction pays off, and several struc-
tural, as well as organisational, accident prevention and consequence mitigation 
measures are available.
Studies on the status of  Natech risk management in EU Member States and 
OECD Member Countries have highlighted deficiencies in existing safety leg-
islation and the need to consider this risk more explicitly. Conventional tech-
nological risk-assessment methodologies need to be expanded to be applicable 
to Natech risk assessment and only a very few methodologies and tools are 
available for this purpose.
With respect to the effective reduction of  Natech risks, several research and 
policy gaps still need to be closed in a collaborative effort between regulators, 
industry and academia. Public–private partnerships could be helpful in this 
context. More specifically, it is recommended that:
• Existing legislation that regulates hazardous industrial activities should be 
enforced. Where missing, legislation for reducing Natech risks should be 
developed and implemented.
• Risk communication on Natech risks should be improved between industry 
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and all levels of  government to ensure a free and effective flow of  informa-
tion that enables a realistic assessment of  the associated risk.
• Government should promote and facilitate the sharing of  Natech accident 
data for future Natech risk reduction.
• An inventory of  best practices for Natech risk reduction should be set up 
and disseminated to all stakeholders.
• Research should focus on the development of  Natech risk assessment meth-
odologies and tools, as well as guidance on Natech risk management for 
industry and at the community level.
• Competent authorities and workers at hazardous installations should receive 
targeted training to be able to handle the challenges associated with Natech 
accidents.
• Additional awareness-raising efforts are needed to help stakeholders recog-
nise the vulnerability of  hazardous industry to natural-hazard impact. In this 
context, the effects of  climate change on natural-hazard frequencies and/or 
severities need to be factored in.
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The communication of  disaster risk is inherently a social process. It aims to 
prevent and mitigate harm caused by disasters, prepare the population for a 
disaster, disseminate information during disasters and nurture the recovery. 
Disaster risk communication plays a vital role during all four stages of  the 
disaster cycle: mitigation and prevention, preparedness, response and recov-
ery. This chapter aims at translating scientific insights in disaster risk com-
munication to decision-makers to eventually enable communities to respond 
effectively to damaging events. It builds on the idea that using insights from 
(communication) science is essential for effective decision-making to improve 
lives, livelihoods and health (Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2016; Dickinson et al., 2016).
Risk communication in disasters has traditionally been a one-way, unilinear 
and top-down transfer of  information from authorities to the public (Krim-
sky, 2009). The current literature on disaster risk communication, in contrast, 
sees communication between authorities and the public about disasters as an 
outcome of  interactions. Although there is no closure on the effectiveness of 
new communication strategies due to the lack of  systematic studies (Bradley et 
al., 2014), there is growing empirical evidence that a two-way dialogue between 
the public and professionals is more effective than the traditional unidirectional 
model of  disaster risk communication (Treurniet et al., 2015). The non-linear, 
multi-directional approach to risk communication is consistent with a political 
landscape where the legitimation is gained through negotiation and delibera-
tion.
Chapter 4.1 shows that for disaster risk communication to be successful, public 
perception should be taken into consideration. This involves both a cognitive 
and affective dimension (understanding and feeling) and is related to trust in 
protection measurements and mitigation processes. In the process of  com-
munication, policymakers should not underestimate the cognitive paradox: a 
higher trust in protection hampers the preparedness intentions (Terpstra et al., 
2009; Lundgren and McMakin, 2013). This relates to the affective dimension, 
which is influenced by the way risk is communicated. Presenting the same in-
formation about risk in different ways, for example mortality versus survival 
rates, will influence people’s perceptions (Slovic, 1993). Unidirectional ways of 
risk communication can reinforce negative feelings such as fear and power-
lessness. In contrast, a two-way, more inclusive communication mode will give 
citizens the feeling that self-help and solidarity are indeed appreciated by the 
formal authorities. This communication strategy opens the possibility to build 
upon both the cognitive and the affective responses in relation to previous 
experiences with disastrous situations. However, whilst the literature highlights 
the importance of  the non-linear multi-directional approach of  communica-
tion, research into actual communication practices indicates that a majority still 
Introduction
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relies on the one-way form of  communication (Höppner et al., 2012).
As Chapter 4.2 on decision-making with uncertainty highlights, disaster risk 
communication takes place through many different communication channels, 
including face-to-face conversations, telephone calls, group meetings, mass 
media such as television, instant messaging and interactive social media, in par-
ticular Facebook and Twitter. These communication channels, however, are 
not considered to be neutral. Today’s society’s social structure, made up of 
networks powered by information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
(Castells, 2009), has shaped and influenced decision-making in disaster risk 
reduction (DRR) and disaster risk management (DRM). Decision-making un-
der uncertainty starts with the question about what the decision-maker knows 
and where the gaps in the existing knowledge and information are (Ben-Haim, 
2006). Consistent with the multi-directional approach to risk communication, 
recent studies show that for decision-making at times of  uncertainty to be 
successful, a top-down, command and control approach should be abandoned, 
and should instead involve the public. Formal authorities, in other words, do 
not have the monopoly in making decisions about the disaster cycle.
The implementation and use of  ICTs including social media provide oppor-
tunities for engaging citizens in disaster risk communication by both dissemi-
nating information to the public and accessing information from them. ICTs 
have great potential for enabling effectively communicating community-rele-
vant information, in particular in situations in which people are geographically 
dispersed (Shklovski et al., 2008; Stal, 2013). 
Chapter 4.3 on last mile communication builds upon the recent empirical in-
sights on effective early warning systems. The term ‘last mile’ is understood 
as a synonym for the immediate affected area and population (Taubenböck 
et al., 2009). The chapter shows that the impact of  the ICT and social media 
response are influenced by: 1) large-scale power blackouts and the disabling 
of  information and telecommunications networks and 2) the demographics 
of  the disaster including the willingness of  people and their organisations to 
collaborate in sharing, managing and communicating disaster information and 
their (dis)ability in accessing resources online. Both the vulnerability of  the 
networks and the particularities of  the users require innovative solutions.
Adequately designing, implementing and using ICTs are equally important 
aspects of  innovation to make full use of  social and technical capacities to 
improve actual practices in risk communication. Innovation in disaster risk 
communication is not neutral, but embedded in social and cultural practices. 
For example, a recent qualitative study assesses the role of  age and ethnic and 
cultural background in the conceptualisation of  colour systems used as part 
of  the Heat Health Watch System and the National Severe Weather Warning 
Service (Tang and Rundblad, 2015). 
The final chapter of  this part, on innovation and good practices, builds on 
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these ideas and addresses both the technical and the social/cultural dimension 
of  innovation. Communities and evolving decentralised approaches of  disaster 
risk communication are discussed in the context of  ICTs development and use. 
The chapter takes a people-centred approach by focusing on the challenges of 
communicating with millennials — technologically sophisticated multitaskers 
(Hartman and McCambridge, 2011) — as an example of  how people with 
specific backgrounds deal with risk communication technologies at times of 
uncertainty. Finally, it discusses innovations which allow rich media channels 
to be utilised, including netcentric operations (Boersma et al., 2012) aiming at 
delivering better targeted actionable risk information to diverse agents across 
multi-cultural, multi-disciplinary and multi-jurisdictional boundaries.
This Chapter 4 provides scientists, practitioners and policymakers the state-of-
the-art knowledge to improve their understanding on communicating disaster 
risk. It combines insights from psychological, social and computer sciences and 
presents good practices for those involved in risk communication practices.
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4.1 Public perception 
of risk
Teun	Terpstra, Ann Enader, Jan Gutteling, Christian Kuhlicke
4.1.1
Introduction
As with any scientific domain, the 
field of  risk perception also embrac-
es many subfields and topics. These 
have been discussed in literature re-
views that have sometimes focused 
on particular hazards, such as seismic 
hazards (Lindell and Perry, 2000), 
flood hazards (Kellens et al., 2012), 
genetically modified foods (Pin and 
Gutteling, 2008) or multiple hazards 
(Wachinger et al., 2013; Shreve et al. 
2014).
Others have focused on theoretical 
frameworks such as people’s pro-
tective action decisions (Mileti and 
Sorensen, 1990; Lindell and Perry, 
2004; 2012), their information seek-
ing (Griffin et al., 2004; Ter Huurne, 
2008), how risk is culturally construed 
(e.g. Steg and Sievers, 2000; Engel 
et al., 2014) and socially amplified 
(Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996), or 
on specific psychological mechanisms 
such as the role of  trust (e.g. Midden 
and Huijts, 2009; Frewer et al., 2003; 
Haynes et al, 2008), perceived respon-
sibility (e.g. Mulilis and Duval, 2003; 
Terpstra and Gutteling, 2008), fear 
and efficacy beliefs (e.g. Witte, 1994) 
and cognition and affect (Slovic et al., 
2007; Loewenstein et al, 2001).
Understanding how 
people perceive risks 
is an important factor 
contributing to successful 
risk communication.
Understanding how people perceive 
risks is one important factor contrib-
uting to successful risk communica-
tion (e.g. Frewer, 2004; McComas, 
2006; Slovic, 2000). However, this 
chapter is not an attempt to review 
the risk perception literature. Instead 
we focus on different approaches in 
risk communication and illustrate 
the working of  perceptual factors by 
presenting a number of  topical cases. 
To set the ground, the Chapter 4.1.2 
presents different approaches in risk 
communication. The presented cases 
comprise capacity building (Chapter 
4.1.3), evacuation (Chapter 4.1.4), 
emergency alerts (Chapter 4.1.5), so-
cial media (Chapter 4.1.6) and news 
media (Chapter 4.1.7). Although 
some of  these chapters focus on 
certain risks in particular, it is not so 
much the risk but rather the described 
socio-psychological processes that are 
relevant. We conclude with some gen-
eral remarks (Chapter 4.1.8).
4.1.2
Approaches in risk 
communication
A long tradition in risk communica-
tion has relied on the idea that sim-
ply informing and educating lay peo-
ple will increase their understanding 
and awareness of  risk. This one-way 
information flow from expert to lay 
is often associated with the so-called 
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deficit model, as experts holding su-
perior knowledge communicate to the 
less informed.
Many communicative 
activities are nowadays 
intending to change 
behaviour; others are 
concerned with norms 
and values. In addition, 
risk communication 
can take place in a 
disengaged (one-way) 
and in a more engaged 
(two-way) manner.
For a number of  years a broad shift 
has been taking place throughout 
Europe (and beyond), characterised 
by, on the one side, ‘a right to know’, 
and on the other side by a stronger 
focus on ‘individual responsibility’ of 
citizens to be prepared for incidents 
and disasters. As a result, commu-
nicative activities that place respon-
sibility for preparedness actions in 
the hands of  citizens are gaining rele-
vance (Wachinger et al., 2013; Walker 
et al., 2014; Begg et al., 2016). Many 
are now following a rather instrumen-
talist rationale intending to change 
behaviour or attitudes; others are 
rather concerned with norms and val-
ues that underpin, for example, estab-
lished governance and decision-mak-
ing structures. At the same time, risk 
communication can take place in a 
disengaged, one-way manner as well 
as in a more engaged, two-way man-
ner (Treurniet et al., 2015). Based on 
these two dimensions, four approach-
es of  risk communication can be dis-
tinguished (based on Demeritt and 
Nobert, 2014; Wardman, 2008): risk 
message, risk dialogue, risk govern-
ment and instrumentalist risk. These 
approaches can be seen as archetypes 
suggesting different ways to achieve 
one’s risk communication goals. In 
practice, examples of  risk communi-
cation often contain features of  mul-
tiple approaches (for more details see 
Kuhlicke et al., 2016).
4.1.2.1
Risk message approach
This type of  risk communication is 
a one-way flow of  information con-
cerned with ‘transmitting risk infor-
mation without distortion, bias or 
misunderstanding’ (Demeritt and 
Nobert, 2014). Fundamentally, this 
model is based on the idea that re-
sponsible organisations are transpar-
ent about how they assess risks, what 
kind of  outcomes risk assessments 
generate and how risks are managed. 
For instance, by designing risk maps 
in a way that renders them intuitive-
ly understandable, the sender tries to 
encode the message in such a man-
ner as to increase the likelihood that 
the receiver will be able to decode 
the message and draw his or her own 
conclusion on what to do or not to do 
(Meyer et al., 2012).
4.1.2.2
Risk dialogue approach
In the risk dialogue approach the dis-
tinction between senders and recipi-
ents or between certified risk experts 
and the at-risk lay public is a blur. 
Exchange forms are based on the as-
sumption that both have a say in the 
decision-making process. The design 
of  participatory processes depends 
on its purpose. A common typology 
is to distinguish between a substan-
tive and an instrumentalist rationale 
Different approaches in risk communication. 
Source: Based on Wardman (2008) and Demerit and Nobert (2014)
FIGURE 4.1
Risk message
approach
Normative =
underlying norms and values
Instrumental =
Changing attitudes and behaviour
Substantively /
engaged /
two-way
Disengaged /
one-way
Risk dialogue
approach
Risk government
approach
Instrumental risk
approach
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(Stirling, 2006). The substantive ra-
tionale usually aims at increasing the 
breadth and depth of  knowledge that 
contributes to a decision, as participa-
tion allows for the inclusion of  tacit or 
local knowledge that can improve the 
quality of  risk assessments and risk 
maps, as well as of  the management 
process itself  (see Meyer et al., 2012). 
In the instrumentalist rationale, there 
is a stronger focus on building trust 
between actors and on raising aware-
ness and motivation for taking actions 
to mitigate the impacts of  hazards (see 
Wachinger et al., 2013). The relevance 
of  dialogical forms of  communication 
is also highlighted by many national 
and European legalisations (Höppner 
et al., 2010).
4.1.2.3
Risk government 
approach
Communication within the risk gov-
ernment approach aims at changing 
attitudes and behaviours, but it does 
so in a less instrumentalist and ex-
plicitly persuasive manner compared 
to the instrumentalist risk approach. 
While the latter is opaque about its in-
tention, the government model relies 
on ‘… logics of  individual choice and 
self-discipline, rather than explaining 
new norms of  conduct as being im-
posed from above through coercion’ 
(Demeritt and Nobert, 2014).
In many European countries insur-
ance companies, for instance, offer 
more affordable insurance premiums 
if  clients voluntarily participate in 
regular preventive medical check-ups 
and, by doing so, aim at activating in-
dividuals’ personal risk awareness and 
inviting them to consider the nega-
tive consequences of  smoking or of 
excessive lifestyle choices; thus cre-
ating awareness of  their own choices 
and decisions and the negative con-
sequences these might have on their 
lives. 
4.1.2.4
Instrumentalist risk 
approach
The instrumentalist risk approach 
aims at actively changing people’s be-
haviour and pays close attention to 
the ‘interactions between informa-
tion, attitudes and behaviour’ (De-
meritt and Nobert, 2014). Due to the 
increasing prominence of  this model, 
many empirical studies focus on un-
derstanding the factors that motivate 
individuals to take responsibility and 
action in order to increase their pre-
paredness (Shreve et al., 2014). This 
type of  communication may take 
many different forms. Quite com-
mon are the use of  printed booklets 
or brochures that encourage residents 
at risk to increase their preparedness. 
The EU project Tactic has collected 
a multitude of  such examples, which 
can be accessed through the online 
platform (TACTIC project, 2017). 
Also more formalised ways of  trying 
to change people’s habits are increas-
ingly established. For instance, in the 
German state of  Saxony citizens are 
required by law to take precautionary 
actions to increase their preparedness 
(Ueberham et al., 2016).
4.1.3
 Capacity building 
through one-way risk 
communication
The EU Seveso and Floods Directives 
have made public risk communication 
an obligatory task of  risk manage-
ment in EU countries. Government 
websites, dedicated hazard and risk 
maps and brochures are common 
methods to inform the general pub-
lic about risk and possible ways to 
increase their preparedness. These 
methods provide information about 
risks in a non-dialogic fashion and 
can be seen as examples of  the ‘risk 
message approach’. Transmitting risk 
information without distortion, bias 
or misunderstanding is a challenge, 
however, both from a normative and 
a practical perspective.
From a normative perspective, ‘with-
out distortion, bias or misunderstand-
ing’ does not mean that the content 
and tone of  the risk communication 
is ‘value free’. Senders of  risk mes-
sages, either risk experts or policy-
makers, have their own perceptions 
of  the problem and interests. These 
are informed by societal norms, po-
litical agendas and personal opinions 
— which are hardly ever universally 
shared in society. In addition, provid-
ing information that is to be under-
stood by many people with different 
backgrounds often requires focusing 
on the most ‘important’ (i.e. certain) 
aspects and simplification of  infor-
mation. This results in deliberate and 
chance choices in content (wording 
and images) and tone, which in turn 
influences people’s perceptions and 
attitudes in different gradations (also 
see Chapter 4.1.5).
From a practical perspective, ‘trans-
mitting risk information’ is hardly 
ever an objective on its own. A com-
mon complementary objective of 
providing information is to enhance 
risk awareness and to provide infor-
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mation about individual preparedness 
actions. This reflects a cross-over be-
tween risk message and risk govern-
ment approaches. The goal is usually 
to convey a message drafted by a re-
sponsible organisation to those who 
are ‘supposed to need’ this message in 
order to be better prepared for disas-
ters. 
While such measures have a relative-
ly low cost (Lundgren and McMakin, 
2013) and are in many cases essential 
for getting a certain message across 
(e.g. warning), non-dialogic risk com-
munication on its own seems limited 
in its impact on most people’s atti-
tudes, active engagement and prepar-
edness behaviour (Moser, 2010). The 
reason is that changes in attitudes 
and behaviour are the end result of  a 
complex social-psychological process, 
and the route to this end result dif-
fers greatly between people and com-
munities. Risk communication from 
authorities will not lead to protective 
action decision-making unless people 
receive, heed and comprehend the 
socially transmitted risk information 
(Lindell and Perry, 2004). For peo-
ple to act upon a risk message they 
must perceive its relevance as well as 
a sense of  urgency. What is relevant 
or urgent for one person may not be 
so for others. For instance, changing 
the battery of  a smoke detector may 
be linked to a personality trait (e.g. 
high risk aversion or a prevention 
orientation; e.g. De Boer et al., 2014), 
previous experience with fire risk, 
willingness to adhere to a perceived 
social norm (e.g. “I should have a 
working smoke detector”) or because 
of  practical circumstances (e.g. being 
a smoker). However, even with these 
factors present, one may fail to take 
action. For instance, dealing with risk 
may arouse negative affect in people, 
which may in turn result in attempts 
to control their feelings instead of 
taking action (e.g. denial), as one may 
feel unable to perform required ac-
tions (low self-efficacy), have little 
faith in the protective action itself  or 
action is hampered due to practical 
response barriers (e.g. having other 
priorities).
There is no such thing 
as ‘one size fits all’ in 
risk communication. 
Resilient behaviour is 
more likely when there is 
a mix of communicative 
approaches and other 
types of measures in 
place. Risk communication 
is based on a thorough 
understanding of 
risk perceptions and 
capacities that are shaped 
through the historical and 
local context.
Evaluations of  a campaign about 
communicating flood risk, organised 
by the city of  Zurich, showed that 
one-way risk communication can im-
prove flood preparedness to some 
extent; i.e. home owners’ flood aware-
ness and their intentions to imple-
ment protective actions did increase 
(Maidl and Buchecker, 2015). 
The majority of  respondents felt bet-
ter informed after the information 
campaign (only 17 % reported that 
the campaign did not increase their 
knowledge) and regression analyses 
revealed that the perceived useful-
ness of  the material provided had 
the strongest effects on flood prepar-
edness intentions. A perceived need 
for information had greater effects 
on preparedness intentions than risk 
awareness itself, underlining that the 
motivation to do something increased 
through the information campaign. 
However, since the overall effect of 
the information campaign was rath-
er low, the authors argued that a sin-
gle-event campaign is unlikely to have 
profoundly positive effects on prepar-
edness behaviour and therefore needs 
to be embedded in a long-term risk 
communication campaign. 
Empirical studies also indicate that 
it is not so much the information it-
self  that is of  relevance but rather 
the wider context within which such 
information is communicated. En-
gel et al. (2014), for instance, focus 
on the role of  disaster subculture as 
a way to explain how two neighbour-
ing communities have developed dif-
ferent strategies and practices to deal 
with flood events. These subcultures 
featured differences in beliefs, knowl-
edge, symbols and preparedness and 
response patterns. Their findings 
suggest risk communication would 
require different approaches in both 
communities.
Therefore, what is feasible and effec-
tive in one context may be difficult 
or ineffective somewhere else. There 
is no such thing as ‘one size fits all’ 
in risk communication. Resilient be-
haviour is more likely when there is 
a mix of  communicative approaches 
and other types of  measures in place 
based on a thorough understanding 
of  risk perceptions and capacities that 
CHAPTER 4 COMMUNICATING DISASTER RISK
397
the level of  support for ‘staying at 
home’ or ‘going to a public shelter’, a 
questionnaire survey was performed. 
The questions asked were embedded 
in two different storylines, which re-
flected two different communication 
frames that emerged from previously 
held focus groups. ‘Framing’ in com-
munication refers to the systematic 
use of  words and symbols reflecting 
underlying norms and values. For a 
risk dialogue it is important that peo-
ple are able to relate to the norms and 
values and support the frame that is 
used. Framing can also be regarded as 
a form of  nudging. Nudging refers to 
‘…any aspect of  the choice architec-
ture that alters people’s behaviour in 
a predictable way without forbidding 
any option or significantly changing 
their economic incentives.’ (Thaler, 
Sunstein, 2009). A more pessimis-
tic ‘Self-frame’ emphasised that in 
case of  a flood, people are on their 
own for a few days and food, water 
and utilities are unavailable and they 
eventually have to evacuate from the 
flooded area on their own.
Cognitive (beliefs) and 
affective (feelings) factors 
are important predictors 
of attitudes. These 
are influenced by the 
way risk information is 
framed in communication 
messages.
The more optimistic ‘Together-frame’ 
emphasised the community perspec-
tive meaning that people are in it to-
gether and will try to help each other, 
are shaped through the historical and 
local context. Finding the right mix of 
measures is therefore a challenge.
4.1.4
Developing
flood evacuation
strategies through
dialogue
In an attempt to hit the right note in 
risk communication, this paragraph 
presents a case study that tested ef-
fects of  different risk communication 
storylines on citizens’ flood evacua-
tion intentions in the city of  Dordre-
cht (Terpstra and Vreugdenhil, 2015). 
Dordrecht is located on an island in 
the Dutch river delta. A potential-
ly dangerous situation occurs when 
high river discharges result in high 
water levels that are suddenly further 
increased by a storm surge pushing 
sea water into the river delta. Evac-
uation models indicate that in such 
a case only between 10-20 % of  the 
population will be able to leave the 
city before the levees break. When 
they do, water depths may vary be-
tween 2-5 metres and the best chance 
of  survival is to seek shelter in homes 
on a higher floor or in a high building 
in the neighbourhood. To reduce the 
potential number of  casualties, the 
authorities aim to develop and com-
municate a strategy based on shelter-
ing at home or in a public building.
In 2015 the municipality started a 
risk dialogue by involving citizens 
in focus groups to understand their 
flood perceptions, their evacuation 
attitudes and their concerns and sug-
gestions. To gain further insight into 
and authorities will assist in evacua-
tion where needed and arrange basic 
stocks of  food, water and utilities in 
shelters. All respondents (about 625 
citizens) answered questions related 
to their efficacy beliefs, feelings and 
support for two evacuation options 
(staying at home, going to a public 
shelter) and their current evacua-
tion intentions. More questions were 
asked, but for our purposes we will 
discuss this subset. On a 1-10 scale, 
both strategies received higher rates 
in the Together-frame―i.e. staying 
at home (Self-frame: 6.2 vs. Togeth-
er-frame: 6.3) and going to a public 
shelter (Self-frame: 5.2 vs. Togeth-
er-frame: 6.0). Remarkable, however, 
is the fact that both strategies were 
rejected by a substantial number of 
respondents: about 27-28 % rejected 
staying at home while 36-52 % reject-
ed going to a shelter (upper limit % 
reflects rejection in the Self-frame).
To further explain these results, the 
authors evaluated respondents’ effi-
cacy beliefs and fear-related feelings. 
Efficacy beliefs reflect the extent to 
which a person believes a protective 
action is effective in the protection of 
people and/or property (e.g. Lindell 
and Perry, 2004, 2012). Fear-related 
feelings such as dread is a negative af-
fective state. Affective states influence 
people’s judgements (Loewenstein et 
al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2007) and can 
be unlocked by framing information 
(Terpstra et al., 2014). For instance, 
Finucane et al. (2000) performed 
framing experiments to influence per-
ceived risks and benefits of  nuclear 
power, natural gas and food preserv-
atives. Their experiments showed that 
when information portrayed the ben-
efits as high (or risks as low), the sub-
sequent experience of  positive affect 
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caused subjects to perceive risks of 
nuclear technology as low (or benefits 
as high). Conversely, when risks were 
framed as high (or benefits as low), 
the subsequent experience of  nega-
tive affect caused subjects to perceive 
benefits of  nuclear technology as low 
(or risks as high).
In line with experiments of  Finucane 
et al., additional analyses of  the Dutch 
flood risk data showed that respond-
ents held more favourable attitudes in 
the more optimistic Together-frame 
since this frame resulted in lower neg-
ative affect/fear and higher efficacy 
beliefs. Specifically, staying at home 
received a (marginally) higher score in 
the Together-frame because it evoked 
slightly lower levels of  negative af-
fect/fear. Going to a public shelter 
received a higher score in the Togeth-
er-frame because this frame evoked 
lower levels of  negative affect/fear 
and higher trust in the efficacy (‘being 
safe’) of  a public shelter.
Respondents’ intentions also revealed 
an interesting pattern. Staying at 
home was regarded as likely by about 
88 % of  the respondents, while going 
to a nearby shelter or going to family, 
friends or neighbours was regarded as 
likely by a substantially smaller num-
ber of  people (25 % and 28 %, re-
spectively). So even though attitudes 
towards staying at home and going to 
a public shelter are similar (at least in 
the Together-frame), the majority pre-
ferred to stay at home. Finally, the fact 
that 19 % of  the respondents con-
sidered leaving the city, even though 
the authorities urge them not to, is 
remarkable. These people may unnec-
essarily risk their lives. Their intention 
to flee the city is correlated with their 
attitude towards staying at home or 
going to a public building. That is, re-
spondents who hold less favourable 
attitudes towards staying at home or 
going to a shelter are more likely to 
flee the city in case of  an urgent flood 
threat.
Overall, the meagre level of  support 
for staying at home or going to a pub-
lic shelter suggests that these strategies 
can be further detailed. A clear action 
plan on how citizens are supported 
prior to a flood (e.g. food and water 
supply and setup and arrangements in 
shelters) and afterwards (e.g. a rescue 
plan) is an important starting point. 
Based on a further risk dialogue with 
citizens, experts in flood risk manage-
ment, utilities, medical and rescue ser-
vices, it seems that such a plan can be 
developed. In addition, developing a 
positive yet realistic storyline for risk 
Perceived fear, efficacy, support and intentions regarding flood evacuation. 
Source: Terpstra and Vreugdenhil (2015).
FIGURE 4.2
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communication based on the capac-
ities available in the local communi-
ties (e.g. neighbourhoods) can help to 
gain further support among citizens 
and reduce chances that people risk 
their lives by fleeing the city while the 
levees are about to break.
4.1.5
Facilitating public 
response through 
wireless emergency 
alerts
In the case of  an imminent threat, 
authorities require communication 
channels that deliver warnings ac-
curately and quickly to a potentially 
large number of  people. A relative-
ly new development is the so-called 
Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA). 
Several countries have started send-
ing out WEA to mobile phones and 
other devices aiming to alert people at 
risk and help them to react adequate-
ly (Gutteling et al., 2014). As one-way 
communication tools, WEA are an ex-
ample of  the risk government model. 
Many of  these systems are based on 
the mobile phone broadcast technol-
ogy. There is no need to have Wi-Fi or 
internet or to subscribe to the service. 
However, technological development 
and its implementation has outpaced 
studies on the effectiveness and lim-
itations (Bean et al., 2015). To date, 
only a few studies have evaluated mo-
bile device-delivered warning messag-
es (Sutton et al., 2014; Terpstra et al, 
2012). 
A United States report lists several 
general insights necessary to facilitate 
adequate public reactions to WEA, 
among which: (1) effects should be 
studied after real events, not in hypo-
thetical situations; (2) people need to 
be trained to properly understand the 
warning system; (3) the alert needs to 
attract attention; (4) people seek so-
cial confirmation of  a warning mes-
sage before taking protective action; 
and (5) warnings must contain infor-
mation that is important to the pub-
lic (Committee on Public Response, 
2013). This chapter describes a recent 
Dutch study on the public’s reactions, 
which is partly based on these general 
insights.
In the study people were questioned 
some time after the implementation 
of  the WEA system in real local 
emergency situations in three Dutch 
cities. In the first two cases the emer-
gencies were large fires in non-resi-
dential industrial areas with a release 
of  potentially hazardous smoke and 
soot particles to nearby residential ar-
eas. The third situation was a large fire 
in a historic city centre, causing one 
casualty. Randomly selected mobile 
and land-line phone numbers of  peo-
ple living in the broadcast area were 
dialled by trained agency interviewers, 
asking whether they had received the 
WEA. In the Netherlands the WEA 
system is known as NL-Alert. If  they 
had, some additional questions were 
asked (e.g. their self-reported be-
haviour) and people were invited to 
complete an additional online ques-
tionnaire measuring psychological 
and behavioural determinants derived 
from conceptual models on risk com-
munication (Witte and Allen, 2000; 
Floyd et al., 2000; Lindell and Perry, 
2012). 
These models suggest that receivers 
of  warning messages first assess the 
threat level, creating some level of 
personal urgency, and subsequently 
assess their ability to personally cope 
with the emergency situation. Coping 
appraisal is related to one’s belief  to 
be able to perform the recommend-
ed behaviour and one’s belief  in the 
adequacy of  the provided advice. 
When the threat is seen as personal-
ly relevant, and the coping apprais-
al is positive then one will decide to 
execute the recommended adaptive 
behaviour. However, when the threat 
is seen as relevant but coping is seen 
as impossible, some psychological re-
framing of  the situation (e.g. psycho-
logical denial or defensive behavioural 
avoidance) is a likely reaction. In re-
cent years, studies have shown that in 
emergency situations the individual 
is an information seeker but also an 
information source for others. Exist-
ing research suggests that perceived 
information sufficiency ― that is, to 
which level one is satisfied with one’s 
information position ― predicts addi-
tional information seeking and infor-
mation sharing. Also, the perceived 
quality of  the warning message is an 
important indicator of  its effective-
ness (Renn and Levine, 1991; Earle, 
2010).
Wireless emergency alerts 
(WEA) are a relatively 
new method to deliver 
warnings to a potentially 
large number of people.
Looking in more detail at the public’s 
reactions to receiving the WEA, some 
findings are noteworthy. An example 
of  the WEA is this message that was 
sent to inhabitants:
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NL-Alert 20-01-2013 14.50 Setheweg 
Meppel. Major fire. Keep clear of  the smoke!
Close windows and doors. Turn off  ventila-
tion. New message follows.
The structure of  all Dutch WEAs is 
similar: sender (NL-Alert date and 
time), threat (major fire), location 
(Setheweg Meppel) and advice (Keep 
clear of  the smoke! Close windows and 
doors. Turn off  ventilation. New message 
follows). The respondents’ reactions 
were measured on five-point scales 
(see Table 4.1).
Overall, the scores indicate that the 
emergencies had relatively little per-
sonal impact for most participants. 
However, even in these relatively low 
impact situations, there are some note-
worthy findings. On average, respond-
ents valued their coping abilities as rel-
atively high and clearly indicated that 
the included message components 
(sender, threat, location and advice) 
were regarded as clear, complete and 
reliable (message quality). In addition, 
respondents did not perceive high 
expectations to be knowledgeable 
and responsible with regard to their 
behaviour in these situations (social 
norms). In absolute terms, perceived 
fear and perceived threat were not 
high, although they were somewhat 
higher in the Leeuwarden case. This 
seems reasonable since the Meppel 
and Oisterwijk fires occurred at some 
distance from residential areas, while 
the fire in Leeuwarden took place in 
the historic city centre. In addition, 
compared to the Meppel and Oister-
wijk cases, respondents from Leeu-
warden were somewhat less satisfied 
with the information received and re-
ported more avoidance (i.e. to contin-
ue with what one was doing) and less 
adaptive behaviour (i.e. to comply with 
the advice and seek and share infor-
mation). Two alternative explanations 
come to mind. First, emergency ser-
vices in Leeuwarden failed to describe 
the location of  the fire, which may 
have caused lower levels of  satisfac-
tion with the information provided, 
and they did not mention any personal 
threat, which resulted in higher disin-
terest in the situation. Second, higher 
levels of  perceived threat and fear may 
have caused stronger fear control re-
sponses, resulting in more avoidance 
reactions and less adaptive behaviour. 
Even though the sample was small and 
these incidents had relatively little per-
sonal impact, correlations did provide 
some support for these explanations. 
Adaptive behaviour was predicted by 
higher perceived fear, seeking social 
Mean (standard deviation) for the measured determinants after three WEA cases. 
Source: Gutteling et al. (2014)
TABLE 4.1
  
  Case 1 (Meppel)   Case 2 (Oisterwijk)  Case 3 (Leeuwarden)  
N=  175  181  287  
Self-reported Behaviour                   
Adaptive (a)  
  
1.71 (0.26)  
  
1.69 (0.29)  
  
1.55 (0.29)  
Avoidance (b)  1.17 (0.38)  1.12 (0.33)  1.46 (0.50)  
Perceived social norms (c)  2.37 (1.10)  2.30 (1.03)  2.13 (0.99)  
Efficacy beliefs (c)  3.93 (0.93)  3.90 (1.06)  3.97 (1.04)  
Perceived threat (c)  2.41 (0.82)  2.59 (0.86)  2.90 (0.82)  
Perceived fear (c)   1.72 (0.62)  1.69 (0.57)  2.32 (0.69)  
Perceived message quality (c)  4.31 (0.77)  4.37 (0.75)  4.32 (0.81) (e)  
Perceived information sufficiency (d)  
  
3.59 (1.11) 3.63 (1.11) 2.98 (0.82) 
 
  
a. telephone: 1 = none of the adaptive actions taken, 2 = all adaptive actions taken
b. telephone: 1 = no avoidance, 2 = complete avoidance
c. online: 1 = low, 5 = high
d. online: 1 = dissatisfied, 5 = satisfied
e. In Leeuwarden the component ‘location’ was missing and therefore not evaluated
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confirmation and perceived warning 
quality. Stronger avoidance was pre-
dicted by higher levels of  perceived 
risk, fear and higher perceived expec-
tations from one’s social environment. 
Overall, the study presents a favoura-
ble impression of  the public’s evalu-
ation of  the WEA system; however, 
more research is needed with other 
types of  emergency situations to fully 
understand the psychological, behav-
ioural and communicative reactions of 
receivers.
4.1.6
Effects of 
interaction on
social media in 
emergencies
Social media (Twitter, Facebook, 
blogs, etc.) have been under the at-
tention of  risk and disaster managers 
longer than WEA. Social media and 
WEA provide similar possibilities 
to inform the public of  imminent 
emergencies. However, social media 
also allow for feedback in the form 
of  user-generated content (opinions, 
observations, etc.) or geospatial infor-
mation (Palen et al., 2009; Terpstra et 
al., 2012; Feldman et al., 2016; Hou-
ston et al., 2014; Committee on Pub-
lic Response to Alerts and Warnings 
using Social Media, 2013; and many 
others). This chapter aims to describe 
studies on the effectiveness of  social 
media in emergencies. The use of  so-
cial media with the objective to influ-
ence people’s behaviour is therefore 
an example of  the instrumentalist risk 
approach.
Social media are 
intensively used in 
times of crises to share 
information and support 
or oppose opinions. A 
recent study indicates 
that when official 
information is regarded as 
effective, peer feedback is 
less influential.
As with WEA, there are few empiri-
cal studies indicating at a general level 
what the impact of  social media disas-
ter information is or how social media 
can be designed to be effective dis-
aster-warning tools. The number of 
studies that have analysed social me-
dia messages after real incidents and 
disasters is steadily growing. A Unit-
ed States study analysing the use of 
Twitter after a disaster (the Tennessee 
River dam break) indicated that the 
amount of  information shared by cit-
izens — even those not in the direct 
vicinity of  the emergency location — 
is considerably greater than the ‘offi-
cial’ information from governmental 
organisations and the company (Sut-
ton, 2010).
Twitter users also tended to be critical 
toward the official information and 
corrected wrong information. Star-
bird and Palen (2010) studied Twitter 
messages after the Red River flood of 
1997 and the the Oklahoma wildfires 
and found that Twitter messages from 
those directly involved in the situation 
Interaction effect between efficacy beliefs and peer feedback on the 
intention to engage in self-protective behaviour.
Source: Verroen et al. (2013)
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are retweeted relatively often. Infor-
mation provided by local news media 
are also retweeted relatively often. A 
Dutch study analysed Twitter messag-
es just before, during and immediately 
after a huge storm which hit a large 
public open air music event (Terpstra 
et al, 2012). In the Twitter messages, 
weather predictions were found as 
well as rumours and messages that 
were focusing on providing help after 
the emergency. When the scale of  the 
emergency became evident, one per-
son took the initiative to organise the 
inhabitants of  a nearby town to pro-
vide help (places to spend the night, 
food and drink, showers, clothing, 
Wi-Fi, etc.). The data suggested that 
some of  the Good Samaritans were 
Twitter novices.
An important downside of  analysing 
communication after real events is the 
difficulty in analysing cause–effect re-
lations of  communication messages. 
This requires communication exper-
iments in a controlled setting where 
researchers can manipulate perceptual 
factors by providing different infor-
mation to separate groups and com-
pare their responses. Although such 
studies are quite common in commu-
nication research, applications to so-
cial media are scarce. 
Verroen et al. (2013) focused on a 
typical characteristic of  social media 
communication: people’s positive and 
negative feedback on an earlier dis-
tributed message. The message con-
tained emergency information in the 
context of  a high-impact risk, namely 
the derailment of  a freight train carry-
ing a highly flammable and toxic sub-
stance. These authors were interested 
in the interplay of  the perceived effi-
cacy of  the emergency information 
and peer feedback, such as responses 
on social network sites (e.g. Twitter) 
and the effect of  this interplay on the 
intention to engage in self-protective 
behaviour.
The study pitted high- and low-effi-
cacy information messages against 
supporting (positive) and opposing 
(negative) peer feedback (N =242). 
Although the study used a hypothet-
ical emergency situation, the partici-
pants were selected based on the fact 
that they lived in an area close to an 
existing railroad track used by these 
high-risk trains. Results showed a 
significant interaction effect between 
efficacy information in a news article 
and peer feedback from Twitter mes-
sages on both the intention to engage 
in self-protective behaviour (see Fig-
ure 4.2) and the levels of  involvement.
Participants who received the news 
article with more efficacy information 
were similarly influenced by support-
ing or opposing peer feedback via 
Twitter messages. 
However, among those who received 
a low efficacious news article, the ef-
fect of  peer feedback on these two 
variables was significantly stronger. 
Supporting peer feedback (that is peer 
feedback that supported the advice in 
the news article) resulted in a signif-
icantly higher intention to take pro-
tective measures (and involvement) 
than opposing peer feedback (that is 
feedback that questioned the advice 
in the news article). Apparently, when 
in doubt about how to act to mitigate 
risk, the tone of  peer feedback on so-
cial media is important for one’s deci-
sion making.
4.1.7
Role of news media 
in defining human 
responses to crises
In this final case we discuss the role 
of  the news media. This case is not 
an example of  one of  the four risk 
communication approaches in par-
ticular. Rather that news media can 
be regarded as a (highly) influencing 
factor in each of  these approaches, as 
they reflect on the norms, values and 
behaviour of  people and organisa-
tions in relation to risks, incidents and 
crises. People may be influenced not 
only by how information about the 
actual risks is framed, but also by how 
different frames concerning reactions 
and behaviours to risks and dangers 
are put forward in media articles and 
reports after critical events. The role 
of  media in contributing to errone-
ous beliefs and myths about human 
behaviour in stressful situations has 
been discussed for some decades in 
the social science literature, culminat-
ing in a number of  critical analyses of 
the reporting of  reactions to Hurri-
cane Katrina in 2005 (Tierney et al, 
2006). More recent work has further 
demonstrated how subtle and implic-
it framing can define the portrayal of 
human reactions, potentially influenc-
ing the expectations and evaluations 
of  both the public in general and risk 
and crisis professionals in particular. 
In an analysis of  media reporting 
from six different crisis events affect-
ing Swedish society, including natu-
ral disasters, antagonistic threats and 
diffuse threats, Nilsson et al. (2016) 
identified three dynamic interrelated 
processes simultaneously at work in 
framing public reactions.
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The first process, that of  identifi-
cation, concerned individuals and 
groups that were referred to as affect-
ed, and in what context. For example, 
in the natural disaster events, some 
groups were described as vulnera-
ble and affected by serious losses in 
terms of  economic value of  forestry, 
while others with less tangible losses 
were barely mentioned. The second 
process refers to characterisation of 
how different individuals and groups 
reacted and coped with the situation. 
In this process certain characteristics 
tended to be attributed collectively 
to groups among the public, creating 
ingroups and outgroups. This pat-
tern was particularly evident in the 
case of  antagonistic events (one case 
concerned street shootings in a ma-
jor city), separating the fear reactions 
of  law-abiding citizens from those 
of  victimised groups with suggested 
criminal links. 
News media reports play 
a very important role in 
effective communication 
and support public needs 
in stressful situations.
Finally, evaluation processes that 
provided signals could be identified, 
sometimes quite subtle, as to which 
reactions and behaviours could be 
considered as expected, accepted or 
stigmatised. For example, the choice 
of  certain words or references could 
suggest that individuals are either re-
acting logically, are not reacting suffi-
ciently responsibly or are overreacting. 
Such suggestions indirectly communi-
cate expectations and evaluations of 
correct or incorrect behaviour. Thus, 
for example in the case of  the influen-
za A (H1N1) pandemic and the issue 
of  vaccination, quite subtle semantics 
could reflect evaluations of  who re-
acted sensibly (and got vaccinated) 
and who did not. Interestingly, these 
evaluations were somewhat reversed 
when cases of  narcolepsy were linked 
to the vaccination campaign, lead-
ing to a new and somewhat different 
media debate (Scott and Enander, 
2016). Taken together, these find-
ings demonstrate a need to examine 
critically frames which may distort a 
realistic view of  public needs and re-
actions when faced with risks, thus 
leading to ineffective communication 
and support.
4.1.8
Conclusions and 
key messages
In this chapter we presented different 
approaches to risk communication 
and acceptance of  risk communica-
tion and addressed a number of  so-
cio-psychological concepts that have 
been shown to influence people’s 
perceptions, attitudes and behaviour 
in the face of  a wide variety of  risks. 
Based on the pillars of  the Disaster 
Risk Management Knowledge Centre, 
we conclude with the following three 
key messages.
Partnership
For a number of  years now, a broad 
shift has been taking place throughout 
Europe (and beyond), characterised 
on one side by ‘a right to know’ and 
on the other side by a stronger focus 
on ‘individual responsibility’ of  citi-
zens to be prepared for incidents and 
disasters. Risk communication that is 
based on one-way media campaigns 
alone, telling people how to prepare, 
is hardly effective. In terms of  part-
nerships, engaging in a dialogue with 
local communities to understand the 
historical and local contexts is an im-
portant basis for future risk commu-
nication that focuses on stimulating 
resilient behaviour.
Knowledge
Sound knowledge of  the effects of 
communication messages based on 
communication experiments and 
tests is indispensable for delivering 
effective communication. In addition, 
there are many best practices available 
that have been identified by EU pro-
jects, such as Tactic and CapHazNet, 
that may offer inspiration.
Innovation
In some cases a more fundamental 
approach may be needed to set up 
and monitor communication effects 
and improve communication practice. 
This is especially important where it 
concerns innovative methods such as 
the use of  new communication tools 
(e.g. WEA), complex topics (e.g. flood 
evacuation strategies), activities that 
cause great societal unrest (e.g. CO2 
storage) or where norms and values 
are at stake (e.g. stigmatisation in me-
dia reports). In such cases, profound 
insight from communication research 
can be useful to support further deci-
sion-making.
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4.2 Decision-making under 
uncertainty
Tina	Comes, Anouck Adrot, Caroline Rizza
4.2.1
Technology 
innovation: promise 
and reality for 
decision-makers
For more than a decade now, infor-
mation has been recognised as a form 
of  aid (IFRC, 2005). Uncertainty has 
been largely related to the lack of 
predictability of  some major events 
or stakes, or a lack of  data (Argote, 
1982). To overcome this uncertainty, 
the traditional decision support para-
digms suggest collecting more infor-
mation. Therefore, decision-makers 
have focused on gathering and analys-
ing more and more data about poten-
tially disaster-affected areas (Comfort, 
2007; Wybo and Lonka, 2003).
In parallel, progress in engineering 
continues to promise connectivity, 
broader bandwidth and unknown 
computational power to all (Gao et 
al., 2011; Meier, 2014). The use of 
social media that first gained prom-
inence in the 2010 Haiti earthquake 
has become ‘main stream’ in the re-
sponse to Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 
(Butler, 2013). Technology-driven 
data sources such as GPSs, radio fre-
quency-based identification tracking, 
remote sensing, satellite imagery or 
drones enable real-time monitoring 
(Comes and Van de Walle, 2016). Bi-
ometric identification technologies 
are increasingly used as tools for refu-
gee management (Jacobsen, 2015) and 
relief  provision shifts towards virtual 
distributions through digital payment 
systems or ‘mobile money’ (Sandvik 
et al., 2014). However, the more de-
cision-making depends on (big) data 
the more challenging it becomes to 
manage and analyse:
• In a fragmented and ‘post-factual’ 
society, information coming from 
heterogeneous sources and actors 
is likely to be contradictory — 
and recent elections, from Brex-
it to the United States in 2016, 
highlight that (mis-)information 
becomes a commodity which is 
a source of  influence and power.
• Volatility — the pace of  change in 
data and public opinion is unprec-
edented, drastically reducing the 
time available for strategic policy 
decisions (Noveck, 2015).
• Because of  the ever-more complex 
socio-technical interdependencies, 
the implications of  decisions can-
not be clearly assessed any more 
(Comes et al., 2011).
Technology has 
enabled new forms 
of data collection and 
participation. It has 
introduced a new layer of 
complexity in decision- 
and policymaking. 
Technologies are enabling 
but never the end-
solution.
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Besides a lack of  information, un-
certainty can also stem from a lack 
of  understanding of  the actual infor-
mation (as opposed to rumours) and 
the impact of  a decision on complex 
systems; as a result, decision-makers 
are not even aware of  what is un-
certain (Taleb, 2007). From this per-
spective, some authors have strongly 
advocated a renewed perspective of 
decision-making strategies (Makrida-
kis and Taleb, 2009). The need for 
new participatory approaches to mak-
ing decisions in the Big data era has 
been equally recognised by the Euro-
pean Commission under the Citizen 
Science theme (EC, 2013) as well as 
central humanitarian actors such as 
the International Federation of  Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
with its 2013 World Disasters Report, 
which explicitly focused on technol-
ogy and the future of  humanitarian 
action (IFRC, 2013), and a series of 
reports by the United Nations Office 
for the Coordination of  Humanitar-
ian Affairs, Humanitarianism in the 
Network Age (OCHA ,2012), and the 
implications of  Big data (Whipkey 
and Verity, 2015).
The uncertainties related to this new 
decision space will be unpacked in this 
subchapter. Since decision-making 
under uncertainty is important in cri-
sis and disaster risk management, this 
chapter covers both domains, making 
distinctions whenever necessary.
We first discuss in Chapter 4.2.2 
the standard paradigms of  ration-
al choice, emphasising new types of 
uncertainty that decision-makers are 
confronted with; this view entails that 
power relations are an important driv-
er of  uncertainty. We discuss power as 
a hidden dimension, introducing be-
havioural uncertainty in Chapter 4.2.3. 
Power relations can also introduce le-
gal and ethical dilemmas, particularly 
when it is about collecting, analysing 
and sharing uncertain information by 
using technology; such dilemmas are 
reviewed in Chapter 4.2.4. We con-
clude with a taxonomy of  decision 
approaches and processes to manage 
uncertainty in Chapter 4.2.5 as well as 
a discussion and recommendations 
for science and policymaking.
4.2.2
Uncertainty 
undermining
the paradigm
of rational choice
The standard paradigm of  deci-
sion-making under uncertainty sug-
gests that uncertainties are due to in-
herent randomness in an event, such 
as throwing a coin. Such uncertainties 
can be best captured by probabili-
ties. To this end, scientists or citizens 
collect and evaluate data, which are 
translated into a model. For instance, 
the chances of  a flood, storm or 
earthquake affecting a community is 
typically given by the frequency of 
the occurrence of  such events over a 
certain period, for example a 100-year 
flood. Data to predict such a flood in-
clude rainfall or changes in tempera-
ture upstream. Standard decision sup-
port tools assume that a crisis evolves 
from a chaotic beginning into a steady 
state that follows patterns which can 
be identified. Therefore it is sufficient 
to collect comparable data to retrieve 
the patterns.
However, this implies that data are 
comparable and standardised and 
were collected following a series of 
specific methods. Applying expected 
utility theory (French et al., 2009), i.e. 
recommending the decision that leads 
to the highest expected value, also 
means that the recommendations lead 
to the best outcome over a series of 
(repeated, similar) events.
Disater risk management 
deals with highly 
uncertain situations. 
Such uncertainties can 
be best captured with 
probabilistic approaches. 
Decision-making under 
uncertainty requires the 
understanding of the 
underlying uncertainties 
and assumptions within 
the probabilistic models 
or the data.
In addition, the variety of  the data 
collected and analysed today ranges 
from sensor measurements to social 
media information or radio conver-
sations (Comes, 2011). Each of  these 
types of  data is fraught with different 
types of  uncertainty or error: while 
sensors can malfunction or fail, hu-
man judgement is typically ambigu-
ous, subjective and highly contextual-
ised (Palen et al., 2010). As such, new 
approaches that help policymakers 
consolidate the different types of  un-
certainty inherent to the heterogene-
ous data need to be developed.
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In addition, the potential impact of  a 
flood, for instance in terms of  dam-
age to infrastructure, is much harder 
to predict than the event itself. Behav-
ioural issues need to be considered; 
for example where will people turn 
for help and how will they support 
each other? The use of  smart phones 
in the refugee crisis, allowing refugees 
to navigate their way across Europe-
an borders, for instance, has caught 
many organisations and governments 
by surprise (Comes and Van der 
Walle, 2015).
Despite these complexities, under 
the time pressure of  (looming) dis-
asters and crises, often simple and 
straightforward recommendations are 
sought for their ease of  communica-
tion (Renn, 2008). Since disasters are 
low-probability events, however, such 
models can be misleading, particularly 
if  there is ‘blind trust’ in a prediction 
or model (French and Niculae, 2005) 
— and no room to reflect upon the 
underlying uncertainties and assump-
tions within the model or the data.
4.2.3
Decision-making 
contexts and 
new sources of 
uncertainty
Three major contexts for deci-
sion-making in disaster risk reduction 
have emerged with the push for in-
creasing digitalization. Creating infor-
mation does not require specific edu-
cation and background any more. By 
relying on open software tools anyone 
can create a map, dashboard or analy-
sis, opening opportunities for partici-
pation and engagement.
• Participatory and communi-
ty-based approaches emphasise 
novel possibilities of  engagement 
and can empower local commu-
nities through joint planning and 
crowdsourcing (Edwards, 2009; 
Norris et al., 2008). An example is 
a citizen science approach to flood 
protection, where communities 
themselves were involved in re-
search from scratch and were thus 
better informed in decision-mak-
ing (Wehn et al., 2015). Uncertainty 
here is related to the fragmentation 
of  voices, the subjectivity of  data 
and the volatility of  public opin-
ions:
• Increasing automation and dom-
inance of  technology-driven ap-
proaches refer to the integration of 
information into decision practic-
es through pervasive information 
technology (IT). Using satellite 
imagery, drones and artificial intel-
ligence for damage assessment af-
ter an earthquake or a forest fire is 
just one of  many examples. While 
data-driven approaches sometimes 
suggest the increase in objectivity, 
they are often far from complete 
and digital shades persist. For in-
stance, social media analyses that 
rely exclusively on Twitter neglect 
the fact that Twitter users are hard-
ly a representative sample of  the 
population. At the same time, com-
mercial proprietary algorithms and 
software (such as those used by big 
search machines like Google and 
Facebook) are certainly not neutral, 
and uncertainty persists about how 
data are analysed.
• Virtual collaborations in networks 
of  experts and volunteers include, 
for instance, ‘crisis mappers’ that 
help local communities map out 
assets such as hospitals or schools. 
The use of  local implementing 
partners, combined with virtual el-
ements, has led to increasing cen-
tralised coordination and remote 
management, particularly when ac-
cess is difficult (McDonald, 2016; 
Comes and Van de Walle, 2015). 
Uncertainty stems from the fact 
that decisions are made removed 
from the context. A mapper in Oslo 
or Brussels may not know what is 
most important to fight fires in 
Greece or Portugal. Decisions and 
policies designed in capitals are 
often political in nature. They are 
related to power structures, nego-
tiations and standards that neglect 
the specifics of  local context. New 
movements such as the Global Par-
liament of  Mayors (n.d.) argue that 
because of  such uncertainties, even 
strategic and policy decisions must 
be made at city (or local) level.
Expertise is not limited 
to policy-makers and 
scientists any more. 
Decision-making under 
uncertainty needs to 
respect new contexts, 
environments and shifted 
power structures.
To deal with these emerging deci-
sion-making contexts, policymakers, 
responders and scientists are expected 
to abide by given professional stand-
ards and norms such as emergency 
plans, risk management and resilience 
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frameworks and good academic prac-
tice. Maybe most prominent are the 
humanitarian principles, which in-
clude humanity, impartiality, neutrali-
ty and independence (OCHA, 2010). 
However, through readily available 
software, new grassroots initiatives 
and volunteers that do not subscribe 
to any standard or code of  conduct 
can produce the same types of  in-
formation products, maps or analy-
sis — without quality assurance. For 
instance, the easy use of  Ushahidi or 
Google Maps contributes to the coex-
istence of  similar maps with conflict-
ing information, which can aggravate 
uncertainty. Moreover, algorithms 
that structure data collection and 
analysis underlying these products 
are often proprietary and not trans-
parent. Having lost the exclusivity to 
create information, scientists should 
therefore ensure that their approach 
to data collection and modelling is 
transparent and matches the purpose 
of  the specific situation and context.
At the same time, uncertainty relat-
ed to professional products that are 
designed to support decisions leave 
way for interpretation and ‘spinning’ 
of  any information into a favourable 
direction, introducing motivational 
biases (Montibeller and von Winter-
feldt, 2015). One important aspect of 
such decisions are power relations be-
tween actors and organisations.
4.2.4
Decision-making 
under uncertainty 
as a power relation
Uncertainty, information and power 
are intricately related concepts. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, deci-
sion-makers and scientists need to re-
vise standards and practices that have 
emerged with increased information 
access. Likewise, decision-makers 
need to fully consider power dynam-
ics in their approach to uncertainty 
and adapt their practices.
In practice, power can be defined 
as the extent to which an entity can 
guide or frame another entity’s ac-
tions. Entities can be individuals, 
groups, organisations (companies, 
non-profit organisations, communi-
ties, governments, etc.) and groups 
of  organisations (consortia, alliances, 
partnerships, networks, etc.). Power is 
thus key to understanding how collec-
tive action emerges and evolves (Prus, 
1999).
Power fuels on ‘an intent or capaci-
ty on the part of  one person or one 
group to influence, control, domi-
nate, persuade, manipulate or other-
wise affect the behaviour, experience 
or situations of  some target’ (Prus, 
1995, cited by Hall, 1997). Informa-
tion and knowledge are essential to 
power: to influence, control, domi-
nate, persuade and manipulate others, 
one needs to know more (Crozier and 
Friedberg, 1977). Thus, one can strive 
to maintain asymmetrical levels of  in-
formation access and uncertainty to 
Power, information access, decision-making with uncertainty 
Source: courtesy of authors
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gain power over the others. Recipro-
cally, power shifts affect the level of 
uncertainty that concern the various 
actors involved in disaster risk.
Power is a driver of 
information creation and 
sharing, which biases 
seemingly objective 
data adding a layer of 
uncertainty to decision-
making.
Various cases illustrate how disastrous 
the effect of  power on uncertainty can 
be. In the aftermath of  2008 Cyclone 
Nargis, the Burmese junta feared los-
ing its power because of  the arrival 
of  foreign aid. It significantly retained 
information by imposing a media ban. 
By struggling to control information, 
the Burmese junta prevented the re-
lief  actors from collecting informa-
tion. Uncertainty about humanitarian 
needs increased at the expense of  the 
population (Pan et al., 2012).
Criticism arose and was directed to-
wards the overwhelming power of 
the international humanitarian appa-
ratus in the aftermath of  the 2010 
Haiti earthquake. The government’s 
infrastructures collapsed and inter-
national non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) quickly took over, 
centralising information and allo-
cating resources without sharing in-
formation. The local government 
remained blinded by uncertainty and 
compelled to rely extensively on in-
ternational aid. Such asymmetry led 
to a vicious circle: priorities shifted 
to the import of  western governance 
standards, which impeded the coun-
try’s response to the 2010 outbreak of 
cholera (Biquet, 2013).
While thus being an important driv-
er of  uncertainty in decisions (Hart, 
1993), power is often mixed up with 
the surrounding notions (Comfort, 
2007). This is, at least in part, because 
the impact of  power is hard to cap-
ture. Power relations can shift quickly 
through interactions and in changing 
circumstances (Hall, 1997). In ad-
dition, power is invisible and ‘silent’ 
(Brown et al., 2010) and cannot be 
bound to a single event, fact or pro-
cess.
To address this issue, decision-mak-
ers need to be aware of  uncertainty 
and information asymmetry in disas-
ter risk. First, decision-makers should 
understand the implications of  a lack 
of  power on uncertainty (Chapter 
4.2.4.1). Second, they ought to identi-
fy benefits from genuine information 
collection (Chapter 4.2.4.2.). Final-
ly, they should consider the implica-
tions of  information on uncertainty 
and power in a holistic way (Chapter 
4.2.4.3. and 4.2.4.4.). Figure 4.4 pro-
vides a representation of  how power 
and information affect decisions.
4.2.4.1
Power as a necessary 
but insufficient condition
to reduce uncertainty
Because power affects communication 
and coordination patterns, a struc-
tural lack of  power confronts deci-
sion-makers with extreme uncertainty 
when disaster strikes. Baumgartner 
and co-authors (cited by Hall 1997) 
highlight how power influences com-
munication: when an incident strikes, 
access to information within a group 
of  individuals depends on the under-
lying power relations. The most pow-
erful actors can radically restrict the 
number of  actors involved in making 
the decision (Smart and Vertinsky, 
1977). The humanitarian example of 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake illustrates 
how a lack of  power results in high 
uncertainty and low participation 
when it comes to decision-making.
To nuance this point, one needs to re-
member that power, while increasing 
centrality in decision-making, does 
not suffice to reduce uncertainty. The 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis vividly il-
lustrates this assertion: powerful ac-
tors can centralise information to le-
gitimately influence decision-making 
in spite of  intense uncertainty (Gut-
tieri et al., 1995).
4.2.4.2
Reliable information 
from other entities an 
entity can reduce 
uncertainty and
establish power
From an operational perspective, or-
ganisations expect information access 
to reduce uncertainty and support 
insightful decision-making. The relia-
bility of  the decisions made can then 
significantly influence performance, 
thereby increasing decision-makers’ 
power in the longer term. Note that 
‘good’ decisions are mandatory; mas-
sive data collection alone does not in-
crease a decision-maker’s power.
For example, during the 2003 Euro-
pean heat wave, some French hospital 
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directors relied on their friendships to 
collect information about potential 
incidents in emergency rooms. By do-
ing so, they got reliable alerts from the 
hospitals and triggered and communi-
cated emergency plans quickly enough 
to capture and mobilise physicians, 
nurses and other hospital personnel. 
In the aftermath of  the crisis, experts 
applauded this initiative as well as the 
hospitals’ reliability, thereby support-
ing the directors’ long-term power 
and legitimacy within the French 
healthcare system (Adrot, 2010).
4.2.4.3
 Information sharing
reduces uncertainty 
asymmetry, thereby 
rebalancing power 
relationships and 
redefining 
decision-making 
constraints and 
modalities
Traditionally, command chains mo-
bilise operational actors to collect in-
formation to reduce uncertainty and 
make decisions. However, informa-
tion sharing is hardly reciprocal, and 
typically reporting chains are directed 
‘upwards’ to centralised coordina-
tion structures (Turoff  et al., 2004). 
In addition, internet and electricity 
blackouts and limited coverage can 
make local communities suffer from 
restricted access to information and 
intense uncertainty. In such settings, 
these local communities often rely 
on their direct perception, experience 
and networks instead of  profession-
al responders or official information 
(Comes et al., 2015a).
Interestingly, power relations be-
tween local and global communities 
can shift because of  technological 
progress: increased use of  smart-
phones, increased connectivity and 
open-source tools can catalyse access 
to data and information. Such access 
means that additional actors, such as 
virtual communities, can provide in-
formation and participate in opera-
tions and reduce uncertainty. For ex-
ample, the opening of  satellite views, 
through open-source platforms and 
communities (such as Open Street 
Map in the aftermath of  the 2010 
Haiti earthquake or even earlier in the 
aftermath of  Hurricane Katrina), can 
compel actors with strong supremacy 
to admit the empowerment of  local 
communities. In addition, the visibil-
ity of  the virtual citizen community 
is improved (Palen et al., 2010). In 
the longer term, such visibility will 
strengthen these communities’ partic-
ipation in decision-making.
4.2.4.4
 A holistic approach to 
power highlights bigger 
challenges related 
to decision-making and 
uncertainty
Even though information access can 
contribute to increasing one’s pow-
er at the response stage, one should 
keep the side effects in mind. From 
an institutional perspective, increased 
competition for information to gain 
power can result in opportunistic or 
fuzzy behaviour with respect to in-
formation. This, in turn, can nega-
tively affect relationships between 
local or other professional actors at 
the expense of  the population that 
has potentially been affected by a dis-
aster. For instance, during the 9/11 
response, a large spectrum of  actors 
(citizens and local non-profit organi-
sations in search of  institutional vis-
ibility) urged on the crisis response 
stage, providing non-exploitable data 
and creating confusion, which slowed 
coordination down (Dawes et al., 
2004).
In addition, NGOs can tend to ex-
ploit information as an opportunity 
to gain legitimacy and visibility. Such a 
tendency is not new. In 1994 Eng and 
Parker observed how local Mississip-
pi communities shifted their efforts 
from social interactions to develop-
ing legitimacy towards their partners. 
However, we believe that digitisation 
can potentially lead to an opportunis-
tic use of  information and we there-
fore call scholars and practitioners to 
consider the ethical and legal implica-
tions of  technology-based decisions 
as a burning issue.
4.2.5
The ethical and 
legal implications of 
technology-based 
decisions
The power implications and uncer-
tainties related to technology require 
a critical review of  the ethical, legal 
and social issues (ELSI). For instance, 
how to engage with citizens through 
social media or how to share informa-
tion between different agencies and 
information systems in line with data 
protection laws remains a current is-
sue. Consequently, designing and de-
veloping technologies and practices 
which address such issues becomes 
essential.
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4.2.5.1
 Pandora’s Box?
Uncertainty related
to unintended 
consequences of 
informationalisation
We have previously highlighted that 
behavioural issues, particularly when 
reinforced by social media platforms, 
increase complexity and uncertainty 
in decision-making. Rather than rely-
ing on compliance of  the population 
(‘keep calm and carry on’), citizen and 
volunteer groups today emerge and 
organise, leading to ‘unintended con-
sequences’.
Specifically, the case of  the 2011 Van-
couver riots (Rizza et al., 2014) high-
lights risks associated with citizen en-
gagement crises through social media. 
The Vancouver Police Department 
asked Vancouverites to send their 
material and to help identify rioters. 
Feeling empowered by local author-
ities, citizens started a real manhunt, 
and some families had to leave the 
city. This case has pointed out: 1) the 
‘institutional unpreparedness’ in deal-
ing with a huge quantity of  data, their 
quality and the new processes of  in-
quiry they require; 2) the ‘unintended 
do-it-yourself  justice’, i.e. the shift 
from supporting crisis managers to 
vigilantes when citizens overruled au-
thorities and enforced justice on their 
own terms; 3) the ‘unintended do-it-
yourself  society’ supported by the po-
tential of  social media for prompting 
people to act. What happened in Van-
couver challenged human rights and 
values such as fairness, justice, integ-
rity, responsibility and accountability.
For the 2010 Eyjafjallajökull volcano 
eruptions, Watson and Finn (2014) 
discussed some of  the privacy and eth-
ical implications surrounding the use 
of  social media. Social media allowed 
persons stranded in Europe to com-
municate, organise their travel, etc. as 
well as allowing the aviation industry 
to get information from its custom-
ers. At the same time, social media 
use led to privacy infringements and 
inequality. Indeed, over-focusing on 
social media could lead disaster risk 
managers to focus on those who pro-
duce a lot of  data and, consequently, 
to down-prioritise those unequipped 
(for example foreign passengers) or 
unable to use ICTs (for example the 
elderly). Lastly, ‘self-help’ between 
citizens under the umbrella of  resil-
ience (i.e. a spontaneous peer-to-peer 
communication) should not become a 
way for corporate or public entities to 
neglect care responsibilities for those 
who have been impacted by a disaster.
Ethical and legal 
considerations have 
become essential in 
designing and developing 
technologies and 
practices which collect, 
analyse and communicate 
(uncertain) information 
and data.
Consequently, designers and practi-
tioners in disaster risk need to consid-
er the uncertainty related to unintend-
ed consequences of  IT. This implies 
noticing, anticipating and knowing 
them.
4.2.5.2
Data protection and 
privacy concerns: how 
much uncertainty is 
needed?
Rizza, Büscher and Watson (2017, 
forthcoming) underline that (person-
al) data and information (sharing) 
constitute the core interest of  ELSI 
concerns in the Big Data era, which 
makes mass surveillance possible. 
The collection and processing of  data 
coming from different applications 
makes the boundary between deci-
sion support and control or surveil-
lance fuzzy. For instance, the knowl-
edge database created through such a 
monitoring system could reveal indi-
viduals’ habits, routines or decisions 
and, consequently, infringes citizens’ 
privacy. Big data has even been said 
to contribute to trapping particularly 
vulnerable populations in poverty by 
obstructing the possibility to get loans 
or access to good education (Waddell 
2016). As such, the statistical likeli-
hood that someone from a specific 
neighbourhood may not pay back a 
loan blocks individual opportunities. 
The collection and processing of  per-
sonal data is also problematic because 
in crises it can erode basic rights such 
as freedoms of  speech, associations 
and movement.
To balance the need to reduce un-
certainty and collect data with eth-
ical responsibility in scientific and 
technological developments, an ethic 
of  co-responsibility should emerge 
(Schomberg, 2013). Research around 
ELSI aspects of  IT also reveals op-
portunities: integrating IT into disas-
ter risk management with an explicit 
commitment to ELSI considerations 
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will provide useful insights for a pro-
active approach to innovation (op. 
cit.).
Initiatives like ‘privacy by design’ or 
‘ethics by design’ (European Com-
mission, 2010) attempt to deal with 
current critiques of  the lack of  con-
cern for ELSI in the development of 
new technologies (Rizza et al., 2011). 
Privacy impact assessments can en-
sure that technology for disaster risk 
reduction is developed to protect the 
interests of  end users and stakehold-
ers within the organisational and legal 
frameworks.
4.2.6
Decision-making 
under uncertainty: 
better than 
muddling through?
The context of  decision- and poli-
cymaking has become complex. The 
very nature of  the different uncer-
tainties we discussed makes it largely 
impossible to use probabilities: the so-
cio-technical uncertainties in disaster 
risk reduction are deep (Comes et al., 
2013; Comes et al., 2011; Pruyt and 
Kwakkel, 2014). Already in the 1950s, 
Lindblom (1959) had described that 
decision-makers confronted with such 
uncertainty are ‘muddling through’.
Participatory approaches to mod-
el design and scenario analysis have 
been advocated as a way ahead when 
the communities affected are clearly 
known (Comes et al., 2015b; Wright 
and Goodwin, 2009). Examples 
range from scenarios for water and 
flood management (Haasnoot et al. 
2011) to urban planning and resource 
management (Vervoort et al., 2010), 
approaches that rely on connecting 
communities and policymakers in the 
preparedness phase. Scenarios are 
built in deliberative processes that 
capture expert knowledge, preferenc-
es and values of  stakeholders (Kok et 
al., 2006; Vervoort et al., 2010). While 
those scenarios serve to establish 
plans and evaluate alternatives based 
on a common understanding, they are 
time consuming to update and adapt 
to new circumstances or information. 
As such, they are most useful in the 
preparedness phase, not in the least to 
help build networks and partnerships 
of  trust (Comes, 2016b).
The opposing trend relies on arti-
ficial intelligence and data mining 
approaches that enable real-time 
analysis of  data streams to be made. 
Automated algorithms and tools can 
be used to extract and illustrate large-
scale patterns and trends in human 
behaviour, damage assessments and 
communication flows (Meier, 2014; 
Monaghan and Lycett, 2013; Whipkey 
and Verity, 2015). As such, they prom-
ise fast answers, which is particularly 
relevant in the heat of  a response. 
It is, however, necessary to ask how 
such analyses influence human sense-
making or possibly introduce biases 
(Wright and Goodwin, 2009). Particu-
larly if  analyses are run remotely and 
disconnected from the community, 
there is a series of  typical errors that 
may mislead analyses or the interpre-
tation of  results (Comes, 2016a). In 
addition, the reliance on software, 
data and algorithms has been increas-
ingly criticised for the lack of  trans-
parency and control that communities 
have over their own data (McDonald, 
2016; Sandvik, 2013).
In between there is a large spectrum 
of  semi-automated data collection 
efforts, semi-automated analyses and 
assessments that are run by scien-
tists, policymakers from municipality 
to international level and an increas-
ing amount of  local and digital vol-
unteers. With the global availability 
of  technology, software and data, the 
creation of  information products has 
been democratised. While in the past 
the design of  a map or a dashboard re-
quired dedicated technical skills, today 
anyone can produce graphs, figures 
and maps. Examples of  such volun-
teer efforts range from the response 
to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines 
in 2013 (Comes et al., 2015a; West-
rope et al., 2014), the Ebola response 
(Landgren 2015) and the response to 
the refugee crisis in Europe in 2015 
(Comes and Van de Walle, 2015; Tal-
houk et al., 2016).
Decision-making should 
reflect the specific 
context, constraints, 
needs and stakeholders 
associated to a decision, 
including the specific 
phase of the disaster risk 
management cycle. 
Decisions differ in terms of  informa-
tion required, time scales, geographi-
cal scope and actors. The question, for 
instance, of  where to set up a hospital 
has very different characteristics from 
general resource-allocation decisions. 
Both decisions are important but have 
very different requirements in terms 
of  information granularity, timeliness 
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and updates. Addressing specific deci-
sion-makers needs or problems in the 
socio-technical context is, however, 
still not commonplace. We propose 
a decision-centric paradigm for in-
formation collection, processing and 
visualisation that focuses on specific 
information needs.
4.2.7
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership 
Together, scientists, policymakers 
and communities need to agree on 
standards that reflect good processes 
and representations of  uncertainties. 
Citizen science can be a way ahead 
to providing necessary training and 
education. In particular, we propose 
that cultural, social and professional 
specificities must be thoroughly taken 
into account in the settling of  stand-
ards. Since information is always also 
a source of  power, it is imperative to 
follow the principle of  reciprocity — 
empowering the people who provide 
information to use it for their own 
good and strictly following the prin-
ciples of  responsible data and tech-
nology.
Knowledge
Given that no single paradigm pre-
dominates how decision- and poli-
cymakers use information, data and 
uncertainties drive power relations 
and introduce ethical and legal dilem-
mas. So far, standard analyses use, at 
best, probabilistic approaches to rep-
resent uncertainties, neglecting the 
socio-technical dimension of  deci-
sion-making, problems of  data gaps 
and consent. The reflections on un-
certainties presented in this chapter 
draw from both practical experiences 
and theory. They are, however, not 
readily translated into concrete policy 
measures or decisions because there is 
first a need for innovation in science 
and policy.
 
Innovation 
Researchers need to frame the prob-
lem they are studying, including the 
context and the purpose of  a model, 
simulation or analysis. Assumptions 
and limitations need to be reflected 
in the design of  decision support sys-
tems. When situations are complex 
and uncertain there is a tendency to 
simplify the problem and to exert 
control through limited consultations 
and conflict avoidance. However, 
models and recommendations must 
not oversimplify complex problems, 
which is a challenge given the call for 
‘easily understandable’ solutions.
In addition, we call for the develop-
ment of  methods and approaches that 
consider the different types of  uncer-
tainty from operational decision-mak-
ing to strategic policymaking. So far, 
there is no clear understanding of  the 
processes, models and tools that ena-
ble institutions to use operational and 
real-time information to collaborate 
with citizens to manage disaster risk.
Besides the uncertainty inherent in 
the new data environment, uncertain-
ty is also rooted in the role of  power 
in decision-making and the lack of 
addressing the ethical and legal stakes 
caused by information use. We there-
fore advocate further research on the 
socio-technical dimension of  uncer-
tainty in decision-making by putting 
technical, social, organisational, ethi-
cal and legal dimensions of  informa-
tion into perspective.
 
Problems in disaster risk reduction 
are complex. As such, any model will 
necessarily reflect this complexity by 
various layers and levels of  uncer-
tainty that will need to be considered 
in the decision-making process. This 
means that deliberation processes and 
communication with stakeholders 
need to be carefully designed to re-
flect such uncertainties, even if  there 
is a temptation to go with quick fix-
es or easy solutions. Error bars or 
margins of  error should not be just a 
footnote, but rather should be openly 
discussed. In particular, critical tip-
ping points need to be flagged, such 
as flood levels that cause a breach in a 
levee or top wind speeds that damage 
major infrastructures.
New participatory processes such as 
risk mapping are increasingly impor-
tant. In the preparedness phase, they 
make it possible to establish networks 
and partnerships that people can rely 
on during the response. If  such pro-
cesses are also to work effectively in 
disaster response, decisions, process-
es and organisational structures need 
to be adapted to enable the uptake of 
information provided by communi-
ties. Such approaches can only work 
successfully, if  connections are estab-
lished prior to disasters.
Participatory processes and new gov-
ernance structures should empower 
local communities in guiding disaster 
risk management and reducing uncer-
tainty. However, this implies collective 
awareness of  how power shapes deci-
sion-making. Power is a system-wide 
dynamic that can impact uncertainty 
for all.
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4.3 Last mile
communication
Irina	Stanciugelu, Aurel Bilanici, Ian Cameron
4.3.1
Introduction: disaster 
risk management and 
information and 
communications 
technology
Disaster risk management (DRM) is 
undergoing noteworthy changes, re-
flecting the emergence of  a globalised 
system of  DRM with technological, 
organisational, and institutional ca-
pacities enhancing DRM’s ability as a 
unit in near real time across the globe 
(Jensen et al., 2015).
ICT is enabling better communica-
tions, remote sensing, monitoring 
networks, warning systems and mod-
elling and geospatial technologies. 
Various ICT tools such as geographic 
information systems (GIS) and global 
positioning systems (GPS) can allow 
organisations to receive satellite infor-
mation and produce accurate location 
information about the affected are-
as, which can be further linked with 
socioeconomic, demographic and 
needs assessment information (Hu 
and Kapucu, 2014). There are diverse 
emergency management information 
systems such as E-Team, Web EOC, 
SharePoint that make it easier to gath-
er, process and disseminate informa-
tion, which helps emergency manag-
ers make informed decisions (Carver 
and Turoff, 2007). 
Incident management systems can 
inform disaster response teams with 
real-time information about the inci-
dent and available resources and can 
help emergency management organ-
isations coordinate efforts (Iannella 
and Henricksen, 2007). Innovative 
means, such as citizen observatories 
enabled by ICTs (e.g. sensor tech-
nologies and social media), have the 
potential to provide new ways of  par-
ticipation (When et al., 2015) whilst 
at the same time generating rele-
vant information and promoting de-
mand-driven policy responses (Hold-
en, 2006; Rojas-Caldenas and Corona 
Zambrano, 2008).
Despite the significant advantages 
of  ICT, unequal ICT adoption with-
in and between countries becomes a 
DRM limitation. As an example, the 
uneven distribution of  warnings in 
the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami re-
sulted in many thousands of  avoida-
ble deaths. 
Various ICTs are used in 
disaster risk management 
to help organisations 
process and share real-
time information. Other 
functions of ICT are to 
establish different 
communication channels, 
to engage with 
stakeholders and to 
coordinate among a large 
number of agencies.
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During Hurricane Katrina in 2005 the 
inadequate monitoring of  infrastruc-
ture and failed warning systems led to 
hundreds of  avoidable deaths. Also, 
the different level of  adoption of 
ICT tends to affect the more vulner-
able populations disproportionately. 
More generally referred to as the ‘dig-
ital divide,’ this tends to exacerbate 
economic differences (Jensen et al., 
2015).
In this chapter, we focus on the main 
changes that ICT brings in DRM. The 
next chatper present what constitutes 
an effective early warning system 
(EWS) (Chapter 4.3.2 and 4.3.3) and 
investigate requirements for and rec-
ommendations on community link-
ages and community empowerment 
within the chain of  an EWS (Chap-
ter 4.3.4 and 4.3.5). Chapter 4.3.6 and 
4.3.7 present the opportunities that 
ICT technologies and social media 
provide for engaging citizens in the 
emergency management and how the 
new digital technologies could be used 
to close the last mile communication 
gap. We conclude with some general 
remarks (Chapter 4.3.8).
4.3.2
‘Last mile’
communication and 
development of 
early warning 
systems (EWS)
The notion of  the ‘last mile’ has been 
popularised in countries of  the Indi-
an Ocean in relation to tsunami EWS 
development (Thomalla and Larsen, 
2010). Even so, ‘last mile’ has been 
understood differently: ‘last mile’ as 
a challenge for rural communities to 
access media and address this by sup-
plementing traditional media chan-
nels for warning dissemination with 
additional technologies (LIRNE Asia, 
2008); ‘last mile’ as the capacity of  the 
community to take action in response 
to a received warning and that sup-
ports the development of  the capac-
ities of  local institutions (Singh Bedi, 
2006).
Early warning systems 
are designed to analyse 
the risks of vulnerable 
communities, carry out 
the task of monitoring 
environmental variables, 
issue warnings and 
ensure that appropriate 
response capabilities are 
in place.
The Hyogo Framework for Action 
2005-2015, which was adopted at the 
2005 World Conference on Disas-
ter Risk Reduction, recognises early 
warning as an effective tool to reduce 
vulnerabilities, save lives and help 
protect livelihoods as well as to im-
prove preparedness and response to 
natural hazards.
The Hyogo framework takes on the 
perspective of  the ‘last mile’ in stress-
ing that disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
must be ‘underpinned by a more pro-
active approach to informing, mo-
tivating and involving people in all 
aspects of  DRR in their own local 
communities’ through multi-stake-
holder and cross-sectoral partner-
ships (UN/ISDR, 2005). The diversi-
ty in interpretations of  the notion of 
‘last mile’ hints at the complexities as-
sociated with the links between DRM 
and ICT, the development of  national 
and regional EWSs and the advent of 
social media in crisis management.
Early warning is defined as ‘the provi-
sion of  timely and effective informa-
tion, through identified institutions, 
that allows individuals exposed to a 
hazard to take action to avoid or re-
duce their risk and prepare for effec-
tive response’ (UNISDR, 2004). EWS 
defines a technological infrastructure 
that can assist in carrying out these 
tasks. However, the EWS needs to go 
beyond this infrastructure by taking 
account of  how risks are understood 
and providing information for warn-
ing messages (Horita et al., 2016). 
EWS has four interlocking elements 
(Grasso, 2012):
• risk knowledge — to understand 
the risks (hazards and vulnerabili-
ties) and priorities at a given level;
• monitoring — to stay up to date 
on how the risks and vulnerabilities 
change through time;
• response capability — so that each 
level (pre-season mitigation activi-
ties, evacuation or duck-and-cover 
reflexes) is able to reduce risk once 
trends are spotted and announced;
• warning communication — to pre-
pare monitoring information into 
actionable messages understood by 
those that need them.
• In addition to the four elements, 
there are a number of  cross-cut-
ting issues that are critical to the 
development and sustainability of 
effective EWS; these include:
• effective governance and institu-
tional arrangements;
• a multihazard approach to early 
warning;
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• involvement of  local communities;
• consideration of  gender perspec-
tive, vulnerable populations and 
cultural diversity.
The most common view of  EWS 
comprises a ‘warning chain’, a line-
ar set of  connections from obser-
vations through warning generation 
and transmitter to users. In the me-
teorological community, the term 
‘end-to-end’ warning system is often 
used (Basher, 2005). The end-to-end 
concept aims to make forecasts and 
warnings more relevant and useable 
to end users. Such linear models are 
top-down and expert driven. They ne-
glect the likely impact of  the hazard 
and how warnings are communicated 
and responded to.
4.3.3
Effective early 
warning systems 
and warning 
communication
An effective EWS needs an effective 
communication system. Early warn-
ing communication systems are made 
up of  the following two main com-
ponents:
• The communication infrastructure 
hardware that must be reliable and 
robust, especially during natural 
disasters; many communication 
tools are currently available for 
warning dissemination such as cel-
lular phone text messaging, email, 
radio, TV and web services. It is 
essential to assure the redundancy 
of  communication systems, while 
emergency power supplies and 
back-up systems are critical in or-
der to avoid the collapse of  com-
munication systems after disasters 
occur (Grasso, 2012). In addition, 
in order to ensure reliable and ef-
fective operations and to avoid 
network congestion, frequencies 
and channels must be reserved and 
dedicated to disaster relief  opera-
tions.
• The warning messages: a critical el-
ement to influence the perception 
of  risk and public behaviour is how 
the warning information is struc-
tured and what it contains. Gen-
erally, warning message content 
represents a source’s assessment 
of  the existence and seriousness of 
a threat as well as what the public 
should do to protect themselves 
(Lindell and Perry, 2004). A mes-
sage delivered during a critical situ-
ation should contain:
- hazard — short description of 
the physical characteristics of  the 
hazard (nature and magnitude);
- location — if  possible, a certain 
position of  the area affected by 
the hazard;
- time (slow onset — occurring 
time, time estimated to reach the 
area; rapid onset — occurring 
time, rapid development);
- guidance — the appropriate 
course of  action necessary to pre-
vent death or injury, providing 
protective action recommenda-
tions, including options for those 
unable to comply with recom-
mended measures (e.g. evacuation 
orders);
- pertinent details that should be 
included in messages; i.e. where 
to find shelter and the location of 
recovery supplies or aid stations 
that may not be obvious to the re-
cipients of  the warning.
Communication and 
dissemination systems 
should be tailored to 
the needs of individual 
communities (e.g. radio 
or television for those 
with access and sirens, 
remote disposals, warning 
flags or messenger 
runners for remote 
communities). Messages 
should incorporate the 
understanding of the 
values, concerns and 
interests of those who will 
need to take action.
Recent studies (Sellnow et al., 2015) 
have underlined the importance of 
using instructional messages (messag-
es that take into account how people 
learn and the learning styles) during 
the response phase. The messages 
must include elements that not only 
explain the information, but also give 
its relevance (proximity, timeliness 
and personal impact) and motivate 
receivers to realise the value/utility of 
the message content and action (spe-
cific behavioural directions) that spec-
ify exactly what receivers are to do for 
self-protection.
A frequent problem is the weak link 
between the technical capacity to is-
sue the warning and the local commu-
nities’ capacity to respond effective-
ly to the formal systems of  warning 
(Basher, 2005). As such, it is impor-
tant to recognise that these activities 
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cannot be undertaken or directed by 
a single organisation, but require the 
coordinated participation of  many 
different types of  organisations that 
are committed at community level. 
National platforms for disaster re-
duction, stakeholder roundtables or 
interdepartmental committees should 
be empowered or established to or-
ganise the required coordination. The 
core technical agencies can play a key 
role by demanding the establishment 
of  such mechanisms and supporting 
them with specialised technical infor-
mation.
4.3.4
People-centred 
approach to early 
warning
To respond to these needs, the EWS 
has grown from a ‘techno-centric 
only’ paradigm to a ‘people-centric’ 
one where the ‘end-to-end’ and ‘mul-
tihazard’ components and their pro-
cedural norms start to bind together 
(Adger, 2000; UN, 2015). This new 
global move is led by the World Me-
teorological Organisation (WMO) 
which adopts a service delivery ap-
proach that should be making early 
warning information available and 
ensure the information is timely, reli-
able, dependable, usable, expandable, 
sustainable, responsive, authentic and 
credible (Ahmed, 2015). The WMO 
argues (WMO, 2014) for service-ori-
ented actions that start from:
• user engagement and developing 
partnerships;
• evaluation of  user needs and 
decisions;
• linking service development and 
delivery to user needs;
• evaluation and monitoring of  ser-
vices, performance and outcomes;
• sustained improved service deliv-
ery;
• development of  skills needed to 
sustain service delivery;
• sharing of  best practices and 
knowledge with others.
 
People-centred early 
warnings need to be 
clearly understood by 
people, easily and readily 
accessible to people; and 
timely: tied to response 
actions to be taken by 
people before, during and 
after the event.
The people-centred approach to ear-
ly warning is promoted by the Hyogo 
Framework for Action, and focuses 
on how communities must under-
stand threats in order to deal with 
them. Communities must be active 
receivers of  information and be en-
gaged in monitoring and such to fa-
cilitate the adoption of  protective 
actions (Grasso, 2012). The ‘peo-
ple-centred’ characteristic requires 
many systematic approaches and di-
verse activities spanning the four ele-
ments of  EWS described above, such 
as (Basher, 2005):
• identifying target populations (es-
pecially the vulnerable and disad-
vantaged);
• interacting with target populations 
to determine needs;
• involving communities in exploring 
and mapping their risks and plan-
ning their responses;
• fostering the development by com-
munities of  monitoring and warn-
ing systems for local risks;
• generating public information tai-
lored to target groups and making 
innovative use of  the media and 
education systems;
• establishing people-focused bench-
marks and performance standards 
for technical warning services;
• developing formal mechanisms for 
public representatives to monitor 
and oversee warning system design;
• using surveys to measure public 
awareness and satisfaction;
• creating monuments, publications, 
annual events and other anchors of 
public memory and learning;
• providing training on social factors 
for technical experts, authorities 
and communicators who operate 
the warning system;
• conducting research on factors that 
enhance or impede human under-
standing of  and response to warn-
ings;
• providing exercises and simulations 
to enable people to experience and 
practice warning interpretation and 
responses.
4.3.5
Effective early 
warning systems: 
lessons learned 
at community 
practice level
 
The  International Federation of  Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(2012) has published an overview of 
successful practices from the field for 
the disaster risk reduction/manage-
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ment practitioners interested in EWS. 
To be effective, warnings 
must have not only a 
sound scientific and 
technical basis, but also 
a strong focus on the 
people exposed to risk. 
Developing working 
relationships with 
partners, such as 
emergency managers 
and the media, and 
involving stakeholders in 
the development 
and review of the 
warning system 
is essential.
It presents guiding principles that 
could build a strong foundation for 
the design or strengthen EWS at any 
level. We present here the guiding 
principles per EWS component and 
for the cross-cutting themes.
The guiding principles per EWS 
component 
• Risk knowledge:
- K-1: Although risk knowledge 
exercises may not lead to early 
warning, all early warning must 
be founded on risk knowledge;
- K-2: Accept that a community’s 
priorities may not be your own.
• Monitoring:
- M-1: Passive receivers of  infor-
mation do not save lives;
- M-2: Some communities will 
need to drive their EWS;
- M-3: Public displays of  moni-
toring can motivate communi-
ties;
- M-4: When hazards evolve, so 
must their monitoring.
• Response capability:
- R-1: In EWS, we respond to 
warnings, not to disasters;
- R-2: Strive to organise robust 
no-regrets response actions;
- R-3: Embed response options 
by annually updating contingen-
cy plans with links to funding;
- R-4: Practice makes perfect: test 
drive your response actions.
• Warning communication:
- C-1: Clearly delegate responsi-
bility to alert or mediate;
- C-2: Do not fall into the sophis-
tication trap for warning devic-
es;
- C-3: Use staged warnings (levels 
and colours) in dissemination.
Cross cutting themes – guiding 
principles 
• CCT-1: Integrate within DRR — 
EWS is not a stand-alone;
• CCT-2: Aim for synergy across 
levels: community, national and re-
gional/global;
• CCT-3: Insist on multihazard EWS;
• CCT-4: Systematically include vul-
nerability;
• CCT-5: Design EWS components 
with multiple functions;
• CCT-6: Accommodate multiple 
timescales;
• CCT-7: Embrace multiple knowl-
edge systems;
• CCT-8: Account for evolving risk 
and rising uncertainty;
• CCT-9: EWS without borders: tar-
get the full vulnerability and haz-
ard-scape;
• CCT-10: Demand appropriate 
technology;
• CCT-11: Require redundancy in in-
dicators and communication chan-
nels;
• CCT-12: Target and reach disad-
vantaged and vulnerable groups;
• CCT-13: Build partnership and in-
dividual engagement.
In the changing landscape of  EWS, 
stakeholders should continue to prac-
tice a combination of  the approach-
es to build people-centric, multihaz-
ard, end-to-end and service-oriented 
EWS. The key for success would rely 
on:
• continued proactive governance;
• mobilisation of  resources and ca-
pacity development for delivering 
the services (from all four streams) 
to the countries;
• making provisions for integrating 
EWS into the overall disaster risk 
reduction measures, which would 
be essential for keeping future 
harm away and moving ahead to 
build resilience at the centre of  all 
activities (Ahmed, 2015).
4.3.6
Social media
and communities in 
disaster: connecting 
the ‘last mile’
ICT in general and social media in 
particular are an integral part of  many 
people’s lives today, including dur-
ing times of  crisis. As the examples 
illustrate in the previous chapter, cri-
sis management authorities in many 
countries are using the new technolo-
gies to increase public awareness and 
preparedness for disasters, to alert and 
warn the public and to optimise situ-
ational awareness when crises strike. 
418
While traditional radio and TV news 
remain important venues for sending 
emergency messages and updates to 
the general public (Collins and Ka-
pucu, 2008), the widely accessible 
internet and wireless technologies 
allow for more flexible methods of 
communication (Cutter et al., 2007; 
Kapucu, 2006a; National Research 
Council, 2007).
For example, a great tool for both 
emergency managers and the pub-
lic is Google Crisis Response, which 
organises emergency alerts and news 
updates relating to a crisis and pub-
lishes the information on dedicated 
landing pages. It also provides oppor-
tunities for donation in collaboration 
with international agencies such as 
Unicef, International Medical Corp 
and local relief  organisations. Google 
also builds and provides tools to help 
crisis responders and affected peo-
ple communicate and stay informed, 
such as Google Person Finder, Goog-
le Maps, Google Fusion Tables and 
Google Crisis Maps. Mobile apps 
have been developed with different 
demands and create a new approach 
for risk communication. The SMS 
alert system is useful in some cases 
for delivering alerts in an emergency, 
and GPS-related mobile apps (loca-
tion sensoring and hazard maps) help 
to locate people in potential danger; 
some applications are developed as 
pre-disaster warning devices (educa-
tional apps). One example for such 
alert apps is the Katwarn system in 
Germany, which is currently used by 
disaster management agencies in more 
than 60 counties to inform the popu-
lation about all types of  disasters; it is 
available for Android, iOS and Win-
dows phone platforms. Other exam-
ples for disaster alert apps are NINA, 
a general purpose disaster alert app. 
also from Germany, and SAIP, an 
app. provided by the French Ministry 
of  the Interior to provide the popula-
tion with alerts on major crises (with 
a special focus on terrorism alerts) 
(Klafft and Reinhard, 2016).
Social media use 
a decentralised, 
collaborative and 
network-based 
communication approach 
that allows citizens to 
generate data and share 
information about a 
hazard event irrespective 
of its geographic location 
and temporal extent, 
contributing to a resilient 
community.
Across various studies of  emergen-
cies and disaster events, numerous 
positive and negative aspects of  social 
media have been identified (Reuter 
and Spielhofer, 2016):
• Social media promote cross-plat-
form accessibility and a constant 
flow of  information. During the 
Haiti earthquake in 2010, Usha-
hidi (an open-source multimedia 
mapping platform) allowed near-
real-time mapping of  the impacted 
population, which helped volun-
teers with rescue and response op-
erations. Just-in-time information 
could be provided on how to cope 
with developing situations. Dur-
ing Super Storm Sandy in 2012, 
FourSquare (a location-based so-
cial network site) provided location 
information about visitors, which 
helped emergency responders with 
evacuation. The Louisiana Bucket 
Brigade, a local environmental jus-
tice organisation active along the 
Gulf  Coast of  the United States, 
created the Oil Spill Crisis Map af-
ter the 2010 Deepwater Horizon 
oil spill to provide information 
about community experience and 
risk perception to help with emer-
gency management (Kar, 2016).
• Moreover, social media provide a 
framework for the work of  jour-
nalists and for public discussion 
and debate. The United Nations 
Office for Outer Space Affairs es-
tablished the Space-based Informa-
tion for Disaster management and 
Emergency Response (UN-Spider) 
in 2006 to help with disaster risk 
reduction through stakeholder par-
ticipation (UN, 2006).
Negative aspects of  social media in-
clude the sometimes ‘chaotic’ or dis-
organised work of  volunteers and 
the need for quality assessment, as 
well as the possible increase of  task 
complexity and uncertainty for emer-
gency services (Reuter and Spielhofer, 
2016).
Social media can be understood as 
communication services that employ 
interactive online ICT (often referred 
to as Web 2.0 technologies) to enable 
the exchange of  user-generated con-
tent. The term ‘social media’ embrac-
es blogs, micro-blogs, social book-
marking, social networking, forums, 
collaborative creation of  documents 
(via wikis) and the sharing of  audio, 
photographic and video files (Balana, 
2012). Social media are highly interac-
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tive ‘digital tools that feature content 
users may generate, manipulate, or in-
fluence’ (Giroux et al., 2013). In other 
words, social media encourage inter-
action and dialogue between users, 
creating an information space that is 
decentralised and devoid of  hierarchy.
By providing community members 
with tools to engage in crisis prepar-
edness, response and recovery, so-
cial media may have a role to play in 
building community resilience — a 
measure of  a community’s ability to 
respond to, withstand and recover 
from adverse situations (Dufty, 2012).
Most studies regarding social media 
use for emergencies focus on under-
standing how emergency response or-
ganisations adopt tools like social me-
dia and bring attention to members 
of  the public as contributors and re-
ceivers in the emergency information 
arena. The ‘crisis informatics’ is the 
study of  the social and technical (so-
cio-technical) behaviours in emergen-
cy response, with a focus on the flows 
of  information between the people 
and organisations involved. The ap-
proach attempts to account descrip-
tively and theoretically for social be-
haviour that is made possible through 
technology (Hughes et al., 2009):
• Citizen reporting: the ability for 
people to report from on the 
ground during and after an event 
is analogue to ideas of  citizens as 
‘sensors’ — members of  the public 
who detect, measure and report lo-
cal emergency information — and 
as ‘journalists’ — members of  the 
public who collect, report, analyse 
and disseminate news and informa-
tion.
• Community-oriented computing: 
social media have been described 
as facilitating online communities 
where members share and seek 
information during times of  crisis 
(Wang, 2010).
• Collective intelligence and distrib-
uted problem solving: social me-
dia have been shown to facilitate 
collective intelligence — where 
large, distributed groups of  peo-
ple solve complex problems (Vi-
vacqua and Borges, 2010). Citizens 
may also provide geographically 
tagged localised and distributed 
reports — known as volunteered 
geographic information — of  cri-
sis events through social media. 
This geographic information can 
then be collated and mapped by 
volunteers who call themselves 
‘crisis mappers’, using open-source 
mapping software such as Google 
Maps, OpenStreetMap or Ushahidi 
(Heipke, 2010).
• Contributions to situational aware-
ness: an important contribution 
that social media offer in times of 
crisis is their potential to enhance 
situational awareness (Ireson, 
2009).
The behaviours described above show 
ways to use social media in order to 
build community disaster resilience. 
These include (Dufty, 2012):
• developing social capital (e.g. net-
works, leadership and support sys-
tems) for disaster resilience-learn-
ing communities;
• informing others of  the disaster 
risks in their community and dis-
cussing and planning what is being 
done to manage the risks and what 
they can do;
• engaging with others to help them 
prepare for a disaster;
• providing intelligence through 
‘crowdsourcing’ to others (includ-
ing emergency managers) before, 
during and after a disaster;
• communicating warnings and other 
information to communities dur-
ing a disaster;
• providing support to people during 
and after a disaster;
• coordinating community response 
and recovery.
4.3.7
High tech/low tech 
communication and 
ethical challenges of 
social media
The London power outage of  2003 
highlighted the importance of  not re-
lying on one single type of  medium 
for warning and for informing the 
public (UK Cabinet Office, 2005) and 
reveals the vulnerability of  social me-
dia networks to power outages, which 
in turn can leave healthy, affluent in-
dividuals in their mid  twenties feeling 
very vulnerable. The guidance provid-
ed by the United Kingdom Civil Con-
tingencies Secretariat to accompany 
the Civil Contingencies Act advises 
emergency responders to promote 
the use of  resilient communication 
systems such as battery-operated or 
wind-up radios during emergencies as 
well as embracing social media plat-
forms such as Twitter and Facebook 
to communicate during a crisis.
A woman in her late eighties, living 
alone in a small apartment with a 
meagre income from a state pension 
might appear vulnerable, but during 
the large-scale power outage in the 
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UK capital in 2003 she was able to 
heat a can of  baked beans on a gas 
cooker and make a meal with some 
pasta, as well as share her experience 
with thousands of  people through 
interactive media by using a landline 
telephone to call a BBC London local 
radio phone-in programme which was 
discussing the power outage.
Although social media 
will not replace traditional 
media in the foreseeable 
future, today many young 
people already heavily 
rely on social media to 
gain information, making 
this population hard to 
reach through established 
communication channels 
such as radio or 
television. Therefore, it is 
about striking a balance; 
social media tools are one 
of many communication 
tools to use.
By contrast, many well-paid workers 
in their mid twenties, who were em-
ployed in the main financial square 
mile of  the City of  London, might 
have been considered to be less vul-
nerable than the old woman, but the 
power outage exposed their lack of 
resilience — they could not use cred-
it or debit cards to pay for food or 
drink due to the outage, they could 
not get any cash from ATMs and 
those that had cash could not buy 
provisions from supermarkets which 
were forced to close as their tills did 
not work. There were also addition-
al security as well as health and safety 
concerns caused by the power outage 
(Civil Contingencies Act DVD, 2005). 
Wi-Fi networks were not available, 
denying internet access to the workers 
who commonly used email to organ-
ise their social life.
Those workers in their mid twen-
ties who had a supply of  ready-oven 
meals at home could not cook them 
as their microwave and electric ovens 
were not working and they could not 
travel further afield to areas with pow-
er because the London underground 
train system had stopped running and 
taxis, which were in great demand, 
would only accept cash payments 
(Civil Contingencies Act DVD 2005). 
With mobile phones lasting just a few 
hours before their batteries died or 
the back-up batteries at mobile phone 
masts lasting little more than 2 hours, 
the City workers in their mid twenties 
were revealed to be highly vulnerable 
and displayed little resilience as the 
power outage affected their service- 
and technology-reliant lifestyle (Civil 
Contingencies Act DVD, 2005).
A study by the University of  East 
London, carried out in 2010-2013, 
used gaming theory to predict social 
media use during a mass evacuation 
event in London and one of  the main 
conclusions was that radio, especially 
BBC radio, was still regarded as one of 
the most trusted and reliable sources 
of  information during an emergency 
(Preston, 2013).
Emergency managers normally have 
to walk a very thin line between ac-
tions that may be deemed excessive 
and any failure to respond adequately 
that could be considered as negligence 
(Alexander, 2014). Also, considering 
the vulnerable people, any system of 
disaster response or risk reduction that 
depends on social media for access to 
its services risks excluding those peo-
ple who lack access to the technolo-
gy. ‘Computer illiteracy’ is a form of 
disadvantage in a world that has be-
come dependent on digital commu-
nication for many services. It is only 
partially compensated for by the fact 
that, by relaying information by word 
of  mouth, other people will be able to 
help a disadvantaged individual cope.
Other ethical risks are associated with 
a largely unregulated internet-based 
system of  public mass communi-
cation. The use of  social media for 
malignant purposes could potentially 
include:
• attempts to persecute people or 
damage their reputations (Boggs 
and Edwards, 2010);
• attempts to spread malicious ru-
mour;
• efforts to create violent protest;
• attempts to organise terrorist activ-
ities.
4.3.8
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership 
In this changing landscape of  ICT, 
EWS and advent of  social media, the 
key for success in disaster risk man-
agement would rely on user engage-
ment and developing partnerships for 
gradual evaluation and improvements. 
This process may comprise compre-
hensive provisioning of: (a) evalua-
tion of  user needs; (b) evaluation and 
CHAPTER 4 COMMUNICATING DISASTER RISK
421
monitoring of  actions, performance 
and outcomes; and (c) sharing of  best 
practices and knowledge with others.
Knowledge
The opportunities and challenges that 
ICT and social media bring to devel-
opment of  disaster risk management 
foster a process that builds principles 
for action for communities of  prac-
tice, creating a ‘space of  meaning’ 
with theories for action, social change 
and instruments for implementation. 
Because each operational context is 
unique, stakeholders who aim to im-
plement a policy or strategy have to 
learn their way into this implementa-
tion, often with a considerable need 
for innovation.
 
Innovation 
This chapter presents some interest-
ing and viable ways that disaster re-
sponders and people could rely on 
ICT and digital media to support their 
communities in times of  disaster. In 
some cases, individual and community 
needs result in authority actions, mov-
ing toward the establishment of  tan-
gible resources that even endure over 
time. In other cases, ICT use might be 
ad hoc and temporary, resulting in the 
establishment of  practices that prove 
useful to the community and can be 
used as tools for continuous adapta-
tion and innovation.
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4.4 Good practices and 
innovation in risk 
communication
David	Allen, Eve Coles, Terhi Kankaanranta, Caroline Mcmullan,
David Mobach, Alistair Norman, Tanja Perko, Kari Pylvas,
Niek Wijngaards
4.4.1
Introduction
In this chapter we deal with the 
thorny issue of  innovations and ‘best 
practices’ in risk communication. In-
dividual examples of  best practice 
developed from both research and by 
enlightened practitioners (c.f. Cole-
man, 2013) are not difficult to find. 
Seeger (2006) identified the following 
ten ‘best practices’ in risk communi-
cation:
1. Process approaches and policy de-
velopment for and responding to 
crisis are critical to success.
2. Pre-event planning, creating teams, 
fact-finding protocols, messaging 
and delivery are vital.
3. Partnerships with the public.
4. Listen to others’ concerns.
5. Exhibit honesty, candor and open-
ness.
6. Collaborate and coordinate with 
credible sources.
7. Meet the needs of  the media and 
remain accessible.
8. Communicate with compassion, 
concern and empathy.
9. Accept uncertainty and ambiguity.
10. Provide messages of  self-effica-
cy by issuing specific information 
telling people what they can do to 
reduce harm; these messages can 
help restore some sense of  control 
over an uncertain and threatening 
situation (Seeger, 2006).
This was developed further by (Heath, 
2006) who suggested two further best 
practices:
1. Realise that crisis response is a 
narrative and that you are telling a 
story.
2. Be committed and able to deliver 
on the promise to be the first and 
best source of  information.
In the early 2000s these issues were 
seen as best practice and, given the 
relative paucity of  research in this 
area, are easily identified. The com-
plexity, scale and scope of  both man-
made and natural disasters now de-
mand new types of  response and have 
led to a blossoming of  research and 
development activity to address these 
societal challenges. Equally, both the 
role of  new technologies and new 
communication patterns have enabled 
new forms of  practice to emerge. 
The best practice discussed by Seeger 
(2006) and Heath (2006) remains rele-
vant but has now been embedded into 
processes and protocols discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter. We refer, 
therefore, to ‘innovation’ and ‘emerg-
ing practice/improving practice’ rath-
er than ‘best practice’.
Innovation can be described as the 
process of  moving knowledge gained 
in research to the development of  a 
physical product or changing the way 
things are done which can improve 
the quality of  life. However, innova-
tion and risk do not necessarily make 
good allies. Innovation by its nature 
suggests levels of  uncertainty and risk 
(HM Government Office of  Science, 
2014); it is therefore unsurprising that 
different authors (Kasperson, 2014; 
Renn, 2014; Árvai, 2014; Pigdeon, 
2014) have agreed that risk commu-
nication practices and processes have 
changed little over the last few years 
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(Kasperson, 2014). Furthermore, 
Pidgeon (2014) points out that in-
creasingly complex, more frequent 
and costly disruptive events require 
scrutiny of  both emerging technol-
ogies and changing risk identities in 
society to develop the strategic capac-
ity to address these fundamental risk 
communication problems ‘in appro-
priate methods for situating ‘values’ 
in public and stakeholder engagement 
and in fostering citizen deliberation 
for the wider public good’. However, 
by surveying the evidence from cur-
rent research about what works, the 
relationship between public sector or-
ganisations and private citizens in fos-
tering innovation in risk communica-
tion can be tested and its effectiveness 
determined (HM Government Office 
of  Science, 2014).
Innovation has been categorised in a 
variety of  different ways from pro-
cess innovation, product or service 
innovation, governance innovation 
or conceptual innovation (De Vries et 
al., 2015). We focus on the following 
three aspects of  innovation and im-
proving practice in risk communica-
tion by identifying particular issues 
and areas of  innovation which are 
challenging either for practice or areas 
of  intense activity.
Firstly we deal with innovation and 
practice in the process of  risk com-
munication, focusing on one of  the 
more significant areas of  the former: 
new emergent approaches that reori-
entate practice around communities 
and new and evolving decentralised 
approaches. Secondly, we look at new 
communication patterns, emphasis-
ing the challenges of  communicating 
with millennials and of  cross-border 
communication. The third chapter of 
this chapter pays particular attention 
to technology infrastructure concern-
ing innovations which allow rich me-
dia channels to be utilised. The final 
chapter discusses the challenges faced 
in embedding these innovations into 
practice.
4.4.2
Risk communication 
and citizen 
participation
Research indicates that messages 
need to be culturally adapted to dif-
ferent country settings. Investigated 
by the current EU BeSeCu project 
as well as by the EU E-COM@EU 
project, findings indicate that cultur-
al differences extend from mere age 
differences to a national context with 
regard to the most popular social me-
dia tools and national norms for com-
munication style and tone. 
Governments (national, regional and 
local), emergency management (re-
sponder) organisations and other 
public service bodies are traditionally 
risk averse and mostly rely on commu-
nication methods that reflect a view 
that aims to align lay perceptions with 
expert views of  severity (Árvai, 2014) 
rather than participatory models that 
recognise local citizen expertise and 
knowledge. Further, Höppneret al. 
(2012) suggest that within the current 
pan-European communication prac-
tices, knowledge on the (target-specif-
ic) suitability of  different communi-
cation forms is rarely translated into 
the field. There has been, however, a 
recent paradigmatic shift in disaster 
risk management moving from a top-
down focus to what has been termed a 
‘people-centred approach’. While this 
approach is still emergent and con-
tested (Scolobiget et al., 2015), it has 
led to a range of  innovative practic-
es and approaches, such as the align-
ment of  people-centred decentralised 
approaches. The development of 
digital technologies and social media 
platforms (e.g. the use of  social media 
in the Haiti earthquake, the Queens-
land floods in Australia and Hurricane 
Sandy in the United States) has led 
to new ways of  delivering better tar-
geted, actionable risk information to 
diverse publics across multicultural, 
multiagency and multi-jurisdictional 
boundaries.
Communication needs to 
be culturally and context 
specific while it engages 
citizens “as sensors” 
and contributors in the 
unfolding “story”.
Due to its popularity and collabora-
tive, participatory, decentralised and 
accessible nature, social media allows 
information to pass quickly to mul-
tiple publics and organisations; thus 
extending the reach of  emergency 
responder organisations, enhancing 
risk communication, improving sit-
uational awareness and furthermore 
providing traceable geographical and 
temporal data for monitoring disaster 
events in real time (OECD, 2012). Re-
lated research also indicates, however, 
that despite the shift from mass me-
dia to social media as a complemen-
tary platform and the several different 
identified uses and functions (prepar-
edness, warning and informing, pre-
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event signal detection, connecting 
communities, developing resilience 
and aiding recovery), social media is 
still emergent (Houston et al., 2015).
To address these issues there has been 
considerable investment by the EU 
through its seventh framework pro-
gramme for research and technolog-
ical development (FP7) and Horizon 
2020 frameworks in risk communica-
tion research. An innovative, ground-
breaking project — PetaJakarta.org 
— combines different sources of  data 
and citizen participation to produce 
real-time intelligence-led information 
to create a shared situational aware-
ness and to promote resilience (Hol-
derness and Turpin, 2016).
PetaJakarta is an example of  apply-
ing new concepts such as geosocial 
intelligence frameworks, and demon-
strates an evolutionary process from 
passive spatial and temporal data min-
ing techniques to ‘big crowdsourcing’. 
Geosocial intelligence frameworks 
rely on a deep understanding of  the 
information ecosystem within which 
social media platforms operate. The 
challenge in gathering ‘intelligence’ is 
to extract knowledge from the ‘noise’ 
generated by such platforms so that 
users, governments and other actors 
can make ‘actionable decisions in a 
time-critical manner’ (Holderness and 
Turpin, 2015). Four principles under-
lie such frameworks:
1. Reliable, free and open-source 
software that enables the gathering, 
sorting and displaying of  useful 
disaster-related information.
2. ‘Big crowdsourcing,’ wherein us-
ers on a social media platform are 
actively encouraged to share infor-
mation relevant to a given situation 
or anticipated scenario.
3. A participatory approach and 
co-management that values the 
peer-to-peer sharing of  situational 
information within the same plat-
form that is used by government 
agencies and first responders who 
can transparently monitor and 
cross-check the data being shared.
4. Open data, so that all users can in-
spect the software, review the sys-
tem and develop complementary 
tools and technologies that further 
enhance resilience within the infor-
mation ecosystem.
This ‘people as sensors’ paradigm 
(which echoes the work of  Scolobig 
et al. 2015) was used by PetaJakarta 
to contact many more Twitter users 
than any human could hope to do 
and allowed the network of  users to 
grow organically through linking to 
personal networks. The map used by 
both citizens and government agen-
cies created a reciprocal communi-
cation interface between citizens, the 
PetaJakarta project and the govern-
ment. By engaging with government 
civil defence agencies and noting their 
operating procedures, including inter-
action between Twitter accounts @
petakjt and @BPBDJakarta to dis-
seminate (retweet) key information, 
the project was seen as credible and 
legitimate by other government de-
partments and the public. Major chal-
lenges for this project were:
• how to ensure the verification of 
very big crowdsourced data; and
• how to engage citizens to partici-
pate actively in sharing their data.
Verifying the data acquired from Twit-
ter was of  critical importance to the 
project. User-generated reports were 
cross-checked in a number of  differ-
ent ways: by cross-referencing data 
with tweets from the same location; 
Twitter feeds from government agen-
cies; electronic media such as televi-
sion reports and internet news sites; 
and by recognising active users who 
frequently tweet reliable information.
To engage as many citizen users as 
possible, a community inclusion strat-
egy was designed to use concise, ac-
tion-oriented messages such as ‘See 
a flood. Tell Us’ and also to adopt a 
user-centric approach by encouraging 
users to retweet any messages received 
from the project to their own person-
al networks. The big crowdsourcing 
element of  the project was also em-
phasised by highlighted messages pro-
moting the benefits of  greater use of 
PetaJakarta such as ‘The more people 
use PetaJakarta, the better the map will 
be’ (Holderness and Turpin, 2015). 
The strategy sought to highlight the 
community resource element of  the 
project by adopting a non-moralising, 
opt-in approach to include citizens as 
partners in the sharing of  real-time 
information and situational awareness 
regarding flooding rather than just 
being the recipients of  emergency or 
information messages.
The example of  the PetaJakarta pro-
ject demonstrates how innovative 
participatory, collaborative approach-
es can be extended to gather real-time 
information through the use of  social 
media platforms and open-source 
software. Furthermore, the utility of 
the concept of  a Geosocial intelli-
gence framework appears to be trans-
ferable given the global nature of  the 
social media platform and the avail-
ability of  the open-source software, 
making the concept adaptable to the 
European context.
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4.4.3
New communication 
patterns
This chapter looks into the use of  so-
cial media and mobile technologies 
in the communication process with 
younger (millennial) demographics. 
Messages, urgency and level of  plan-
ning change with the stage in the dis-
aster cycle and planned versus reac-
tive settings are highlighted. The place 
of  such media in a wider set of  media 
used in a range of  disaster settings is 
examined and discussed, as are the 
opportunities to extend messages 
from traditional media to include, and 
take advantage of, newer forms of 
communication.
Eurostat statistics suggest that young-
er people are more likely, in Europe 
as elsewhere, to have access to more 
up-to-date smartphones as well as 
to information via tablets and gam-
ing consoles. Furthermore, younger 
people are less likely to engage with 
traditional channels such as radio 
and broadcast media/print press and 
more likely to make use of  social 
media such as Twitter, regarding this 
as a legitimate source of  informa-
tion, more than older citizens would 
(Bruns and Burgess, 2014). 
Conflicting previous research (such 
as Austin et al. 2012) has implied that 
traditional media was preferred — at 
least a few years earlier —as a credible 
source of  information, and similarly 
(according to Vihalemm et al. 2012), 
the trust in traditional media outlets 
has been seen to rest upon the belief 
that communication institutions have 
the proficiency to assess and estimate 
information to obtain an adequate 
overview of  a situation and to calcu-
late risks and make decisions when 
broadcasting.
Even though decreasingly, informa-
tion is still sought through tradition-
al mass media sources (namely from 
broadcasting companies), to some ex-
tent regarded as more credible sourc-
es of  information. According to the 
findings of  a survey of  1 034 citizens 
across 30 European countries, only 
13 % of  respondents perceived infor-
mation on social media to be more ac-
curate than that of  traditional media 
channels. In fact, nearly half  (44 %) 
of  the respondents did not agree with 
this statement (Reuter and Spielhofer, 
2016).
To this extent, there have been im-
plications that — through its social, 
interactive, local, rapid, unfiltered and 
timely qualities as well as convenience 
and personal nature — social media 
serves as a medium leading towards 
providing relevant information (Po-
setti, 2012; Austin et al., 2012). This 
is also supported by the previously 
mentioned survey, showing that citi-
zens perceive information provided 
on social media during emergencies 
as more accessible than information 
provided via more traditional media 
channels such as TV, radio or me-
dia websites (Reuter and Spielhofer, 
2016). The change could be explained 
through media convergence; the in-
terlocking of  different types of  media 
(text, audio and video) and content 
(news, popular culture, etc.) on online 
forums (and further on social media 
sharing) has improved and simplified 
access to any kind of  information via 
smart devices that was previously sec-
tored behind different media (televi-
sion, radio and print press). Key social 
apps such as Facebook and WhatsApp 
also have a useful characteristic in that 
it is easy to share information, and the 
functionality of  the apps make it clear 
which information is more recent or 
has updated other information; there-
fore, these apps facilitate the creation 
of  shared situation (or information) 
awareness.
It is important to 
handle the transition 
from traditional media 
to social media, while 
fostering trust and 
reducing rumours and 
misinformation.
A key issue is that of  engaging com-
munities and citizens rather than 
purely disseminating messages. This 
was investigated comprehensively by 
the Public Empowerment Policies for 
Crisis Management (PEP), which sug-
gested the integration of  younger cit-
izens in responsibilities for such com-
munication to improve relevance and 
access to that demographic. A related 
effect is the low reliance of  EU com-
munities on self-help (POP ALERT 
project), with ‘the authorities’ being 
expected to lead efforts as well as be a 
source of  information. POP-ALERT 
suggests that community resilience 
can (and should) be strengthened, and 
highlights social media and messaging 
as key tools in engaging younger de-
mographics as well as in providing 
resources such as toolkits to support 
such development. This is further 
supported by Duffy (2012), who iden-
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tifies the use of  social media in such 
efforts to improve resilience and pre-
paredness.
Once a disaster has occurred, the 
emphasis shifts from preparedness 
messages to messages designed to 
update and inform. There has been 
significant EU action to develop ap-
propriate infrastructure, which allows 
connectivity and access to informa-
tion during the course of  a disaster 
that may have compromised such 
communication systems (IDIRA and 
PPDRTC, for example). For many 
people in such a situation, the priority 
becomes the ability to ‘track’ the dis-
asters and gauge the likelihood of  be-
ing affected. For example, residents in 
a flood area not yet affected by flood-
water need to know whether they are 
in an area where they should stay put, 
prepare for the eventuality of  evacua-
tion or evacuate. 
Another interesting notion is how the 
source and form of  crisis information 
affects the public’s information-seek-
ing behaviour. Based on their study 
on such behaviour during crisis sit-
uations, Austin et al. (2012) suggest 
that people are more likely to use the 
same type of  media to seek informa-
tion as that from which they initially 
heard about the crisis. Their findings 
extend to the channel complementa-
rity theory, which proposes that users 
of  a medium that serves a particular 
functional need are also more likely to 
choose other media relevant to serv-
ing that particular function or need 
(Dutta-Bergman, 2006).
Similarly, previous research has es-
tablished that the effectiveness of 
crisis communication is positively in-
fluenced when the social position of 
the communicator or the channel is 
‘close’ to the recipients’ everyday lives 
(Trumbo and McComas, 2008; La-
chlan et al., 2007). Furthermore, the 
public’s implicit or inherent presump-
tions regarding the source or channel 
of  information may affect further 
information behaviour (e.g. seeking 
more information about threats or ig-
noring it) (Vihalemm et al., 2012). Bird 
et al. (2012), for example, highlight 
the use of  Facebook groups — both 
official and community generated — 
in the Queensland floods in Australia. 
In this setting, the ability to trust the 
messages received is key and informa-
tion is likely to be sought, particular-
ly by younger people, from multiple 
channels in order to ‘cross-reference’ 
advice and information (EU public 
empowerment policies project). The 
issue of  trustworthiness of  messages 
also needs to be highlighted. Credible 
sources are needed to convey messag-
es and should take advantage of  the 
‘spotlight’ period of  public attention 
at the height of  a disaster to ensure 
effective messages are disseminated. 
This issue of  trust is specifically ad-
dressed by the E-COM@ EU project.
Post-incident preparedness messages 
can be continued and will have, for a 
period of  time, a higher level of  at-
tention, especially with regard to the 
specific type of  incident that has oc-
curred, although, depending on the 
nature of  the disaster, communica-
tion systems may be affected over a 
very short or an extended period of 
time (e.g. in the case of  infrastructure 
damage after a flood or earthquake).
Cool et al. (2015) highlight the role of 
social media with younger citizens in 
post-disaster risk communication af-
ter Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines 
as well as the lack of  an infrastructure 
of  social media use during the disas-
ter itself. Yasuda et al. (2016) highlight 
the role of  in-school projects in pre-
paring younger citizens in the same 
setting, as do Schiavo et al. (2016) in 
a broader health-promotion context.
Communication with younger demo-
graphics shares one key issue with 
wider issues of  communication; the 
requirement for a capable and resilient 
infrastructure to support communi-
cation. This is being addressed both 
as a technical issue (e.g. provision of 
resilient broadband —PPDRTC pro-
ject) and through effective middle-
ware to improve collaboration among 
message providers (e.g. Disaster and 
IDIRA). In terms of  preparedness, 
such communication capability is 
available to many people (and argua-
bly especially to younger people) for 
most of  the time through 4G wireless 
networks, broadcast media and target-
ed project interventions.
Cyber security is also raised as a risk 
factor by projects including the EU 
public empowerment policies project, 
as is the quality of  information sourc-
es feeding into messages — especially 
at the reaction stage; EU Proactive 
project being an example of  a tech-
nical approach to this issue. The need 
to take a multidisciplinary and multi-
channel approach to communication 
rather than targeting specific groups 
— such as younger people — solely 
via a ‘preferred’ channel is highlighted 
by the EMBRACE project. Further-
more, studies related to crisis com-
munication in real-life situations (e.g. 
Greater London area riots in 2011 
and the swine flu epidemic in 2010) 
have highlighted the role of  proactive 
and interactive methods of  commu-
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nication as well as timely reaction in 
both enabling trust and increasing 
communicational reach.
These studies emphasise the impor-
tance of  interaction and participation 
in online communication rather than 
merely relying on one-way informa-
tion dissemination. Prompt reaction 
and interaction can prove to be piv-
otal in avoiding a communicational 
void (especially from the public au-
thorities) — and in preventing such a 
void from being filled by other actors 
— as well as in establishing dialogue 
and trust towards citizens, but also 
in increasing communicational reach 
through shares, likes and recommen-
dations (Denef  et al., 2013; Tirkko-
nen and Luoma-Aho 2011). A further 
risk issue in the use of  social media — 
therefore disproportionately affecting 
younger citizens — is the potential 
(Alexander, 2014) for inaccurate in-
formation. Rumours, either naïve or 
malicious, can be rapidly and widely 
disseminated in advance of  accurate 
information, and can potentially re-
duce its impact or fully eclipse it when 
it does come. For example, according 
to a study by Gupta et al. (2013), ru-
mours and fake content covered 29 % 
of  the most viral content on Twitter, 
while 51 % of  the content was gener-
ic opinions and comments and only 
20 % relayed true, factual informa-
tion. 
A recent study also found echo ef-
fects (i.e. the dissemination of  older 
tweets with fake information) but also 
self-correcting mechanisms of  social 
media communities when verifying 
and dispelling online rumours dur-
ing crises (Jong and Dückers, 2016). 
There are also imbalances in nation-
al contexts; Mudhavanu et al. (2015), 
for example, highlighted the lack of 
involvement of  younger citizens in 
disaster risk communication in Zim-
babwe.
4.4.4
Technology
Infrastructure
A key area for technological inno-
vation in DRM relates to the social 
and technical challenges concern-
ing personalisation while achieving a 
shared situational awareness among 
the emergency services and citizens. 
Shared situation awareness refers to 
information that is shared, including 
updates of  the information among 
a group of  people, for example as 
achieved by projects discussed above. 
Shared situational awareness is often 
defined for team performance (e.g. 
Cuevas et al., 2011), yet is also rele-
vant in crisis management (e.g. Van 
De Ven et al., 2008; Wolbers and 
Boersma, 2013). Personalisation is 
directly related to cultural and con-
textual diversity in Europe, including 
multilingualism, the EU-wide mobili-
ty of  its citizens and serving citizens 
experiencing a disability or requiring 
special needs (e.g. deafness, speech 
impairment, etc.). A number of  EU 
FP7 and Horizon 2020 projects are 
currently addressing these aspects to 
enable rich(er) communication be-
tween emergency services and citi-
zens, including bidirectional voice, 
real-time text, video and data: ‘total 
conversation’ with rich data (personal, 
medical and location data). A non-ex-
haustive overview can be found in the 
appendix.
Current communication means that 
rely mainly on voice calls via land-
lines or mobile phones as services 
for exceptional cases are only partial-
ly supported by SMS, email, fax and 
text relay. The advent of  social apps 
and the wide availability of  smart de-
vices enable the implementation of  a 
total conversation model that com-
bines audio, real-time text, video and 
data-sharing to serve all citizens, in-
cluding those experiencing a disability 
and requiring special needs. However, 
typical challenges encountered are re-
lated to standardisation and customi-
sation: standardisation is necessary to 
ensure European-wide accessibility to 
emergency services, while customisa-
tion is necessary to allow the imple-
mentation of  specific apps, products 
and services for specific audiences.
Another open challenge is multilin-
gualism and multicultural personali-
sation (Stephens and Malone, 2009). 
Each European country (and beyond) 
hosts many citizens who do not speak 
the native language, including tourists, 
expats and immigrants, but also citi-
zens who use sign language (i.e. due 
to speech or hearing impairments). 
During crises, effective and efficient 
communication is of  utmost impor-
tance, and having control over the 
quality of  translations of  commu-
nications is also an applicable chal-
lenge to emergency services (Manso 
et al., 2016). The operators and first 
responders engaging in dialogue with 
citizens may need automated support 
in communicating effectively with 
citizens with different language pro-
ficiencies and cultural backgrounds 
(Manso et al., 2016). Projects such as 
NEXES, Insign and SignSpeak ad-
dress the challenge of  fostering com-
munication with (national and inter-
national) sign language users.
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Technical standardisation may be 
hampered or fostered by the current 
developments of  regional and nation-
al ‘emergency apps’. Examples of  na-
tional apps with integration into the 
emergency services’ systems and work 
processes include the BurgerNet app. 
(n.d.), the WhereAREU app. (n.d.), 
Greater Manchester Police app. (n.d.), 
and others. A possible disadvantage 
is a plethora of  special-purpose apps 
that only function within a specif-
ic region. Other apps, such as the 
BurgerNet app., have functionality for 
cross-border cooperation and pave 
the way for standardisation efforts. 
An innovation investigated by the 
NEXES project is to provide stand-
ardisation to the ‘back-end’ of  these 
apps through providing reusable li-
braries. This ensures flexibility by app. 
developers to build any desired app. 
with a harmonised integration with 
emergency services. An advantage of 
such an innovation is that, potentially, 
such apps can function everywhere in 
Europe and beyond.
Enable communication 
between many parties 
through different (non-)
digital media, securing 
proof of origin, tamper 
proof contents and 
discovery of updated 
information.
A social and technical challenge for 
emergency services is to engage in 
‘crowdsourcing’: mobilising citizens 
to provide information on specific 
topics and/or engage in certain ac-
tions. However, both the advantages 
and disadvantages of  crowdsourcing 
concern privacy, handling informa-
tion from participants with malicious 
intent, detecting false positives, etc. 
Furthermore, participant motivation 
and engagement are of  importance, 
especially when frequent updates of 
information from crowdsourcing are 
required (Liu, 2014).
Although general media coverage 
cannot, and likely should not, be re-
stricted, communication with and by 
emergency services may need to be-
come more focussed and targeted. A 
challenge for risk communication is 
to target specific risk communication 
to a specific audience, possibly de-
liberately excluding specific citizens, 
e.g. unaffected citizens (Manso et al., 
2016).
Another challenge concerns the par-
ty that takes the initiative. Typically, 
citizens take the initiative by calling 
emergency services in an emergency. 
Emergency services, however, take 
the initiative prior to an incident/
situation in providing information to 
(groups of) citizens. An innovation to 
be investigated in social and techni-
cal implications concerns how emer-
gency services can contact a citizen, 
which could be a response of  ‘call-
ing back’ or when losing connectivi-
ty (Manso et al., 2016). Alternatively, 
there is the case of  proactive com-
munication: initiating communication 
before a hazardous situation unfolds. 
Unexpected communication by emer-
gency services and other authorities 
towards citizens may raise issues re-
garding privacy.
Crisis informatics (Palen et al., 2007) 
is a documented phenomenon that 
illustrates how people in and out of 
the disaster go online through com-
puters using Web 2.0 applications, cell 
phones and other personal devices to 
provide, seek and broker information 
in times of  emergency. 
For example, results found in Soteria 
indicate that citizens consider author-
ities’ presence in social media as valu-
able and reassuring during emergen-
cy situations (Jäntti et al. 2016). This 
directly implies that trust is an im-
portant facet of  risk communication 
(Coombs and Holladay 2014). Apart 
from social and political aspects of 
trust, a number of  security considera-
tions are of  importance regarding the 
message(s) sent by certain (trustwor-
thy) parties (Fruth and Nett, 2014; 
Tanenbaum and Van Steen, 2007):
• Non-repudiation: no message can 
be changed or tampered with; it is 
the original message with original 
author, source location and times-
tamp.
• Signed: any message can be traced 
to its author (the originating party).
• Relationships: any message explicit-
ly refers to another message, includ-
ing an annotation of  the type of  re-
lationship, such as ‘is an update of ’.
• Distribution: any message can be 
shared and distributed, without 
changing the above properties.
• A challenge is to explore these 
technical considerations further so 
that messages sent by (authorised) 
parties can be received, inspected 
and shared by any recipient. Of  im-
portance is the ability to check for 
‘updates’ and to have the built-in 
technical means to assure that citi-
zens can be notified of  updates in a 
timely fashion. Information-bound 
security approaches (Xylomenos et 
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and solutions for telecommunication 
infrastructures and network robust-
ness. Nevertheless, it is prudent to 
assume that communication networks 
may be (temporarily) disabled, con-
gested or unavailable during a crisis. 
Given this assumption, a challenge 
is to ensure that (a) information can 
al., 2014) may be of  relevance.
A typical technological challenge dur-
ing a crisis concerns the availabili-
ty and reliability of  communication 
networks. Numerous national and 
EU-funded projects (too many to list 
here) investigate new technologies 
be communicated to citizens and that 
(b) information can be inspected for 
authenticity and timeliness. The se-
curity considerations with regard to 
messages, formulated from the trust 
perspective, also apply to non-tech-
nical communication. Is it possible 
to deliver messages without using 
Project overview (non-exhaustive)
• BeSeCu (Behavior, Security and 
Culture) project. Understanding 
culture in crisis behaviour. 
• COMPOSITE project.Comparative 
police studies in the EU (www.
composite-project.eu).
• DISASTER. Data Interoperability 
Solution At Stakeholders Emer-
gency Reaction Novel methods to 
enhance cross-border emergency 
response (www.disaster-fp7.eu).
• E-COM@EU project. Effective 
communication in outbreak man-
agement (www.ecomeu.info). 
• EMBRACE. Building Resilience 
Amongst Communities in Europe. 
(www.embrace-eu.org).
• HeERO 2 project. Harmonised 
eCALL European Pilot (www.hee-
ro-pilot.eu)
• IDIRA. Interoperability of Data 
and procedures In large-scale 
multinational disaster response 
actions. (http://www.idira.eu/). 
• INSIGN. European Commission 
DG Justice and Consumers pilot 
project regarding improving com-
munication between deaf and 
hard of hearing persons and the 
EU (www.eu-insign.eu; not online 
anymore)
• New information system for 
the national emergency re-
sponse centre of Finland (http://
www.112.fi/en/the_erc_reform/
new_information_system)
• NEXES. NEXt generation Emer-
gency Systems ( www.nexes.eu, 
Manso et al., 2016)
• Online and mobile communi-
cations for crisis response and 
search and rescue actions (isar.
i112.eu) (Flizikowski et al., 2014; 
Manso and Manso, 2012)
• Online and mobile communica-
tions for emergencies (soteria.
i112.eu) (Jäntti et al., 2016)
• PEP project. EU Public Empower-
ment Policies for Crisis Manage-
ment (www.crisiscommunication.
fi/pep). 
• POP ALERT project. Solutions to 
better prepare European citizens 
and authorities during large-
scale crises. 
• PPDRTC project. Public Protection 
and Disaster Relief — Trans-
formation Centre. Roadmap 
to emergency communication 
(www.ppdr-tc.eu).
• PROACTIVE project. Terrorism de-
tectors.  (www.proactiveproject.
eu). 
• Project Slándáil, which aims to 
build and test a prototype sys-
tem for managing disaster emer-
gencies by fusing information 
available in different modalities 
in social media with due regard 
to ethical and factual data prov-
enance (www.slandail.eu)
• REACH112. Responding to All 
Citizens needing Help (www.
reach112.eu)
• REACT. Reaction to Emergency 
Alerts using voice and clustering 
technologies (www.react-ist.net; 
not online anymore)
• Software to understand sign lan-
guages (www.signspeak.eu)
• Use of new communications and 
social media to support citizens 
during crisis (www.projectathena.
eu) (Gibson et al., 2015)
BOX 4.1
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local), emergency management (re-
sponder) organisations and other 
public service bodies in disaster risk 
management are slowly shifting  from 
communication methods that reflect 
a view that aims to align lay percep-
tions with expert views of  severity to 
participatory models that recognise 
local citizen expertise and knowl-
edge. A key issue is that of  engaging 
communities and citizens rather than 
purely disseminating messages, that 
is, moving from a top-down focus to 
what has been termed a ‘people-cen-
tred approach’. The development of 
digital technologies and social media 
platforms (e.g. the use of  social media 
in the Haiti earthquake, the Queens-
land floods in Australia and Hurricane 
Sandy in the United States) has led 
to new ways of  delivering better tar-
geted, actionable risk information to 
diverse publics across multicultural, 
multiagency and multi-jurisdictional 
boundaries.
Knowledge
In this context, it is wise to consider 
the ‘dark’ or unexplored areas of  re-
search and practice in risk communi-
cation. In a recent structured literature 
review of  research focusing on inno-
vation within the public sector, De 
Vries et al. (2015) noted that only 7 % 
of  the literature reviewed dealt with 
technological process innovation and 
that interorganisational innovations 
have not been thoroughly investigat-
ed. It is perhaps interesting that much 
of  the work discussed here deals pre-
cisely with these areas: interorganisa-
tional innovations and technologically 
enabled process innovation. However, 
it is also telling that whilst the studies 
we have identified discuss the nuanc-
es of  the technologies and processes 
to ‘improve practice’ or demonstrate 
‘innovations’, they singularly fail to 
discuss the mechanisms by which the 
innovations are stabilised or grown in 
terms of  institutionalisation, scope 
and function.
Innovation
The key challenges for innovation in 
disaster and risk communication lie 
not in the generation of  innovative 
practices but in the implementation 
of  mechanisms by which innovations 
and improving practice are diffused 
and moved from a state of  emergence 
to wide-scale adoption. Rather than 
generating innovative approaches, we 
would suggest that embedding and 
diffusing innovations is the key area 
that both policy and practice must ad-
dress.
digital communication infrastructure, 
while retaining these trust-enhancing 
aspects? The challenge here lies in al-
lowing citizens to distribute messages 
using various media, including but not 
limited to paper, photographs, photo-
copy, etc.
4.4.5
Conclusions and 
key messages
In this subchapter we have identified 
a number of  areas of  practice, many 
of  which reinforce existing tenets of 
effective practice: communication is 
reciprocal and risk communication 
is about increasing the quality, time-
liness and accuracy of  situational 
awareness. We also point out the in-
fluence of  technological innovations 
and current innovation challenges 
that lie in realising total conversation 
and crowdsourcing capabilities, per-
sonalisation for citizens, integration 
with emergency services, enhancing 
trust in (official) communication and 
standardisation with and beyond the 
EU. Research has indicated that many 
of  the challenges related to informa-
tion sharing during major incidents 
transcend technology issues (Al-
len, Karanasios and Norman 2014). 
These new innovative processes can, 
however, be seen as a double-edged 
sword, bringing not only benefits but 
also new risks and challenges. As Liegl 
et al. (2016) state, it is also important 
to note the importance of  the con-
sideration of  ethical, legal and social 
issues (ELSI) related to these new in-
novations.
 
Partnership
Governments (national, regional and 
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The approach to communicating disaster risk in recent years has been shifted 
from a top-down, ‘one size fits all’ approach to a more democratic, engaged 
and inclusive one. It implies partnership between policymakers, practitioners 
and citizens of  all backgrounds. In a society in which people have the opportu-
nity to inform themselves about a wide variety of  risks through various media 
channels, one-way media campaigns that tell people how to prepare, respond 
and recover from a disaster are not effective. Instead, engaging in a dialogue 
with local communities to understand the historical and local context is an im-
portant fundament for future risk communication that focuses on stimulating 
resilient behaviour:
• words used for risk communication should be inclusive and emphatic in or-
der to contribute to effective communication and support and eventually to 
more resilient coping strategies of  those affected by a disaster;
• since the people’s response to disasters is influenced by past experiences and 
local cultures, risk communication should be based on the understanding of 
local risk perceptions and capacities.
Likewise, the practices of  disaster and risk management should rely on a com-
prehensive approach to decision-making. Participatory models emphasising 
engagement with and empowering of  local communities through joint prepa-
ration, planning and information crowdsourcing have emerged, enabled by in-
creasing digitalisation. Those involved in risk communication should:
• realise that collecting, sharing and disseminating disaster information is not 
neutral, as it has an impact on how people perceive risks and deal with the 
consequences;
• bottom-up, people-centred and participatory processes need to be estab-
lished to ensure collaborative and inclusive decision-making;
• make sure that the collection, analysing and modelling of  crisis data is done 
in a transparent and ethical way to avoid privacy infringements, unauthorised 
dissemination of  personal information, inequality and irresponsible behav-
iour.
ICTs play a vital role in risk communication. New communication tools and 
innovations, including social media, Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) and 
the use of  mobile and online communication tools, might help people to find 
more relevant information on disaster risks. At the same time, innovation in 
risk communication should never be a goal in  itself:
• it is critically important to invest in the implementation of  mechanisms by 
which innovations can improve communication practices, including interor-
ganisational collaboration;
• the communicator and/or the channel’s social position should be as close 
as possible to the recipients’ everyday lives as this will positively affect the 
Recommendations
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outcome of  risk communication;
• using personalisation of  risk communication that is related to cultural and 
contextual diversity is a key ingredient of  a successful communication strat-
egy;
• since critical information infrastructures can be affected by disasters (e.g. 
resulting in large-scale power blackouts), governments should invest in re-
liable, redundant and sustainable infrastructures, but at the same time take 
measurements to go beyond the infrastructure by investing in risk knowl-
edge, monitoring and risk capacity and early warning systems.
The above efforts together will support a more balanced, inclusive and system-
atic approach to risk communication and will eventually lead to a more resilient 
European society that has to deal with increasing risks.
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The European region is exposed to a wide range of  natural hazards such as storms, droughts, heat waves, floods, earthquakes, avalanches and landslides that continuously cause human and economic loss.
Despite the European wealth of  expertise, knowledge and know-how in disas-
ter risk management (DRM), statistics show that vulnerability to hazards in the 
region is increasing.
DRM comprises a systematic process of  using administrative decisions and 
organisational and operational skills and capacities to implement policies and 
strategies, and coping capacities of  society and communities to lessen the im-
pacts of  natural hazards and related environmental and technological disas-
ters. This concept includes all forms of  strategies, policies, plans and activities 
aimed at minimising disaster impacts on individuals and society.
This chapter examines the scientific contribution to understanding these pro-
cesses and institutions across Europe. These are described in four subchapters, 
divided up in a similar way to how DRM functions and are often separated 
conceptually across a disaster management cycle. The disaster management 
cycle commonly includes four types of  measures needed to manage disasters: 
mitigation and preparedness (before a disaster) and response and recovery (af-
ter a disaster).
These measures are broadly aligned with the Sendai Framework for Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2015-2030 (SFDRR), which adopts the idea of  managing dis-
aster risk as opposed to managing disasters, whereby action is needed to do the 
following.
• Reduce existing risk: a set of  measures, known as ‘corrective risk manage-
ment’, similar to the commonly used concept of  ‘mitigation’.
• Avoid new disaster risk: activities to address and avoid the development 
of  new or increased disaster risk, known as ‘prospective risk management’, 
similar to what are often referred to as ‘prevention’ measures.
• Manage residual risk: activities that strengthen the resilience of  individuals 
and societies to risk that cannot be effectively reduced, including prepared-
ness, response and sometimes recovery activities (those that do not actually 
avoid new disaster risk by, for example, relocating populations in the after-
math of  a disaster) as well as risk transfer and financing activities.
Prevention and mitigation; preparedness and response planning; post-disaster 
recovery (to new risk); and risk transfer and financing are the major topics 
of  this chapter. The focus in Chapter 5.1 is on studies of  disaster mitigation 
and prevention presenting a range of  structural (e.g. building codes and their 
Introduction
CHAPTER 5 MANAGING DISASTER RISK
447
enforcement and structural protection measures) and non-structural (e.g. land-
use planning and zoning) measures. Critically, all disaster prevention and miti-
gation measures need to be identified on the basis of  risk assessments, and the 
use of  these across Europe is reviewed in this chapter.
Mitigation and prevention measures in Europe are widely considered to be 
more cost-effective than post-disaster interventions. This is predominantly 
based on an analysis of  the benefits arising from avoided loss. Economic anal-
ysis methods have been applied to gain a better understanding of  the economic 
benefits of  mitigation and prevention. Yet recognising and appraising the wid-
er co-benefits of  investing in mitigation and prevention could make an even 
more convincing case. This chapter examines some of  these broader benefits 
to society and to the economy.
Human exposure to natural hazard risk is mainly caused by settlement and oth-
er economic developments in hazard-prone areas, but this risk can be managed 
through spatial planning and regulations; national spatial planning policies may 
involve cooperation with other countries. Within cross-boundary river basins, 
countries may jointly seek for policies to control flood waters through spatial 
planning measures. An example are the flood retention areas in the Rhine ba-
sin, which aim at storing flood waters upstream in Germany to lower the risk 
of  flooding downstream in the Netherlands.
Disaster preparedness and response addressed in Chapter 5.2 is embedded in 
complex ethical, legal, social and political contexts, and broad values and prin-
ciples are needed for emergency response that transcends boundaries.
This necessitates cooperation between regional, national and international 
communities. The EU Community Mechanism for Civil Protection is develop-
ing several tools to support this, including the European Emergency Response 
Coordination Centre (ERCC) in Brussels as  well as a Common Emergency 
Communication and Information System (CECIS). A key issue for prepared-
ness is how societies can translate these broader values and principles of  emer-
gency response into social, organisational and technical innovation.
The professionalism and coordination of  preparedness for response by civil 
protection agencies has significantly advanced in recent years alongside a de-
sire to give citizens increasing responsibility for their own preparedness. There 
has been a strengthening of  the value of  citizens themselves in preparedness 
and response planning, with social groups playing an important role during a 
disaster to help manage emergency response. Strengthening social cohesion 
and trust before a disaster can increase the response’s effectiveness. Extensive 
flooding in 2007 in Kingston upon Hull in the United Kingdom, for example, 
stimulated a range of  spontaneous actions by local residents, including assist-
ing with evacuation, giving care and support to vulnerable neighbours, protect-
ing houses against floodwater and giving medical assistance.
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Chapter 5.3 presents post-disaster recovery as an opportunity for economic 
development and regeneration. The recovery process is multidimensional and 
progresses at different rates for different people, businesses, institutions and 
places affected by a disaster. Institutional fragmentation and short-term plan-
ning can hinder recovery processes and often result in new risks being created. 
Thus, cross-scale and longer-term risk management strategies are needed in 
recovery, integrating different stakeholder perspectives and knowledge and co-
ordinating across policy domains.
For earthquake and other types of  reconstruction there is not a ‘one size fits all’ 
model, but decisions need to be discussed in advance with the citizens, taking 
into account suggestions and explaining the limits of  time, space and budget. 
Territories are different, available scientific and technologic support evolves 
and the population’s expectations can change through time: a mature civil pro-
tection system looks for tailored solutions building on previous experience 
while exploring new alternatives.
Economic recovery occurs at various scales after a disaster and the economic 
system will unlikely return to a pre-disaster state, yet measures can be taken 
to support and accelerate the recovery process. Higher levels of  assets give a 
wider range of  options and opportunities following a disaster and can speed 
recovery, as can access to formal credit and grants. Families, neighbours and 
social networks can help people to recover their assets.
Accessing financial resources after a disaster is critical to rebuilding and main-
taining essential functions. Nonetheless, the policies supporting economic 
recovery should not focus solely on financing. A mix of  policy initiatives is 
needed to build resilience after a disaster: from the design of  early warning 
systems (EWS) tailored to specific audiences to the development of  efficient 
regulations. Overall, combinations of  financial support with other market sup-
port and service provision are needed.
People’s psychosocial recovery after disasters is a complex, multidimensional 
process that is also linked to the measures taken before disasters occur, to the 
social and economic circumstances of  those affected, to the actions taken to 
rebuild and restore assets and to the services provided after disasters. Research 
demonstrates that people’s recovery in the short and medium term can be pro-
moted through a psychosocial approach, with interventions made universally 
available to reduce suffering and risks of  people developing mental disorders.
Disasters can undermine development progress and financial and economic 
stability and well-being, and so a sound risk financing strategy is needed to less-
en these impacts and speed up recovery and reconstruction (Chapter 5.4). Risk 
financing complements regulatory and economic instruments such as prices, 
taxes, tradable permits and liability. There is ample consensus that insurance 
can and should play an increasingly important role in mitigating disaster im-
pacts, not only through risk sharing, but also by improving risk identification 
and modelling, risk awareness and recovery.
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5.1 Prevention and 
mitigation: avoiding 
and reducing the new 
and existing risks
Swenja	Surminski, Jeroen Aerts, David Alexander, Daniela Di 
Bucci, Reinhard Mechler, Jaroslav Mysiak, Emily Wilkinson
5.1.1
Introduction
In line with the United Nations Of-
fice for Disaster Risk Reduction (UN-
ISDR) definitions used in this report, 
prevention is understood as the activi-
ties and measures to avoid existing and 
new disaster risks (UNISDR, 2007). 
Prevention (i.e. disaster prevention) 
expresses the concept and intention 
to completely avoid potential adverse 
impacts of  hazardous events. While 
certain disaster risks cannot be elim-
inated, prevention aims at reducing 
vulnerability and exposure in such 
contexts where, as a result, the risk of 
disaster is removed. Examples include 
dams or embankments that elimi-
nate flood risks, land-use regulations 
that do not permit any settlement in 
high-risk zones, seismic engineering 
designs that ensure the survival and 
function of  a critical building in any 
likely earthquake and immunisation 
against vaccine-preventable diseases. 
Prevention measures can also be tak-
en during or after a hazardous event 
or disaster to prevent secondary haz-
ards or their consequences, such as 
measures to prevent the contamina-
tion of  water (UNISDR, 2016).
Ex ante interventions 
aimed at reducing 
existing risk (mitigation) 
and avoiding a generation 
of new ones (prevention) 
are important elements 
in the DRM process. 
Mitigation relates to ‘the lessening or 
limitation of  the adverse impacts of 
a hazardous event. The adverse im-
pacts of  hazards, in particular natural 
hazards, often cannot be prevented 
fully, but their scale or severity can be 
substantially lessened by various strat-
egies and actions. Mitigation meas-
ures include engineering techniques 
and hazard-resistant construction as 
well as improved environmental and 
social policies and public awareness. 
It should be noted that, in climate 
change policy, ‘mitigation’ is defined 
differently and is the term used for 
the reduction of  greenhouse gas 
emissions, which are the source of 
climate change (UNISDR, 2016).
The SFDRR, adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly, calls for ‘a 
culture of  prevention’ and enhanced 
risk reduction. Priority 3 of  the 
framework focuses on ‘investing in 
disaster risk reduction for resilience’ 
and proposing ‘public and private in-
vestment in disaster risk prevention 
and reduction through structural and 
non-structural measures are essen-
tial to enhance the economic, social, 
health and cultural resilience of  per-
sons, communities, countries and 
their assets, as well as the environ-
ment’ (UNISDR, 2015). The Sendai 
framework provides a set of  guiding 
principles relevant for any efforts 
aimed at addressing rising disaster 
risks, from global to local levels.
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This subchapter explores current in-
stitutions, policies and challenges for 
disaster prevention and mitigation in 
Europe across different hazards. We 
differentiate between structural and 
and non-structural measures as well as 
examine the political complexities and 
barriers that currently hinder mitiga-
tion and prevention efforts. We then 
look at the economics of  investing in 
mitigation and prevention, consider-
ing how the costs and benefits of  dif-
ferent strategies and measures could 
be weighed up and compared. The 
section concludes with a reflection on 
how mitigation and prevention goals 
can be supported. 
Development of the 
concept and use of DRM
In this subchapter we focus primarily 
on the institutions, policies, incentives 
and applications of  mitigation and 
prevention measures as the principle 
ex ante actions used to manage risk. 
The concept of  DRM has been devel-
oped in the context of  managing risk 
related to natural hazards. 
.
The gradual adoption of  DRM as a 
name and a framework for dealing 
with disasters has brought with it the 
realisation that natural hazards can 
only be managed effectively at the 
local level. The theatre of  operations 
for both mitigation and response 
is inevitably local, although no one 
would deny the need for coordination 
at the regional and national levels of 
public administration, if  not also the 
international level. The system that 
arises out of  concerted responses to 
hazard can be termed civil protection. 
Its counterpart is civil defence, a na-
tionally organised system that now-
adays is heavily orientated towards 
threat management and counter-ter-
rorism (Alexander, 2011). The factor 
that links the two approaches is vul-
nerability. In threat management, it 
is seen as the defence of  weak points 
in the human socioeconomic system, 
whilst in civil protection, it is regard-
ed as a systemic factor that is socially 
constructed because it reflects deci-
sion-making in all realms: physical, 
social, economic, institutional, envi-
ronmental and so on.
Disaster impacts can be instantane-
ous, rapid, stepwise, ramped, ‘creep-
ing’ (i.e. insidious) or of  long onset. 
Although it is tempting to classify 
impacts by their causes into natural, 
technological, social and intentional, 
very many disasters are composite 
in nature. Such is the complexity of 
modern society and its interrelations 
that this has become the age of  the 
cascading disaster. Impacts are prop-
agated through critical infrastructure 
(CI) failures, with escalation points 
that mark the interactions between 
factors that generate positive feed-
back and spread the impacts into new 
areas (Pescaroli and Alexander, 2016).
Several basic principles underpin ef-
fective risk mitigation and prevention. 
First, the underlying risk drivers need 
to be tackled. This means reduction 
in poverty and underdevelopment, as 
these are barriers to the protection of 
communities against hazards. We may 
add climate change abatement, redis-
tribution of  wealth and reinforcement 
of  rights, including access to informa-
tion, self-determination and freedom 
to act.
Secondly, a multihazard approach 
to planning is favoured because it is 
more efficient than a single-hazards 
approach. Vulnerability should be 
considered the essence of  disaster 
risk, and hazard the trigger. Hence, 
abatement of  vulnerability is the pri-
mary need in disaster risk reduction. 
Vulnerability to disaster can be con-
sidered by sector (economic, environ-
mental, institutional, physical, etc.), 
but this runs the risk of  failing to em-
brace the connections between sec-
tors. An alternative approach might 
consider vulnerability to be pristine 
(unaffected by mitigation and pre-
vention), technocratic (resulting from 
the misapplication of  technology), 
wilful (the result of  corruption and 
exploitation), economic (deficiencies 
in livelihoods) or socio-psychologi-
cal (oppression, community conflict, 
etc.). It is essential to recognise that 
there is a constant dialectic between 
forces that create vulnerability and 
those that reduce it (McEntire, 2001).
Academic studies of  the social impact 
of  disasters have been carried out sys-
tematically for about a century. In the 
latter part of  the 20th century and the 
beginning of  the 21st, the field grew 
at an accelerating rate. As a result, it is 
now a rich repository of  lessons to in-
spire future efforts in prevention and 
mitigation, if  the lessons are learnt. 
5.1.2
EU structures, 
institutions, 
strategies and 
political instruments
In recent years, the EU has taken an 
active role in drawing together the 
collective expertise of  its members 
for the purposes of  disaster preven-
tion and mitigation (see Chapter 1). 
The European Commission (JRC) has 
CHAPTER 5 MANAGING DISASTER RISK
451
been a central coordination mecha-
nism in this endeavour. It developed 
the European Flood Alert System 
(EFAS) in 2003, providing local wa-
ter authorities with probabilistic flood 
forecasting for transnational Europe-
an river basins (Thielen et al., 2009). It 
also helped to establish the European 
Drought Observatory, which since 
2011 has been the ‘leading dissemina-
tor on drought-related information’ 
such as precipitation measurements 
and soil moisture content (Stein et al., 
2016). Another significant resource is 
the European Forest Fire Informa-
tion System (EFFIS), which combines 
information from across European, 
Middle Eastern and North African 
regions, including fire danger assess-
ments, damage assessments and a fire 
news module (JRC, 2015).
In addition to working with the na-
tional authorities of  Member States, 
the EU also works closely with other 
independent organisations to improve 
the level of  research and publicly avail-
able information on disasters. One 
such organisation is the European 
Exchange Circle on Flood Mapping, 
which produced a comprehensive 
handbook of  good practices in flood 
mapping in 2007 (EXCIMAP, 2007). 
The EU also has an agreement with 
the European-Mediterranean Seismo-
logical Centre to monitor seismologi-
cal activity and provide early notifica-
tions for earthquakes (Papatheodorou 
et al., 2014). Additionally, progress 
has been made with regard to mul-
tihazard disaster risk prevention and 
mitigation. Meteoalarm, developed 
by the European Meteorological Ser-
vices Network, is a collaborative plat-
form providing 24-48-hour lead-time 
warnings for extreme weather events 
in participating European countries 
(Alfieri et al., 2012).
In recent years, the EU 
has taken an active role 
in drawing together the 
collective expertise of its 
members for the purposes 
of disaster prevention and 
mitigation.
These partnerships are frequently 
underpinned by EU directives and 
policies, which provide the impetus 
and strategic vision for their work. 
Examples include the Water Frame-
work Directive (2000), which estab-
lished an integrated EU-wide frame-
work for water management (Stein et 
al., 2016) and monitoring to address 
the problem of  water scarcity and 
drought affecting many European 
countries (Quevauviller and Gemmer 
2015). The issue of  water scarcity and 
drought was later taken up as a main 
priority during the Portuguese Presi-
dency in 2007, culminating in a for-
mal communication by the European 
Commission on this topic (Stein et al., 
2016). Other examples  include the 
Flood Directive (2007), which aimed 
to standardise the level of  flood pro-
tection that European citizens receive 
by prompting states to review their 
risk assessment policies and take de-
liberate steps to reduce flood risk 
(Alfieri et al., 2012). In April 2013 the 
European Commission also adopted 
an EU strategy on climate change ad-
aptation to support adaptation plan-
ning and policies at all levels (Quevau-
viller and Gemmer, 2015).
These mechanisms and policies are, 
to a large extent, the result of  broad-
er commitments by the EU to protect 
civilian populations from disasters 
both within Europe and worldwide. 
The European Union Civil Protection 
Mechanism (UCPM), for instance, 
was established in 2001 to harness 
cooperation between the national civ-
il protection authorities from all 28 
Member States to respond quickly to 
civilian emergencies and assist in pre-
vention and mitigation by allowing in-
formation sharing between countries.
In many EU countries, different 
hazards are still handled by differ-
ent organisations and ministry lines, 
particularly in the prevention and 
mitigation phases. However, the 
methodologies, tools (e.g. EWS) and 
data are often common across many 
hazards (e.g. both land use planning 
and weather forecasts are crucial for 
floods, landslides, hurricanes as well 
as for drought and wildfires). Effec-
tive coordination mechanisms, such 
as the national platforms promoted 
by the SFDRR, are aimed at ensuring 
a joined-up understanding of  risks, 
including the cascade effects of  haz-
ards, as well as coordinated resource 
allocation and integration of  roles and 
responsibilities. The EU has adopted 
the SFDRR and developed an action 
plan accordingly (European Commis-
sion, 2016a).
5.1.3
Structural and 
non-structural 
measures and 
innovation in 
Europe
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A common distinction is made be-
tween structural and non-structural 
measures. Structural measures are 
commonly derived from the engineer-
ing and physical sciences and include 
the following (Coppola, 2015):
• building resistant structures, such 
as dams and sea walls;
• using certain materials in buildings 
and adopting building codes that 
require structures to be disaster-re-
sistant;
• relocating populations to safer ar-
eas;
• modifying the natural environ-
ment, such as slope terracing and 
draining. 
Non-structural measures are general-
ly described as ‘soft methods’ (Palli-
yaguru et al. 2014), or man adapting 
to nature (Coppola 2015). These may 
include the following:
• adopting regulations designed to 
prevent people from engaging in 
risky behaviour (for example, zon-
ing laws);
• community initiatives such as flood 
warning systems (although these 
are usually classified as prepared-
ness measures);
• modifying the natural environment 
without causing a structural change 
to it (for example, controlled burn-
ing of  bushland to prevent bush-
fires);
• encouraging people to change their 
behaviour, such as providing tax in-
centives to plant trees. 
Although most EU Member States 
implement mitigation measures at 
the national or local level, the Eu-
ropean Commission will co-finance 
projects that enhance mitigation 
and preparedness through an annual 
call for proposals under the UCPM 
(European Commission, 2016b). In 
2016, its total budget for assisting EU 
Member States was EUR 29 366 000 
(European Commission, 2016c). 
This represents a slight increase from 
2015, where the total budget was 
EUR 28  068 000.
Only a small percentage of  this 
budget, however, is available for pre-
vention and mitigation. In 2016, EUR 
2.8 million was available for co-fi-
nancing prevention projects (Euro-
pean Commission 2016c) and this 
amount did not increase from 2015. 
By comparison, EUR 5 million was 
made available for training EU civil 
protection teams and EUR 3.6 mil-
lion was made available for planning, 
conducting and evaluating disas-
ter simulation exercises (European 
Commission 2016c). Furthermore, 
although the maximum co-funding 
rate for a project is high (75 % of  a 
project’s cost), it only applies up to a 
maximum of  EUR 800 000 for each 
project that is co-financed (European 
Commission, 2016c).
The list of  projects that were co-fi-
nanced in 2015 shows a focus on 
non-structural measures and im-
proving response capability. This is 
in response to the clear domination 
of  structural measures across the 
EU. The emphasis on non-structural 
measures by the UCPM can be seen 
as an attempt to balance the structur-
al measures taken at the national level 
with non-structural assistance at the 
regional level. Supported projects in-
clude the following:
• improving evacuation preparedness 
in Romania and Slovenia in case of 
a nuclear accident (non-structural);
• improving knowledge against seis-
mic risk through the KnowRISK 
project (non-structural);
• improving the capacity for address-
ing the impact of  natural disasters 
on cultural heritage (non-structur-
al); and
• a programme for improving the 
self-help capabilities of  young peo-
ple in times of  disaster (non-struc-
tural).
Ex ante disaster 
mitigation and prevention 
can be achieved through 
a range of structural 
(e.g. building codes and 
their enforcement and 
structural protection 
measures) and non-
structural (e.g. land-use 
planning and zoning) 
measures.
Technological innovation is recog-
nised by the SFDRR as an important 
part of  the arsenal available for reduc-
ing a society’s disaster risk. In Europe, 
technological innovation is promoted 
in a number of  ways, including but 
not limited to the following:
• The European Commission (JRC) 
has researched and produced a 
number of  technological advance-
ments (particularly computer-based 
systems) that have contributed to 
minimising the impacts of  disasters 
on a global scale (JRC, 2014). For 
example, The European Commis-
sion (JRC) has conducted research 
on the vulnerability of  buildings to 
seismic activity through its exper-
imental reaction wall, which has 
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also been used in other projects 
(e.g. the Series project) to test ret-
rofitting techniques (JRC, 2014).
• The European Commission (JRC) 
also operates the European Crisis 
Management Laboratory for the 
development of  information and 
communications technology as 
well as annual workshops address-
ing bespoke technological issues 
such as the use of  unmanned aerial 
vehicles for rapid mapping (JRC, 
2016). It used such vehicles to sup-
port the post-disaster needs assess-
ment (PDNA) mission in Bosnia 
following the May floods in 2014 
(JRC, 2014). The laboratory forms 
part of  the Disaster Risk Manage-
ment Knowledge Centre’s ‘innova-
tion’ stream, which also includes 
the European Network for Innova-
tion Test Beds (DRMKC, 2016a). 
The innovation stream is focused 
on ‘advancing technologies and 
capacities in disaster risk and crisis 
management’ (DRMKC, 2016b).
• Horizon 2020, the largest EU re-
search and innovation programme 
ever (European Commission 
2016d), provides funding for pro-
jects improving societal resilience 
against natural and man-made dis-
asters. These calls are made under 
its ‘secure societies’ stream. The 
following are examples of  projects 
that have received funding and re-
late to DRR:
1. The Brigaid project, which 
seeks to ‘bridge the gap for in-
novations in disaster resilience’ 
by providing a platform for 
the testing of  resilience inno-
vations (TU Delft, 2016). The 
EU contributed approximately 
EUR 7.7 million to the project 
(CORDIS, 2016a).
2. The Liquefact project, which 
seeks to address the effects 
of  earthquake-induced lique-
faction disasters (CORDIS, 
2016b).
Data innovations are increasingly sup-
porting decision-making on mitiga-
tion measures at the national level. In 
the United Kingdom, for example, the 
Department for Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (EFRA) will be mak-
ing greater use of  crowdsourced data 
on regional flood risk thanks to im-
provements in data technology (UK 
Space Agency 2016). Further, innova-
tion is also coming from areas outside 
the EU; for example, innovators seek-
ing to provide technology solutions to 
mitigation regularly attend the annual 
Geneva-based International Exhibi-
tion of  Innovations (Fowler, 2015).
5.1.4
Identifying 
appropriate 
prevention and 
mitigation measures
Risk assessment plays an important 
part for prevention and mitigation 
strategies, for example through ap-
plying risk information in decision 
support, evaluation and cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) processes (Watkiss 
et al., 2014). Mitigation and preven-
tion measures seem more likely to be 
adopted when an effective informa-
tion-sharing programme is in place. 
For example, the EU seeks to foster 
the development of  mitigation and 
prevention measures across differ-
ent countries by reviewing their risk 
assessments and promoting best 
practice. Since 2012, eight such peer 
reviews have occurred across Eu-
rope (European Commission 2016b). 
Indeed, the EU has issued guidance 
for other states on how to prepare 
national risk assessments as part of 
the UCPM (European Commission, 
2016b). Risk information also plays 
an important role in assessing the 
appropriateness of  risk management 
activities/strategies in anticipation of 
future risk conditions. Information 
requirements about risk and the kind 
of  risk assessment applied may differ 
depending on the needs of  the deci-
sion-maker (Surminski et al., 2012).
In Europe, FP7-funded ENHANCE 
project has shown that the kind and 
scale of  a risk assessment depend 
on how the results are used by deci-
sion-makers. For example, the EU-
wide flood risk assessment informs 
the design of  the EU solidarity fund, 
while the local assessments of  surface 
water flooding in the United King-
dom and drought risk in the Jucar 
provide useful information for local 
risk management policies, such as in-
surance and water pricing (Botzen et 
al., 2015).
In addition to risk information and 
data, mitigation and prevention meas-
ures require support and interaction 
between stakeholders, whether it be 
at the local, regional or international 
level. This includes public and private 
stakeholders. Engaging with commu-
nities at the local level can foster the 
adoption of  risk-reduction techniques 
by individuals engaged in that commu-
nity (Wittyorapong et al., 2015). This 
also requires a combination of  both 
‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ strate-
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gies (European Commission, 2013). 
For example, utilising a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach, communities in the Pacif-
ic Islands have developed their own 
techniques to combat tropical hazards 
(e.g. cyclones). The implementation of 
these techniques is monitored by Red 
Cross volunteers, allowing the transi-
tion of  information from the local to 
the international. This is referred to as 
‘participatory DRR’ (European Com-
mission, 2013).
Tools and models for 
understanding risk are 
well advanced within 
Europe and can be 
used as the basis for 
identifying and prioritising 
action to reduce risk and 
avoid risk creation in the 
future.
The recent emphasis on resilient cit-
ies is another example where action at 
the local level can inform internation-
al-level thinking. Carmin et al. (2013) 
present several examples of  city-
based, stakeholder engagement part-
nerships for supporting adaptation 
to climate change and resilience in 
diverse contexts, including large cities 
such as Toronto, Quito and London 
and smaller urban centres such as 
Walvis Bay in South Africa (Carmin et 
al., 2013). This coincides with the re-
alisation that cities form a pivotal part 
in pursuing internationally agreed 
policy goals, including climate mitiga-
tion and adaptation, as well as DRR 
(Bulkeley and Castán Broto, 2013). 
Cities are of  importance in managing 
climate risks as they serve as centres 
of  economic activity, technology and 
innovation hubs while often being 
exposed to a range of  climate risks, 
including potential infrastructure 
failure, urban blight and loss to both 
populations and assets (Surminski 
and Leck, 2016). Recent examples 
of  initiatives that promote mitigation 
and prevention (Geneva Association, 
2016; Golnaraghi et al., 2016) include 
city-level and industry collaboration.
• Encouraging mitigation and 
prevention in urban areas
The UNISDR (n.d.) global cam-
paign for resilient cities has fo-
cused on raising awareness about 
risks and comprehensive approach-
es to risk preparedness and reduc-
tion among local governments and 
authorities and urban communities. 
The 100 resilient cities initiative, 
launched by the Rockefeller Foun-
dation, is supported by a number 
of  international associations such 
as the International Consortium of 
Local Governments for Sustain-
ability, other foundations (such as 
the Clinton Foundation), the Unit-
ed Nations and other non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs). It 
has been instrumental in raising 
awareness, sharing experiences 
and facilitating global cooperation 
among local governments to devel-
op resilient cities based on seven 
key principles that allow them to 
withstand, respond to and adapt 
more readily to shocks and stress-
es. This initiative provides member 
cities with four types of  support: 
assistance to develop a compre-
hensive ‘resilience strategy’; access 
to a USD 100-million-plus (EUR 
91.7-million-plus) pool of  best-in-
class services from partners in the 
private, public, NGO and academic 
sectors; and connection through a 
peer-to-peer network so that cities 
can learn from each other’s success 
and failures. It also offers funding 
and support for hiring a chief  re-
silience officer, a top-level advisor 
who reports directly to the city 
mayor. Their task is to establish 
a compelling resilience vision for 
their city, working across depart-
ments and with the local commu-
nity to maximise innovation and 
minimise the impact of  unforeseen 
events. To date, this initiative has 
led to the designation of  chief  re-
silience officers in 68 cities.
• Collaboration with industry
In several countries the private 
sector is funding technical devel-
opment as well as testing facilities 
for building materials, designs and 
techniques. In Germany the pre-
vention and safety testing institute, 
VdS, was initially set up by insurers 
as a way to support fire resilience in 
businesses and industry. Insurers in 
the United Kingdom are collabo-
rating with the Environment Agen-
cy (the government agency respon-
sible for flood risk management) to 
provide guidance and information 
about flood resilience techniques 
to home owners. In France the in-
surance industry formed the Mis-
sion Risques Naturels association 
to foster disaster risk awareness 
and reduction activities across 
public and private stakeholders. 
Triggered by concerns about rising 
disaster loss, the Japanese insurer 
Tokio Marine is focusing on eco-
system-based solutions for DRR, 
or ‘Eco-DRR.’ As the United Na-
tions environment programme 
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(UNEP) pointed out in its 2014 re-
port, natural ecosystems, such as 
mangroves, can demonstrate phys-
ical and economic effectiveness in 
reducing the impact of  storm surge 
or tsunami. The 8 994 hectares of 
mangroves in nine Asia-Pacific 
countries planted by the company 
since 1999 are being studied for the 
shelter effect and its consequential 
economic benefits so far generated 
to improve the living standard of 
the local inhabitants (Geneva As-
sociation, 2016).
If  and how effective all these advanc-
es in risk information, knowledge 
sharing and technology are remains 
somewhat unclear. Moving towards 
implementation and changing ex-
isting behaviour in terms of  home 
construction and building design re-
quires a range of  incentives as well 
as legislative support, for example 
through building codes (Surminski, 
2014). Governments, organisations 
and people are not inherently interest-
ed in mitigating disasters unless they 
perceive a direct benefit, and greater 
effort is needed to draw attention to 
these benefits and to improving the 
incentives for investing in mitigation 
and prevention. 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of 
mitigation and prevention measures 
must be weighed against, amongst 
other things, their social cost (Vorhies 
and Wilkinson, 2016).
5.1.5
The economics of 
mitigation and 
prevention 
Economic analysis methods have 
been applied to gain a better under-
standing of  the economic benefits 
of  mitigation and prevention. Build-
ing a home on an elevated platform 
between 0.5 metres and 1.5 metres, 
for example, could reduce loss due 
to flooding by 10 % and 80 % below 
present-day levels in coastal areas, re-
spectively, even in the context of  a 
sea level rise that would otherwise in-
crease the 1-in-200-year loss by 20 % 
(Lloyd’s, 2008).
CBA is a popular and oft-advocated 
tool to choose between alternative 
DRM options. Ideally, it compares ad-
vantages (benefits) and disadvantages 
(costs) of  options in a systematic and 
objective way, so that the option that 
provides the greatest net gain to so-
ciety can be selected. The EU Floods 
Directive 2007/60/EC requires that 
flood risk management plans ‘take 
into account relevant aspects such as 
costs and benefits’ (European Union, 
2007), and this has undoubtedly given 
an incentive to apply CBA in regions 
where it was not common before.
CBA has often been criticised, how-
ever, because it requires all costs and 
benefits to be expressed in a money 
metric to compare them, and that it 
is biased towards those options that 
can most easily be expressed in mone-
tary terms, to the disadvantage of  op-
tions that provide intangible benefits 
in the form of  greater social or en-
vironmental quality (Vorhies, 2012). 
Yet the United Kingdom Foresight 
report, Reducing risks of  future dis-
asters (UK Government, 2012) argues 
that, especially in times of  austerity, 
CBA continues to be an important 
tool for prioritising efficient DRM 
measures. However, with a shifting 
emphasis from infrastructure-based 
(hard) options to preparedness and 
systemic (soft) interventions, other 
tools such as cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis, multicriteria analysis and robust 
decision-making would deserve more 
attention (Mechler, 2016). In the con-
text of  adaptation to climate change, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change of  2012 concluded for 
such reasons that the applicability of 
‘rigorous’ CBA for evaluations of  cli-
mate adaptation would be limited.
Mitigation and prevention 
measures are widely 
considered more cost-
effective than ex post 
disaster interventions. 
This is predominantly 
based on an analysis of 
the benefits arising from 
avoided loss. 
Recently, there has been a push to-
wards studies taking a probabilis-
tic approach for addressing disaster 
risk, particularly those arising from 
low-frequency, high-impact events. 
This is a promising development for 
two reasons: 1) disaster risk is prob-
abilistic in ‘nature’, which means that 
looking at one flood event only does 
not capture the entire distribution of 
possible flood events and their re-
spective return periods; and 2) DRR 
options are efficient for certain levels 
of  risk but not necessarily for all; e.g. 
risk reduction is more effective for 
frequent events (up to 50- or 100-
year return periods), while insurance 
tackles higher-level risk. Indirect ef-
456
Examples of using risk assessment for improving mitigation 
and prevention
Risk assessment and information is 
key to any mitigation or prevention 
decision. Risk assessment looks to 
understand future permutations, 
constantly updating projections on 
risk scenarios through risk assess-
ment and reflection (Tschakert and 
Dietrich 2010). The Enhance pro-
ject has deployed a range of new 
risk scenarios and information in 
selected hazard cases in close col-
laboration with stakeholders. The 
project focusses on selected cases 
of high-profile catastrophic hazards 
in a variety of countries, includ-
ing multihazard events (EU wide) 
as well heatwaves (EU wide), for-
est fires (Portugal), surface water 
flooding (United Kingdom, Italy and 
Romania), droughts (Spain and Ita-
ly), storm surges (Wadden Sea and 
Rotterdam), flash floods and land-
slides (Austria) and volcanic erup-
tions (Iceland with Europe-wide ef-
fects).
One example is surface water flood 
risk in London, United Kingdom. 
Through the Enhance project, the 
latest London flood risk analysis 
data was fed into an agent-based 
model (ABM), which is a useful 
method for understanding systems 
and individual behaviour. This ABM 
has been developed to demonstrate 
the effects of flood risk and mitiga-
tion and prevention measures on 
risk levels, household wealth, po-
tential shifts in inequality caused 
by flood damage and insurance (un)
availability (Jenkins et al., 2017). 
Results of the ABM highlight how 
development of properties in cer-
tain areas can become unsustain-
able as well as how there is a need 
for a consistent framework between 
different stakeholders to promote 
flood risk reduction (Jenkins et al., 
2015).
BOX 5.1
Prevention
Prepardness
Response
Recovery
Reconstruction
Financial
Political
Social
Human
Environmental
Modeling
Monitoring
Data analyses
Stakeholders process
Multi Criteria Evaluation
Socio-Economic
Change
Environnemental
Change
Ex
te
rn
al
 s
tre
ss
or
s
Reduced risk Policy Change
1. Scoping and data2. MSP - Partnership Capitals
3. Risk assessment 4. DRM Design
5. DRM Action
Setup of the ENHANCE framework for assessing the healthiness of MSPs, to assess current and future risk lev-
els, and to reduce and manage risk through DRR design and action.
Source: Novel Multi Sectoral Partnerships. EU Enhance project. (Aerts and Mysiak, 2016)
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fects (i.e. impacts on livelihoods and 
the local and regional economy) are 
being considered more strongly, while 
accounting for intangible effects, such 
as on health or impacts on natural re-
sources, has remained a challenge.
Another important consideration is 
the data needs for calculating the net 
benefits of  a measure. This requires 
information about the costs: both 
direct costs as well as opportunity 
costs of  other investments or even 
other DRM measures. However, data 
on these indirect costs are not always 
readily available (Vorhies, 2012).
One further aspect is how to account 
for the benefits of  any mitigation 
or prevention activities: at local or 
project level the benefits are directly 
linked to a certain location where the 
mitigation or prevention activity takes 
place, while at national level an aggre-
gate, macroeconomic view is applied, 
considering the implications on eco-
nomic growth, national employment, 
federal budgets or poverty-reduction 
efforts. 
This distinction is important as a pro-
ject may show the potential for bene-
fits to a local area, while substitution 
effects may mean it does not show 
benefits nationally. For large coun-
tries, establishing impacts at a nation-
al level may prove difficult. Hence the 
usefulness and robustness of  a CBA 
generally declines as time and scale in-
creases (Mechler, 2008). Recognising 
and appraising the wider co-benefits 
might deliver an even more convinc-
ing case for mitigation and preven-
tion. Table 5.2 highlights the range of 
co-benefits that can arise.
An interesting extension of  the exist-
ing approaches to appraising mitiga-
tion and prevention measures is the 
‘triple resilience dividend’ concept. It 
provides a much broader approach to 
appraising investment in DRR efforts, 
citing positive spillovers that even cre-
ate economic gains in the absence of 
disasters (Tanner et al., 2015; Tanner 
and Surminski, 2016).
5.1.6
Policies, institutions 
and incentives for 
investing in 
mitigation and 
prevention 
Exposure to hazards has increased 
faster than our vulnerability has de-
creased (UNISDR, 2015). Indeed, 
since the 1970s research has argued 
that disasters are manifestations of 
unresolved developmental problems 
because most hazards are constructed 
through the same processes (econom-
ic, social and territorial) that produce 
exposure and vulnerability (Lavell and 
Maskrey, 2014). In addition, there is 
growing economic evidence of  the 
cost-effectiveness of  many mitigation 
and prevention measures, particularly 
when compared to ex post disaster 
support.
However, this has not yet triggered a 
significant shift of  political and finan-
cial focus away from ex post towards 
ex ante measures: although the Euro-
pean Commission estimates that every 
EUR 1 spent on DRR measures saves 
EUR 4 to EUR 7 (European Com-
mission, 2016b), significantly more 
(indeed, up to 95 % of  total funds) 
continues to be spent on post-disaster 
recovery (Aakre et al., 2010). Preven-
tion and mitigation requires buy-in 
and action from across a variety of 
institutional bodies, political entities 
and stakeholders.
Understanding 
the incentives and 
disincentives to 
investment is key to the 
promotion of ex ante 
investment in mitigation 
and prevention. 
An expanding body of 
scientific evidence 
on the benefits of 
these investments 
can help improve the 
business case. 
The literature provides a long list of 
barriers and challenges for a greater 
ex ante focus on mitigation and pre-
vention, which Coppola (2015) sum-
marises as financial, political, tech-
nical and sociocultural. In addition, 
effective prevention and mitigation 
requires community engagement 
across the entire suite of  stakehold-
ers, as it cannot be provided by any 
single authority or agency (Palliyaguru 
et al., 2014). Indeed, local communi-
ties tend to be the first responders to 
natural disasters and therefore might 
have valuable information about the 
best mitigation practices (Genovese 
and Przyluski, 2013). Similarly, the 
private sector, while dominating the 
financing and delivery of  infrastruc-
ture investments, does not seem to be 
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fully aligned with the prevention and 
mitigation principles when it comes to 
day-to-day business operations (UN-
ISDR, 2013). Even the insurance in-
dustry views disaster prevention and 
mitigation as a domain of  the state, 
which can be supported by private 
sector action, but only through better 
public/private collaboration (Surmin-
ski et al., 2015). Involving the private 
sector is particularly relevant in the 
context of  infrastructure. The World 
Energy Council (2015) provides crit-
ical evidence on the impacts of  ex-
treme events and emerging risks asso-
ciated with climate change on energy 
infrastructure and recommends that 
the industry work together with the 
financial community, investors and 
policymakers to share and promote 
measures that must be incorporated 
into energy infrastructure design and 
investment decisions (Golnaraghi et 
al., 2016).
A key to successful resilient partner-
ships between policymakers, private 
sector actors and scientists is a com-
mon understanding of  the risks, pref-
erences and needs of  actors and the 
implications of  proposed economic 
and regulatory policy instruments 
(National Research Council, 2011). 
Successful examples of  such resilient 
partnerships include the joint imple-
mentation of  non-structural measures 
such as building codes (CEA, 2007). 
Several EU-funded projects, such as 
MOVE, Ensure, Conhaz, Matrix, Cat-
alyst and emBRACE, have significant-
ly advanced scientific knowledge and 
produced methodological innovations 
with respect to assessing and manag-
ing risk and exploring resilience to 
natural hazards. They have developed 
scenarios of  risk for different natu-
ral hazards and have examined risk 
management measures and how the 
concept of  resilience can be used to 
reduce the negative impacts of  those 
hazards on society. As a result, resil-
ience to natural hazards is becoming a 
more integral component of  current 
policymaking and implementation, 
both at the country as well as at EU 
scale. This has also informed policy 
drivers, such as the EU Floods Direc-
tive, and to a lesser extent the EU Ag-
ricultural and Regional Policy.
Despite considerable disincentives to 
investing in prevention and mitiga-
tion, an increase in mitigation invest-
ment has occurred in some Europe-
an countries (See Box 5.2 on seismic 
investment in Italy), but the lack of 
public and therefore political interest 
in prevention and mitigation remains 
a problem.
5.1.7
Achieving 
mitigation and 
prevention through 
land-use planning
Benefit-cost ratios for a global review compared to a prominent United States study only (MMC, 2005)
Source: Mechler (2016)
TABLE 5.1
Hazard Review.
Simple average
(number of studies)
Review.
Range of
estimates
MMC (2005).
Average
Flood (riverine and coastal) 4.6 (21) 0.1-30 5.0
Wind (tropical and extratropical) 2.6 (7) 0.05-50 3.9
Earthquake 3.0 (8) 0.08-15.6 1.5
Drought 2.2 (1) 1.3-2.2 na
Landslide 1.5 (2) 0.1-3.7 na
Overall 3.7 (39) 0.08-50 4.0
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Human exposure to natural hazards 
risk is mainly caused by settlement 
and other economic developments 
in hazard-prone areas. For example, 
many large urban centres are locat-
ed in low-lying floodplains prone to 
floods and storm surges (Jongman 
et al., 2012) and in earthquake zones 
(Daniell et al., 2011). The reason for 
developments in hazard-prone areas 
is often the economic attractiveness 
of  these locations. For example, port 
cities in low-lying coastal areas are 
historically centres of  economic ac-
tivity and therefore attractive for ur-
ban development, despite being vul-
nerable to storm surges (e.g. Brown et 
al., 2014). In the case of  mountainous 
areas, valleys are the only suitable ar-
eas for urban development and form 
the economic basis for tourism devel-
opment, although they are threatened 
by landslides and avalanches.
The question that arises is how to de-
velop these areas so that vulnerabili-
ty to natural hazards is managed in a 
way that it limits risks to human life, 
physical structures and the economy 
in general? Protection measures, such 
as levees and avalanche shields, are 
mainly targeted to limiting the mag-
nitude and probability of  hazards. In 
addition, measures can be developed 
that lower exposure and vulnerability. 
With respect to the latter two, spatial 
planning policies and regulations play 
an important role as they determine 
where and how people and econom-
ic assets will be located (King et al., 
2016). Hence, spatial planning direct-
ly influences the exposure of  people 
and economic assets as well as how 
vulnerable these exposed assets and 
people are (Greiving et al., 2006). 
During the last 10-15 years, there has 
been increasing attention within spa-
tial planning policy to address the is-
The range of co-benefits associated with DRM measures
Source: adapted from the Environmental Resources Management and the Department for International Devel-
opment (2005)
TABLE 5.2
 
Possible co-benefits DRM activity 
Provision of irrigation or potable water and hydro-electric power 
Dual-purpose road infrastructure 
Flood protection structures 
Improved governance, more organised social structures Strengthening DRM capacity of civil society 
Environmental conservation, improved air quality, climate change 
mitigation  
Ecosystem-based DRM approaches 
Community facilities (e.g. clinics or schools) in non-disaster periods Shelters 
Water supply systems improved regardless of a disaster occurring Improving water supply systems in rural areas 
Improved irrigation practices, possibly improved agricultural practices 
Dual purpose road tunnel or parking lot infrastructure 
Construction and use of drainage pipes, canals and  
water retention basins 
Improved women’s involvement in community-level activities Community-based disaster preparedness 
Enhanced access to telephony and electronic data services Installing more resilient wireless communications 
Reduced vulnerability to poverty Training farmers to diversify the use of crops 
Improvement to the food supply chain, possibly making it more cost-
effective 
Better monitoring of food supplies 
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The Italian national seismic prevention programme
Over the last 50 years, earthquakes 
with a magnitude between 5.5 and 
6.9 in Italy have resulted in thou-
sands of victims and monetary 
losses  of over EUR 160 billion. Even 
considering the present condition of 
the building stock and the possible 
occurrence of future earthquakes, 
expected direct costs are of the or-
der of EUR 2-4 billion per year.
Similar to other countries subject to 
seismic hazard with high population 
exposure and high vulnerability of 
constructions, a huge effort would 
be needed to mitigate seismic risk, 
which requires different and paral-
lel lines of action to be pursued: the 
improvement of the knowledge, the 
reduction of the vulnerability and 
exposure and the mitigation of the 
effects. Seismic prevention remains, 
however, a difficult objective to 
achieve fully due to the high costs 
implied, long time frame and lack 
of public and political interest. 
After a destructive earthquake, 
some seismic risk mitigation meas-
ures are usually taken, mainly con-
sisting of the improvement of seis-
mic codes and classification, but 
with little economic effort to direct-
ly reduce vulnerability in areas not 
affected by that earthquake.
In Italy, since 1986 very few invest-
ments have been made in structur-
al seismic prevention, and almost 
exclusively on strategic and im-
portant public buildings (hospitals, 
schools, etc.). A change of perspec-
tive occurred after the earthquake 
on 6 April 2009 in Abruzzo. Two 
articles of Law 77/2009, issued for 
reconstruction in the damaged ar-
eas, have instead been devoted to 
seismic prevention in the entire na-
tionalterritory. 
Article 1bis established the imme-
diate enforcement of the new tech-
nical standards promulgated at the 
beginning of 2008, but not fully en-
forced yet, while Article 11 allocat-
ed around EUR 1 billion for seismic 
prevention, to be spent in the fol-
lowing 7 years. This is a small frac-
tion of what is needed to solve the 
problem of seismic risk in Italy and 
less than half the expected average 
annual cost of earthquakes. Nev-
ertheless, Italy now has a national 
seismic prevention programme and 
EUR 965 million has been spent in 7 
years on reducing seismic risk.
The National Seismic Prevention 
Program essentially focuses on the 
following points:
• Reducing the risk of human loss 
rather than economical loss, 
especially for private buildings.
• Stimulating the attention of pri-
vate owners and administrators 
towards the different problems 
of seismic risk (vulnerability of 
buildings, importance of local 
amplification and co-seismic 
effects and use of microzona-
tion studies to improve urban 
and emergency planning and 
correct implementation of civil 
protection plans considering the 
vulnerability of the strategic el-
ements and of the interconnec-
tion routes).
• Seeking co-funding by local 
public administration and by 
private owners to at least du-
plicate the actual effects of 
the allocated fund of the state. 
At present, the funding pro-
gramme is approaching its 
end. The evaluation of the re-
sults provides some positive 
feedback, but also emphasises 
some difficulties that are relat-
ed to the spending capability of 
local administrations. 
This experience confirms that a 
prevention programme has to be 
based on a strong scientific back-
ground and developed through a 
long time horizon, so that public 
administrators and private owners 
can adequately make their preven-
tion plans and put them in effect.
Source: Dolce (2012)
BOX 5.2
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Importance of risk assessment for land use
Where inaccurate risk information 
can lead to is exemplified in the Fig-
ure 5.2. This figure shows a map of 
New York City for the actual flood-
ing due to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 
(in red) and the official 1/100 flood 
zone (in blue) provided by the gov-
ernment before the hurricane oc-
curred. The figure shows that many 
of the actual flooded areas are out-
side the official flood zone. Inaccu-
rate perception of flood risk for an 
area may lead to the development 
of urban areas in unprotected are-
as or to under-designing levees for 
protecting people against extreme 
events.
BOX 5.3
1983 FIRMs 100-Year Floodplain
Sandy Inundation Area
 ea
FEMA Effective 100-year Flood Plain and Sandy Comparison Map
0 3 6
N
12 miles
New York City – a comparison of the actual flooding due to Hurricane Sandy in 2012 (in red) and the official 
1/100 flood zone (in blue) provided by the government before the hurricane occurred.
Source: Aerts and Mysiak (2016)
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sue of  disaster prevention, but there 
is still a need to further integrate risk 
assessment within spatial planning 
processes; this has been advocated by 
the SFDRR (Mysiak et al., 2015).
5.1.7.1 
National Policies
Spatial planning involves different 
scales of  policy- and decision-making. 
Regulations at the national and even 
continental scales (such as the EU) 
prioritise the importance of  the use of 
space for different land uses and, for 
example, lay out what areas should be 
protected from further development 
(e.g. national parks; Natura 2000 sites; 
e.g. Mikkonen and Moilanen, 2013). 
Spatial planning policies at the high-
est levels also set out guidelines and 
benchmarks for safety against natural 
hazards. As an example, although not 
directly targeted at natural hazards, 
the EU Seveso III directive (Europe-
an Union, 2012) states that ‘Member 
States shall ensure that the objec-
tives of  preventing major accidents 
through hazards and limiting the con-
sequences of  such accidents for hu-
man health and the environment are 
taken into account in their land-use 
policies or other relevant policies’. 
In addition, the EU Flood Directive 
(European Comission, 2007) aims at 
reducing flood risk by encouraging 
cross-border integrated flood risk 
management plans for all European 
river basins. These plans should cover 
all aspects of  flood risk management, 
integrating spatial planning policies 
and physical-hydrological measures 
such as protection and prepared-
ness, including flood forecasts and 
early warning. These policies include 
making sure that the siting of  new 
transport lines and the development 
of  new buildings or modifications of 
new establishments must address risk 
from hazards.
Human exposure to 
natural hazards risk 
is mainly caused by 
settlement and other 
economic developments 
in hazard-prone areas. 
This risk can be 
reduced through 
spatial planning and 
regulations that should 
take into consideration 
opportunities for 
economic growth, 
development of 
communities and 
well-being.
National policies often involve coop-
eration with other countries within 
river basins. An example is the flood 
retention areas in the Rhine basin, 
which aim at storing flood waters 
upstream in Germany to reduce the 
risk of  flooding downstream into the 
Netherlands. These retention meas-
ures use space, which has to be re-
served, or require land-use change to 
create space (Te Linde et al., 2010). 
Another example is the efforts in 
Germany after the 20o2 floods. These 
floods showed that retention areas 
that can be flooded in a controlled 
manner can be effective. In addition, 
floodplain surface in Germany has 
been reduced by one third, and pol-
icies were developed to further install 
retention areas through reserving 
space in spatial planning policies to 
bring back resilience to floods in the 
hydrological system (Thieken et al., 
2016).
Since the basis for prevention and 
mitigation is the availability of  accu-
rate risk data, national policy within 
the spatial planning domain plays an 
important role in initiating risk map-
ping activities to assess areas that 
are at risk from natural hazards. Risk 
maps can be used to prioritise land-
use planning, to restrict development 
in some high-risk areas or to impose 
additional measures in areas above 
certain risk thresholds to lower vul-
nerability. 
For flood risk management, this pro-
cess has been geared up in the EU 
through the EU floods directive (Eu-
ropean Comission, 2007). This direc-
tive requires Member States to assess 
flood risk by developing spatial flood 
risk maps (De Moel et al., 2008) and to 
prepare catchment-based Flood Risk 
Management Plans (FRMPs), that 
include spatial planning actions and 
measures (Office of  Public Works, 
2009). Flood risk maps must show 
information on the flood extent, wa-
ter depths/level and flow velocities. 
On the basis of  these maps, Member 
States are to develop flood risk man-
agement plans aiming at the ‘reduc-
tion of  potential adverse consequenc-
es of  flooding for human health, the 
environment, cultural heritage and 
economic activity, and, if  considered 
appropriate, on non-structural initia-
tives and/or on the reduction of  the 
likelihood of  flooding’ (Van Rijswick 
and Havekes, 2012).
Another opportunity to include disas-
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ter risk in spatial planning processes 
stimulated at the national scale is to 
further integrate risk assessments in 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA), which is a procedure that en-
sures that the environmental impli-
cations of  decisions are taken into 
account before decisions are made. 
In principle, it can be undertaken for 
individual projects such as the devel-
opment of  a new airport or for plans 
and programmes (Strategic Environ-
mental Assessment - SEA). An exam-
ple for SEA includes the assessment 
of  a regional spatial plan in which 
risks from natural hazards are ideally 
considered (Greiving et al., 2006). The 
recent EU Environmental Impact As-
sessment directive has acknowledged 
the need for greater integration of 
risk information in this kind of  as-
sessment (European Union, 2011).
5.1.7.2
Zoning
At the regional to local scales, na-
tional DRM guidelines and policies 
are commonly elaborated in zoning- 
and building-code policies. Zoning 
regulations are set to control land 
use and setting development stand-
ards throughout urban areas. Zoning 
makes it possible to create transitional 
land-use patterns so that incompati-
ble uses are separated and buffered. 
Zoning regulations determine what 
land can be used for, or combina-
tions of  use for available space, and 
what kinds of  buildings can be de-
veloped, including how they address 
natural hazard risk management. In 
terms of  utilising space for especial-
ly urban areas, zoning policies and 
building codes are powerful tools for 
controlling land use and urban devel-
opment, and hence (changes in) fu-
ture land use (Burby et al., 2000). As 
such, zoning is increasingly seen as an 
important tool in climate adaptation 
and managing changes in natural ex-
tremes due to climate change (Aerts 
and Botzen, 2011).
Zoning encompasses the following 
general policies related to urban de-
velopment and risk management:
• Restrictions: based on hazard maps 
and/or additional risk information 
(See Box 5.3), zoning policies may 
indicate that in certain areas urban 
development is not allowed.
• Conditional development: urban 
development is allowed in risky ar-
eas, but only when certain condi-
tions are met, for example by:
a. implementing building codes;
b. homeowners have purchased 
insurance against natural hazard 
risk; 
c. buffer zones are respected, 
whereby building development 
is only allowed when appropri-
ate distances between establish-
ments and vulnerable risk areas 
are maintained.
Zoning and land-use planning is also 
used to create space for other risk 
management measures, for example 
by creating structural space for escape 
lanes (e.g. in case of  flooding) or by 
providing space for structural meas-
ures such as dikes, avalanche protec-
tion or forest protection against land-
slides (e.g. Dorren et al., 2004).
In special cases, spatial planners may 
decide to ‘retreat’ or relocate the in-
habitants of  an area. Such rare cases 
exist, for example in the aftermath 
of  extreme events (e.g. the Tsuna-
mi events of  2004 and 2011), when 
the costs of  rebuilding an area else-
where are lower than rebuilding urban 
settlements on original (but devas-
tated) land. In addition, inhabitants 
who have been evacuated from the 
disaster area do not want to return 
to their previous living area because 
they have found a home elsewhere 
or because reconstruction takes too 
long (Ranghieri and Ishwatari, 2014). 
Retreat, as an alternative option to 
lower exposure without having had 
a disaster, is rarely considered a fea-
sible option for policymakers. Only 
few examples are known where peo-
ple have moved voluntarily to another 
location; an example is the creation 
of  an extension of  a floodplain in the 
Netherlands (Schut et al., 2010). Peo-
ple were compensated either to leave 
the area, or were subsidised to elevate 
their homes a few metres, which in 
practice meant completely rebuilding 
their homes. Although the area only 
comprised some 30-40 households, 
it took more than 15 years to devel-
op and implement the project. Some 
authors, however, argue that sea level 
rise will initiate an increase in reloca-
tion of  low-lying urban centres near 
floodplains and coastal waters (Hauer 
et al., 2016). Again, politics here is im-
portant.
5.1.7.3 
Object level and  
building codes 
Zoning regulations, and in particular 
zoning for conditional development, 
can be further refined in building 
codes regulations for the development 
and maintenance of  buildings in risk 
zones. Building codes are meant for 
the adaptation of  building structures 
to lower their vulnerability to natural 
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hazards. Building codes are anchored 
in planning law, which is operation-
alised in legally binding land-use or 
zoning plans. These zoning plans lay 
out the areas where building codes 
will be enforced.
Specific measures to comply with 
building codes pertain to different 
hazards. For example, in the Unit-
ed States, buildings that lie in flood-
prone areas need to elevate their base 
floor to a minimum height. Flood 
zones are mapped by the Feder-
al Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) as Flood Insurance Rate 
Maps (FIRM), representing the 1/100 
flood zone. In these flood zones, 
building codes apply and homeown-
ers need to seal basements or crawl-
spaces to avoid the entrance of  flood 
waters. Furthermore, electric facilities 
(sockets and heating systems) must 
be installed above certain elevations 
to avoid power outages and short cir-
cuits (Aerts and Botzen, 2011).
A study by De Moel et al. (2014) in 
the port area of  the City of  Rotter-
dam in the Netherlands shows that 
the current flood risk is about EUR 
40 million per year. A large part of 
this risk can be attributed to industrial 
land use. Climate change and sea level 
rise may double the risk by 2100 if  no 
additional measures are implement-
ed. The research showed that by dry 
proofing all buildings in the port area 
by up to 1 m, risk would be reduced 
by 56 %. Elevating all buildings by 
only 0.5 metre would reduce the to-
tal flood risk by 50 % (De Moel et al., 
2014).
Building codes for earthquakes may 
involve specific requirements to 
improve the seismic resistance of 
buildings. For example, the National 
Earthquake Hazards Reduction Pro-
gram (NEHRP) in the United States 
shows how to design and construct 
practices that address the earthquake 
hazard and minimise the resulting risk 
to life and property (FEMA, 2009). 
For landslides, building codes focus 
on reinforcing walls and list specific 
requirements for the groundwork of 
the building (see, for example, the 
handbook of  the Australian Building 
Codes Board on landslides, ABCB, 
2015). Under Eurocodes, the EU 
standard for construction, structural 
design rules are laid out for seismic-re-
sistant structures as well as resistance 
to hydrometeorological hazards, often 
replacing the national codes.
In some countries, zoning regulations, 
building codes and insurance policies 
are integrated. For example, in the 
United States, homeowners can buy 
flood insurance when their property 
complies with the prescribed building 
codes. Homeowners may even derive 
a discount on their flood insurance 
premium when they implement more 
stringent measures via a Communi-
ty Rating Program (CRS) to lower 
vulnerability (see Aerts and Botzen, 
2011). Building codes and zoning 
measures, however, also take quite 
some time to develop and to process 
them through all regulatory bodies. 
In many instances, building codes 
are not yet assessed against increases 
in risk through, for example, climate 
change (see Burby, 2006).
5.1.8
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership
National DRM policies increasingly 
involve cooperation with other coun-
tries. Within cross-boundary river ba-
sins, countries can jointly seek policies 
to control flood waters, for example, 
through spatial planning. Partner-
ship for mitigation and prevention is 
particularly important in urban areas 
because of  the disconnect between 
national and local responsibilities 
and resources. Horizontal city-to-city 
knowledge sharing and technology 
transfer is invaluable because of  the 
unique context of  urban systems. 
Resilience strategies can bring in the 
private, public, NGO and academic 
sectors.
Knowledge
However, identifying suitable invest-
ments is not enough. Presenting evi-
dence of  additional dividends to poli-
cymakers and investors could provide 
a narrative reconciling short- and 
long-term objectives. This will im-
prove the acceptability and feasibility 
of  DRM investments, enhancing the 
business case for investment in pre-
vention and mitigation.
Innovation
Integration of  policies and regula-
tions across sectors such as zoning 
regulations, building codes and in-
surance policies would be a key inno-
vation in mitigation and prevention, 
making the mitigation strategy more 
coherent and easier for stakeholders 
to implement.
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5.2 Preparedness and 
response
Katie	Peters, Monika Buscher, Carina Fearnley, Ira Helsloot, 
Pierre Kockerols, John Twigg
5.2.1
Policy and 
institutional  
architecture of  
preparedness and 
response in Europe
The DRM policy landscape has tran-
sitioned to ‘civil protection’, empha-
sising the importance of  effective 
transboundary coordination and co-
operation to manage transboundary 
disasters. This has been accompanied 
by a shift towards the role of  policy in 
adaptive management and in protect-
ing the rights of  victims and survi-
vors. Science plays an important role 
in better understanding the complex-
ity of  modern disasters and in devis-
ing suitable tools and approaches for 
preparedness and response.
5.2.1.1
Policy landscape  
and trends 
Historically within European states, 
disasters were times when affected 
individuals had to self-organise, as ex-
ternal response was not systematically 
available, if  at all. This changed in the 
20th century when states started to 
organise loose structures of  ordinary 
citizens intended to respond in times 
of  crisis. For fires, this concept dates 
back to the Romans (Goudsblom, 
2015). In recent history, the risk of 
aerial bombing across Europe led to 
a significant shift with the formation 
of  civil defence organisations (Dynes, 
1994; Van der Boom, 2000). By a dec-
ade or so after the Second World War, 
a transition had taken place from an 
essentially untrained volunteer-based 
response system to disaster manage-
ment organisations staffed by paid 
professionals. Most European coun-
tries moved towards a professional-
isation of  disaster management and 
a centralised command-and-control 
structure (Dynes, 1994).
Command and control through civil 
defence centred on managing popu-
lations in the face of  aggression and 
on emphasising top-down methods 
(Alexander, 2002). During the Cold 
War (1948-1989), the focus on possi-
ble relocation of  civilian populations 
under threat of  nuclear attack saw 
civil defence administered by mili-
tary and paramilitary groups. Scientif-
ic critiques of  civil defence point to 
the possibility for such institutions to 
become an instrument of  repression 
and used to ‘protect the state against 
its people’ (Alexander, 2002).
Science played a key role 
in shaping the nature of 
civil protection.
Science played a key role in shaping 
the nature of  civil protection through 
the 1960s to 2000s. Research ques-
tioned the role of  the military in 
emergency management and helped 
to shape the non-military, civilian 
character of  emergency preparedness 
that emerged (Alexander, 2002). A 
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better understanding of  the complex-
ity of  modern disasters has focused 
attention on adaptive emergency 
management as well as the rights of 
victims and survivors. The military 
still has a role to play; in redefining its 
role in disaster preparedness and re-
sponse, military forces can be used in 
integrated ways with civil protection, 
or civil protection forces may contain 
pseudo-military organisations. For 
example, some fire brigades are part-
ly organised along military lines, and 
non-governmental organisations such 
as the Salvation Army adopts a pseu-
do-military image (Alexander, 2002). 
Overall, ‘modern civil protection is 
not inherently authoritarian’ (Alexan-
der, 2002), although the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks altered emer-
gency planning with a new focus on 
terrorist incidents and response op-
erations in which police force or mil-
itary units would usually be the lead 
agency (Alexander, 2002). Concerns 
over the possible remilitarising of  civ-
il protection in light of  efforts to pre-
pare for possible terrorist attacks are 
regarded as a threat to progress made 
in the 2000s in expanding civilian dis-
aster response networks (Alexander, 
2002).
5.2.1.2
Institutional architecture 
and coordinating  
mechanisms
European Union members have over 
time been drawn closer together by 
policies and legislation facilitating 
greater interstate cooperation (Boin 
et al. 2014b). The risks facing Mem-
ber States have become increasingly 
European Union Civil Protection Mechanism
When activated, the mechanism 
provides support via the ERCC, 
which provides 24/7 capacity to 
monitor and coordinate response 
to disasters. It is directly linked with 
the civil protection and humanitari-
an aid authorities in the participat-
ing states. 
The centre also acts as the central 
24/7 contact point in the eventual-
ity that a Member State activates 
the solidarity clause (Article 222 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union) or when the Eu-
ropean Union presidency activates 
the integrated political crisis re-
sponse arrangements and ensures 
coordination with other EU services 
and bodies for the response (ECHO, 
2016).
Recent disasters such as the west-
ern Balkans flooding (2014), the 
eastern Ukraine conflict (2015), 
the forest fires in Greece (2015) 
and the European refugee crisis 
(2015-2016) have activated the 
mechanism and therefore the ERCC. 
Twenty-eight Member States plus 
a number of other European coun-
tries participate, providing addition-
al response capabilities in times 
when the disaster exceeds those of 
the state in which the crisis takes 
place. Assistance deployed includes 
technical expertise, relief and 
equipment items, as well as advice 
on preparedness measures.
In 2013, legislative changes placed 
greater emphasis on preparedness 
(through the mechanism), including 
the establishment of a voluntary 
pool of pre-committed response 
capacities. In addition, EU funding 
helps address caps and temporary 
shortcomings in preparedness and 
response planning, including ‘im-
proving the quality of and accessi-
bility to disaster information, imple-
mentation of prevention measures, 
raising of public awareness of risks 
and disaster management, support-
ing Member States in risk assess-
ment and hazard mapping based 
on guidelines, encouraging research 
to promote disaster resilience and 
reinforcing early warning tools’ 
(ECHO, 2016). 
Source: ECHO (2017)
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transboundary in nature and require 
greater cross-country collaboration to 
prepare and respond to crises (Boin 
et al. 2014a). Therefore, it has been 
necessary to create integrated institu-
tions and coordinating mechanisms 
to manage these. We outline key in-
stitutions that have developed and 
explores how they have evolved and 
how they respond to the challenges of 
Europe’s changing risk environment.
Crises in the future will be increas-
ingly transboundary, transcending 
geographic and political borders and 
affecting multiple vital elements of  in-
frastructure, and will not be contained 
in time (Ansell et al., 2009; Ansell et 
al., 2010; Boin and Ekengren, 2009; 
Boin and Lagadec, 2000). Recognis-
ing this, the European Security Strat-
egy (ESS) declares: ‘the EU’s commit-
ment to combat a variety of  security 
threats, including failed states, ener-
gy security, terrorism, global warm-
ing and disasters. The ESS adopts a 
comprehensive view, explicitly linking 
internal and external threats, civilian 
and military capacities and natural 
and man-made disasters’ (Boin and 
Ekengren, 2009). This points to the 
importance of  effective cooperation 
between regional, national and inter-
national communities.
The UCPM, established in 2001, seeks 
to enhance and strengthen coopera-
tion and coordination between Mem-
ber States and to jointly respond to 
major emergencies — including pool-
ing capabilities (Morsut, 2014). The 
mechanism has evolved from prepar-
edness for response, and response, to 
include preparedness and prevention, 
and in supporting international relief 
efforts, for example to the 2004 Indi-
an Ocean tsunami and the 2010 Haiti 
earthquake (Morsut, 2014).
Evidence points to the value of  infor-
mation sharing in disaster response, 
with studies showing that failure to 
do so ‘… during interagency disaster 
response has a negative influence on 
collective decision-making and ac-
tions’ (Bharosa et al., 2010). This has 
been recognised by European mem-
bers, including the Dutch Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations 
(Bharosa et al., 2010). The UCPM 
promotes a coordinated response to 
disasters across Europe (see Box 5.4) 
supporting countries when capacity 
if  surpassed. However, empirical ev-
idence is sparse on the challenges and 
obstacles to effective coordination 
and information sharing, limiting un-
derstanding of  the means to address 
barriers between community, agency 
and individual levels (Bharosa et al. 
2010).
Overall, Europe’s approach to pre-
paredness and response can be cat-
egorised as a ‘networked approach’ 
reflecting the complexity of  recent 
disaster events (Boin et al., 2014a). 
Europe’s recent experience with dis-
asters that cross traditional geograph-
ic and policy boundaries — referred 
to as ‘transboundary crises’ — include 
the bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy crisis in 1996; the Erika and Pres-
tige tanker disasters in 1999 and 2002, 
respectively, with devastating environ-
mental, social and economic impacts; 
flooding in central and eastern Europe 
in 2002; and fires in southern Europe 
in 2003 (Boin et al., 2014a). Through-
out 1990 and 2000 the European 
Union developed its transboundary 
coordination and cooperation in re-
sponse to different crises, harnessing 
European capacity and leading to the 
establishment of  several agencies: the 
European Food Safety Authority, the 
European Maritime Safety Agency 
and three European financial super-
visory authorities (Boin et al., 2014a). 
The development of  tools, approach-
es and institutions has therefore been 
largely reactive, whereby ‘The EU de-
veloped all of  this capacity in a punc-
tuated and fragmentary manner: with 
each crisis, Member States invested 
additional authority in the Union’s 
budding crisis management appara-
tus. There is, in other words, no insti-
tutional blueprint’ (Boin et al., 2014a). 
It can therefore be characterised as 
a ‘network’ or governance approach 
(Boin et al., 2014a).
This networked approach is support-
ed by a number of  tools, including 
the ERCC in Brussels (Box 5.4) and 
a Common Emergency Communica-
tion and Information System, which 
facilitates communication between 
the ERCC and national authorities. 
These centres seek to align with the 
European Union’s core values — re-
spect for human dignity, liberty, de-
mocracy, equality, the rule of  law and 
human rights.
Progress over the past 20 years has 
seen research initiatives move from 
a focus on cross-border cooperation 
between Member States to method-
ological development. The latter in-
cludes hazards such as earthquakes, 
floods and landslides, as well as more 
effective management plans linked to 
EWSs employing those new technol-
ogies (Papatheodorou et al., 2014). 
Papatheodorou et al. (2014) note that 
‘… harmonisation of  methodologies 
used to assess ELF Hazards (earth-
quake, landslide, flooding), easy or 
even free access to reliable and accu-
rate harmonised data and reliable and 
accurate hazard maps on a local scale 
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are needed in order to effectively de-
sign preventive measures, to plan an 
effective management strategy and fi-
nally to raise public awareness’.
Initiatives such as EFAS support im-
proved preparedness to flooding in 
transnational European river basins 
(Thielen et al. 2009). Starting with a 
2003 prototype, local water author-
ities were provided with 3-10 days 
advance notice of  medium-range and 
probabilistic flood forecast informa-
tion. Initiatives such as these involve 
collaboration with national hydro-
logical and meteorological services 
linking research, action and continual 
development of  a model supported 
by information exchange and linking 
meteorologists with national water 
authorities. When initiated, EFAS was 
one of  the few flood warning systems 
in existence to utilise ensemble pre-
diction systems to increase predicta-
bility of  floods and enhance prepar-
edness capacity (Thielen et al., 2009).
The importance of  cross-border co-
operation is especially important for 
flood hazards, providing means to 
strengthen knowledge, information 
and selection of  cost-effective miti-
gation strategies. The lack of  a legal 
framework for cooperation, of  ca-
pacity and resources and of  differ-
ing institutional structures and pub-
lic awareness present challenges to 
be addressed (Papatheodorou et al., 
2014). Effective cross-border action is 
limited without comparable pan-Eu-
ropean methodological approaches to 
hazard assessment and risk mapping 
(Papatheodorou et al., 2014).
European community urgent radiological information 
exchange (Ecurie)
In the wake of the Chernobyl acci-
dent, Council Decision 87/600/Eur-
atom was adopted. This decision 
essentially obliges a Member State 
to notify the European Commission 
without delay in the event of enact-
ing measures to protect its popu-
lation from the effects of an event 
with radiological consequences. 
This legislation was the legal basis 
for what became known as the ‘Eu-
ropean community urgent radiolog-
ical information exchange’, or Ecu-
rie, and was a major step forward in 
the field of radiological emergency 
preparedness in Europe.
The information to be shared not 
only covers the basic characteristics 
of the event itself but also the fore-
seeable development of the emer-
gency and its potential effects, the 
results of radiological monitoring in 
the affected country and the meas-
ures taken to provide information 
to the general public. On receipt 
of such a notification, the Europe-
an Commission promptly forwards 
the information to all Ecurie contact 
points. The intention is for the sys-
tem to provide a continuous flow of 
information during the emergency.
In the years since, the system has 
matured both in terms of stakehold-
er network and operational status. A 
new information exchange software 
application, ‘Web-Ecurie’, was de-
veloped and first made operational 
in 2012, replacing its predecessor, 
which was based on point-to-point 
secure email communication. Users 
only require internet access in order 
to enter the application, which may 
be used on a variety of platforms. 
Submitted information is organised 
in a modern status board arrange-
ment. ‘Event’ or ‘National’ status 
boards allow for either a broad or a 
country-specific view, with particu-
lar focus on the display of national 
protective measures.
Much attention has been and con-
tinues to be given to harmonis-
ing the underlying procedures and 
technology with that of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, and 
the transfer of valuable experience 
gained over the decades in Europe 
to countries and regions outside the 
European community is actively be-
ing pursued.
Source: De Cort et al. (2015)
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5.2.1.3
Developing effective 
early warning systems
EWSs form an important part of 
DRM and are essential features of 
UCPM (Alfieri et al., 2012). Greater 
recognition of  the role of  EWSs have 
contributed to the move from an ex 
post response towards a culture of 
risk prevention and preparedness (Al-
fieri et al., 2012). The shift to greater 
stakeholder participation in prepared-
ness and response (described earlier 
in this chapter) can be seen in more 
accessible and open information in 
EWSs including the ability of  systems 
to be accessed remotely and stake-
holders to input data that improves 
the quality of  early warnings (Alfieri 
et al., 2012).
EWSs provide timely warnings to 
minimise loss of  life and to reduce 
economic and social impact on vul-
nerable populations (Garcia and 
Fearnley, 2012). In 2006, the UNIS-
DR platform for the promotion of 
early warning published the Global 
survey of  early warning systems, iden-
tifying existing capacities and gaps in 
EWSs in over 23 countries with 20 in-
ternational agencies (United Nations, 
2006). The report advocates that an 
EWS should be ‘people centred’ (i.e. 
community based) and should include 
many systematic approaches and di-
verse activities spanning four key el-
ements: risk knowledge, monitoring 
and warning service, dissemination 
and communication, and response 
capability (Basher, 2006). The opera-
tion of  an EWS presents numerous 
challenges due to variations in scale 
(global, national, regional or local), 
temporality (rapid onset or slow onset 
and frequent or infrequent), function 
(safety, property or environment) and 
hazard (weather, climate and geohaz-
ards).
An EWS needs to fit within the 
broader mitigation and preparedness 
actions of  the DRM cycle. Research-
ers and other stakeholders frequently 
work independently on EWS subsys-
tems in a multitude of  non-coordinat-
ed strategies with no structure or link-
ing, compromising the effectiveness 
of  the EWS. An effective EWS can 
only be achieved once stakeholders 
recognise their relative contribution 
and work together to link efforts in 
order to achieve effective DRM.
With the increasing impact of  glob-
al warming on extreme natural haz-
ards, EWSs are increasingly required 
to cater for multiple hazards (Bash-
er, 2006) or even cascading hazards 
(Pescaroli and Alexander, 2015). This 
is reflected in the SFDRR — and its 
European signatories — which aims 
to ‘substantially increase the availa-
bility of  and access to multihazard 
EWSs and disaster risk information 
and assessments to the people by 
2030’ (UNISDR, 2015). This requires 
a greater examination of  the role of 
EWSs as a whole within preparedness 
strategies.
5.2.2
Ethical, legal and 
social principles in 
preparedness and 
response
We review some of  the core ethical, 
legal and social (ELSI) considera-
tions in emergency preparedness and 
response. Recent efforts have begun 
to draw interdisciplinary research to-
gether and engage closely with prac-
tice (Campbell 2012; Boin and Eken-
gren 2009) to discuss ELSI. Debates 
about responsible research and in-
novation (Nowotny et al., 2001; Von 
Schomberg, 2013; Stilgoe, 2015) have 
brought a reflexive dimension to re-
search and practice in DRM. 
DRM is embedded in 
complex ethical, legal, 
social and political 
contexts, and disasters 
should not justify 
exceptions in moral 
standards. 
Shared values and 
principles are needed 
for emergency response 
that transcend 
national boundaries 
and strengthen social 
cohesion and trust before 
a disaster can increase 
the effectiveness 
of response.
Debates about responsible research 
and innovation (Nowotny et al., 2001; 
Von Schomberg, 2013; Stilgoe, 2015) 
have brought a reflexive dimension to 
research and practice in DRM.
5.2.2.1
Legal frameworks 
National legal frameworks for disaster 
preparedness and response in Europe 
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are based on European Commission 
directives or international initiatives. 
As in the case of  the Flood Directive 
(Alfieri et al., 2012), these policy de-
velopments often respond to global 
change or large-scale disasters. The 
Flood Directive, for example, shows 
how major European floods have 
resulted in a move towards uniform 
protection for all European Union 
citizens and call on Member States 
to review their flood risk manage-
ment approaches (Alfieri et al., 2012). 
Directives urging Member States to 
strengthen preparedness measures 
are often closely linked to mitigation 
strategies and environmental protec-
tion actions, including the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (Papathe-
odorou et al., 2014). This is largely the 
case for earthquakes, floods and land-
slides (Papatheodorou et al., 2014).
With a shift towards a risk manage-
ment approach to dealing with dis-
asters, the legal frameworks under 
which preparedness and response 
are situated have broadened. The at-
traction of  ‘risk-based regulation’ has 
been discussed by scholars reflecting 
on the increased adoption of  ‘risk’ 
by policymakers — including the Eu-
ropean Commission, which regards 
risk as a ‘crucial’ component of  pub-
lic policy, and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment’s recommendation of  risk-based 
approaches (Krieger, 2013). Disas-
ter preparedness and response has 
evolved in this context of  risk-based 
governance, regarded as a means to 
operate more efficiently with finite re-
sources in a context of  austerity and 
accountability in the context of  a nar-
rative of  ‘good governance’ (Krieger, 
2013).
Increased incidents of  flooding and 
economic damage since the 1990s 
— and, in particular, USD 11 billion 
(EUR 10.1 billion) of  damage as a 
result of  the Elbe/Danube flood in 
2002 and USD 4 billion (EUR 3.7 bil-
lion) in the United Kingdom in 2007 
— have reinforced this paradigm shift 
and there has been a clear move from 
flood defence to flood risk manage-
ment across Europe (Krieger, 2013). 
This can be seen in the United King-
dom’s ‘Making space for water’ (DE-
FRA, 2004) and Germany’s ‘Room 
for rivers’ approaches (Krieger, 2013).
As with many EU Member States, the 
United Kingdom emergency man-
agement approach is ‘all hazards’ and 
incorporates mitigation, prepared-
ness, response and recovery (O’Brien, 
2008). Emergency management is 
characterised as ‘legally based, profes-
sionally staffed, well funded and or-
ganised’ (O’Brien, 2008). Reforms to 
United Kingdom emergency manage-
ment have replaced discretion with a 
duty to prepare plans, standardising 
procedures for risk assessment and 
supporting a more integrated ap-
proach. Emergency management in 
the United Kingdom has, however, 
been criticised for focusing largely on 
institutional resilience and organisa-
tional preparedness where a greater 
emphasis on societal resilience and 
public preparedness is regarded as 
necessary (O’Brien, 2008). Great-
er emphasis on a preparedness and 
emergency planning that moves be-
yond the focus on the continuity of 
emergency services and commercial 
activities could entail greater inclusion 
of  the public (O’Brien, 2008).
5.2.2.2
Ethics and moral  
standards for  
emergencies 
Disasters are often still seen as jus-
tifying exceptional decisions. Sorrell 
(2002), for example, argues that in 
emergencies, societies may be ‘sucked 
into a moral black hole’; meaning a 
breakdown of  moral and social order 
that justifies the use of  extraordinary 
powers. These positions are, however, 
challenged by a number of  analysts. 
At the root of  these debates are ques-
tions about whether moral standards 
should ever be disregarded in emer-
gency situations.
As part of  its code of  ethics, the Inter-
national Committee of  the Red Cross 
(ICRC) provides detailed guidance 
on how to engage local populations 
in conflict areas in the production, 
protection and sharing of  sensitive 
information (ICRC, 2013). These ap-
proaches make the case that prepara-
tion can protect societies from excep-
tions that go against ordinary morals, 
integrity and dignity, from unintended 
consequences or from entrusting de-
cisions solely on experts or govern-
ments without public engagement. 
This resonates strongly with calls for 
responsible research and innovation, 
process-oriented, ‘post-ethical, legal 
and social issues’ approaches (Balm-
er et al., 2016) that develop forms of 
disclosure and ethics (Introna, 2007), 
collective experimentation (Petersen 
et al., 2016) and collaborative design 
(Liegl et al., 2016) to address ELSI as 
they emerge in DRM.
Community involvement in DRM is 
generally agreed to be essential and 
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is widely promoted internationally. 
While states have an ethical and often 
legal responsibility for preparedness 
and response, effective action requires 
society as a whole to engage and the 
government to partner with civil so-
ciety and private sector organisations. 
The shift towards civilian disaster 
preparedness and response recognis-
es that ‘disasters can only be mitigat-
ed successfully if  ordinary people are 
empowered to take responsibility for 
their own safety. Disasters, therefore, 
are as much about democracy as they 
are about security’ (Alexander, 2002).
Guiding principles for state interac-
tion with society in preparedness and 
response have been highlighted by 
international agencies, including ‘em-
powering and inclusive participation’, 
‘accessible and non-discriminatory 
support’ and the ‘special attention 
[needed for] those disproportionate-
ly affected by disasters’ (UNISDR, 
2015). Indeed, emergency prepared-
ness is considered by some as a means 
to ensure and safeguard democratic 
rights, not to circumvent them. Thus, 
civil protection often explicitly in-
cludes principles of  equity (Wisner 
et al., 2004; Alexander, 2002) and 
the Council of  Europe’s European 
and Mediterranean Major Hazards 
Agreement has published extensive 
guidance on the application of  ethi-
cal principles to all aspects of  DRM 
(Prieur, 2012).
Accountability, which is a key princi-
ple behind community participation 
and involvement, is encouraged by 
international, regional and national 
codes, charters and standards (Twigg, 
1999). For international humanitarian 
response, the International Federa-
tion of  the Red Cross/International 
Committee of  the Red Cross has a 
code of  conduct, a voluntary code 
of  principles for humanitarian actors 
(IFRC/ICRC, 1994), while the Sphere 
Project has developed a set of  mini-
mum standards in core areas of  hu-
manitarian assistance (Sphere Project 
2011) and the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee has prepared operational 
guidelines on human rights and natu-
ral disasters (IASC, 2006). In Europe, 
the 1998 Aarhus Convention estab-
lished public rights to information 
on the environment and associated 
human safety as well as to participate 
in relevant decision-making (UN-
ECE, 1998). Such instruments may 
be linked to or supported by broader 
principles and agreements on human 
economic and social rights and to in-
stitutions that monitor and support 
them. The idea of  a ‘right to safety’ 
is supported implicitly in some in-
ternational covenants and charters, 
although it is rarely recognised in na-
tional legislation (Twigg, 2003).
Public debates regarding ethical as-
pects of  preparedness and response 
are often triggered by disasters, such 
as the L’Aquila earthquake trial (Alex-
ander 2014, Newberry 2010), but are 
also ongoing, wider discussions about 
social justice and vulnerability, both 
internationally (Wisner et al., 2004; 
Morrow, 2008) and within the Euro-
pean Union (Brisley et al., 2012; Field-
ing, 2007; Lindley et al., 2011).
5.2.2.3
Social capital and 
social cohesion
Research points to the very important 
role of  social capital as a primary base 
for community disaster response and 
is vital in reducing the impact of  dis-
asters and facilitating recovery (Dynes, 
2002; Ko and Cadigan, 2010; Murphy, 
2007; Aldrich, 2012). In crises, social 
networks provide mutual assistance 
and access to support and resources, 
thereby reducing disaster impacts and 
facilitating recovery. This has been 
demonstrated by research in a number 
of  countries, notably Japan and the 
United States, but there is a need for 
further research in Europe (Comfort, 
1996; Dynes, 2005; Murphy, 2007; Air-
ess et al. 2008; Aldrich, 2012; Aldrich 
and Meyer, 2015; Nakagawa and Shaw, 
2004; Shaw and Goda, 2004; Wallace 
and Wallace, 2008; Minamoto, 2010; 
Mimaki and Shaw, 2007).
Disasters often encourage or reinforce 
social capital formation (Putnam, 
2000; Gordon, 2004; Shaw and Goda, 
2004; Bankoff, 2007; Yamamura, 
2010). Studies mostly show a strong 
association between , levels of  social 
capital and post-disaster mental health 
outcomes, particularly a reduction 
in post-traumatic stress (Wind et al,. 
2011; Wind and Komproe, 2012; Rit-
chie and Gill, 2007; Adeola and Picou, 
2014; Ganapati, 2012a, b). Conversely, 
an acute lack of  social capital — social 
isolation — can contribute significant-
ly to vulnerability, as documented with 
regards to the European heatwave of 
2003 (Keller, 2015; Klinenberg, 2002; 
Ogg, 2005; Romero-Lankao et al., 
2012).
5.2.3
Professionalization of 
citizen engagement 
in preparedness and 
response
At a national and regional scale, over 
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the past decade the professional-
ism and coordination of  prepared-
ness for response by civil protection 
mechanisms, including across states, 
has advanced significantly. Some of 
these tendencies and an analysis of 
the changing roles of  different pre-
paredness and response actors are de-
scribed below.
The professionalism 
and coordination of 
preparedness and 
response by civil 
protection agencies has 
advanced significantly 
in recent years 
alongside a desire to 
give citizens increasing 
responsibility for 
individual preparedness 
and response. New social 
groups can emerge during 
a disaster to help manage 
emergency response 
measures — their role 
could be better harnessed 
if appropriately planned 
for informal responses.
 
5.2.3.1
Citizen engagement  
and volunteerism 
Locally organised, trained and 
equipped responders are considered 
a societal asset and a means to enlist 
significant social capital and capability 
in preparedness and response. Thus, 
in some contexts, citizens are encour-
aged to play a more active role in pre-
paredness and response. The 2014 
Dutch National Council for all safety 
regions — the decentralised bodies 
responsible for disaster management 
— recognised the value of  untrained 
citizens and their role in preparedness 
(Veiligheidsberaad, 2014).
Encouraging preparedness for rare 
disasters, however, remains a policy 
challenge. Citizens primarily prepare 
for incidents perceived to be a signif-
icant threat and/or the most recent 
disaster they encountered (Major, 
1999; Tierney, 1989). Government 
programmes aiming to boost resil-
ience therefore need to focus on 
dominant and regularly experienced 
risk. For example, in areas that reg-
ularly experience small earthquakes, 
citizens can be more easily persuad-
ed to prepare for the risk of  a more 
severe earthquake, but less for other 
risks. This raises questions about, for 
example, preparedness measures by 
citizens for flood risk in the Nether-
lands where the perception of  flood-
ing from the sea is low, having not 
occurred since 1953. In spite of  gov-
ernment flood risk preparedness pro-
grammes, further efforts are needed 
to engage citizens (Engel et al., 2012).
5.2.3.2
Emergent groups 
Emergencies stimulate informal re-
sponses by spontaneous, self-or-
ganising and voluntary groups and 
individuals from within and outside 
disaster-affected communities. These 
groups may carry out a wide variety of 
activities including search and rescue, 
first aid, damage assessment, debris 
removal, handling of  bodies, relief 
supplies distribution, food provision, 
translation, counselling and present-
ing survivors’ grievances (Quarantelli, 
1994; Stallings and Quarantelli, 1985). 
This ‘emergent’ and ‘convergent’ be-
haviour in disasters has been docu-
mented over several decades across 
the world, in different cultures and 
under a variety of  governance struc-
tures (Comfort 1996; Drabek and 
McEntire 2003; Dynes et al. 1990; 
Linnell 2014; Neal et al. 2011; Quar-
antelli 1993; Rodriguez et al. 2006; 
Whittaker et al. 2015). In some cases 
large sections of  populations are in-
volved (Quarantelli, 1993). Extensive 
flooding in Kingston upon Hull in the 
United Kingdom in 2007 stimulated a 
range of  spontaneous actions by lo-
cal residents, including assisting with 
evacuation, giving care and support 
to vulnerable neighbours, protecting 
houses against floodwater and giving 
medical assistance (Neal et al. 2011).
Large numbers of  spontaneous vol-
unteers can present significant coor-
dination, integration, communication 
and logistical and health and safety 
challenges to emergency managers, 
especially in rigid ‘command and con-
trol’ disaster management structures 
that do not plan for community en-
gagement.
Improvisation and creativity are re-
quired to build networks and rela-
tionships between organisations and 
incorporate volunteers within or-
ganised efforts (Alvinius et al., 2010; 
Cone et al., 2003; Drabek and McEn-
tire, 2003; Kendra and Wachtendorf, 
2006; McEntire, 2002; Majchrzak et 
al., 2007; Uhr et al., 2008). Neverthe-
less, emergency volunteerism offers 
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longer-term opportunities for more 
structured citizen response through 
training and creation of  community 
preparedness and response teams as 
well as through formal voluntary or-
ganisations (Alexander, 2010; Barsky 
et al., 2007; Helsloot and Ruitenberg, 
2004; Pardess, 2005), although efforts 
are necessary to maintain volunteer 
motivation (Brand et al. 2008). Red 
Cross national societies are a ma-
jor provider of  organised volunteer 
support in disasters, with approxi-
mately 17 million active volunteers 
in 190 national societies worldwide 
(IFRC, 2016). Technisches Hilfswerk, 
a German government agency, has 
over 80 000 volunteers (99 % of  its 
membership) who assist in disaster re-
sponse in their own countries as well 
as in others (THW, 2016).
Recognition of  the contribution that 
social groups can make in emergen-
Digital humanitarianism and citizen mobilisation
There has been a ‘digital tsuna-
mi’ (European Commission, Future 
Group, 2007), with individuals, ob-
jects and environments generat-
ing vast amounts of data through 
self-disclosure and sensors, while 
advances in data processing make 
this data amenable to analysis for 
commercial, governance and secu-
rity purposes — and DRM (Thrift, 
2011). Together, these advances 
can enable improvements in pre-
paredness and disaster response 
because they provide communities 
with more broad-based and de-
tailed monitoring and timely feed-
back on their situation and support 
predictive modelling and more pre-
cise targeting of assistance.
‘Digital humanitarianism’ (Starbird 
and Palen, 2011; Munro, 2013; 
Burns, 2015) can be extremely 
useful if addressed within a frame-
work for resilience that places an 
emphasis on data ownership, com-
munity-based analytical authority 
and community-based data skills 
(Crawford et al., 2013). Social me-
dia is one aspect of the role of tech-
nology in citizen mobilisation and 
awareness raising.
Social media can also service 
self-organised mobilisation and 
coordination of local resources, 
knowledge and efforts. During the 
floods in Germany in 2013, for ex-
ample, 29 % of Twitter messages 
focused on coordinating help and 
resources locally (Zipf, 2013). Re-
ports from sandbag-filling stations 
appeared alongside calls for help 
and a crowdsourced map of the cur-
rent need for volunteers in different 
places (Mildner ,2013). Lüge (2013) 
suggests that these examples index 
a shift in the use of social media for 
emergency management. The in-
formational service function for of-
ficial response is increasingly seri-
ously complemented by a practical 
service function for self-organised 
community help and resources, es-
pecially for members of the public. 
Recent studies find that in Europe 
generally, social media are grow-
ing and supporting the emergence 
of new forms of ‘social resilience’ 
(Flizikowski et al., 2014, Reuter and 
Spielhofer, 2016).
The use of social media in crises 
can give rise to rumours (Mendoza 
et al., 2010), vigilantism and ‘do-it-
yourself’ justice (Rizza et al., 2014, 
Tapia and LaLone, 2014). Howev-
er, attempts at structuring digital 
volunteer work and crisis mapping 
through the UN co-founded Digi-
tal Humanitarian Network (Meier, 
2015) and Virtual Operations Sup-
port Teams or ‘VOST’ (St. Denis et al., 
2012) have begun to create bridges 
between crisis mappers and formal 
emergency agencies (Kaminska et 
al., 2015). They establish networks 
of trust: mechanisms that com-
bine standardisation, training, and 
agreed channels of communica-
tion that enhance risk governance. 
These include engagements around 
air pollution (Mosley, 2009) and ra-
diation risks from Chernobyl where 
‘descriptive standards’, ‘alignment’, 
‘unblackboxing’ and ‘mobile meas-
uring’ proved central to prevent 
risks from becoming ‘twice invisi-
ble’ (Kuchinskaya, 2012).
BOX 5.6
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cy response has stimulated positive 
changes in state-civil society relation-
ships for disaster planning. Yet gov-
ernments sometimes resist in order 
to maintain control (Jalali, 2002), and 
extensive government activity and 
spending can crowd out voluntary 
activity, especially where autonomous 
civil society is not well developed 
(Deng, 2009; Teets, 2009).
5.2.3.3
The role of social media 
in citizen engagement  
Knowledge of  crisis communication 
in Europe is growing rapidly (Palt-
tala et al., 2012). A complex field in 
itself, crisis communication links to 
societal expectations over the role of 
public authorities to effectively com-
municate risk and educate citizens on 
effective preparedness and response. 
Coordination has become increas-
ingly important, as responsibility for 
managing crisis moves from solely the 
government and emergency services 
to include the role of  media, social 
media and other actors (Palttala et al., 
2012). Despite differences between 
countries — including different levels 
of  financial resource for public crisis 
communication — the growing body 
of  evidence, a plethora of  guidelines 
and best practice, suggests there re-
main gaps in ensuring communication 
is integrated into disaster manage-
ment practice and an integral part of 
decision-making (Palttala et al., 2012). 
Gaps remain in relation to coopera-
tion across actors, i.e. the media, with 
citizens and across the response net-
work (Palttala et al., 2012).
New forms of  self-help, partnership 
and cosmopolitan ‘digital humanitar-
ianism’ become possible with tech-
nology. Watson and Finn (2014), for 
example, examine information flows 
between corporations and their cus-
tomers during the Eyjafjallajökull 
eruption, the most severe global flight 
disruption since 9/11. This empow-
ered improvised self-help, including 
self-organised information services, 
and support for actively coordinat-
ing alternative travel. It widened peo-
ple’s networks through ‘virtual social 
convergence’, and Watson and Finn 
(2014) conclude that ‘such activities 
are able to enhance citizen resilience 
by mobilising social capital’.
5.2.4
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership
Cooperation between regional, na-
tional and international communities 
is needed for preparedness and re-
sponse planning given the complex 
and transboundary nature of  modern 
day disasters. ELSI are dimensions 
of  DRM that need to be addressed 
together with practical efforts to pre-
pare and respond. Effective prepared-
ness can protect societies from excep-
tions that go against ordinary morals, 
integrity and dignity, from unintended 
consequences and from entrusting 
decisions solely on experts, or gov-
ernments without public engagement.
Knowledge
A move away from command-and-con-
trol approaches to managing disasters 
has opened up more opportunities for 
citizens to participate in preparedness 
and response. Strong bonds and trust 
within and between communities fa-
cilitates a more effective response in 
emergencies and can be harnessed by 
authorities. Social media can also be 
used to enhance self-organised mo-
bilisation and coordination of  local 
resources, knowledge, and efforts for 
disaster preparedness and response.
Innovation
Research and innovation in pro-
cess-oriented approaches to ELSI will 
improve collective experimentation 
and collaborative design, to address 
issues as they emerge in the dynamic 
contexts of  disaster preparedness and 
response.
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5.3 Recovery and avoiding 
risk creation
Carlos	Sousa	Oliveira, Betâmio de Almeida, Daniela Di Bucci, 
Mauro Dolce, Herman Havekes, Verity Kemp, Catherine Simonet, 
Solveig Thorvaldsdottir, John Twigg, Richard Williams
5.3.1
Introduction
Most disasters are difficult to predict 
in the short term, but research to 
quantify the impact and understand 
recovery processes can help reduce 
the uncertainties associated with these 
events. Recovery is, however, the least 
understood aspect of  DRM (Smith 
and Wenger, 2006). It is considered 
a complex, non-linear process with 
physical, social, economic and insti-
tutional dimensions (Johnson and 
Hayashi, 2012; Alexander, 2016). The 
recovery period is also an opportuni-
ty to facilitate economic, social and 
physical development long after the 
disaster (Berke et al., 1993); and the 
promotion of  social and intergenera-
tional equity is a key principle for sus-
tainable recovery.
In this subchapter we examine scien-
tific knowledge of  recovery processes 
and the policies that have been im-
plemented to enhance recovery, fo-
cussing primarily on Europe. Europe 
has experienced a range of  disasters 
in recent years, though perhaps with 
less frequency and intensity than oth-
er parts of  the world.
It is important to be 
prepared to live with 
the possibility that 
disasters may occur in 
one’s lifetime or in that 
of the next generation. 
Anticipating the multiple 
dimensions of recovery 
is key to effective risk 
management.
The aim is not to provide an extensive 
coverage of  all disasters or hazard 
types but rather cases that have been 
illustrative of  the recovery process 
and that have led to scientific innova-
tions and advances in theory. Not all 
recovery processes are covered here, 
but authors have attempted to cover a 
range of  physical reconstruction and 
economic, social and psychological 
aspects, as well as knowledge about 
the planning and coordination of 
measures aimed at assisting recovery.
Europe is the focus of  analysis, but 
whenever experience from other lo-
cations helps to understand recovery 
processes and policies in Europe, 
these are mentioned. Within Europe 
there are differences between north 
and south, not only in the types of 
hazards that are prevalent, but also in 
the cultural processes shaping recov-
ery. These are mentioned here but not 
explored in detail due to space restric-
tions.
5.3.2
Planning for  
recovery 
The recovery process is multidimen-
sional and progresses at different 
rates for different people, businesses, 
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institutions and places affected by a 
disaster (Wein et al., 2011). Institu-
tional fragmentation and short-term 
planning can hinder recovery and of-
ten result in new risks being created. 
Thus, cross-scale and longer-term 
strategies are needed in recovery, inte-
grating different stakeholder perspec-
tives and knowledge and coordination 
across policy domains. Innovations in 
our understanding of  recovery plan-
ning are discussed in this section and 
provide a starting point for a deeper 
exploration of  recovery processes lat-
er in the subchapter.
5.3.2.1
Recovery plans
The core purpose of  disaster recov-
ery planning is to offer a vision of  the 
future after a disaster, provide a direc-
tion-setting framework (strong fact 
base, goals and policies) to achieve the 
vision; ensure that even short-term 
actions build longer-term resilience 
and that community needs are linked 
to broader regional, state and nation-
al disaster response and reconstruc-
tion policies (Berke and Campanella, 
2006). Successful plans maintain both 
a combination of  as well as distinct 
short-term recovery and long-term 
planning goals (Ingram et al., 2006).
Recovering from damage, loss and so-
cial disruption involves different types 
of  activities. Categorising the impact 
can provide focus for both planning 
and research activities. Common re-
covery sectors are: reconstruction of 
buildings, restoration of  livelihoods, 
system repairs, human and social reha-
bilitation, amongst others, to restore 
society back to being a well-func-
tioning community, and preferably a 
better functioning community. Lin-
dell and Prater (2003) define disaster 
impact sectors as physical (both built 
and human) and social (psychosocial, 
sociodemographic, socioeconomic and 
political); while Davis (2006) divides 
the process into five sectors, psy-
chosocial, economic, physical, envi-
ronmental and administrative/insti-
tutional sectors. Overall, identifying 
and classifying areas of  recovery is 
best done on the basis a Post-Disaster 
Needs Assessment (PDNA). PDNA 
is a common assessment approach 
to support governments to assess 
damage and recovery needs. It is an 
inclusive process that builds on the 
capacity and expertise of  national and 
international actors (GFDRR, 2013). 
PDNA provides damage and loss es-
timates and quantifies needs. A recov-
ery framework is then needed to build 
on the damage and loss assessment 
for detailed sequencing, prioritisation, 
financing and implementation of  re-
covery efforts.
Pre-disaster planning, 
participatory planning, 
capacity building, 
scheduling and process 
coordination can all 
help improve recovery 
and build more resilient 
communities.
Recovery goals commonly include the 
timely restoration of  normal living 
conditions (Alexander, 2004; Lu and 
Xu, 2014); however, there is a trade-
off  between speed and deliberation 
(Olshansky, 2006; Lu and Xu, 2014). 
Pressure to urgently address complex, 
difficult decisions can result in reactive 
policies that may increase long-term 
vulnerability of  affected populations 
(Ingram et al., 2006). Time compres-
sion has thus been identified as an 
important overarching characteristic 
of  the recovery process (Olshansky et 
al., 2012).
5.3.2.2
Integrating mitigation  
in recovery plans
Disaster recovery provides oppor-
tunities for reducing risk through 
mitigation measures (Ingram et al. 
2006). Mitigation measures should 
be integrated into pre-disaster recov-
ery planning (NGA, 1979; Alexander, 
2004; Lu and Xu, 2014) and can in-
clude proposals to reform building 
codes and land-use plans as one of 
the steps needed to meet recovery 
objectives (along with reconstruc-
tion, restoring systems, rehabilita-
tion of  people and re-establishment 
of  livelihoods) (Thorvaldsdóttir and 
Sigbjornsson, 2014). Methodologies 
developed for evaluating benefits and 
costs of  disaster mitigation measures 
(e.g. Chang, 2003) can also be used to 
guide the recovery process, although 
CBA needs to be used carefully (see 
Chapter 5.1.5).
5.3.2.3
Promoting participation
Recovery is also considered an inter-
active problem requiring coordina-
tion between numerous agencies and 
stakeholders (Berke and Campanella, 
2006; Lu and Xu, 2014). Research on 
actors includes: the role of  local offi-
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cials (Rubin and Barbee, 1985), affect-
ed people (Ingram et al., 2006), citi-
zen participation (Kweit and Kweit, 
2004), the private sector (De Tura et 
al., 2004), community participation in 
general (Johnston et al., 2012) and au-
ditors of  the planning and implemen-
tation of  recovery (Labadie, 2008). 
The role of  partnerships (Mitchell, 
2006) and management types (nor-
mal line ministries, special task force 
of  government and new organisation) 
(Davis, 2006) are also addressed in the 
literature.
5.3.3
Reconstruction, 
building and 
urban design in 
post-disaster 
contexts 
5.3.3.1
Principles for  
reconstruction
In post-disaster reconstruction, loca-
tion and exposure to risk are impor-
tant considerations, as are the type 
of  construction materials, the con-
straints on materials (due to environ-
mental conditions), timing of  execu-
tion and access. Understanding the 
appropriateness of  different materials 
that would be needed for reconstruc-
tion prior to a disaster can speed up 
reconstruction decisions, although 
the disaster itself  will create new chal-
lenges. In the 1755 Lisbon earthquake 
(Oliveira, 2012), for example, scientif-
ic knowledge was lacking and guide-
lines for reconstruction (new urban 
design, introduction of  seismic and 
fire-resistant techniques, new sanitary 
system, etc.) were drawn up quickly 
alongside a large number of  decrees 
dealing with feeding, healthcare, de-
fence, property jurisdiction, com-
merce activities and taxes. In compar-
ison, discussion on the types of  new 
defences needed for future tsunamis 
in the zones affected by the Tohoku 
tsunami have occurred over several 
years (Ieda, 2012), culminating in the 
decision to build big barriers made of 
concrete or soft dunes to dampen the 
energy of  waters (Figure 5.3).
Disasters affect 
communities for varying 
periods of time and 
reconstruction is often 
required. Rebuilding poses 
various challenges, from 
defining suitable locations 
to merging tradition with 
modern construction 
techniques.
Reconstruction time varies tremen-
dously depending on the level of  resil-
ience and the degree of  impact of  the 
event. There are cases where recon-
struction has been greatly influenced 
by low pre-existing levels of  develop-
ment and will take a very long time, as 
is the case of  the earthquake in Haiti 
in 2010. In these cases, the urban sys-
tems themselves need to be developed 
at the same time as reconstruction is 
happening. In other cases, the value 
and ownership of  property has to be 
correctly identified and agreed before 
reconstruction or rehabilitation can 
begin.
For the historical centre of  L’Aquila 
a roadmap for housing reconstruction 
was developed and building has been 
carefully monitored (Murao et al., 
2007; Ishikawa, 2012; Chern, 2012). 
Considerable attention has been paid 
to discussing options with the affect-
ed population to ensure reconstruc-
tion decisions are acceptable to them 
(see Box 5.7).
5.3.3.2 
Local construction  
practices
The process of  rebuilding residential 
property, industrial stock, critical in-
frastructures and historical buildings 
is shaped by existing arrangements 
for urban planning as well as educa-
tional, technical and financial resourc-
es available. Pre-disaster construction 
practices, including the mix of  ‘en-
gineered structures’ versus ‘low-cost 
structures’ and how building is guid-
ed by regulations and land-use/urban 
plans, all affect the type of  recon-
struction activity that is appropriate 
and necessary. The political system 
also affects the success of  a recon-
struction process (Lucas et al., 1992; 
Oliveira et al., 2008).
Table 5.3 provides an intentional 
oversimplification of  reconstruction 
options and the norms guiding these 
in countries of  ‘higher income’ and 
of  ‘lower income’. Understanding the 
most common reconstruction tech-
niques used and other considerations 
influencing reconstruction patterns 
is really important. For engineered 
structures, codes of  practice and tech-
nological tools can help guide recon-
struction. In particular, EN-1998-3 
(2005) is a code of  practice to guide 
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reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
structures, but needs to be adapted to 
a country in accordance with material 
properties, techniques of  reconstruc-
tion, etc.
The knowledge contained in codes 
needs to be communicated to the 
technical community and to practical 
contractors through manuals as well 
as training courses, and even using 
the media to reach a broader popula-
tion. Codes that are efficient but not 
too complex are more likely to reduce 
non-compliance. For ‘low-cost struc-
tures’, on the other hand, building 
techniques that are compatible with 
traditional practices are more effec-
tive, adjusting the codes to local mate-
rials and local traditions.
5.3.3.3 
Avoiding future risk
Housing and other structures can be 
relocated to areas where exposure to 
hazards and other sources of  risk is 
a lesser problem. Techniques can be 
used to weigh the various components 
of  risk. For instance, ‘Sirius’ (Mota de 
Sá et al., 2013) is an indicator refer-
ring to geographic zones which are 
more prone to urban impact in case 
of  an event. It deals with two varia-
bles, one concerning the vulnerability 
of  the existing housing and the other 
reflecting the human concentration. 
It is organised into several plateaus 
which define the level of  impact for 
that event. The opinions of  those af-
fected on whether to rebuild in the 
same place or move to another envi-
ronment is also of  great importance.
Reconstruction can be used to cor-
rect urban development problems, 
such as high population concentra-
tions, and to widen roads for more 
Sketch of possible solutions for Tohoku earthquake.
Source: MLIT (2013)
FIGURE 5.3
2. Improvements for evacuation facilities (evacuation 
centers, storage warehouses for disaster supplies kit, 
water tanks, tsunami evacuation towers, etc.)
1. Development of urban districts 
(compacted terraces and berms, 
countermeasures against 
3.  Development of the support 
facilities for post-tsunami recovery
4. Improvement of Information and 
communication facilities
5. Development 
of urban parks
13. Improvement of 
railway facilities 
14. Improvement of harbor 
facilities (berth, etc.)
2. Improvements for evacuation facilities (evacuation 
centers, storage warehouses for disaster supplies kit, 
water tanks, tsunami evacuation towers, etc.)6. Reinforcement of river maintenance 
facilities (river improvement, countermea-
sures against tsunami and tidal wave, 
earthquake-resistant, etc.)
7. Reinforcement of coastal protection 
facilities (levees, countermeasures 
against erosion, earthquake-resistant, etc.)
8.  Reinforcement of Tsunami mitiga-
tion facilities (lock gates, seawalls, etc.)
9. Improving sewage systems
10.  Reinforcement of erosion control 
construction (countermeasures against 
erosion, landslide and step slope, etc.)
11. Improvement of road 
infraestrutures
12. Development of residential 
facilities (housing for the victims, 
welfare facilities, etc.)
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effective drainage. The case of  Italy, 
with the several earthquakes in the 
last 25 years, is critical (Dolce and 
Bucci, 2015), and the project C.A.S.E. 
(Costruttori ForCase, 2009) is par-
ticularly relevant for avoiding future 
risk, where new buildings have been 
constructed in a short period of  time 
with base isolation. 
Similarly, the Guidelines for seismic 
microzonation (SM Working Group, 
2015) and the European Floods Di-
rective (European Parliament and 
Council, 2007) are good examples of 
how to minimise risk through recon-
struction after major disasters (Euro-
pean Parliament and Council, 2007; 
IPCC, 2014; Thaler and Hartmann, 
2016). Reconstruction after the floods 
in the Netherlands in 1953 is, howev-
er, perhaps the most striking example 
of  taking measures to control flood 
risk in the future (See Box 5.8).
Another example of  significant mit-
igation measures being taken to lim-
it risk in the future in the wake of  a 
high-impact disaster can be found in 
Madeira (see Box 5.9).
Temporary housing construction in recent Italian earthquakes 
On 24 August 2016, a M6.0 earth-
quake started a seismic sequence 
in central Italy, which included a 
M6.5 event on 30 October 2016. 
There were at least 299 fatalities, 
essentially caused by the collapse 
of buildings during the first main 
shock.
So, how should long-term tempo-
rary housing be managed after an 
initial period in tent and caravan 
campsites or hotels and before re-
construction takes place? A variety 
of responses can be seen after the 
three strongest earthquakes oc-
curred in Italy in the past 30 years: 
Umbria-Marche in 1997, Abruzzo 
in 2009 and Emilia in 2012. Due 
to the long lapse of time typically 
required in Italy to complete the re-
pair and reconstruction process — 
especially for the historical centres 
— housing arrangements are need-
ed for homeless families for several 
years. Different solutions have been 
adopted (Dolce and Di Bucci, 2015).
In Umbria-Marche and Emilia, the 
temporary solution consisted of 
public contributions to autono-
mous construction or, alternatively, 
pre-fabricated homes. In Abruzzo, 
four different alternative solutions 
were conceived for about approxi-
mately 45 000 people. 
The first two consisted in the req-
uisition of unused apartments and 
in a monetary contribution for au-
tonomous lodging arrangement. 
Moreover, two ad hoc projects 
were set up and realised. The pro-
ject C.A.S.E. consists of seismically 
isolated three-story buildings that 
can host around 15 000 people in 
4 449 apartments. It was complet-
ed 10 months after the event. The 
limited land needed made them 
suitable for the city of L’Aquila. The 
project M.A.P. consisted principally 
of single-family timber houses in 
small settlements near the origi-
nal villages. In total, 3 535 houses 
were erected in 141 areas, for ap-
proximately 8 500 people. For the 
Amatrice sequence, the choice was 
to use monetary contributions or 
‘Emergency housing solutions’ sim-
ilar to the M.A.P.s housing.
All of the described choices have 
a sound rational basis and could 
be adopted under different condi-
tions. For the earthquake disaster 
recovery there is no ‘one size fits 
all’ model. Territories are different, 
available scientific and technolog-
ic support evolves and the expec-
tations of the affected population 
change over time. A mature civil 
protection system looks for tailored 
solutions, building on previous ex-
perience while exploring new alter-
natives.
BOX 5.7
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5.3.4
Economic 
recovery processes 
from households to 
the macro economy
Economic recovery refers to the 
process by which an economic unit 
(household to country) returns to 
conditions of  stability following a 
disaster (Chang and Rose, 2012). Re-
covery does not require returning to 
a pre-disaster state; in fact, economic 
systems may never return to pre-dis-
aster states, but rather achieve a new 
equilibrium (DFID, 2011). 
In this section we examine knowledge 
on recovery processes that take place 
at different scales after a disaster. This 
literature draws on a wide range of 
post-disaster experiences in many dif-
ferent countries.
5.3.4.1 
Economic recovery  
processes at the 
microlevel
The processes that enable house-
holds to recover levels of  wealth af-
ter a shock or a disaster have been 
extensively studied (see, for instance, 
Christiaensen et al., 2007; Dercon and 
Christiaenen, 2011). In the short term 
after a disaster, incomes drop and the 
loss in income can lead to a reduction 
in consumption, with direct impact 
on individuals within the households, 
including higher levels of  malnutri-
tion (Alderman et al., 2006; Beegle et 
al., 2006). 
The recovery process begins immedi-
ately but partially depends on the ini-
tial economic situation of  the house-
hold: diversified sources of  income 
and relatively high income levels are 
found to be beneficial for recovery 
across a range of  countries and con-
texts (Adger et al., 2002; Morris et al., 
2002). High levels of  assets as well as 
access to credit, government grants 
and social protection give people a 
wider range of  options and oppor-
tunities following a disaster and can 
speed up recovery (Twigg, 2015).
Measures can be taken 
to support and accelerate 
the economic recovery 
process at various scales, 
although the economy 
may not return to the pre-
disaster state.
Social networks, safety nets and re-
mittances play a particularly impor-
tant role. These mechanisms are often 
ignored by DRM policies (Gaillard 
and Le Masson, 2007), yet social and 
physical connections are a major fac-
tor in people’s vulnerability to disas-
Structures, technologies and related norms Higher-income countries Lower-income countries
”Engineered” Home made Imported
”Low-Cost” Contracts Self-construction
Construction legislation Comply if compulsory Need supervision
Urban design considerations Comply if discussed Low priority
Matrix of construction types
Source: courtesy of authors
TABLE 5.3
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Improving flood defence after the Dutch flood disaster of 1953
Its geographical position means the 
Netherlands is not only threatened 
by the sea but also by major (inter-
national) rivers (Figure 5.4).
On 1 February 1953, there was 
a major flood causing significant 
losses due to high water on the 
North Sea and a severe northwest-
ern storm. A total of 800 km of 
dikes were severely damaged and 
200 000 hectares of land flooded. 
The Netherlands was not prepared 
and the condition of the dikes was 
inadequate. A more structural ap-
proach to preventing damage in 
the future was needed and a Del-
ta Commission was appointed, the 
Delta Act passed (Bulletin of Acts, 
1958) and the Delta Works project 
initiated to close off all tidal waters 
between the Western Scheldt and 
the Rotterdam Nieuwe Waterweg 
and to strengthen primary dikes 
along the coast and the Western 
Scheldt. The central government 
decided to fund a massive invest-
ment in flood defense: the East-
ern Scheldt barrier, with its sliding 
gates, was considered a technical 
and expensive innovation at the 
time but was considered a good 
investment, saving dike-strength-
ening costs and promoting Dutch 
hydraulic engineering.
In 2008 the Delta Commission pro-
duced new advice on water safety 
in the context of climate change 
and sea level rise. Yearly, delta pro-
grammes and a fund have been 
established and new rights-based 
legislation passed, guaranteeing 
Dutch citizens a safety standard 
(likelihood of dying in a flood disas-
ter is no bigger than 1: 100 000 per 
year) and stimulating further in-
vestment in dike projects. The legal 
water safety standards are unique 
in the world and (much) higher than 
in other countries, and knowledge 
on water safety is also high. Recent 
research also suggests that water 
safety is affordable, costing the 
ministry (from 1954 to the pres-
ent day) approximately EUR 35 per 
capita.
BOX 5.8
Virtual coastline shore up in the Netherland
Sea level +1m and flooding in rivers
Netherlands’ flood hazard map
Source: Bulletin of Acts (1958)
FIGURE 5.4
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5.3.4.2 
Economic recovery at 
the business and 
sectoral level 
Disasters can cause long-term struc-
tural changes in local economies. Ac-
cording to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency in the United 
States, more than 40 % of  business-
es never reopen after a disaster (nat-
ural or man-made). Over the period 
2006-2010, the average commercial 
flood claim amounted to USD 85 000 
(FEMA 2016). Small businesses and 
financially marginal businesses in par-
ticular tend to have greater difficulty 
in recovering from disasters (Webb et 
al. 2002; Alesch et al. 2001; Alesch et 
al. 2009). A recent national survey in 
the United States estimates that 52 % 
of  small business owners consider it 
would take at least 3 months to re-
cover from a disaster (Nationwide 
Insurance 2016). Thus, research on 
business continuity highlights the im-
portance of  strengthening capacity for 
pre-disaster mitigation and prepared-
ness (Webb et al. 2002; Chang 2010). 
A business continuity strategy is con-
sidered a relevant response to natural 
disasters for businesses. Cerullo and 
Cerullo (2004) showed that of  all the 
businesses damaged by Hurricane An-
drew in 1992, 80 % of  those lacking a 
business continuity plan failed within 
2 years of  the storm. In 2014, regard-
ing a Forrester’s survey (Balaouras, 
2015), the most common scenarios of 
these plans mentioned by private sec-
tor decision-makers included natural 
ters and their capacity to recover from 
them. Families, neighbours and social 
networks can help people to recover 
their assets (Twigg, 2015), while re-
mittances from family members not 
affected by a shock often increase 
after disasters (Ebeke and Combes, 
2013). Families that have access to 
remittances can recover more quickly 
(Savage and Harvey, 2007), as remit-
tances act in a similar way to insur-
ance for people who have no access 
to these financial services.
Transport and communications infra-
structure and support, for instance, in 
helping people to access credit, as well 
as other key services, are essential for 
household recovery.
Debris flow in 2010 in Madeira Island
Madeira is a mountainous island 
prone to landslides and debris 
flow risks. On 20 February 2010 a 
strong storm occurred with intense 
rainfalls, provoking flash floods and 
a mixture of water and sediments 
came down the very narrow valleys 
of five streams, killing around 50 
people and causing EUR 1 billion 
of damage. The capital, Funchal, 
is built on the common alluvial fan 
of three of these small rivers and 
was severely hit by the debris. The 
reconstruction process began, but 
safe space is very scarce and fur-
ther measures had to be taken to 
limit debris floods:
• removal of damaged buildings 
that were in dangerous flood-
prone areas in the valleys;
• rehabilitation and reinforce-
ment of defence walls in the 
vulnerable areas and in the 
main urban areas;
• several retention structures (slit 
dams) were built upstream to 
reduce the volume of sediment;
• the EU inundation directive is 
being adapted to Madeira (in-
undation and risk maps) as 
well as flood risk management 
guidelines (land-use guidelines) 
for 27 critical valleys;
• a warning system based on me-
teo radar and prediction mod-
els, as well as rainfall triggers, 
is being developed;
Despite the strong difficulties to 
guarantee completely safe areas 
against floods, due to prediction 
uncertainties and the potential high 
energy flows that can be induced 
and propagated into densely occu-
pied valleys, it is believed that the 
protection measures will be able to 
mitigate future debris flood risk in 
Madeira.
Source: Gouveia-Reis et al. (2016)
BOX 5.9
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disasters/extreme weather (83 % over 
118 business continuity decision-mak-
ers and influencers that have or will 
have scenario-based plans in 2014). 
The sample is based on a self-selected 
group of  respondents (predominantly 
Disaster Recovery Journal subscribers 
and Forrester clients).
Contingency plans can ensure, for 
instance, the continuity of  key activ-
ities during a crisis, while recovery 
plans accelerate the recovery process 
and limit loss in the aftermath of  a 
shock. A recent study in the United 
States, for example, found that having 
an emergency plan was significant-
ly associated with reduced levels of 
physical damage after Hurricane Ike 
in 2008 on the Gulf  Coast (Xiao and 
Peacock, 2014). If  disaster recovery 
plans (DRP) and business continuity 
plans (BCP) are recognised as effi-
cient tools to reducing the impact of 
natural disasters, most small business-
es still do not have any disaster plan. 
This share is decreasing with the size 
of  the firm. Thus, the nationwide in-
surance survey showed that 75 % of 
small business owners who settle do 
not have such a plan, whereas for one 
third of  them it is a low priority (34 
%). For companies with fewer than 50 
employees, only 18 % have a disaster 
recovery plan (National Insurance, 
2016).
Disaster can also have a major im-
pact on key sectors. For instance, 
during the Eyjafjallajökull eruption, 
the European airlines industry was 
heavily affected. The International 
Air Transport Association estimat-
ed that airlines lost GBP 130 million 
(EUR 154 million) per day while flight 
disruptions cost airlines USD 1.7 bil-
lion (EUR 1.56 billion) in total (BBC 
News, 2010). Other transport compa-
nies benefited, however, from the air-
line disturbance (passengers looking 
for alternative transport means), but 
specific fragile and perishable product 
importation such as flowers was re-
duced during the crisis period.
The overall recovery process is close-
ly linked to the characteristics of  the 
sector and the value chain. Thus, very 
large firms, such as multinational cor-
porations are more likely to be well 
diversified, and localised disasters are 
unlikely to affect the overall organi-
sation (Stevenson et al., 2016). Hor-
witz (2009), for example, shows that 
although Wal-Mart temporarily closed 
126 stores after Hurricane Katrina 
due to major damage, there was little 
long-term effect on income. 
The August 2002 flood in Germany, 
with a total damage of  EUR 11.6 bil-
lion, became one of  the most expen-
sive natural hazard events in the coun-
try (Thieken et al., 2016a). In June 
2002, Fischerdorf, across the Danube, 
was inundated after several levees col-
lapsed, leaving the entire town’s small 
industrial and commercial businesses 
under 3 metres of  water with impor-
tant consequences on small business-
es and individuals. Similarly, a recent 
survey on German businesses affected 
by flood in 2013 (557 business inter-
viewed) shows that 60 % were affected 
by staff  absences due to problems of 
reaching the workplace. Around 80 % 
of  businesses mentioned they were 
affected by turnover loss and 88 % 
faced interruption of  their operations, 
sometimes lasting up to 8 weeks with 
long-term consequences on their ac-
tivities (Thieken et al., 2016b; OECD, 
2016). The ‘commerce, hotels, restau-
rants and transportations businesses’ 
seem to have been the most affected 
by the event, whereas manufacturing 
and construction firms mainly suffered 
‘own delivery problems’, highlighting 
the importance of  value chain and ver-
tical integration in supporting recov-
ery. Thus, Thieken’s analysis suggests 
linkages between geographical sectors 
organisation and unbalanced regional 
impact of  2013’s floods. Consequenc-
es of  natural disasters on a sector can 
be regional or global (OECD, 2016). 
For example, the flooding in Thai-
land in 2011 had global and regional 
impacts in the automotive and elec-
tronics sectors as global companies 
such as Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Ford, 
Apple, Sony, Canon and Toshiba faced 
disruptions to production as a result 
of  their linkages to sites located in the 
flood zone. According to Schanz and 
Wang (2015), global industrial produc-
tion declined by 2.5 % as a result of 
the floods (OECD, 2016). These ex-
amples suggest that both the sector’s 
organisation and the firm’s echelon 
interplay within the value chain, in ad-
dition to the firm’s characteristics to 
influence businesses’ recovery pattern.
Economic stimuli are also provided 
by the reconstruction process and can 
have a significant impact on key sec-
tors: in particular, construction and 
other sectors involved in reconstruc-
tion often benefit from this (Chang, 
2010; Chang and Rose, 2012). Sim-
ilarly, trade can play an important 
buffering role in recovery (Bierkandt 
et al., 2014; Meng et al., 2015), com-
pensating for the lack of  products af-
ter a disaster. The role of  market in 
the recovery process is essential and is 
often poorly understood or biased by 
recovery policies.
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5.3.4.3 
Economic recovery 
process at the 
national level
At the national level, pre-disaster 
trends are accelerated or exacerbated 
during the recovery period (Alesch et 
al., 2009; Chang, 2010), with impacts 
on gross national product (GNP) or 
gross domestic product (GDP) and 
key economic sectors (agriculture; 
health) highly dependent on the in-
itial level of  income and financial 
penetration (as highlighted after Hur-
ricane Katrina). After a disaster, new 
investments made in infrastructure 
and human capital can increase pro-
ductivity and growth (Skoufias et al., 
2011) — a phenomenon known as 
‘creative destruction’, but disasters 
can also have negative impacts on the 
economy more than 1 year after the 
shocks, affecting early recovery (Si-
monet et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the 
financial capacity of  the country is 
usually lessened by the recovery pro-
cess (Cochrane, 2004).
Finally, external funds such as human-
itarian assistance can influence the 
recovery process in both ways (Ra-
ghuram and Subramanian, 2008). The 
absorptive capacity of  the country 
and its ability to smooth temporary 
and volatile external financial inflows 
will determine its ability to make effi-
cient use of  external assistance.
5.3.4.4 
Supporting economic 
recovery
Accessing financial resources af-
ter a disaster is critical to rebuilding 
and maintaining essential functions 
(Haworth et al., 2016; World Bank, 
2012; World Bank, 2016). Financing 
at all scales is needed (see Chapter 
5.4). 
The European Union Solidarity Fund 
(EUSF) is a good example of  efficient 
risk sharing at the regional level. Cre-
ated in 2002, the EUSF’s objective is 
to assist the EU Member States in re-
covering from natural disasters. The 
fund primarily aims to cover non-in-
surable loss and to support critical in-
frastructure such as energy and drink-
ing water during the recovery phase. 
Since 2002, 24 different European 
countries have received aid for an 
amount of  over EUR 3.784 million 
for the recovery (see list of  benefi-
ciaries by EUSF (2017)). Flood events 
are the main disasters leading to the 
EUSF’s assistance to date, which sup-
ports the recovery of  major natural 
events (damages exceed EUR 3 bil-
lion and the total loss is up to 0.6 % of 
gross national income of  the Member 
State). National or local events can 
be considered if  the two economic 
conditions are fulfilled. The annual 
budget of  EUSF is EUR 500 million 
in addition to the unallocated funds of 
the previous year. Moreover, rules for 
disbursement and funds used across 
each year ensure its sustainability. The 
EUSF can be combined with other 
national risk transfer measures such 
as the one implemented in the Czech 
Republic, where aid for recovery and 
reconstruction is provided to munici-
palities and regions if  their budget is 
not sufficient (OECD, 2015). Thus 
the combination of  national and re-
gional risk transfer measures provides 
a more efficient coverage of  loss in 
case of  disasters. If  the fund is a good 
example of  regional, fair and effective 
risk transfer mechanisms (OECD, 
2015; Olsson, 2009), the criteria of 
the fund’s categories, thresholds is-
sues and a significant delay in the fund 
delivery (Olsson, 2009) could prevent 
its efficiency. The EUSF is to date the 
only funds available to support recov-
ery after disasters even if  other funds 
(such as rural development funds) can 
provide financial aid for prevention 
activities (Olsson, 2009).
Nonetheless, the policies supporting 
economic recovery should not focus 
solely on financing. A mix of  policy 
initiatives is needed to build resilience 
after a disaster (Twigg, 2015): from 
the design of  Early Warning Systems 
(EWSs) tailored to specific audiences 
to the development of  efficient regu-
lations. For instance, the work of  the 
European Commission (ECHO) on 
DRR through providing trainings and 
policy guidelines, as well as economic 
support is also essential to support ef-
ficient recovery (ECHO, 2016). Over-
all, combinations of  financial support 
with other market support and service 
provision are needed. Building an ef-
ficient and flexible private sector will 
speed up the recovery. A good knowl-
edge of  the vulnerabilities along the 
value chain will help to anticipate 
fracture points and key actions to be 
taken when there is a disaster. Provid-
ing vouchers, for example, is known 
to have a destabilising effect on local 
prices.
External assistance after a major dis-
aster can overcome local financial re-
source constraints but can have what 
is known as ‘a Dutch effect’. If  a 
country cannot smooth or absorb the 
financial support provided, growth 
patterns can be destabilised. This oc-
curred after the 2004 tsunami in the 
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Indian Ocean (De Ville de Goyet and 
Morinière, 2006).
Overall, economic recovery strategies 
need to not only consider the short-
term impacts of  disaster, but also 
avoid indirect and destabilising ef-
fects. Strategies need to consider and 
avoid environmental impacts and find 
ways to improve sustainability and re-
silience. Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) 
frameworks guide of  the World Bank 
provides a good summary of  how the 
combination of  policy and strategy 
settings, financial support, institution-
al frameworks and implementation 
arrangements can ensure an efficient 
economic recovery as well as rele-
vance of  timely activities (GFDRR, 
2013; 2015).
5.3.5
Psychosocial 
recovery
Recovery originates in social relation-
ships before disasters occur and more 
marginal groups usually find it harder 
to recover (Nigg, 1995; Tierney and 
Oliver-Smith, 2012). Gender, disabil-
ity, income and ethnicity are strongly 
associated with differential recovery 
trajectories (Cutter et al., 2006; Foth-
ergill, 1996; Fothergill and Peek, 2004; 
Priestley and Hemingway, 2007; Bo-
lin, 2007; Pomonis, 2002). 
Other influences are the severity of 
the impact of  each disaster, the ef-
fectiveness of  initial responses, the 
quality of  governance systems and 
the strength of  the civil societies in 
which the events occur (Tierney and 
Oliver-Smith, 2012), as well as the 
pressure to make quick decisions with 
long-term consequences (Ingram 
et al., 2006; Olshansky et al., 2012). 
Overall, psychological recovery un-
derpins broader social recovery and 
vice versa: the relationships between 
all aspects of  recovery are reciprocal.
5.3.5.1 
The psychosocial
 approach to disasters
Understanding the behaviour and the 
psychosocial and mental health needs 
of  people affected by disasters is vital 
to disaster recovery because it affects 
how:
• societies, governments, communi-
ties and families prepare for disas-
ters;
• responsible authorities work with 
communities to meet people’s 
needs and preferences and ensure 
their continuing agency;
• governments and responsible au-
thorities communicate with the 
public;
• the responsible authorities and 
agencies manage responses in the 
immediate, short and medium 
terms.
Patel (2014) identifies the gap between 
mental health specialists’ use of  the 
terms ‘mental health’ and ‘mental dis-
order’ and public conceptualisations 
of  psychosocial suffering that affects 
many more people than those who 
require specialist mental healthcare. 
Thus, here, psychosocial refers to the 
psychological, social and physical ex-
periences of  people in the context of 
their social, cultural and physical en-
vironments.
5.3.5.2 
The psychosocial and 
mental health impacts 
of disasters
There is a broad spectrum of  ways in 
which people react emotionally, cog-
nitively, socially, behaviourally and 
physically before, during and after a 
disaster. Research into these reactions 
has, however, identified some com-
mon psychosocial and mental health 
impacts (Box 5.10).
The majority of  people are not like-
ly to develop a mental disorder, but 
distress after emergencies is very 
common. In most cases, it is transient 
and not associated with dysfunction, 
and many people are psychosocially 
resilient despite their distress. People 
affected by large-scale events that de-
stroy infrastructure may be immobi-
lised by fear and hopelessness. In the 
immediate aftermath of  most events, 
people behave in rational and altruis-
tic ways, but the frequency of  panic 
remains the most pervasive myth 
about disasters and is sometimes ex-
aggerated in official policies (Carter et 
al., 2013).
Psychosocial resilience and 
trajectories of response
Social relationships have powerful 
influences on how people cope with 
disasters (Williams et al., 2014a). Most 
people recover reasonably well given 
social support from relatives, friends 
and acquaintances. Resilience is a 
dynamic process ‘… linking a set of 
adaptive capacities to a positive tra-
jectory of  functioning and adapta-
tion after a disturbance’ (Norris et al., 
2009) and can be seen in differing tra-
jectories of  people’s responses over 
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time (Norris et al., 2009; Bryant et al., 
2015; Fink et al., 2016) (Box 5.11).
Risk factors
Psychosocial impacts of  disaster vary 
in severity with a number of  factors, 
the most significant being the magni-
tude of  the event and the degree of 
exposure to it, as well as gender, age, 
ethnicity, pre-existing psychosocial 
problems and the perceived quality 
of  psychosocial support. Groups of 
people at greater risk of  dysfunc-
tional distress, social problems and 
mental disorders following disasters 
include: women; children and adoles-
cents; older people; people who have 
pre-existing health problems and dis-
orders; socially disadvantaged people; 
and staff  of  rescue and responding 
services.
5.3.5.3 
Policies and 
interventions for 
psychosocial recovery
The psychosocial and mental health effects of disasters
Direct effects on people
1.Immediate and short term
 a. Short-term distress and dysphoria (a state of feeling unwell or unhappy)
 b. Acute stress reactions
2. Medium and longer term
 a. Persisting distress and dysphoria maintained by secondary stressors
 b. Grief
 c. Mental disorders (NB: these disorders are very frequently comorbid with each other)
  i. Substance use disorders
  ii. Adjustment disorders
  iii. Post-traumatic stress disorder
  iv. Anxiety disorders
  v. Depression
  vi. Impacts on personality
Direct effects of complicated, sustained and/or multiple events
1. Sustained distress and dysphoria that impacts on people’s functioning
2. Exacerbation of existing mental disorders
3. Precipitation of new episodes of previous mental disorders
4. Increased frequency of new mental disorders
Indirect effects on people
Disasters increase medium- and longer-term psychiatric and physical morbidity because of their effects on 
social conditions that affect physical and mental health. These social determinants of mental health include:
1. Increased poverty
2. Changed social and societal relations
3. Threats to human rights 
4. Domestic and community violence
BOX 5.10
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Priority 4 of  SFDRR calls on states 
‘to enhance recovery schemes to pro-
vide psychosocial support and mental 
health services for all people in need’. 
Indeed, the European Network for 
Traumatic Stress – TENTS (2008), 
which surveyed 33 European countries 
in 2007-2008, found planning and de-
livery of  psychosocial care after disas-
ters was suboptimal and inconsistent, 
with wide variations in plans and inter-
ventions. It concluded that more effec-
tive and evidence-based services were 
needed. In 2014, the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists in the United Kingdom 
drew together the NATO guidance 
(NATO, 2009) and the TENTS find-
ings and guidance to produce a com-
prehensive approach to developing 
the quality of  comprehensive policy, 
planning and practice for delivering 
psychosocial and mental healthcare for 
people affected by disasters — called 
‘OP94’ (Williams et al., 2014a). The ap-
proach taken by OP94 builds on guid-
ance from the Inter-Agency Stand-
ing Committee (IASC, 2008), WHO 
(2013), IFRC et al. (2009) and publi-
cations from McFarlane and Williams 
(2012) and Williams et al. (in press). 
Operationalising Psychosocial Support 
in Crisis (OPSIC), another initiative 
supported by the EU, has produced 
comprehensive guidance on psycho-
social and mental healthcare in disas-
ter settings to support harmonisation 
of  approaches across countries. It is 
based on an extensive survey of  re-
search and practices (OPSIC, 2015).
Flexible, generic approaches are need-
ed that can be adjusted as events and 
people’s needs evolve. The NATO 
guidance (NATO, 2009), for exam-
ple, is constructed around a strategic 
framework that contains components 
including the following.
• Constructing an evidenced knowl-
edge base: appropriate knowledge 
provides a baseline for creating and 
implementing plans before events 
occur and adjusting them later.
• Working from core principles: 
identifying evidence-informed and 
values-based principles ensures les-
sons are learned from past events 
when planning, designing and de-
livering services:
• Gathering information: emergency 
specialists require services to gath-
er and supply information to adjust 
generic plans as events evolve.
• Using a model of  care: a model en-
ables resources and services to be 
treated efficiently and effectively 
against people’s assessed needs.
• Providing psychosocial care for the 
staff  of  all responding organisa-
tions: the needs of  all responding 
organisation staff  require active 
consideration.
• Incorporating psychosocial recov-
ery and mental healthcare in an 
integrated emergency management 
cycle: using a single, integrated 
management cycle for all responses 
to disasters enables planners to de-
sign, deliver, review and adjust the 
services that the public requires.
The number of  people who require 
Trajectories of psychosocial and psychiatric responses
Resilient responses: around 70 % 
of people show psychosocial resil-
ience. They suffer mild or moderate 
distress that rapidly reduces in se-
verity if they receive support they 
perceive as adequate.
Deteriorating responses: initially, 
up to 20 % of people have stress 
symptoms of low severity, which 
become more severe and/or asso-
ciated with dysfunction over time. 
About half recover later on, while 
others develop more chronic prob-
lems or disorders.
High initial stress responses: around 
10 % of people may have high lev-
els of stress before and/or imme-
diately after events. The symptoms 
of about half may run a chronic 
course, while others improve.
The percentages in this box are ap-
proximations made from drawing 
together several different studies. 
They are only intended to illustrate 
broad orders of magnitude.
BOX 5.11
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supporting psychosocial interven-
tions to assist them with distress after 
disasters is very substantial. Early in-
tervention and interagency coordina-
tion are vital elements in psychosocial 
responses. Williams and Kemp (2016) 
summarise the principles: intervening 
early can reduce the risks of  survivors 
developing disorders later; there is a 
great deal that family members and 
friends can do in the response phases 
to alleviate people’s suffering; families 
and communities are the main sourc-
es of  emotional and tangible social 
support that people exposed to disas-
ters prefer and receive.
Psychosocial recovery 
after disasters is a 
multidimensional process 
linked to measures that 
are taken before disasters 
occur, to the social and 
economic circumstances 
and to actions taken 
to restore assets and 
services.
Most people do not require specialist 
mental healthcare, but a substantial 
minority may. They require timely per-
sonal mental healthcare and a small 
proportion of  them require long-term 
mental health services. Survivors at 
particular risk require surveillance and 
clinical assessment. OP94 provides 
a summary of  specific components 
of  the responding services that are 
required within the first week, first 
month, first to third months, and be-
yond 3 months after a disaster.
Psychosocial first aid, assessment and 
surveillance is needed for people who 
appear to be at risk of  developing a 
mental disorder, and biomedical clin-
ical treatments for people who have 
specific disorders. Psychosocial care 
offers people safety, calm, connected-
ness, hope and self-efficacy with the 
intention of  promoting psychosocial 
recovery (WHO et al., 2011; WHO, 
2013). Education, consultation and 
discussion processes for survivors, 
communities and responders also 
play an important role (Eyre, 2006; 
Aloudat and Christensen, 2012). Mu-
tual support groups, such as Disas-
ter Action in the United Kingdom, 
help survivors of  disasters to come 
to terms with their experiences and 
loss and can also be a platform for ac-
tion to improve safety and emergency 
management practice (Eyre and Dix, 
2014).
In summary, research demonstrates 
that people’s recovery in the short 
and medium term after disasters can 
be promoted through a psychosocial 
approach, using a strategic frame-
work and generic policies that can be 
adapted as each disaster evolves. Psy-
chosocial interventions can be made 
universally available to reduce suffer-
ing and risks of  people developing 
mental disorders. Those with mental 
disorders can be supported through 
surveillance, assessment and effective, 
timely and sustained evidence-based 
treatments.
5.3.6
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership
Governance is key to reconstruction 
and recovery processes, particularly 
intergovernmental relations and pub-
lic participation and engagement in 
post-disaster policies. Close collabo-
ration across sectors and with affect-
ed groups is beneficial for physical, 
economic and psychosocial recovery 
processes. People and systems may 
not return to their pre-disaster state, 
but strong multisectoral pre-disaster 
plans and flexibility in response can 
help improve the speed and efficacy 
of  recovery, avoiding indirect and ad-
verse impacts after the disaster.
Knowledge
While the impacts of  disasters have 
been well studied, recovery is mul-
tifaceted and not well understood. 
Significant progress has been made 
in understanding the psychosocial im-
pact of  disasters and on (re)construc-
tion techniques to improve the built 
environment after a disaster.
Innovation
Innovation in recovery promotion 
is particularly seen in reconstruction 
and more comprehensive approaches 
to rebuilding in urban areas. Given 
the diverse scales at which impacts 
are felt, more research is needed on 
the relationship between the different 
aspects of  recovery, that is physical, 
social, psychological and economic.
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5.4 Risk transfer and 
financing
Jaroslav	Mysiak, David Bresch, Dionisio Peréz Blanco, 
David Simmons, Swenja Surminski
5.4.1
Risk financing 
and transfer: 
introduction and 
typology
 
Natural hazard risks can undermine 
development progress (UNISDR, 
2015), financial and economic stability 
and well-being (World Bank, 2013). A 
sound financial protection strategy can 
lessen these impacts, speed up recov-
ery and reconstruction, and harness 
knowledge and incentives for reduc-
ing risk (IPCC, 2012). Amidst growing 
damage and losses caused by natural 
and human-made hazards, some of 
which are further amplified by glob-
al environmental (including climate) 
change (IPCC, 2014), a comprehensive 
financial strategy is conducive to a bet-
ter framed and informed risk manage-
ment and governance. 
The SFDRR (UN, 2015a) substantially 
reduced disaster losses and reinforced 
resilience as a top priority of  interna-
tional and national efforts. As part of 
the transformational change in how 
natural and human-made risks are 
dealt with (van der Vegt, Essens, Wahl-
ström and George, 2015; Wahlström, 
2015), the SFDRR emphasised invest-
ing in DRR and financing. The Addis 
Ababa action agenda on financing for 
development erected a financial frame-
work that fosters inclusive economic 
prosperity and lines up financing re-
sources and flows with the priorities 
of  the 2030 agenda for sustainable de-
velopment (UN, 2015b). Similarly, the 
Paris Agreement on climate change 
(UNFCCC, 2015) addressed the issue 
of  promoting sound risk financing as 
part of  climate adaptation and a strate-
gy for coping with damage and losses.
A comprehensive disaster financing 
strategy is equally important in the 
context of  the European Economic 
and Monetary Union. In the absence 
of  financial protection tools for cop-
ing with disasters, the incidence of 
major disasters in several EU Member 
States may exacerbate economic im-
balances and deteriorate credit ratings 
(S&P, 2015). 
A comprehensive 
strategy for disaster 
financing can moderate 
the impacts of natural 
hazard risks, speed 
up recovery and 
reconstruction, and 
harness knowledge 
and incentives for 
risk reduction. 
Private financial sectors 
play an important 
role, along with 
governments and civil 
society organisations, 
in designing innovative 
financial protection goals 
and sharing knowledge 
and capacity. 
A recent debt sustainability analy-
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sis showed that marginal changes in 
nominal GDP growth and interest 
rates can lead to a much greater debt-
to-GDP ratio than the one projected 
as a baseline (EC, 2016). By targeting 
residual risk that cannot be efficiently 
mitigated, risk financing complements 
regulatory and economic instruments 
such as prices, taxes, tradable permits 
and liability (see Chapter 5.1), which 
serve as a vehicle of  DRR and tran-
sition to a low-carbon, resource-effi-
cient and socially inclusive economy.
Recognising that in an increasingly 
interconnected world disasters can 
have far-reaching, spill-over effects, 
the G20 finance ministers invited the 
Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD) 
to develop a voluntary framework 
helping governments to develop fi-
nancial strategies for disaster risk. 
The ensuing methodological guide 
(OECD, 2012) defines risk financing 
as strategies and instruments used to 
manage the financial impact of  dis-
asters, ensuring adequate capacity 
to manage and mitigate the costs of 
disaster risk, thereby reducing the fi-
nancial burden and economic costs of 
disasters and enabling rapid recovery 
in economic activity (ibid.). A thor-
ough understanding of  risk exposure 
and risk-bearing capacity, as well as 
institutional arrangements creating fa-
vourable regulatory and market infra-
structure are the major constituents 
of  the comprehensive disaster financ-
ing strategy, along with the choice of 
optimal risk financing and transfer in-
struments.
Here we introduce various instru-
ments, their design criteria and their 
principles, carrying institutions and 
markets, as well as the different public 
and private roles of  their realisation. 
Disaster financing embraces a variety 
of  instruments that are intended for 
and capable of  achieving different 
outcomes. Each of  these instruments 
can efficiently handle only a certain 
type of  risk, depending on their fre-
quency, intensity and impacts. Conse-
quently, a strategy that builds upon a 
diversified pool of  mutually comple-
menting financial tools and institu-
tions is better equipped to cope with 
and respond to a variety of  environ-
mental and human-induced risks.
Risk layering means pairing the suit-
ability of  different instruments with 
Major categories of risk financing and transfer instruments
Source: Adapted based on G20 (2016), GFDRR (2014), MCII (2009, 2013), Okuyama (2010), UFCCCC (2016), 
World Bank (2012)
TABLE 5.4
Categories Examples of instruments
Saving and reallocation — bank deposits and liquid securities
— reserve/contingency/disaster relief funds
— budget reallocation
Credit and assistance — contingent credit facilities and microcredit
— fiscal relief such as delayed or reduced tax and social security payments
— external assistance and aid
Insurance — catastrophe risk insurance (from micro- to macro-insurance)
— indemnity vs index-based vs modelled insurance schemes
Catastrophe-linked securities — cat bonds (catastrophe bonds)
Derivatives — weather derivatives
CHAPTER 5 MANAGING DISASTER RISK
491
levels of  risk and risk-bearing capac-
ity (Mechler et al., 2014). The contin-
gent losses from frequent, low-impact 
risk can either be reduced or retained 
through adequate funds in the form of 
savings, set-aside reserves or credits. 
Medium- to high-level risk exceeding 
the risk-bearing capacity can be more 
efficiently managed by risk transfer 
via insurance or capital markets.
Comprehensive risk management 
(MCII, 2013) embraces a systemat-
ic identification of  risk arising from 
multiple hazards and employs a com-
bination of  financial instruments that 
take into account hazard exposure 
and risk-bearing capacity of  (national 
and subnational) governments, home-
owners, enterprises and the most vul-
nerable populations. In a more com-
prehensive way, the total climate risk 
approach, as adopted by the method-
ology of  the Economics of  Climate 
Adaptation Working Group (ECA, 
2009), first explores manifold risks 
arising at a specific location or region 
today, then looks at the projected in-
crease in risk due to economic devel-
opment before finally considering the 
aggravation of  risk due to a range of 
future climate change scenarios. The 
working group then devises and as-
sesses a portfolio of  infrastructural, 
technological, behavioural and finan-
cial investments to adapt to these risks. 
The various instruments (Table 5.4) 
differ in terms of  access prerequisites, 
(opportunity) costs and activation 
time. This approach thus provides de-
cision-makers with a fact base which 
enables them to understand the im-
pact of  weather and climate on their 
economy — and helps to identify ac-
tions to minimise that impact at the 
lowest cost to society. It therefore al-
lows decision-makers to integrate ad-
aptation with economic development 
and sustainable growth.
Disaster risk financing and transfer 
stretches out over several functions 
of  responsible and accountable gov-
ernment, including fiscal (risk) and 
Disaster risk financing and transfer policy areas and benefits
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2014)
TABLE 5.5
Sovereign disaster risk financing
— Increases response and reconstruction capacity
— Eases public expenditure by reducing volatility of
     disaster costs
— Clarifies contingent liability
— Provides incentives for investing in risk reduction
Property catastrophe risk insurance
— Provides access to compensation for damage
— Increases awareness of risk and understanding of
     financial vulnerability
— Helps distribute risk and burden of recovery
— Can incentivise investments in risk reduction
Disaster-linked social protection
— Mitigates shocks by providing compensation for
     losses through safety nets
— Increases awareness and understanding of
     vulnerability to disaster risk
— Can incentivise investments in risk reduction
— Safeguards vulnerable people from poverty
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budgetary policies, public finance, 
market and business development, 
and social protection (OECD, 2015; 
World Bank, 2014). Disaster risk 
poses implicit and explicit liabilities 
(Cummins and Mahul, 2009); explic-
it liability arises from statutory and 
contractual obligations, while implicit 
liability results from public expecta-
tions and political pressures. The lat-
ter poses the greater fiscal risk (World 
Bank, 2012). Governments play mul-
tiple roles, on both the demand and 
the supply sides of  risk financing. As 
rule makers they: (i) provide public 
insurance and financing recovery and 
reconstruction expenses for public as-
sets; (ii) organise (and cover the costs) 
of  post-disaster order, rescue and re-
lief; (iii) ensure social protection for 
vulnerable populations; and (iv) reg-
ulate and supervise financial markets 
(including insurance) and institutions. 
Nonetheless, only few countries have 
sought protection against fiscal im-
pacts of  disasters (World Bank, 2012).
The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the United 
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Re-
duction (UNISDR); multilateral insti-
tutions such as the World Bank and 
the OECD, and other major actors 
have played a catalysing role for pri-
vate sector involvement in DRR and 
financing. The UNEP’s finance ini-
tiative, principles for sustainable in-
surance (PSI) (UN-FI 2012), and the 
UN-backed principles for responsi-
ble investment (PRI) have promoted 
sustainable lending, investment and 
insurance practices and sensitised na-
tions to the environmental, social and 
governance challenges involved in 
business decision-making. 
Other insurance-oriented initiatives, 
such as Global Insurance Indus-
try Statements and the Climate Risk 
Statement of  The Geneva Associa-
tion, have urged contemplating cli-
mate risk in business investments and 
risk management strategies. More re-
cently, a joint report by UNEP PSI 
and Inquire (Bacani, McDaniels and 
Robins, 2015) outlined three major 
initiatives: an Insurance Network on 
Sustainable Development to stimu-
late innovation and partnerships, a 
Sustainable Insurance Policy Forum 
to scale up intergovernmental coop-
eration and Insurance Development 
Goals to make the ways in which the 
insurance sector can contribute to 
meeting Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) more explicit. 
Similarly, international collaboration 
among financial businesses and finan-
cial regulators is growing, focused in 
large part on knowledge sharing and 
capacity building. The Financial Sta-
bility Board (FSB) convened a Task 
Force on Climate-related Financial 
Disclosures (TCFD, n.d.) focusing on 
disclosing market-relevant informa-
tion on climate-related financial risk, 
the results of  which were released in 
December 2016 (TCFD, 2016). The 
International Capital Market Asso-
ciation (ICMA) has coordinated the 
development of  the ‘green bond prin-
ciples’, which have helped catalyse the 
rapid growth of  the green bond mar-
ket (G20, 2016).
5.4.2
The role of  
insurance:  
spreading risk 
Insurance is the most common form 
of  financial protection against risk of 
contingent losses. The insured party 
or policyholder transfers the cost of 
potential loss to the insurer in ex-
change for monetary compensation 
known as a premium. By acquiring 
the costs of  contingent losses from 
many policyholders, the insurer ab-
sorbs, pools and diversifies the indi-
vidual risks, making them assessable 
and manageable. 
Insurance is the most 
common form of financial 
protection against risk 
of contingent losses. But 
not all risks are insurable 
or covered by insurers. 
Climate change amplified 
natural hazard risks, and 
raising vulnerability may 
make financial protection 
unaffordable for some 
people and business, 
and risks uninsurable in 
certain places.
When the loss occurs from specified 
contingencies under an insurance 
contract, the insurer indemnifies or 
compensates the insured party. The 
premium charged should reflect the 
level of  risk each policyholder cedes 
to the insurer. The premium will re-
flect not only the ‘pure premium’, i.e. 
the average losses expected from the 
contract, but also allowances for ex-
penses and the contract’s impact upon 
the insurer’s capital requirements (and 
so its required contribution towards 
target return on capital).
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Not all risks are insurable or covered 
by insurers. Insurable risks are those 
that are quantifiable, in terms of  both 
the probability of  an event’s occur-
ring and the extent of  losses incurred, 
and for which premiums can be set 
for each policyholder or group of 
policyholders (H. C. Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjant, 2007). 
In addition, risk ambiguity, asymme-
try of  information (implying adverse 
selection and moral hazard) and cor-
relation between losses influence the 
ability and willingness of  insurers to 
underwrite risk and the level of  premi-
um sought (Charpentier, 2008; Jemli, 
Chtourou and Feki, 2010; Louaas and 
Goussebaile, 2016). If  the latter are 
high, risks may be insurable but not 
affordable for low-income subjects 
who may benefit most from insurance.
Natural hazards that have been ampli-
fied by climate change may make finan-
cial protection unaffordable for some 
people and risks uninsurable in certain 
places. Recent estimates of  the Bank 
of  England (PRA, 2015) show that cli-
mate change and socioeconomic risk 
drivers may widen the gap between 
‘affordable’ flood insurance premiums 
and premiums that reflect the techni-
cal price of  flood insurance. Likewise, 
Kunreuther et al. (2011) demonstrated 
that climate change is likely to signif-
icantly increase premiums for build-
ing insurance in Florida. These studies 
also suggest that consistent risk reduc-
tion efforts may be effective in keep-
ing premiums affordable. A better un-
derstanding of  risk, product bundling 
and public interventions (see Chapter 
5.4.4) contributes to making climate 
risk insurable.
Insurance is a financial service of-
fering protection against the risks of 
contingent losses. However, directly 
or indirectly, it also serves other pur-
poses. By facilitating prompt post-dis-
aster recovery, insurance helps to con-
tain the economic and social impacts 
of  disasters. Beyond that, insurance 
serves public interests by promoting 
social protection and public welfare. 
Insurance makes it possible, for ex-
ample, for individuals to get mortgage 
loans or compensation for injuries 
without going to court (Talesh, 2012). 
Insurance can also promote numerous 
economic activities in the higher risk/
return market spectrum (Grant, 2012), 
thus contributing to higher productiv-
ity and innovation. And it can incen-
tivise behaviour change and individual 
risk prevention, as shown in Chapter 
5.4.3.
Role of insurance for better understanding of risks
The reinsurance industry has driv-
en the development of catastrophe 
risk analytics over the last 30 years, 
moving from a position where haz-
ard mechanisms, their impact and 
comparative risks were little under-
stood, to one where sophisticated 
and integrated stochastic catastro-
phe models have become the norm 
in the industry. The models require 
and understanding and knowledge 
of:
• the likely hazard events, that 
is their frequency, severity and 
geographic scale;
• the buildings/goods insured, 
that is where they are, how they 
are built and how they are used;
• the vulnerability of these build-
ings/goods to the events;
• the financial/social loss caused.
The process of building and under-
standing these models, as much as 
the model results themselves, has 
lead to a transformation of the in-
surance and reinsurance industry, 
massively increasing technical un-
derstanding and financial resilience. 
The appropriateness of these mod-
elling techniques, the ability of the 
models to provide objective rigour 
around risk mitigation and adapta-
tion decision-making and the ben-
efits of the consequential greater 
risk and hazard understanding are 
leading many governments and 
quasi-government organisations to 
consider adopting these methods. A 
catastrophe insurance scheme can 
be a catalyst to great risk under-
standing.
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A variety of  insurance schemes ex-
ists, depending on the type of  risk 
and the protected asset (property, 
business assets and interruption, li-
ability, sovereign risk, etc.). Natural 
hazard insurance is either an exten-
sion of  property insurance (Bräu-
ninger et al., 2011) or a stand-alone, 
for example agricultural (crop yield, 
revenue or income) and energy insur-
ance. Sovereign insurance (Mahul and 
Ghesquiere, 2007) covers costs asso-
ciated with damage to infrastructure 
and relief  expenditure. Traditional 
insurance employs the principle of 
indemnity, claim payments are made 
to make good an actual loss ether in 
full or in part. However, indemnity 
insurance requires a thorough knowl-
edge of  the good(s) insured, how they 
react to a certain hazard and a post-
event assessment of  damage incurred, 
all adding to expense and delays in 
claim settlement. Parametric or in-
dex insurance schemes employ other, 
more easily measurable data (for ex-
ample rainfall, yields or vegetation in-
dex) for determining pay-offs without 
the need to prove actual loss, requir-
ing less detailed knowledge of  the risk 
covered and enabling speedy payment 
(Collier et al., 2009; Hazell et al., 2010; 
IFAD and WFP, 2011).
Agriculture poses particular challeng-
es for insurance because of  the spa-
tially correlated weather and climate 
risks and large information asym-
metries (Porth and Seng Tan, 2015). 
Agricultural insurance schemes differ 
from country to country but often in-
volve the public sector (Bielza et al. 
2009; Capitanio, Bielza, Cafiero and 
Andolfini, 2011), either via premium 
subsidies or public participation in 
reinsurance systems. Insurance prod-
ucts can be classified according to 
the risks covered (named perils and 
multiple perils) and trigger of  claim 
(e.g. indemnity or index based, crop 
revenue and farm income) (Iturrioz, 
2009). More sophisticated insurance 
schemes include comprehensive in-
come/revenue insurance packages 
also covering, besides production, 
market risks (e.g. price), although 
most insurance policies limit their 
coverage to yield variability risk (in-
cluding single risk, combined, integral 
insurance and whole-farm integral 
insurance) unless the market risk can 
be transparently hedged in the com-
modities market. In the EU, farm risk 
management schemes are supported, 
among others, through rural devel-
opment programmes (Bardají et al., 
2016; EC, 2013c).
Based on 2015 data, the European 
insurance industry holds the largest 
share (32 %) of  the global market 
(Insurance Europe, 2016). Proper-
ty insurance accounts for about 8 % 
(around EUR 93 billion) of  written 
premiums and 6 % (EUR 53 billion) 
of  claims paid. Insurance coverage 
is very heterogeneous across the EU 
Member States and hazard types (A. 
M. Best, 2016; Maccaferri, Carboni 
and Campolongo, 2012). For natural 
hazard, some countries apply a free 
market system, others a centralised 
national or state scheme and oth-
ers again an amalgam of  public and 
private schemes. For example in the 
United Kingdom, natural hazard in-
surance is written competitively by 
private insurers, although with op-
tional state-supported reinsurance 
for hazardous flood risks to ensure 
affordability. In contrast, in Spain, 
standardised natural catastrophe cov-
er is provided by a public national 
pool.
On average over the period 1980-
2015, out of  the total registered natu-
ral hazard losses in Europe the share 
of  those insured amounted to 30 % 
(EEA, 2015). Globally, written premi-
ums in agriculture amount to around 
EUR 27 billion, an approximately 
fourfold increase since 2005 (Porth 
and Seng Tan, 2015).
In 2013 and as part of  the EU Climate 
Adaptation Strategy package (EC, 
2013a), the European Commission 
launched a broad consultation about 
which EU action could be appropri-
ate for improving the performance 
of  insurance markets (EC, 2013b). 
The responses cautioned against uni-
formising the regulation on natural 
hazard insurance across the EU (EC, 
2014). Both the uneven distribution 
of  hazard risk and the diversity of 
the economic standing and other re-
quirements of  customers have been 
brought up as reasons against an EU 
intervention (HM Treasury, 2013). 
Consequently, uniformised regula-
tions could harm innovation and 
competition in insurance products. 
The European Parliament stressed 
that flexible markets should oper-
ate in a non-mandatory framework 
and that no ‘one size fits all’ solution 
would serve the magnitude of  differ-
ent risk and economic conditions in 
Europe (EP, 2014).
5.4.3
The role of insurance: 
incentivising risk 
reduction
Insurance can help dissuade policy-
holders from risky behaviour and 
incentivise risk reduction (Surminski 
and Oramas-Dorta, 2013; Surminski, 
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2009; Warner et al., 2009). Premiums 
and policy terms (e.g. deductibles) can 
be adjusted to reward good risks and 
penalise bad ones. The role that the 
insurance industry has played in de-
ploying loss-prevention technologies 
such as automobile air bags and fire 
prevention/suppression systems is 
an example. Harnessing insurance for 
DRR becomes particularly significant 
in the context of  increased frequen-
cy of  disaster events, larger economic 
exposure, rising vulnerability and cli-
mate change.
Insurance and other 
financial instruments 
can contribute to 
reducing disaster 
risk, if designed and 
implemented 
to this end.
There is an ample consensus that 
insurance can and should play an in-
creasingly important role in mitigating 
disaster impacts, not only through risk 
sharing, but also through all aspects of 
the risk management cycle, including 
risk identification and modelling, risk 
awareness, damage prevention, risk 
transfer and recovery (Michel-Kerjan 
and Kunreuther, 2011; Evan Mills, 
2012; Swenja Surminski, 2014). How-
ever, practical evidence of  whether 
insurance encourages risk reduction 
in a climate context remains incon-
clusive (Botzen and van den Bergh, 
2009; E. Mills, 2009; Surminski and 
Oramas-Dorta, 2011; Surminski et 
al., 2015). Few existing national ca-
tastrophe insurance schemes direct-
ly include risk reduction incentives 
(Swenja Surminski and Oramas-Dor-
ta, 2014; von Ungern-Sternberg, 
2004). Nevertheless, progress is being 
made. Insurers are increasingly re-
warding customers who take steps to 
reduce their risk with lower premiums 
(or avoid the risk if  they do not). The 
regional natural catastrophe scheme, 
African Risk Capacity (ARC), man-
dates that clients, in this case African 
countries, undergo a period of  risk 
analysis and policy design with ARC 
staff  before they are allowed to buy 
a policy. Countries are also required 
to agree contingency plans to put in 
place in the case of  loss and agree 
a revised final implementation plan 
when a loss occurs.
Existing studies, such as Thieken et 
al. (2006) in Germany and Poussin 
et al. (2013, 2015) in France, rely on 
isolated surveys of  insured and un-
insured parties. Whilst they suggest 
that insured parties are slightly more 
likely to undertake risk reduction ef-
forts than uninsured ones, there are 
some methodological issues that limit 
comparability and scalability. Survey 
response methods often suffer from 
fundamental problems of  reliability 
and internal validity, and even when 
considered sufficiently robust, they 
offer no consistent and comparable 
method for assessing the cost-effec-
tiveness of  insurance mechanisms. 
Hudson et al (2014) found that those 
buying natural catastrophe insurance 
are particularly risk averse, which sug-
gests that the higher observed risk 
reduction of  the insured may be an 
effect of  selection.
Measuring if  and how insurance con-
tributes to direct risk reduction re-
mains challenging, as it requires an 
understanding of  disaster impacts 
and the scope of  risk prevention 
measures that are induced by insur-
ance, including measures influencing 
the policyholder’s behaviour, directly 
promoting actions by the policyhold-
er and directly or indirectly affecting 
actions by third parties (such as the 
government). Various metrics for as-
sessing the insurance impact on pro-
moting risk reduction/prevention 
have been proposed in the literature, 
including Chrichton (2008), Paudel 
et al. (2012), Surminski and Ora-
mas-Dorta (2013)and Surminski and 
Eldridge (2015). In the latter study, el-
ements of  this approach were applied 
to United Kingdom flood insurance 
schemes through a set of  qualitative 
assessments.
Recently, attention has been brought 
to harnessing insurance for better 
protection of  the environment as well 
as ecosystem services for the sake of 
DRR. Ecosystems may mitigate natu-
ral hazard risks by mediation of  flows 
and nuisances or through mainte-
nance of  physical, chemical and bio-
logical conditions in the face of  pres-
sures. Ecosystem services for DRR 
are most frequently associated with 
mass stabilisation, water flow regula-
tion (especially flood control), wind 
dissipation and (micro- and regional) 
temperature regulation. Other equally 
important hazard-mitigating services 
include control of  pests, disease and 
alien species, water filtration, and di-
lution and detoxification of  hazard-
ous substances. The combination of 
increasing intensity and frequency 
of  natural hazards, continuing con-
version, uniformisation and simplifi-
cation of  (semi-)natural ecosystems 
and the footprint of  built infrastruc-
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ture may be contributing to the rapid 
increase in costs and damage from 
natural hazards. The European Com-
mission research and innovation pol-
icy agenda on nature-based solutions 
(EC, 2015b) defined ‘insurance value 
of  ecosystems’ as a ‘sustained capac-
ity of  ecosystems to reduce risks to 
human society’ caused by natural haz-
ards, climate variability and climate 
change. The insurance value of  eco-
systems in this sense is equivalent to 
the net present value of  avoided dam-
age and losses obtained from the risk 
mitigation ESS. In other words, it is 
the monetary value that risk reduction 
by ecosystems would bring to risk 
transfer schemes such as insurance. 
One indicator could be a reduction in 
property insurance premiums in light 
of  reduced risk; another could be the 
willingness of  the private sector to 
underwrite a risk on the basis of  con-
fidence in ecosystem services.
Collective insurance schemes ap-
pear better equipped to deliver size-
able improvements of  ecosystem 
services and to get around concerns 
about free riding. An example of  a 
collective insurance reward under a 
state-subsidised insurance scheme is 
the Community Rating System (CRS) 
under the United States National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), 
where households receive a premium 
discount if  their community takes 
specified flood-mitigation measures; 
which can include nature-based solu-
tions. Pollution insurance provided to 
businesses is another example of  a 
positive relationship between taking 
out insurance and reducing harmful 
environmental damage (Surminski, 
2015). A 2003 OECD study found 
that, with pollution insurance, the in-
surer may act as a private surrogate 
regulator aligning its interests with 
those of  high environmental stand-
ards (OECD, 2003). More than that, 
properly priced insurance can help to 
internalise externalities (such as envi-
ronmental risks) and hence improve 
or even secure more sustainable func-
tioning of  markets. The internalisa-
tion of  environmental costs through 
the payment of  premiums is compat-
ible with the deterrence goal of  any 
liability regime and with ‘the polluter 
pays’ principle. Conversely, Minoli 
and Bell (2003) found in an evalua-
tion of  two leading United Kingdom 
insurance companies’ pollution claims 
that the insurers’ initial underwriting 
assessments and post-loss investiga-
tions were insufficiently developed. 
The management practices of  in-
sured parties in connection with the 
prevention of  pollution were also un-
derdeveloped. Consequently, insurers’ 
terms and conditions on policies were 
insufficient to work as an incentive to 
dissuade pollution losses.
The effectiveness of  environmental 
insurance has been most extensively 
researched in the United States. For 
example, there is evidence that de-
spite a range of  practical barriers, en-
vironmental insurance can be efficient 
where government fines are not (Yin 
et al., 2011). The concept of  liability 
for environmental damage, institut-
ed in Europe by Directive 2004/35/ 
CE (EC, 2004a), extended the law of 
tort to damage incurred to ecosys-
tems. The directive points to sureties 
or bank guarantees but leaves it to 
Member States to guarantee finan-
cial solvency for damage rectification 
and clean-up. In the wake of  this di-
rective, insurers have developed data 
sets to map ecosystems and their 
characteristics with a view to facili-
tating restoration in case of  acciden-
tal damage through an insured entity. 
This development points to a possible 
entry point for the more widespread 
incorporation of  ESS concepts in an 
insurance.
5.4.4
Public–private 
partnerships for risk 
financing and transfer 
A commercial insurance may not 
guarantee affordability and equitable 
access to insurance (EC, 2013b). Ad-
dressing affordability and equity issues 
in provision of  disaster risk insurance 
combines business objectives with 
public policy goals (Solana, 2015). 
Consistently, the role of  the public 
sector in this pursuit goes beyond the 
regulatory oversight to include an ac-
tive involvement in insurance provi-
sion. Because public intervention may 
interfere with market equilibriums 
and undermine rather than encourage 
individual risk reduction (Surminski, 
2009), reconciling the public and pri-
vate roles and objectives necessitates 
a thorough analysis and organisation 
(Pérez-Blanco and Gómez, 2014).
‘Public–private partnerships’ (PPPs) is 
a term coined to denote different ap-
proaches to public and private coop-
eration for providing public services 
or projects (Bielza et al., 2009; CEA, 
2011). PPP is a model for a joint bear-
ing of  responsibilities and efficient 
risk sharing intended to increase in-
surance coverage and penetration and 
guarantee a strong financial backing in 
view of  uncertain tail distributions of 
risk (Johansen, 2006). PPPs are typi-
cally characterised as a long-standing 
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relationship bringing forth mutually 
beneficial resource and risk-sharing 
arrangements (EC, 2004b).
Ideally, the PPPs should be designed 
so as to address market failures such 
as a lack of  or a limited access to af-
fordable insurance and low insurance 
penetration. In doing so they should 
limit, to the extent possible, market 
distortion and preserve competition. 
Private insurers (should) ‘have the 
opportunity to carry on using their 
savoir faire in an environment of  mu-
tual understanding’ (Johansen, 2006). 
The PPPs should be shaped through 
constructive dialogues and conscious 
of  mutual principles and limitations. 
The partnerships should actively pro-
mote or at least not harm the incen-
tive for risk reduction, for example by 
making the individual insurance costs 
reflecting those risks that result from 
each individual’s choices (Mysiak and 
Pérez-Blanco, 2016). They should be 
built on principles of  transparency, 
equal treatment and efficient use of 
public resources.
In Europe, the most longstanding 
insurance-related PPP is embodied 
within the extraordinary risks insur-
ance scheme of  Spain’s Insurance 
Compensation Consortium (Con-
sorcio de Compensación de Seguros 
- CCS). Instituted in 1954 after its 
provisional creation in 1941, the CCS 
is an independent public company 
attached to the Ministry of  Econom-
ics, Industry and Competitiveness but 
with separate accounts and a certain 
degree of  entrepreneurial freedom 
(CCS, 2016).
As a tool at the service of  the Spanish 
insurance sector, CCS performs many 
different functions, among others the 
lynchpin of  the Spanish Extraordi-
nary Risk System. The extraordinary 
hazards covered are well defined in 
the statutes and include floods (be-
fore 1986 conditional on declared ca-
tastrophe zone, Barredo et al., 2012); 
cyclones, tornadoes and wind storms 
(with gusts exceeding 120 km/h); 
earthquakes; tidal waves; volcanic 
eruptions; meteor strikes; and other 
hazards such as acts of  terrorism and 
civil unrest. Spain counts additionally 
with a comprehensive combined agri-
cultural insurance, managed by a pool 
of  private companies (Agroseguro) 
in which CCS participates both as a 
co-insurer and as a reinsurer. A bulk 
of  the estimated EUR 6.4 billion paid 
in compensations over the 1987-2014 
period referred to floods and wind-
storms (Espejo Gil, 2016).
Public–private 
partnerships (PPPs) are a 
model for a joint bearing 
of responsibilities and 
efficient risk sharing, 
capable of increasing 
insurance coverage 
and penetration and 
guaranteeing a strong 
financial backing in 
view of uncertain tail 
distributions of risk.
The scheme is financed by compulso-
ry surcharge on designated insurance 
policies. Insurance policies cover-
ing property damage (with some ex-
ceptions), business interruption and 
personal life and accident.The flat 
rate surcharge is based on the total 
insured value and varies only across 
the type of  underlying insurance pol-
icies. For example for dwellings and 
office building the surcharge amounts 
to 0.008 per thousand.The same rate 
applies without differentiation for 
any degree of  exposure and any risk 
across the entire country, as it is calcu-
lated considering all claims and risks 
covered as a whole. Deductibles are 
applied to commercial policyholders 
but not to households (ibid.). Risk un-
derwriting is the task of  private insur-
ers and the extraordinary risk cover 
is entirely transferred to CCS. In ex-
change, the insurers retain 5 % of  the 
collected surcharges to cover adminis-
trative costs. Claims are managed and 
indemnified by CCS. The fact that 
the scheme has very low administra-
tive costs (less than 10 % of  the col-
lected surcharges including the costs 
of  claim processing) is an argument 
in favour of  this arrangement (von 
Ungern-Sternberg, 2004). Half  of 
the CCS Board of  Administrators is 
composed of  chief  executive officers 
from Spanish insurance companies 
and the other half  of  senior officials 
of  the public sector. All decisions 
affecting CCS or the Extraordinary 
Risk Coverage System emanate from 
the board, setting another example of 
PPPs, which is also a flexible mecha-
nism to easily introduce modifications 
to the system.
France introduced the ‘Catastrophes 
naturelles’ (CatNat) insurance regime 
back in 1982 in the aftermath of  the 
devastating Saône, Rhone and south-
west France floods (CCS, 2008; Mag-
nan, 1995). It is based on a manda-
tory extension of  insurance policies 
against fire and damage to property 
(theft, water damage, etc.) and land 
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vehicles, to protect also against dam-
age caused by extreme natural hazard 
events deemed uninsurable. A defin-
ing characteristic of  the CatNat re-
gime is that the exceptional character 
of  the natural hazard events, serving 
as a trigger for damage compensation, 
has to be sanctioned by an interminis-
terial decree. What qualifies as natural 
disaster is not exactly specified by stat-
utes and is indeed sanctioned case by 
case. The CatNat system usually ap-
plies to floods, landslides, subsidence, 
droughts, avalanches, earthquakes 
and tidal waves. CatNat exemplifies 
a system in which policyholders can-
not exclude the natural hazard cover-
age, and the insurers have to supply 
it (Grislain-Letrémy et al., 2012). The 
additional premiums (or surcharges) 
are set by the government as uniform 
percentage rates of  the underlying 
property insurance premium without 
any regional differentiation, equal for 
all risks covered and any degree of 
risk exposure. The government also 
determines the level of  deductibles 
that are compulsory even if  the un-
derlying (base) policies do not envis-
age them. The deductibles serve as an 
incentive for risk prevention: the pol-
icyholders in districts without a risk 
prevention plan (Plans de Prévention 
des Risques - PPR) have to accept 
higher deductibles when exceptional 
events of  the same hazard types oc-
cur consecutively (von Ungern-Stern-
berg, 2004). In addition, a levy on the 
CatNat premiums flows into aFund 
for the Prevention of  Major Natural 
Hazards (Fonds de Prévention des 
Risques Naturels Majeurs - FPRNM), 
which finances prevention measures.
Private insurers underwrite the risk, 
collect premiums and process the 
claims. Except for the premium rates 
and deductibles, the natural disaster 
cover follows the terms and condi-
tions of  the underlying insurance 
policy. The insurers may choose to 
reinsure the underwritten risks by 
a Central Re-insurance Company 
(Caisse Centrale de Réassurance - 
CCR), initially a public entity of  com-
mercial nature and later turned into 
a state-owned limited company. The 
CCR offers two types of  comple-
mentary and inseparable reinsurance 
contracts: (i) quota-sharing contracts 
under which the CCR accepts a share 
of  the risk in exchange for a share of 
the collected premiums; and (ii) stop-
loss contracts under which the CCR 
compensates the loss that exceeds the 
insurer’s annual premium income by 
a certain factor (OECD, 2014). The 
CCR holds a dominant position in the 
reinsurance market in France (Gris-
lain-Letrémy et al., 2012). In 2015 the 
French Insurance Federation (Fédéra-
tion Française de l’Assurance - FFA), 
estimated that by 2040 the human 
induced climate change may increase 
the disaster losses by 90 % (EUR 
44 billion) compared to losses over 
the past 25-year-long period (FFA, 
2016a). To improve the sustainability 
and viability of  the CatNat regime, the 
FFA made several suggestions about 
how to make DRR an integral part of 
the regime. Among other things, the 
FFA recommended that the insurers 
should be able to define the level of 
deductibles for major policyholders 
(with insured value beyond EUR 50 
million) (FFA, 2016b).
The Flood Reinsurance Scheme (FR 
Scheme or Flood Re (n.d.)) in the 
United Kingdom is an example of 
a public–private reinsurance mech-
anism for flood components of 
housing policies. Private flood risk 
insurance in the United Kingdom 
has a long tradition and coverage of 
residential properties is among the 
highest in Europe (Maccaferri et al., 
2012). Housing insurance typically 
covers a portfolio of  risks in addi-
tion to floods and is compulsory for 
securing mortgage loans. Public–pri-
vate cooperation in the flood insur-
ance sector started in the 1960s and 
gradually evolved into a partnership 
entailing tangible commitments on 
both the public and private ends (Pen-
ning-Rowsell et al., 2014; Ball et al., 
2013; Lamond, Proverbs and Ham-
mond, 2009; Penning-Rowsell and 
Priest, 2015).
The FR Scheme had been designed 
as a publicly accountable but privately 
owned and managed, non-profit ser-
vice organisation. The ownership and 
management of  the scheme is entirely 
in the hands of  the insurance indus-
try, with a limited government mem-
bership role. The commercial insurers 
are free to choose whether to reinsure 
the written market risk or cede the 
flood-risk component of  housing pol-
icies to the scheme at predetermined, 
capped prices. In the latter case, any 
and all damage claims are paid by the 
scheme and the primary insurers con-
tinue acting as a broker. The capped 
premiums are specified by the regu-
lation (FR Regulation, 2016), annually 
updated by the consumer price index 
and revised every 5 years.
The FR Scheme is funded by an an-
nual statutory levy set at GBP 180 
million (EUR 213.5 million) for the 
first 5-year period, which is imposed 
on all home insurers operating in the 
United Kingdom. The total amount 
of  the primary levy was decided as an 
equivalent level of  current cross-sub-
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sidy, which amounts to an estimated 
GBP 10.5 (EUR 12.5) per household. 
The FR Scheme administrator can 
raise supplementary (top-up) levies or 
contributions in cases where it does 
not have sufficient resources to meet 
its non-reinsured claims.
Because the statutory and top-up 
levies constitute a state aid and the 
scheme entails a selective advan-
tage, the European Commission had 
been notified and reviewed the FR 
Schemes. In its review, the Commis-
sion recognised the goal of  ensuring 
affordable insurance against flood 
risk as a legitimate aim of  public 
policy (EC, 2015a). Furthermore, it 
recognised that the FR Scheme pro-
motes a free flood insurance mar-
ket and rectifies market failures that 
might or eventually would compel 
insurers to stop providing insurance 
cover in some areas or only at high 
prices that would not be affordable by 
all households. Neither of  these out-
comes was deemed acceptable. The 
Commission acknowledged that the 
FR Scheme was designed in such a 
way as to minimise the (competitive) 
advantage granted to the insurers, and 
that the threshold above which the 
insurers will be able to cede the pre-
miums to the Flood RE scheme will 
be attuned in a way that limits mar-
ket intervention to only around 2 % 
of  domestic insurance policies. Other 
design criteria have prompted a pos-
itive review of  the scheme. The fact 
that the capped premium is differen-
tiated by the Council tax band and is 
adjusted to inflation made the scheme 
proportional to its objectives. More 
importantly, the scheme is designed 
as a transitional measure to be phased 
out after 20-25 years. While the Gov-
ernment has publicly committed to 
continue flood risk defence efforts, 
Flood Re does not provide any incen-
tives for risk reduction and resilience, 
which has been highlighted as a prob-
lem for ensuring future affordability 
and availability of  flood insurance. 
(Surminski, 2017; Jenkins et. al. 2017).
5.4.5
Conclusions and 
key messages
Partnership 
A comprehensive strategy for disas-
ter financing can moderate the im-
pacts of  natural hazard risks, speed 
up recovery and reconstruction, and 
harness knowledge and incentives 
for risk reduction. Private financial 
sectors play an important role, along 
with governments and civil society 
organisations, in designing innovative 
financial protection goals and sharing 
knowledge and capacity. PPPs are a 
model for a joint bearing of  respon-
sibilities and efficient risk sharing, ca-
pable of  increasing insurance cover-
age and penetration and guaranteeing 
a strong financial backing in view of 
uncertain tail distributions of  risk.
Knowledge 
Climate change has amplified natural 
hazard risks, and raising vulnerability 
may make financial protection unaf-
fordable for some people and busi-
nesses as well as risks uninsurable in 
certain places. Insurance and other fi-
nancial instruments can contribute to 
reducing disaster risk, if  designed and 
implemented to this end. The rein-
surance industry has driven the devel-
opment of  catastrophe risk analytics 
over the last 30 years, moving from a 
position where hazards mechanisms, 
their impacts and comparative risks 
were little understood to one where 
sophisticated and integrated stochas-
tic catastrophe models have become 
the norm in the industry.
Innovation
Insurance can help dissuade policy-
holders from risky behaviour and 
incentivise risk reduction. Premiums 
and policy terms (e.g. deductibles) can 
be adjusted to reward good risks and 
penalise bad ones. Harnessing insur-
ance for DRR becomes particularly 
significant in the context of  increased 
frequency of  disaster events, larger 
economic exposure, rising vulnerabil-
ity and climate change. Comprehen-
sive strategies for risk financing help 
to shed light on impacts of  disaster 
risk on economy and society and facil-
itate identification of  actions to mini-
mise them. They allow decision-mak-
ers to integrate adaptation and risk 
reduction with economic develop-
ment and sustainable growth.
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National policies for disaster prevention and mitigation involve cooperation 
across sectors and scales. Partnership for mitigation and prevention is par-
ticularly important — there is a need for active engagement and commitment 
of  the private sector, communities and academia as well as a need to share 
responsibilities for development and implementation of  DRM strategies. Nev-
ertheless, the main responsibility will remain with national governments, as also 
reaffirmed in the SFDRR. Some further efforts will be required in order to en-
sure that DRM is considered a cross-sectoral topic, which requires engagement 
and commitment on behalf  of  multi-stakeholders. Understanding direct and 
indirect costs is crucial to selecting and investing in preventive measures as well 
as the stakeholders to be involved and their roles and responsibilities.
However, identifying suitable investments is not enough; presenting evidence 
of  additional dividends to policymakers and investors could provide a narrative 
reconciling short- and long-term objectives, thereby improving the accepta-
bility and feasibility of  DRM investments and enhancing the business case for 
investment in prevention and mitigation.
Integration of  mitigation and prevention policies and regulations is a key in-
novation in mitigation and prevention, but it is rare. Where zoning regulations, 
building codes and insurance policies are integrated, the mitigation strategy 
becomes more coherent and easier for stakeholders to implement.
Cooperation between regional, national and international communities is par-
ticularly important for preparedness and response planning given the trans-
boundary nature of  modern-day disasters. ELSI are not a separate dimension 
of  DRM that can be addressed in isolation. Good preparedness can protect 
societies from exceptions that go against ordinary morals, integrity and dignity, 
from unintended consequences and from entrusting decisions solely on ex-
perts or governments without public engagement.
A move away from command-and-control approaches to managing disasters 
has opened up more opportunities for citizens to participate in preparedness 
and response. Strong bonds and trust within and between communities favours 
a more effective response in emergencies and can be harnessed by authorities. 
Social media can also be used to enhance self-organised mobilisation and co-
ordination of  local resources, knowledge and efforts for disaster preparedness 
and response.
Close collaboration across sectors and with affected groups is beneficial for 
physical, economic and psychosocial recovery processes. Recovery is complex 
and people and systems may not return to their pre-disaster state, but strong 
Recommendations
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multisectoral pre-disaster plans and flexibility in responses can improve the 
speed and efficacy of  recovery, avoiding indirect and adverse impacts after the 
disaster.
Significant progress has been made in understanding the psychosocial impact 
of  disasters and on (re)construction techniques to improve the built environ-
ment after a disaster. Scientific gaps still remain in understanding economic re-
covery given the diverse scales at which impacts are felt and potential problems 
created by external intervention for local economies post-disaster.
Innovation in recovery promotion is particularly seen in reconstruction and 
more comprehensive approaches to rebuilding in urban areas.
A comprehensive strategy for disaster financing can moderate the impacts of 
natural hazard risks, speed up recovery and reconstruction and harness knowl-
edge and incentives for risk reduction.
Climate change has amplified risks and raising vulnerability may make financial 
protection unaffordable for some people and businesses as well as risks unin-
surable in certain places.
Insurance and other financial instruments can contribute to reducing disaster 
risk if  designed and implemented to this end.
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The work of  summarizing knowledge in disaster risk management is not only 
to communicate what we know. It is equally important to recognize what we 
don’t know. Knowledge gaps, once identified, can be addressed by future re-
search and development projects.
We’ve asked all lead authors and coordinating lead authors to critically look 
at their fields of  expertise and identify the future challenges. Some relate to 
forming the right partnerships. Other challenges are about creating new knowl-
edge - the classical research projects.  A third category of  challenges are about 
applying new knowledge, i.e. innovation. This bottom-up approach brought to 
light a wide spectrum of  future challenges and emerging issues.
This chapter provides a summary of  these key messages to various reader com-
munities on the key challenges: all DRM actors, scientific experts, policymakers 
and practitioners.
Introduction
520
ALL DRM ACTORS
Partnership
• The Sendai Framework signals a clear mandate to the science, technology, 
and innovation community to work together with governments in develop-
ing and sharing the knowledge and solutions needed to improve the resil-
ience of  communities. Stronger partnerships among disaster risk science, 
policy and practice are necessary. The benefits of  collaboration are recog-
nized throughout this book by all three communities.
• To tackle systemic challenges related to disaster risk reduction, a trans-
disciplinary and holistic approach in is necessary involving science, poli-
cy makers and practitioners. Resilience building needs to start at the level of 
individual households and communities. Partnerships are particularly 
useful for building awareness of  available knowledge in the communities 
and build trust to exchange experiences, skills and knowledge.
• Scientists, practitioners and policy makers must work together to create 
evidence-based narratives for reconciling short- and long-term objec-
tives of  risk management, such as economic and social benefits, in order 
to enhance the business case for investment in prevention and mitigation.
• There is a need for dedicated platforms at local, regional, national and 
international level for science-policy-practice interface adapted to the local 
context. These platforms need to link and cooperate. 
Knowledge
• Two key challenges in the scientific world are increased complexity and ac-
celeration. Ever more science is produced and is available at a mouse-click. 
Ever more actors from different disciplines and policy areas are involved. 
For practitioners, policy makers and even for scientists themselves, the 
challenge now is to find the relevant science, from multiple disciplines, 
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and make sense of  it, for multiple policies.
• A fundamental building block is understanding the risks being faced; as 
well as making sense of  the relevant science this also requires enhancing the 
use of  local knowledge.
• In such a complex policy area, knowledge management is essential. Rel-
evant science must be synthesized for different target audiences. Science 
must be made available in useful format.
• Knowledge is not only the realm of  scientists. Evidence in evidence-based 
policy making is much wider than scientific knowledge only. Experience 
of  practitioners must be collected and fed back to scientists (for analysis) 
and policy makers.
Innovation
• The main areas for innovation lay in risk governance, including better 
communication among the communities, engagement and clear roles for 
all actors, and accountability and transparency throughout the system. 
The interface between scientific knowledge and pragmatic decision 
making must continuously be improved, e.g. through secondments of  sci-
entists into government and vice versa.
• Practitioners can benefit from many unexploited research results. 
Hurdles for innovation must be tackled through training, exercises, demon-
strations, pilot projects, etc.
• Vast amounts of  data are being produced from many sources – e.g. earth 
observation is expected to bring 10TB of  free and open data per day. New 
approaches are needed for data handling and processing. Early warning sys-
tems (EWS) play an important role in saving life and property and should 
benefit from the data revolution combined with more robust modelling 
in order to help reduce the time required for the warning activation and 
improve the warning information.
522
SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS
Partnership
• Synthesis of  scientific knowledge across disciplinary boundaries requires 
the development of  networks where mutual learning can happen and trust 
can be built. It is important to be transparent on context, terminology, as-
sumptions and limitations.
• To tackle systemic challenges related to disaster risk reduction, a transdis-
ciplinary and holistic approach in science is necessary to integrate natu-
ral, social and health sciences with ICT, economics, engineering, legal and 
policy frameworks and operational practice. A shift from mono-disciplinary 
silos to transdisciplinary networks is required but challenged by differences 
in risk frames, objectives, terminology, methods and funding mechanism.
• Science needs to produce coherent advice, during emergencies and for long 
term risk management. Pre-established mechanisms to access scientif-
ic experts from all disciplines are necessary for effective risk governance. 
Scientist must be ready to engage with such mechanisms, and translate their 
expert knowledge for non-technical communities. For emergencies, im-
pact-based multi-hazard early warning systems must be developed to 
assess the likely impact of  any hazard on population, economy and society.
• Partnerships should be effective. Measuring the effectiveness of  part-
nerships is a scientific challenge in itself. Social network analysis and other 
techniques should continuously monitor the effectiveness of  partnerships, 
including their depth, reach and growth, connectivity to other networks, 
scientific innovation and impact on policy and practice.
Knowledge
• This report shows that a wealth of  knowledge exists, but each discipline still 
has its own scientific challenges. For instance, natural sciences seek to im-
prove modelling of  bio-physical processes of  the Earth and atmosphere to 
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anticipate extreme events for early warning and under climate change. Engi-
neers must keep improving standards, cost-benefit methods, green and gray 
prevention solutions, retrofitting and other engineering challenges. Social 
scientists should better understand decision making under uncertainty, im-
prove risk communication theory, harness social networks and include eth-
ical and legal issues. Measuring effective risk governance (including ethical 
and legal issues) is an outstanding challenge, as are assessing science-policy 
interfaces and metrics for the impact of  science on DRR. The information 
communication technology (ICT) community must harness rapidly devel-
oping technology, including big data, artificial intelligence, and augmented 
reality for better human-machine interaction. Economists see further chal-
lenges in disaster financing, including loss estimations, cost-benefit meth-
ods and understanding economic recovery, given the diverse scales at which 
impacts are felt and potential problems created by external intervention for 
local economies post-disaster. Health sciences should be more involved in 
the DRM community, advancing their understanding of  outbreaks and pan-
demics, health impacts of  all hazards, but also advances in data collection.
• Transdisciplinary research is in its infancy and should be encouraged. The 
most difficult challenges in disaster risk management cannot be solved by a 
single discipline. Specific challenges identified in this report include better 
handling of  uncertainty, a more coherent approach to data across disci-
plines (open data, big data, social data) balancing openness with privacy, de-
velopment of  science-based standards and guidelines, and development 
of  methodologies for all-risk mapping and management.
• There is a clear need for more systematic knowledge management. Ac-
cess to synthesised knowledge of  other disciplines is important for scien-
tists, practitioners and policy makers.
Innovation
• More innovation is needed in in-situ, sea-borne, air-borne and satellite sen-
sors to increase the completeness and timeliness of  earth observation. 
Scientists help develop better, cheaper and robust instrumentation, allow-
ing pervasive deployment also in poorly monitored areas, which should 
yield the necessary data to drive new scientific developments. Similarly, sci-
entists must develop and exploit social networks to gather fine-grained 
524
socio-economic data on vulnerability and resilience of  people, communi-
ties, economies and societies. More technological innovation is necessary 
to enable “total conversation” among citizens and authorities. 
• A comprehensive strategy for disaster financing can not only moderate 
the impacts of  natural hazard risks, it can speed up recovery and recon-
struction, and harness knowledge and incentives for risk reduction. More 
research is needed on how these incentives could work more effectively.
• To foster adoption by public authorities, technological innovations must be 
tested and demonstrated to end-users with clear criteria for evaluation. 
The policy-impact of  innovations need to measured and, if  relevant, mech-
anisms for institutionalizing innovations are necessary. It is challenging 
to make global solutions available at local level.
• Fostering innovation involves all actors, including funding agencies, re-
searchers, practitioners and policy makers.
POLICYMAKERS
Partnership
• Continuity of  partnerships is particularly challenging. As interlocutors 
both on policy maker side (rotation) and scientific side (projects end, new 
projects start over) change often, there is a continuous learning curve. Es-
tablishing well-funded, long term partnerships may be beneficial.
• A partnership should first agree on the principles of  risk governance. If 
risk tolerance and risk ownership are clear, science can contribute more easi-
ly with appropriate methods and appropriate thresholds for acceptable risks.
• There are two key challenges for the public sector: (1) obtaining timely ad-
vice during emergency management and (2) obtaining reliable advice for 
policy making. Both rely on well-defined and sustainable science-pol-
icy interfaces drawing from the best expertise available. Communication 
among the communities is particularly challenging, and should not be biased 
by skewed power relations. 
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• Participation of  policy makers in existing partnerships should be encour-
aged. These include knowledge centres, alliances of  research institutes, na-
tional DRR platforms, Community of  Users, etc.
Knowledge
• More knowledge is needed on integrated policy making in the area of 
disaster risk reduction.  A clear understanding of  related policies, but also 
of  legal, scientific and ethical aspects is required. Policy makers must both 
implement and shape regional and global frameworks (Sendai).
• The scientific community must summarize and translate science into pol-
icy language. The policy community must formulate long-term research chal-
lenges for the R&D community. This can help prioritize research funding.
Innovation
• New approaches to risk governance must be tested, including early 
warning and emergency management. The balance between national and 
European/regional systems must be optimized continuously, seeking to op-
timize cost-benefit, quality and effectiveness.
• A key challenge is to evaluate the (long-term) impact of  science-based pol-
icies. There is a need for quantifying the economic, social and humani-
tarian gains of  better incorporating science.
• New ways of  prioritizing research funding should be sought based on 
proven needs of  policy makers.
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PRACTITIONERS
Partnership
• A key challenge for disaster risk reduction is to apply global solutions to 
local problems. Partnerships between scientists and practitioners can en-
able transfer of  knowledge and practice necessary to implement available 
solutions. Scientists should be aware of  the wide variety of  social, legal, 
linguistic, physical and political contexts in which disaster risk management 
is practiced.
• Where possible, trans-border agreements should be put in place in ad-
vance, to foster joint exercise and prepare to face the real events. Such mech-
anisms can lead to harmonisation in preparedness and response planning.
• Preparedness planning should be comprehensive and involve multi-agency 
partnerships in order to make the transition from disaster management to 
risk management. The process should involve collective action by scien-
tists, government, essential services, businesses, the media, other public, pri-
vate and voluntary organisations and communities to help mitigate potential 
impacts. Effective communication of  risk, considering power relations 
among actors, is an important challenge for scientists.
• Existing Public Private Partnerships and Public Public Partnerships 
show clear benefits in terms of  efficient risk-sharing. Virtuous feedback 
loops lead to increased insurance coverage and penetration, investments in 
disaster risk reduction and innovative risk financing.
Knowledge
• Further research in crisis management is essential for practitioners. Devel-
oping new technology and infrastructure and improved models for sense-
making of  chaotic situations is necessary to allocate scarce resources more 
effectively during a crisis.
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• Development or implementation of  standards (e.g. on data formats or pro-
tocols, such as the CAP protocol, but also on hazard and risk assessment 
methods) can improve interoperability of  the crisis management actors. Sci-
entists, practitioners and policy makers must collaborate to develop practical 
standards.
• Understanding of  direct and indirect costs is crucial to selecting and in-
vesting in preventive measures, as well the stakeholders to be involved, their 
roles and responsibilities. The private financial sector plays an important 
role, along with governments and civil society organizations, in designing 
innovative financial protection goals and sharing knowledge and capacity.
• The opportunities and challenges that the crisis information systems and so-
cial media brings to development of  disaster risk management foster a pro-
cess that builds principles for action for communities of  practice, creating a 
‘space of  meaning’ with theories for action, social change and instruments 
for implementation.
Innovation
• Training, exercises and education are essential to transfer scientific 
knowledge to practitioners.
• The Internet of  Things is expected to provide citizens and emergency 
authorities with information and knowledge in real time. This will allow for 
new tools to be developed for a more resilient society. A balance needs to be 
struck between surveillance and privacy concerns.
• It is necessary to develop well-trained downstream components in early 
warning systems, incorporate volunteered geographical information.
• Rather than generating innovative approaches, embedding and diffusion 
of  innovations is the key area that both policy and practice must address. 
Strong bonds and trust within and between communities favours a more 
effective response in emergencies and can be harnessed by authorities. Social 
media can also be used to enhance self-organised mobilisation and coordi-
nation of  local resources, knowledge, and efforts for disaster preparedness 
and response.
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Conclusions for European research
The EU and in particular its successive Research Framework Programmes 
(FPs) have actively supported various scientific research projects that, step by 
step, have contributed to a better understanding of  risks in all their dimensions. 
Multinational and interdisciplinary research in the field of  natural and techno-
logical disasters has led to the development of  innovative tools and methodol-
ogies to forecast and monitor natural and human-induced hazards. In addition, 
research efforts in support of  risk and crisis management have largely contrib-
uted to the preparedness for, and the response to, major crises and therefore 
helped reduce the toll on human lives and economic assets.
Since the 7th Framework Programme and now Horizon 2020, the EU re-
search has become more multidisciplinary and has promoted a systemic-risk 
approach. The report highlights how research projects have been instrumental 
in delivering a deeper insight into the complex interactions between the hazard 
element and the natural and the built environment. New research avenues will 
further address the multi-risk impacts of  physical hazards (floods, droughts, 
forest fires, etc) and the cascading effects of  those hazards in order to integrate 
this information into the overall assessments. 
EU-funded demonstration projects and other instruments (e.g., Public-Pri-
vate Partnerships) are supporting the development and the awareness of  risk 
mitigation and adaptation approaches (e.g. ecosystem-based Disaster Risk Re-
duction), as well as demonstrating their added value in terms of  co-benefits 
for local economies, social cohesion and the broader environment. One of 
the priorities of  the EU Action Plan for Disaster Risk Reduction is to foster 
green growth through promoting risk-proofed investments and building the 
capacity of  local and national authorities and communities. Solution-driven 
research should help to explore how best to transform evolving challenges 
and problems into new opportunities and potential markets. Climate servic-
es, nature-based solutions for more resilient cities or territories and dynamic 
Earth observation are examples of  promising sectors. A strong evidence base 
on the damage caused by disasters, the benefits of  adaptation and mitigation 
measures, and the costs of  inaction constitute key information that supports 
the science-policy interface and provides planners, designers, engineers and 
decision makers with appropriate tools for risk management.
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Conclusions for UNISDR Science and 
Technology Roadmap
In response to a strong call in the Sendai Framework to "enhance the scientific 
and technical work on disaster risk reduction” (25(g)), the science and technol-
ogy community, as well as other stakeholders, came together at the UN Office 
for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) Science and Technology Conference 
held 27- 29 January 2016 in Geneva. The conference produced a “Science and 
Technology Roadmap to Support the Implementation of  the Sendai Frame-
work for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030”, which includes expected sci-
entific outcomes, actions, and deliverables under each of  the four priority of 
actions of  the Sendai Framework. 
This report is a contribution to the Science and Technology Roadmap, and spe-
cifically addresses, from a European perspective, topic 1.1 “Assess and update 
the current state of  data, scientific and local and indigenous knowledge and 
technical expertise availability on disaster risks reduction and fill the gaps with 
new knowledge.” 
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